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ABSTRACT 
 
While a comprehensive set of laws and ethical guidelines legally protects patients and 
promotes their access to good quality health care, inhumane and abusive medical practices 
have, nevertheless, been documented internationally. A large and varied body of work 
documents multiple aspects of medical culture. Many of the features described in this work 
have potential implications for the provision of inhumane care. That body of work discussing 
abusive practices and the violation of patients’ rights in health care settings, however, 
remains small. Even fewer authors attempt explicitly to link the features of medical culture 
with the quality of medical practice in these terms. Thus, research that attempts to provide 
explanations for inhumane and abusive practices is sparse. This thesis begins by reviewing a 
broad range of literature discussing the context of medical practice, and highlights the 
implications of these discussions for an explanation of inhumane care. It then presents a study 
of abusive practices in a particular medical setting, namely that of a South African emergency 
unit. Using an eclectic mix of methods including participant observation, interviews and 
audio recordings of interactions between doctors and between doctors and patients, this study 
attempts to provide insight into the ways in which the discursive context in this particular unit 
mirrors characteristics identified by past research as common throughout medical culture 
more generally. It further attempts to show how some of these characteristics, as animated in 
the local context of this particular unit, in turn allow for the routine occurrence of practices 
that in other contexts might be unthinkable. This thesis argues that two broad narratives, 
identified in previous research and brought to life by the individual doctors in this unit, 
namely that of science and that of masculinity, dominate the unit’s discursive context, 
rendering doctors all-powerful, superior and unquestionable; and offering the opportunity for 
aggressive domination. Within this context, doctors and patients are construed as binary 
opposites, establishing coherent groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and characterising doctors and 
patients as different from, and indeed in conflict with, one another. In combination with the 
construction of doctors as all-powerful within a situation in which failures are inevitable, as 
doctors attempt to cure a massive overload of patients with very limited resources at their 
disposal, doctors are susceptible to self-doubt and to feelings of failure and guilt. Invited to 
draw on a repertoire of defensive discursive strategies for warding off these feelings, made 
available within the broader medical culture, doctors frequently resort to blaming their 
patients, generating anger towards them and a paradoxical sense of their own victimisation. 
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The thesis shows how this process can lead, on occasion, to aggressive attempts by doctors to 
protect themselves from their patients and to re-establish their own threatened power.  
 
Within a context construed in these terms, and inhabited by actors with the above 
characteristics, a range of actions on the part of both doctors and patients, that might 
otherwise be deemed unacceptable, become permissible and even likely, leading, in some 
cases, to provision of inhumane care and the violation of patients’ dignity and rights. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Legislation and practice: Violations of patients’ rights in South African 
hospitals 
South Africa is often said to have some of the best legislation in the world, in that it is 
designed to protect its citizens, including patients, from ill-treatment of every kind. With 
respect to the legislation relevant to provision of humane health care, our legislation is 
comprehensive, protecting patients from violations of their dignity, freedom, physical and 
psychological integrity and from being subject to medical procedures to which they have not 
consented. For example, the South African Constitution enshrines the dignity of every human 
being, stating that, “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected” (South Africa, 1996). The National Health Act protects the right of patients to 
participate in any decisions that affect their personal health and treatment, and stipulates that 
for a doctor to perform any health service he must receive the patient’s informed consent 
(South Africa, 2003). While not legally binding, the Patients’ Rights Charter (South Africa, 
Department of Health, 2003) sets guidelines that health care professionals are expected to 
follow and reinforces these rights, stating that “everyone has the right to be given full and 
accurate information about the nature of one’s illnesses, diagnostic procedures, the proposed 
treatment and the costs involved, for one to make a decision that affects any one of these 
elements.” In addition, the National Health Act renders “All information concerning a (health 
service) user, including information relating to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a 
health establishment, confidential.” 
 
The South African Constitution (South Africa, 1996) and National Health Act (South Africa, 
2003) also states that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment, a right that is 
again reinforced in the Patients’ Rights Charter (South Africa, Department of Health, 2003), 
which adds that this treatment should be delivered in a “timely” fashion. The Constitution 
enshrines the right to freedom and security of the person, stating that all persons have the 
right “not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause,” “to be free from all 
forms of violence,” “not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhumane or degrading way,” 
and to bodily and psychological integrity. It further states that “No person may unfairly 
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discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone.” In addition, the Patients’ Rights Charter 
requires that health professionals display “a positive disposition” that “demonstrates courtesy, 
human dignity, patience, empathy and tolerance.” 
 
While this comprehensive set of laws and ethical guidelines legally protects patients from 
exposure to inhumane care and supposedly ensures their access to good quality services, the 
following excerpts from South African newspapers indicate a discrepancy between theory 
and practice. On May 28 2009 a South African newspaper quoted the Democratic Alliance as 
damning “The death of a 16-year-old boy from suspected meningitis at the Chris Hani 
Baragwanath Hospital (a leading academic hospital)…(as) ‘shocking’ and ‘inexcusable,’” 
reporting that the boy had been “misdiagnosed four times and left…untreated for three days,” 
eventually dying after a doctor at the hospital “allegedly told (the boy’s) mother that (he) was 
on drugs.” (“DA: Boy's death 'inexcusable'”, 2009, May 28). Reporting on the death of one of 
six babies from klebsiella at Prince Mshiyeni Hospital in Durban, the same newspaper alleges 
the mother was “never told what klebsiella was, or when or how her child had contracted it.” 
Instead, the nurses had “taunted” her, “saying mothers like her -- who gave birth at home -- 
brought the disease to the hospital. ‘They made it seem as if it was my fault that my baby had 
klebsiella. She was born at six months; she came before time and I had her at home before 
going to hospital,’” the baby’s mother said.” (“Sixth baby dies from Klebsiella”, 2007, 
December 6) Another article details the treatment of “A 66-year-old diabetic woman with 
multiple fractures [who] spent seven hours waiting for care at Helen Joseph Hospital in 
Johannesburg, while security guards threatened to use force to stop her relatives from caring 
for her. Despite her fractured foot and injured back and ribs, Anna Myers was asked to stand 
so that her chair could be used by other patients.” According to the woman’s son, "I was 
worried about my mom. She is sixty-six years old, she was in shock, her blood pressure was 
high, she is diabetic and she hadn't eaten anything. I asked the guards if I could please just get 
her some water before I left. They refused and demanded I leave or they would use force." 
The article documents the patient’s progress through the hospital until, after seven hours of 
waiting without food or drink, she was admitted, only to be told there was no bed, and 
subsequently sent home without having received treatment. The newspaper further reports 
that negligence and malpractice has cost the Department of Health millions in damages 
awards.  
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Violations in medical practice: the research 
Not only do such reports appear in the newspapers and in popular discourse from time to time 
but a relatively small body of research literature documents the violation of patients’ rights by 
health care professionals. Within this small body of work, the majority deals with abuse of 
patients suffering from mental disturbances in psychiatric hospitals (see, for example, Saks, 
2002, and Eriksson & Saveman, 2002). The subject of violation of patients by health 
professionals is therefore less well documented than it might be, given the serious nature of 
the events, their potentially serious consequences and the fact that the vast majority of people 
will find themselves dependent on medical care at some point in their lives. As Clarence and 
Sundram (1993) point out, this dearth of reliable research and data documenting such events 
may well be entwined with the same set of conditions that contribute to their occurrence, 
namely the climate within the relevant institutions, as well as those characteristics of the 
administrative and disciplinary structures of state institutions that preclude the reporting of 
abuse. The popular assumption that doctors' intentions are benign and that their motives are 
inevitably their patients' best interests further protects their conduct, to a large extent, from 
this kind of scrutiny (Katz, 1984). 
 
Zaner (2000) argues, however, that the asymmetrical nature of the relationships between 
doctors and patients bears the possibility for doctors to take advantage of their patients’ 
multiple vulnerable positions. As Lewinsohn (1998) points out, combined with the 
insensitivity characteristic of medical practice, this power imbalance creates conditions under 
which abuses could easily flourish. Indeed, on a continuum from relatively minor 
infringements to overt abuse, a number of authors have discussed actions on the part of 
hospital staff that violate patients' rights (Barber, 2007). Saks (2002), for example, describes 
such practices as the “spreadeagl(ing)” of a psychotic patient, Julia, to her hospital bed with 
thick leather straps that bruised her ankles and wrists, for having broken a plastic spoon 
during lunch. Such violations of patients by doctors and other hospital staff are reported 
around the world. Mizrahi (1986) reports the doctors’ disparaging treatment and avoidance of 
patients, sometimes leading to their death, in a hospital in the United States.  Zaman (2004) 
describes the routine humiliation of patients by hospital staff in Bangladesh. Andersen (2004) 
reports on differential treatment of patients based on staff prejudice in Ghana. And Malterud 
and Thesen (2008) discuss abusive practices in Norwegian health care settings. Such events 
thus occur globally and, according to Andersen (2004), are common throughout Africa.  
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D’Oliveira, Diniz and Schraiber (2002), in a review of studies documenting the perpetration 
of violence by health care professionals against patients between 1992 and 2002, argue that 
abuse occurs routinely in health care practice: “…Abuse and negligence seem intentional and 
commonplace events, an integral part of service routine, and not accidental episodes or 
perpetrated by a few bad staff” (p. 1682). These authors have further linked acts of abuse to 
negative health outcomes, arguing that violence, including neglect, verbal and physical abuse 
of patients by health care workers, is associated with reduced health-service access, quality 
and effectiveness. For descriptions of the alarmingly high incidence of cases in which 
patients suffer avoidable harm at their doctors’ hands, see, for example, the 1991 US Harvard 
Medical Practice study conducted by Brennan, et al., and the Quality in Australian Healthcare 
Study, conducted by Wilson et al. in 1995. In addition to these large-scale studies, a paper 
authored by Iedema, Flabouris, Grant and Jorm (2006), “Narrativising errors of care,” reports 
a wave of more recent studies of particular instances of medical failure, reporting figures as 
high as 8,3% of hospital admissions that result in avoidable adverse events. 
 
What is going on? 
The massive discrepancy between standards of practice, as set out in legislation and other 
documents detailing the requirements of ethical practice, as well as the commonsense 
assumption that sick people should and do receive compassionate care, and the acts of abuse 
described in the newspaper articles and research above, beg the question, ‘What is going on?”  
 
Reasons provided for the violations described by these authors are manifold and diverse. 
Professional norms of non-interference and the absence of effective professional regulation 
are frequently cited as major contributers (Mizrahi, 1986; Freidson, 1970a; 1970b; Millman, 
1977), as are the routine medical proceedings, such as case conferences and ward round 
discussions, that help to sanction and neutralise errors that might otherwise be deemed the 
results of unacceptably bad practice (Fox, 1989; Atkinson, 1995). Some authors put forward 
the working conditions of hospital staff, in particular those in emergency units, where 
frequently inexperienced doctors work at the interface between the hospital and the 
community and are unprotected from the undifferentiated mass of mostly critically ill or 
injured patients flooding into the hospital (Jeffery, 1979). Others point to the practical 
constraints affecting delivery of care, for example the limited time available for each patient, 
impeding any intentions to provide patients with relevant information, to allow voice to their 
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concerns, and so on (West, 1984). And still others cite the myriad of justifications that health 
professionals use to deny or neutralise their involvement in events that might otherwise be 
construed as bad practice (Mizrahi, 1986; Dreyer & Geist, 1993). According to Scheeres, 
Slade, Manidis, McGregor and Matthiessen (2008) and Slade et al. (2008), ineffective 
communication has been cited as the most frequent cause of what they refer to as ‘critical 
(adverse) incidents’ in Australian healthcare.  
 
While these and other authors have made some attempt to identify the reasons and conditions 
that lead to the perpetration of inhumane or abusive acts by health care professionals against 
their patients, there is very little research the specific focus of which is to provide such an 
explanation. (See Jewkes, Abrahams and Mvo, 1998, for one of the most substantial attempts 
to explain nurses’ abuse of patients in a South African maternity ward.) Rather, the majority 
of these authors make passing reference to possible explanations, leaving large expanses of 
the terrain uncharted. Of course some of the reasons, particularly in an overstretched health 
system like that of South Africa’s public sector, require little research to uncover. The recent 
illegal strike by doctors in South Africa speaks volumes about the extent of their 
dissatisfaction with working conditions, which have been described as “awful” by 
Zwelinzima Vavi, secretary general of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (“Vavi: 
Doctors’ salaries awful”, 2009, May 29). It is no great leap of logic to imagine that 
dissatisfied doctors who are poorly remunerated (earning between R9 791 and R19 048 a 
month, depending on qualifications) (Vavi: Doctors’ salaries awful”, 2009, May 29) for 
working shifts of up to thirty two hours in hospitals literally bursting at the seams, under the 
strain of too many patients, too few staff and insufficient equipment, are more likely to 
behave abusively toward their patients than are those who feel well rewarded for their work 
and get a good night’s sleep every twenty four hours. Excerpts from a further newspaper 
article illustrate the conditions with which doctors working in the public sector in South 
African hospitals are faced: 
 
“It's Monday and…three doctors are meeting the Mail & Guardian. ‘Why do we always have 
to fight and get the press involved for something to happen?’ asks Van der Westhuizen. The 
‘something’ of which he speaks is a stable process for the procurement of basic equipment 
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needed in the hospitals. ‘We've run out of Panado1 and antibiotics,’ he says. ‘This means we 
have the option of giving patients morphine -- or nothing’.  
 
After the meeting we are taken on a tour through Rahima Moosa and Helen Joseph….First is 
the labour ward of Rahima Moosa. Eight women, all of whom are already in labour, sit in 
plastic chairs in the corner of a room, waiting for beds to become available. Our ‘tour guide’ 
points out a scale next to a bed. ‘For two years we didn't have scales to weigh the babies,’ he 
says.  
 
He shows us the resuscitation machine, which backs up what Zietsman told us earlier. ‘We 
have 12 000 to 15 000 deliveries every year,’ Zietsman said. ‘And we have resuscitation 
equipment for only one baby. It's first come, first serve’.  
 
… There is only one blood-gas machine in the entire hospital, says the doctor. . Van der 
Westhuizen had told us about this machine. It works using cartridges of chemicals. ‘The 
company that supplies the cartridges won't give us any more because they haven't been paid 
in months,’ he said. ‘The hospital owes R180 000 to the company’.  
 
In a consultation room a couple and their blanketed child sit in front of a mark on a wooden 
screen. The doctor points this out as the place where a blood-pressure machine used to be 
installed before it was moved closer to a power outlet. ‘We ask for the equipment for so 
long,’ says the doctor, ‘so they put it up where it's not supposed to be, in this case without 
access to a power point. Then no one can use it and we have to wait weeks till they come 
back to install it properly’  
 
Down the road -- at Helen Joseph -- the equipment situation is not much better. Until this 
month there was just one blood-pressure machine in the triage ward, an admission ward 
where doctors determine how urgently a patient needs to be seen… The department sees 100 
patients a night and each patient's blood pressure needs to be taken. …In the doctors' quarters 
the lock on the door has been broken for months and patients often come in and steal the 
doctors' possessions. …The stairs…are strewn with dirty tissues and visibly dusty…We go 
up to the TB ward, which is the only ward in the entire hospital that has TB masks -- even 
                                                 
1
 Brand name for paracetamol. 
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though the tour-guide doctor says ‘most patients visiting our hospital are TB carriers and can 
infect other patients and also health workers… 
 
As we prepare to leave Helen Joseph, we take one last look at a men's toilet. A rather 
unhappy cleaner sees us go in and asks: ‘Are you here to fix the toilets?’” (Rawoot, I., 2009, 
June 20).  
 
The conditions described in this article, familiar to every doctor working within the public 
sector health care facilities across South Africa, make stress, frustration and anger 
understandable and produce inevitable responses on the part of doctors trying to function 
within them. However, while there can be little doubt that they play their part, I argue that 
these conditions cannot be invoked as the whole answer. Not all health care professionals 
abuse their patients or deliver healthcare in an inhumane fashion, despite overwhelmingly 
bad conditions. Thus questions seeking insight into why some doctors, and not others, 
operating in similarly stressful circumstances, respond in ways that are neglectful or more 
actively abusive of their patients remain unanswered. I argue that the answers to these 
questions hold the potential for contributing toward improving practice despite the hard 
realities of resource shortages and patient overload within the hospitals.  
 
The contribution of this thesis 
While the factors that produce and maintain the deplorable conditions of South Africa’s 
hospitals are in dire need of attention, the relevant issues lie predominantly beyond the scope 
of psychological research and within the domain of such fields as economics, politics and 
policy formulation. My interest in this thesis is in exploring those features of the context 
within which health care is delivered that involve the more subtle factors that influence the 
manner in which health care professionals, and doctors in particular, work and respond to the 
constraints of the circumstances with which they are faced.   
 
I set out in this thesis to explore these issues first by reviewing the existing literature on 
abusive and inhumane practice in medical care. The literature that specifically addresses 
abusive medical practice is small and under-developed in terms of the range of insights it has 
provided into the reasons for its occurrence. I will therefore review a relatively broad range of 
material that, while not necessarily explicitly intended to throw light on this topic, has 
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relevance for understanding how inhumane medical practices are made possible and even 
likely. The second chapter will therefore address discussions of medical culture, with 
particular reference to its core characteristics and to how these might enable inhumane 
practice. In the third chapter I will focus specifically on the identities produced and made 
available to doctors and patients within the context of medical culture, and on the 
implications of these for the relationships that develop between them and for the quality of 
care that doctors are likely to provide. In the fourth chapter I will review discussions of the 
workings of power within medical settings, exploring its interaction with medical culture and 
its ability to further entrench pathways to the delivery of inhumane care and the violation of 
patients’ rights. And in the fifth I will review discussions of the operation of all these factors 
within specific local contexts, including the South African one, and as animated by particular 
individuals. 
 
I will then go on to describe and report on the present study, which seeks to offer insight into 
the inhumane practices characteristic of the routine functioning of the emergency unit in a 
South African state hospital. In this regard I will attempt to show how the discursive context 
in which doctors’ and patients’ interactions take place allows for the ordinary occurrence of 
practices that in other contexts might be unthinkable. After outlining the methodological 
approach in chapter six, in order to contextualise my findings within the story of the research 
process through which they emerged, I will discuss in chapter seven the narratives in terms of 
which doctors structure and make sense of their worlds and experiences and establish their 
powerful position within these. In chapter eight, using their narrative landscapes as a 
framework for understanding the ways in which they discursively construct themselves, their 
patients and the events in which they are engaged, I will explore the identities available to 
doctors and patients within the emergency unit and the implications that these have for 
directing doctors’ actions. Chapter nine highlights a theme that is latently present in the two 
preceding chapters, namely that of the relationship between doctors’ attributions of agency 
and responsibility in the unit and a self-doubt that seems ever-present beneath the surface 
structures of their stories, and to which they respond with defensive reactions that further 
perpetuate a cycle of power and doubt, with negative consequences for the delivery of good 
quality care. Finally, in chapter ten, I will attempt to draw some conclusions as to the 
implications of this discussion for research and practice in medical settings and, even more 
importantly, for the possibility of producing change. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF MEDICAL PRACTICE  
 
Explanations of violations of ethical practice and patients’ rights in medical care are widely 
dispersed across a range of perspectives in the literature that pertains to this topic, with only a 
handful of authors taking any given approach to the subject, and the majority working 
independently of one another within very different modes, and across a time span that 
extends from the 1970s to the present. Within this diverse array of work, only a few authors 
focus directly on explaining the occurrence of abuse and inhumane care. Many authors 
address aspects of medical culture and practice that can be argued to be highly relevant to 
such an explanation, but do so with other goals in mind, making no explicit link between their 
topics of discussion and the potential for inhumane action. And others refer only briefly to 
these possible associations, while maintaining a principal focus on other lines of thought.  
 
In this review, I will approach the diverse work pertinent to my focus on inhumane and 
abusive practice, organising the material in terms of four broad and interrelated concepts, 
namely medical culture, the construction of identity in medical settings, power in medicine 
and the context-specific and individually-enacted animation of all of these themes. My aim in 
this review is to weave together the various threads that appear in the literature in such a way 
as to highlight their relevance for an understanding of how it comes about, all too often, that 
doctors act inhumanely and that patients’ rights are violated in health care settings.  
 
In this chapter I will explore the core components of medical culture as they appear in the 
literature, arguing that some of these contribute toward a climate within which the inhumane 
treatment of patients becomes thinkable and justifiable. Providing the framework within 
which the material covered in subsequent chapters is embedded, this chapter represents the 
weightiest of the four chapters that comprise this review. In chapter three I will focus this 
discussion to explore the treatment in the literature of the identities produced within this 
cultural context and will attempt to establish links between aspects of the identities available 
to doctors and patients, as described in the literature, and the possibilities for inhumane or 
abusive practice.  In chapter four I will briefly discuss the power held by medicine as an 
institution. I will then explore those themes in the literature that illustrate the interrelationship 
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between relevant aspects of medicine’s professional status and of medical culture and its 
associated identities with the power imbalances that exist between individual doctors and 
patients in medical settings. I will argue in this chapter that these highly interwoven features 
of the medical world further enable inhumane practice and the violation of patients’ rights. 
Finally, in chapter five, I will discuss arguments for the context-specific and individually-
driven manifestation of the various themes discussed in previous chapters within concrete 
settings and actual encounters between particular doctors and patients. Amongst these 
contexts, and most relevant to this research, is the South African setting. This chapter will 
therefore also briefly review the South African literature pertinent to these themes, in order to 
provide some insight into the context within which this research was undertaken.  
 
Medical Culture  
A significant body of work explores the culture that has developed within the medical 
professional body, showing many of its features to be universal to most, if not all, medical 
settings. Studies of medical culture are highly relevant to my aim in this thesis to explore the 
emergence of inhumane practices amongst medical professionals, offering insights from a 
position outside of the biomedical model and critiques of the assumptions that underpin the 
dominant forms of practice (Mishler, Amarasingham, Hauser, Osherson, Waxler and Liem, 
1981). These critiques hold the potential to make recommendations not merely about how to 
increase the number of doctors in underserved areas, or to enhance the efficiency of existing 
systems, for example, but to facilitate more fundamental change that promises to affect “how 
biomedicine serves humanity” (DelVecchio-Good, 1995: p. 471, my emphasis). 
 
A major arena in which medical culture has been addressed is that of medical education. 
Introduced by Fox’s influential 1957 work, “Training for uncertainty,” the body of work 
exploring socialisation within medical education foregrounds the existence of a medical 
culture into which students are socialised and that informs their subsequent practice. Authors 
who address this process emphasize the ‘hidden curriculum’ that dominates medical 
education, transmitting not only knowledge and skills but also values, beliefs and attitudes 
(Fox, 1989; Mishler et al, 1981; Mizrahi, 1986; Sinclair, 1997).  While this body of work 
does address those aspects of medical education not explicit in the curriculum, but rather 
implicit in the subtexts through which senior doctors communicate to their students what is 
important and what is not, what is valuable and what is not, what attitudes and values are 
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appropriate for members of the profession and so on, the majority of this work remains 
uncritical of the core constructs on which the medical model is built, and thus offers criticism 
that falls within the medical paradigm, attempting to fine-tune the ways in which it operates 
and is transmitted to its student members, rather than to uncover and evaluate the dominant 
assumptions that underpin the biomedical model, to which Mishler et al. (1981) refer above.  
 
A few authors working in this area do, however, adopt a more fundamentally critical stance, 
and it is their work with which I shall be primarily concerned in this review. I will not, 
however, give separate attention to studies that focus specifically on medical education as 
opposed to practice, as my focus is on the features of medical culture that have relevance for 
explaining inhumane practice, whether these are communicated within institutions of training 
or of practice. I will therefore discuss that material emerging from this body of work that is 
relevant to an explanation of inhumane practice according to themes that appear in the 
literature more generally. The unique contribution made by this body of work is the important 
recognition that medical education includes processes of socialisation and that the 
socialisation processes that medical students undergo affect their subsequent mode of 
practice. For example, authors including Mumford (1970), Mizrahi (1984; 1986), Fox (1989), 
Lupton (2003) and Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993; 2000) have explored the processes 
through which medical training impacts on the ways in which doctors perceive and relate to 
their patients, arguing that the structure of medical knowledge as taught in medical training 
encourages doctors to view their patients as diseases, and that the ‘training in silence’ that 
students receive contributes to doctors’ later propensity to withhold from their patients 
information about diagnoses, treatments and other important decisions (Fox, 1989). I will 
review the work of these and other authors working within the area of medical socialisation at 
various points throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
 
Probably the most used means for gaining insight into the socio-cultural dimensions of 
medicine is exploration of the language employed in medical settings. Since the focus of this 
review is on content rather than method, I will not detail the diverse methodological 
approaches taken by the various authors to the exploration of language. Suffice to say that 
those authors employing language to gain insight into medical practice do so with a very 
diverse array of aims and making use of a wide range of methodological approaches. Broadly 
speaking, however, this body of work can, from a methodological point of view, be divided 
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into two distinct categories. On the one hand are those authors who focus exclusively on the 
unit of talk being analysed, for example a particular conversation between doctor and patient 
(see for example ten Have, 1991; Heath, 1992; Sarangi & Roberts, 1999; Gill, Halkowski & 
Roberts, 2001; Stivers, 2006; Boyd and Heritage, 2006; Perakyla, 2006). This very 
substantial body of work, representing that which can strictly speaking be categorized as 
conversation analysis, was possibly the dominant approach to the investigation of language in 
medical settings in the 1980s, gathering momentum through the 1990s and continuing to the 
present, although with diminishing force. There are two major contributions that this 
literature has made with respect to the aims of this thesis. First, through its ability to 
empirically reveal the construction of medical knowledge between people, it has challenged 
the status of medical knowledge as objective and therefore unquestionable. And second, this 
body of work has abundantly illustrated the means through which medical domination is 
exercised within the micro-details of talk, thus articulating the linguistic mechanisms through 
which unequal power between doctors and patients is produced and maintained.  
 
However, neglect of the broader contexts within which particular conversations are located 
represents a serious limitation of the extent to which this work has been able to  offer insight 
into the meanings of talk for the participants involved, as well as the influences on and effects 
of these beyond the immediate conversational sequence. This limitation gave rise to a 
similarly linguistically-oriented body of work, but one that displays a more holistic approach 
to the analysis of talk, including aspects of its broader context, for example the events of the 
morning on which the relevant conversation occurred (Wodak, 2006a) or the broader social 
relationships and institutional contexts within which the conversation took place, in their 
interpretations. On a smaller scale, this work arose around the same time that conversation 
analytic approaches to the study of medical culture were flourishing and many of those 
leading the trend toward greater contextual awareness in the interpretation of language 
initially worked within this mode. Driven by a few authors whose works remain classics in 
the field to the present day, this movement began in the 1980s with the work of authors 
including Sue Fisher (1980; 1984; 1986), Elliot Mishler (Mishler et al., 1981; Mishler, 1984) 
and Candace West (1984; 1990). While strict conversation analysis has been heavily 
criticised for the reasons outlined above, this body of work has gathered an ever increasing 
number of adherents and at this point in time represents the more dominant of the two 
approaches, including a range of authors who tackle the investigation of medical settings 
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through a variety of approaches to language, including conversation analysis (see Maynard, 
2003 for a detailed explanation of his incorporation of ethnography into the conversation 
analytic approach), discourse analysis (for example, Wodak 1996, 2006a; 2006b)  and 
narrative analysis (DelVecchio-Good & Good, 2000). While these latter authors tend to be 
critical of the work of the former group, they have successfully employed many of the same 
and related methods for analysing language and interaction in the production of more 
contextually sensitive interpretations. While I will address some of the work of the former 
group in this review (mainly in the following chapter), to the extent that it offers important 
insights into the possibility for inhumane practice, it is the work of this latter cluster of 
authors, who adopt a contextually-driven approach to the analysis of language, with which I 
will be primarily concerned, as their work has greater relevance for the aim of this thesis to 
produce explanations for abusive practices rooted within the contexts in which they occur.  
 
Overall, the most important contribution of this diverse array of linguistically-oriented work 
in terms of the aims of this thesis, is its treatment of medical talk as, not so much the 
elicitation and conveyance of independently existing information, but rather as social action 
that constructs, rather than reflects, biomedical material. This body of work thus highlights 
the social activities through which medical talk is produced by meaning-making beings 
(Donnelly, 1997; Lupton, 2003; Van der Geest, 2005), constituting medicine as a 
symbolically mediated activity, and its products, including case reports, clinical findings and 
treatment procedures (Good, 1994; Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993, 2000), as constructions 
manufactured between all participants in the medical encounter (Dreyer & Geist, 1993), as 
together they respond to questions concerning what is taking place in any given situation 
(Rittenberg, 1985). Through its ability to supply empirical evidence of the construction of 
meaning between people in conversation, this body of work has thus highlighted the 
importance of the social context and of the relationship between doctors and patients for the 
form assumed by medical knowledge and practice. While, as stated above, this review covers 
a wide range of material from a diverse set of perspectives, this linguistically-oriented work 
represents the core of its focus. Those perspectives that do not offer critical insight into the 
ways in which broad medical and local hospital cultures enable abusive practices and the 
provision of inhumane care, including those that tackle doctor-patient relationships through 
the lens of patient-centred practice or shared decision-making - for example, those that 
address management issues in the delivery of quality medical care and those that focus on 
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biomedical ethics - are therefore not represented in this review. While these bodies of work 
no doubt have implications for humane care and the protection of patients’ rights, the insights 
that they provide are not relevant to providing the social critique that is the intention of this 
study. 
The relationship between medicine and broader society 
Related to the above discussion of the importance of context is the issue of the relationship 
that exists between medicine and the broader society. A number of authors have remarked on 
the invisibility of medical culture and of the reciprocal influence of medical practice and the 
broader social environment on one another. Again, probably most influential in this area are 
the works of Elliot Mishler, Sue Fisher and Howard Waitzkin. (While Waitzkin’s work is 
important for the field in general, its focus is divergent from that of this thesis, as his interest 
is not so much in inhumane or abusive acts by medical professionals as it is in the manner in 
which their attempts to relieve their patients’ suffering simultaneously reinforce power 
relations between socially distinct groups, most notably in terms of gender and class. 
Waitzkin’s work thus features only in a limited way in this review.) This theme, too, emerged 
in the early 1980s, although it was preempted by the work of Eliot Freidson in the 1970s, 
which continues to exert its influence on the shape of the field. In sum, these authors argue 
that biomedicine represents the lens through which the world is seen, obscuring the 
possibility that the biomedical perspective itself might be an object of study, and thus 
reinforcing the appearance of its neutrality. The major contribution of this discussion, as it 
weaves its way through the literature from 1980 to the present, to the aims of this thesis is 
that this characterisation of biomedicine as objective is responsible for the predominance of a 
tunnel vision that fails to account for the socio-political and ideological context within which 
medicine is produced and practiced. This tunnel vision perpetuates what Fisher (1995: p. 23) 
calls the “moral and political regressiveness that all too often accompanies it,” and 
contributes to the possibility for acceptance of potentially hurtful and demeaning practices as 
stemming from the neutral application of objective knowledge, that is hence devoid of moral 
content and beyond criticism. 
 
From this perspective, really understanding biomedicine and its practice involves looking 
beyond its parameters and asking how it responds and contributes to broader socio-economic 
forces (Mishler et al.,1981), thus uncovering the interests that shape medicine, both in terms 
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of its conceptualisation and its daily practice. Sue Fisher was amongst the first and most 
prominent authors to really flesh out a theoretical perspective for articulating the relationship 
between medicine and society and her work in this regard remains influential. Drawing on a 
perspective akin to that of Howard Waitzkin (see for example 1989; 1991), Fisher (1986) 
characterises the instances of medical practice as micro-level processes occurring within a 
context shaped by macro-level social structures, influencing one another in reciprocal 
fashion. In her own words,  
 
“The web stretches from the spoken interactions of participants situated within specific 
medical events to the more general organisational and structural arrangements of society. It 
spreads from those structural arrangements out to the world view of the dominant culture, and 
then it folds back, spiraling in upon itself, returning to the core of spoken interactions” (p. 
18). 
 
Fisher’s contextual web metaphor, therefore, foregrounds the reciprocal and embedded nature 
of the relationship between medicine and its context, producing an understanding in terms of 
which medical culture can be seen to be “simultaneously created by its inhabitants and by the 
conditions in which they must exist” (Van der Geest & Finkler, 2004: p. 1999).  Rather than a 
body of objective knowledge and neutral practices,  medicine is thus conceptualised as a 
window into the culture in which it is located, rendering its most deeply held beliefs and 
values visible, as they are laid bare through participants’ responses to misfortune (Finkler, 
2004; Zaman, 2004). Far from being an island separate from the rest of society, Van der 
Geest & Finkler argue that medicine should be viewed as the “‘capital’ of the ‘mainland’” 
(2004: p. 1998), replicating and continuing the features of the broader society, including its 
less than desirable ones. In the words of Lewinsohn (1998: p. 17), medicine, “like a vital 
organ in a sick body…suffers from all the ills of society at large: its degradation, its lack of 
an ethic, its fragmentation, its physical and spiritual pollution.”  
 
As Fisher and Groce (1985) point out, understanding the cultural assumptions embedded 
within medical perspectives and practices facilitates insight into the influence of these on the 
delivery of health care. Different authors have focused on a variety of aspects of this 
relationship between medicine and the rest of society. Sue Fisher (1986) discusses the role of 
individualism in medical culture, arguing that, when combined with the ever-growing 
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medicalisation of social life, it lays the responsibility for illness and health care on the 
individual sufferer, obscuring the need for social responsibility in medical practice. Kaja 
Finkler,  from an anthropological perspective, explores the relationship between the practice 
of biomedicine and the broad cultural milieus in which it is practiced (see, for example, her 
1991 publication, in which she investigates the reciprocal influence of Mexican culture on 
biomedicine as practiced in that country.) And Shahaduz Zaman (2004) demonstrates the 
reciprocally reinforcing relationship between the hierarchical structures of the broader society 
and the social relationships within a hospital in Bangladesh. With a few exceptions, including 
Zaman’s work, the majority of this body of work is relevant here only to the extent that it 
rests on the notion that medical practice and broader culture are interrelated. Its further 
relevance, however, lies somewhat beyond the boundaries of the work that I wish to explore 
in detail and that has relevance for my focus on inhumane practice. (For a relatively recent 
attempt to initiate reformulation of ethical constructs in terms of the relationship between 
medical practice and broader society, see Mishler’s 2004 paper entitled “The unjust world 
problem,” in which he advocates a heightened awareness of social inequity, and its 
consequences for the distribution of health and illness, in clinical practice.) 
 
More immediately pertinent here is the work of those authors who have noted the differential 
treatment afforded patients who are members of marginalised social groups. Fisher (1984; 
1986; 1991; 1995) focuses primarily on gender bias in the delivery of health care, 
compounded when female patients are also poor. Mizrahi (1984; 1986) has highlighted the 
salience of a wide range of social categories marginalised within the broader social structure, 
including those defined according to age, sex, race and class, members of which are likely to 
receive inferior care. Andersen (2004) has documented the replication of inequality in the 
broader society in a hospital in Ghana, showing how construction of relationships within the 
hospital in terms of the bureaucratic and structural organisation and of the social relationships 
in that broader society results in the provision of differential treatment to patients along these 
lines. And Katz (1984: p. 9) tells a story of a conversation he had with a French nephrologist 
that perfectly captures the mix of these prejudices with other discourses, in this case 
paternalism, in medical culture, enabling actions that might otherwise seem unthinkable:  
 
“Immediately prior to our meeting the nephrologist had examined a French peasant who lived 
some forty miles outside of Paris and suffered from chronic renal failure. The condition was a 
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rapidly progressive one and would soon lead to death unless the patient was placed on 
dialysis. Yet the patient was not offered this option. Instead, he was told that no medical 
treatment existed that would help him. When I asked the nephrologist why he had concealed 
the alternative of dialysis from his patient, he reacted with surprise, as if the answer were 
self-evident: ‘To say more would have been cruel. Peasants do not adjust well to a permanent 
move to a large city’. Dialysis would have required a permanent relocation.” 
 
From a related perspective, a number of authors have discussed the social origins of medicine 
and medical practice, arguing that its current form can be traced to its historical development. 
Authors such as Hogarth and Marks (1998), Rothman (2003) and Mishler et al. (1981) have 
illustrated the historical processes whereby patients have been objectified in medical thought 
and practice, the patient as subject being overshadowed by the medical case – an object. With 
the emergence of the hospital and the development of evidence-based medicine, doctors have 
come to focus on general patterns that can be identified in the ailments of categories of 
patients through technological means, the significance of the individual patients’ narratives 
being diminished in the process. These developments have, in addition to contributing to a 
mechanical view of the sick body, and thence to the disappearance of patients’ subjectivity, 
also furthered the development of an ever-growing gap between doctor and patient, a gap that 
continues to increase with doctors’ specialisation and consequent focus on particular organs, 
and with the ever increasing external pressures to which doctors are exposed.  
 
Informed by this understanding of the interrelationships between medicine and broader 
society,  and underpin ing the aims of this thesis, Fisher (1986) and others argue that 
strategies for change need to address not merely the practical aspects of health care but 
elements of the cultural framework within which it occurs that exert a potentially harmful 
influence on its delivery. Effective change should address not merely the technical 
advancement and efficiency of care but should tackle the cultural politics within which it is 
delivered (Lupton, 2003). As Van der Geest (2005) cautions, the conversion of contextual 
problems into technical ones is not only inappropriate but obscures the need for social 
change. Similarly, criticisms leveled at individual doctors, through their failure to address the 
social context within which the understandings and actions of these doctors are embedded, 
are unlikely to produce broad or lasting change (Andersen, 2004). This argument, emanating 
from the work of the authors discussed in this section, holds great potential for designing 
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interventions that are responsive to the ‘invisible’ forces brought to bear on medical practice 
and that, it is the implication of these authors, will continue to produce their effects until they 
are addressed and changed. However, this work does not appeal to the majority of those 
responsible for effecting change in medical practice and is overshadowed by less critical 
approaches with more readily applicable suggestions. It is perhaps a weakness, in these terms, 
of this rich and insightful body of work that more has not been done to render its findings 
immediately useful to practice.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will review the various features of medical culture 
identified as relatively universal within the literature. Since this body of work is diverse, 
spanning approximately forty years and a range of differing paradigms of thought, I will 
attempt to synthesize relevant themes that occur within a sprawling mass, rather than a 
coherent body of work, articulating the interrelationships between them in a way that remains 
largely unarticulated in the existing literature.  
 
The narrative of science 
Amongst the most widely discussed elements of medical culture is that of the dominance of 
the scientific perspective within it.  As pointed out by authors including Mishler (1984), 
Fisher (1986), Mizrahi (1986), Wodak (1996) and Lewinsohn (1998), science represents the 
point of entry into medicine, is prioritised throughout medical education and is pervasive in 
all aspects of its practice (Mizrahi, 1986; Fisher & Groce, 1990). The scientific perspective 
thus informs all action in medical settings, enabling and constraining the things that can be 
said and done (Donnelly, 1997), and blinding doctors to alternatives that might enhance or 
complement technological procedures (Lewinsohn, 1998). Exploring the ways in which this 
scientific perspective is structured and structures the practice of medicine, this body of work 
highlights the values implicit in medical knowledge and practice, challenging the claims of 
the medical profession to objectivity and thus foregrounding the unavoidably moral nature of 
their activities.  
 
The scientific values of rationality, objectivity and neutrality inform the manner in which 
health care is delivered, and are argued to have facilitated a shift from humane to 
technological medicine (Mishler et al., 1981). While this issue is discussed by a large number 
of authors, perhaps Mishler’s 1984 work, “The discourse of medicine: dialectics of medical 
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interviews,” has been the most influential over the last quarter of a century in its 
identification of two voices within the medical conversation, namely the ‘voice of medicine’ 
and the ‘voice of the lifeworld’. Referred to again and again by multiple authors working in 
the area, Mishler’s binary construction of medical and patients’ knowledge has been 
criticised for being overly simplistic but has also played a major part in shaping the field, 
through the relevant authors’ varying responses to it. Criticisms of Mishler’s construction 
centre predominantly around the argument put forward by authors such as Fisher (1991), 
Silverman (1987), Wodak (1996) and Atkinson (2004) that medical settings should not be 
understood in terms of a monologic discourse, all participants subscribing to or suppressed by 
one dominant voice. Rather, these authors argue that the medical world is constituted by 
multiple voices, sometimes in conflict with or in contradiction of one another. Indicating the 
massive gap and even conflict between the scientific perspective and that of the suffering 
patient, one of the most valuable implications of Mishler’s concept of the ‘voice of 
medicine’, however, is the emphasis it places on the narrative and meaning-laden nature of 
(scientific) medical discourse and its consequences for the relationships possible between 
doctors and patients. No longer directed by the question, “Why does it hurt?” the diminished 
focus of care is directed by the question, “Where does it hurt?” (Wodak,1996). Assumptions 
concerning the biological specificity of illness implied by this latter question and the 
associated construction of doctors as scientists are shown by those authors concerned with 
this issue to have resulted in a variety of practices that have the potential to compromise the 
delivery of humane care.  
 
Dominating all other frameworks of understanding, the scientific perspective leads, amongst 
others, to prioritisation of scientific endeavor over all other approaches to the treatment of 
illness. Successful practice depends solely on technological processes, and success is defined 
in terms of cure. All other knowledge and activity is deemed irrelevant to medical purposes 
(Mishler et al., 1981). Valuing only technical insights into the nature of illness, therefore, 
patients’ experiences are reduced to diseased organs and medical facts, and their bodies to 
machines (Helman, 2001), as stories told in the ‘voice of the lifeworld’  are translated 
through the medical encounter into ones structured by the ‘voice of medicine’. Caring 
actions, too, since they are not easily connected to specific and definable cure-related results, 
tend to be viewed as ineffective (Stokes, 1994). Talking with patients is thus downgraded in 
medical practice (Mishler, 1984), and treatment is administered instead through the use of 
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technical language that excludes patients from its processes (Wodak, 1996). In fact, in order 
to meet the scientific demand for generalisability, medical narratives of illness must 
necessarily exclude the unique experience of any given patient (Donnelly, 1997). Thus, 
technical and humane aspects of medical practice are split off from one another and attributed 
differential value, the emphasis being on technical procedures (Good and DelVecchio-Good, 
2000; Atkinson, 1999 and Conrad, 1988).  
 
The linear explanatory model offered by scientific medicine for the occurrence of illness, in 
its attempt to define a single cause, further tends to locate that cause within the individual, 
ascribing blame for bodily malfunctions to the patient concerned (Helman, 2001). Any 
actions on the part of the patient are, in turn, judged in terms of the criteria laid out by 
‘objective’ scientific knowledge as rational or irrational, with similar consequences for 
patient blame (Good, 1994). Authors including Fisher (1986; 1995) and Waitzkin (1991) 
have argued that this perceived irrelevance of all perspectives and sources of information 
other than scientific ones obscures the potential importance of social factors for making 
correct diagnoses and recommending appropriate tre tments. In addition to the consequent 
possibility for misdiagnosis and inappropriate treatment, ignoring the social contexts of 
patients’ lives and experiences has been argued to constrain and even prohibit the possibility 
of humanistic relationships between doctors and patients and thus the provision of humane 
care (Mizrahi, 1986; Mishler, 1984).  
 
The predominance of the scientific approach to medical practice has thus led to the 
association of medical competence with the values of objectivity. And the caring aspects of 
practice, including building relationships and displaying compassion, are associated with the 
humanities (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993). As Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993) and 
Mizrahi (1986) point out, this emphasis on ‘curing’ as opposed to ‘caring’ actions begins 
during medical training, within which only technical learning is rewarded and the more 
humane  aspects of patient care are referred to, for example, as “sociological bullshit” 
(Mizrahi, 1986: p. 118). Medical education is thus organised around the diametrically 
opposed discourses of caring and curing, thereby separating patients from suffering people, 
juxtaposing technical activities with caring actions (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993)  and 
enabling and justifying the callousness so often displayed by members of the medical 
profession in the delivery of technological treatments to their patients (Helman, 2001; Good 
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and DelVecchio-Good, 1993; Conrad, 1988; Mizrahi, 1986; Konner, 1997; Stokes, 1994; 
Mishler, 1984). 
 
In opposition to this primary assumption in medical culture, Mishler (1984) argues that 
humane and effective care are, rather than mutually exclusive, inseparable from one another. 
He makes the bold argument that for care to be effective it must necessarily be humane, and 
thus that humane care is effective care. Mishler’s argument is appealing; indeed there is no 
doubt some truth in it. For example, it seems intuitively true that a patient who feels that her 
doctor is listening empathetically to her will be more likely to provide a fuller history, 
rendering accurate diagnosis more likely, and so on. While the extent to which health care 
needs to be humane in order to be effective is a question  to which the answer lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis,  Mishler’s standpoint is relevant in that it emphasizes the importance of 
humane care not merely for its own sake but also in terms of affecting health outcomes. 
Certainly, Mishler’s point, namely that the biomedical model’s stripping of the patient’s 
social context from the doctor’s understanding of his condition obstructs the possibility of his 
attaining a full understanding of that condition, and thus has the potential to impact 
negatively on the accuracy of diagnosis and appropriateness of treatment, represents a 
warning that should not be readily dismissed.  
Objectification 
In reducing patients’ bodies and illness experiences to diseased organs, biomedicine 
simultaneously objectifies the patient, who is transformed from a suffering human being into 
the object of (scientific) medical knowledge and practice. In the words of Mishler (2005: p. 
449), with reference to the very notion of a ‘patient’, ‘There is always a person whose 
complexity and fullness is not captured by this characterisation.” This issue, with its 
associated (negative) consequences for the delivery of health care, in particular with 
reference to the interactions between doctors and patients, is widely discussed in the literature 
on medical practice.  
 
Turner (1995) points out that the processes through which patients came to be depersonalised 
as objects of medical knowledge, rather than human subjects, are closely related to 
secularisation of the human body, in terms of which it came to be seen in scientific rather 
than theological terms. With Descartes’s division between body and mind (Mishler, 1984) 
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and the rapidly developing relationship between the body and technology, the body was 
conceptually transformed from a mystical entity into a mechanical one (Potter & McKinlay, 
2005). The development of this metaphor of the body as machine (Helman, 2001) was central 
to the development of medicine and the medical profession throughout the twentieth century. 
This mechanistic view of the body ushered in a new way of perceiving patients as composed 
of a series of mechanical parts, the patient himself or herself no longer greater than the sum 
of these. As machines, patients were no longer conceived of as spiritual beings but came to be 
viewed as without emotion, non-purposive, and therefore not meriting considerations of 
value, and fully understandable through objective means (Mishler, 1984). As illustrated in 
studies conducted by authors such as Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993), the development 
of this view of the body is not confined to a historical process that took place in the 
development of abstract bodies of thought and knowledge, but represents a process of 
inculcation that recurs and is continually reinforced as individual students and doctors 
progress through the medical system, coming to acquire increasingly machine-like views of 
their patients as objects and of themselves as mechanics (Dreyer & Geist, 1993).  
 
Alongside these developments in scientific thought were related developments in institutional 
practice. A number of authors, most notably Foucault, have discussed the relationship 
between the rise of the hospital and the transformation of patients into cases. Bringing sick 
people together in the hospital ward enabled the identification of commonalities between 
them. Patients could now be classified in terms of these commonalities (Hak, 1999) and the 
patient’s unique narrative, central to the past home visits of the local physician, became 
increasingly obsolete (Hogarth and Marks, 1998). In the words of Foucault:  
 
“The process of bringing sick people together in the hospital, and of observing them and 
treating them as bodies that could be classified as cases, made not only biomedical science 
possible but in the same process, as the other side of the coin, the ‘sick man’… 
disappeared…” (as cited in Hak, 1999: p. 428). 
 
With these developments, the medical curriculum came to be one of learning about 
standardised objects (Mishler et al., 1981) and the individual case became the object of 
medical knowledge (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993).  
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In terms of the basic scientific premise that anything that is real can be seen (Arney & 
Bergen,1984), and the physiological specificity in terms of which biomedicine views the 
causes of disease, as well as the traditional perception of doctors as collectors of technical 
information produced by passive patients in response to their stimuli (Mishler, 1984), the 
patient’s perspective on his condition, including anxieties and other concerns, is irrelevant to 
the medical diagnosis and treatment of disease (Fisher, 1991). The body is transformed from 
what Mishler et al. (1981: p. 224) call the “seat of subjective impressions” to the “site of 
specific disease entities to be detected and evaluated by the doctor independently of the 
patient.” Suffering is thus removed from the concept of disease (Mizrahi, 1986) and patients’ 
subjectivity is obscured from medical view, the illness having been appropriated by the 
profession (Mishler, 1984; Atkinson, 1995). DelVecchio-Good and Good (2000) show how 
medical students are taught to interact with their patients in such a way as to elicit ‘medically 
important’ information, and to edit out of their case presentations the patient’s story, 
transforming the ‘illness’ into a ‘disease’ (Savett, 2002 ), and resulting, in many instances, in 
the deletion of the patient’s lived reality from medical awareness. Finkler (2004: p. 2038) 
describes her experience of observing the practices associated with this perspective: 
 
“…Perhaps most draining on me was witnessing the drama of the medical consultation, when 
patients reported the tragedies of their lives, and the doctors explored only the patients’ 
physical symptoms. The physicians listened to the patients politely but did not hear when the 
patients described the squalor in which they lived as they were answering the doctor’s 
questions about their symptoms.” 
 
Along with Mizrahi, these authors show how this perspective is communicated to medical 
students “from the first tutorial” (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993: p. 90) and continues to be 
reinforced as young doctors proceed through the system, taught by their seniors what is 
relevant and what is not through their expressions of boredom or impatience when presented 
with the ‘irrelevant’ details of patients’ social contexts, as they yawn or snap their fingers to 
communicate the norm: “obtain just the [medical] facts” (Mizrahi, 1986: p. 96. See also, for 
example, Fisher, 1986; Apker & Eggly, 2004). Through this process, these authors show how 
not only the patient but his lifeworld disappears from medical reality. Along with the 
patients’ life contexts go their emotions, construed as distinct from their physical distress 
(Cassell, 1982) and dismissed as irrelevant to medical understanding and intervention. Any 
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appearance of patients’ emotions is negatively sanctioned as soon as it happens and, when 
suppressive measures fail, the patient runs the risk of her illness being classified as caused by 
her emotions (Fisher, 1986). Mishler (1984) argues that, through this process of defining 
what is medically relevant, the language of patients is absorbed by that of medicine, their 
subjective experience translated into scientific terms as their personal accounts are 
interrupted and their lifeworlds stripped away. With technological developments allowing 
doctors to make diagnoses even at the cellular level (Helman, 2001; Mishler et al., 1981), the 
patient’s account of his/her illness came to be viewed as still less relevant and even invalid, 
possessing all the suspect qualities of subjectively based information (Atkinson, 1995). 
Patients’ accounts are constructed as both inconsequential and invalid, juxtaposed against the 
medical history, for example, as fiction rather than fact (Arney & Bergen, 1984). If a 
discrepancy exists between the patient’s account and the medical record, therefore, the former 
is dismissed in favour of the latter (Mizrahi, 1986). Indeed, doct rs tend to mark patients’ 
accounts as of questionable truth value, using rhetorical devices including words such as 
“states,” “reports,” “claims” or “denies” to precede narration of the information they have 
provided (Antaki, 1994; Donnelly, 1997). In contrast, words such as “shows,” “notes” or 
“reveals” precede the accounts produced by doctors and by medical technology (Donnelly, 
1997).  
 
The depersonalisation of patients is thus grounded in the basic structure of medical training 
and practice (Mizrahi, 1986). The patient’s body, in the eyes of the medical profession, 
becomes a medical body, different from those encountered in everyday social interaction 
(Dreyer & Geist, 1993), and the patient’s identity is simultaneously transformed from that of 
social subject into medical object (Atkinson, 1995). As Helman (2001) points out, this 
transformation of the sick person into a case in a ward is aided by routine processes within 
the hospital, whereby the patient is surrounded by strangers, stripped of the usual identity 
props, such as personal dress, control of personal space and decisions - for example, what to 
eat and when - and transformed into a ‘decontextualised’ object in a hospital gown. This 
transformation of the patient’s identity is reflected in and reinforced by doctors’ talk, 
prescribed by medical and organisational culture that separates the person from the biological 
processes that are causing his distress. The patient is referred to by name and attributed with 
social characteristics only in the opening phrase of the case presentation and thereafter 
merely as an example of impersonal categories or in terms of such descriptions as are offered 
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by the numbers produced through laboratory tests (Atkinson 1995). Even in this opening 
phrase, social attributes ascribed to the patient tend to be limited, depicting a sick woman, for 
example, as “a thirty-seven year old black female” (Donnelly, 1997). The patient is thus 
presented as a ‘thing’ (Mizrahi, 1986) and his or her illness as an example of disordered 
biology (Donnelly, 1997). This process has been further exacerbated by growing 
specialisation. Training doctors intensively in the function of a specific organ or system 
increases the likelihood that they will lose sight of the whole (Rothman, 2003) and focus only 
on the affected part, reducing the patient to such an entity as a “stab abdomen” (Helman, 
2001). It might be noted at this point that, while the focus in the literature is on how medical 
practice and doctors objectify patients, there are a few authors (see, for example, Heath, 
2006) who draw attention to the dialogical nature of the process whereby patients are 
transformed into and treated as objects. These authors argue that, in presenting their bodies to 
their doctors, withholding their responses to disturbing procedures or diagnostic deliveries, 
and so on, not only doctors but patients in fact play a role in their own objectification. 
 
The perspectives of doctors and patients are thus set up in opposition to one another, and the 
medical interaction becomes a process of translating lay explanatory models into medical 
ones (Helman, 2001). More than mere transactions between distinct points of view, a number 
of authors argue that the medical interaction is in fact a confrontation (Francis & Hester, 
2004; Atkinson, 1995; Mishler, 1984; Hogarth and Marks, 1998; Kirkmayer, 2000), 
representing a struggle between conflicting agendas, namely the doctor’s with regard to 
biomedical evaluation of the patient’s complaint and the patient’s in terms of her personal 
fears, anxieties and life circumstances (Heritage & Maynard, 2006). 
 
This process whereby the patient is denied as a human subject facilitates emotional distance 
between doctor and patient, a distance that, as much as it has negative consequences, protects 
doctors from suffering on their patients’ behalf (Goffman, 1961) and enables them to carry 
out invasive and potentially mutually distressing procedures, such as surgical ones (Mishler 
et al., 1981). It also enhances efficiency, the treatment of patients in terms of categories 
facilitating the smooth and effective running of the hospital system. And the more like an 
object the patient, the easier becomes the doctor’s work, diminished autonomy also rendering 
patients more likely to accept routine treatment. For these reasons, Lorber (1975) argues, the 
process of depersonalisation is frequently felt to be worth the price, all these consequences 
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bearing obvious benefits for the patient. 
 
However, in another of that most influential cluster of works from the 1980s informing this 
field, Mizrahi (1986) argues that if efficiency was the only reason for the treatment of 
patients as objects, their subjection to disparagement would not feature amongst its 
consequences. While the consequences of particular actions are not necessarily related to the 
intentions that motivated them, Mizrahi’s point certainly alerts us to the importance of 
increasing awareness within the medical profession of what are possibly the unintended 
consequences of various routine actions. In this regard, authors including Goffman, Mishler, 
Helman and others argue that the consequences of objectification can be serious, ranging 
from disrupted communication between patients and doctors to abusive actions inflicted on 
patients by doctors.  
 
Mishler et al. (1981) argue that the problematic nature of many of the relations between 
doctors and patients derives from patients’ objectification. The psychological distance 
thereby created between them has been argued to produce interactions characterised by 
distance, formality, brevity and the use of jargon, usually incomprehensible to the patient 
(Helman, 2001). Patients are frequently referred to on ward rounds in the third person, 
excluded from eye contact and generally treated as if invisible (Mizrahi, 1986). In the words 
of Goffman (as cited in Lorber, 1975: p. 213), objectification of patients produces “the 
wonderful brand of ‘nonperson treatments’ found in the medical world, whereby the patient is 
greeted with what passes as civility, and said farewell to in the same fashion, with everything 
between going on as if the patient weren’t there as a social person at all, but only as a 
possession someone has left behind.” Mizrahi argues that such interactions can confuse, 
frighten and hurt patients, affecting at least their psychological conditions, if not their 
physical ones. And Katz (1984) adopts the view that the human desire for recognition of 
“individuality, common dependence and equality” is profound, arguing that the “relief of 
suffering requires doctors’ presence in the full sense of the word,” (Katz,1984: p. 208).  
 
In similar vein, Mishler (1984) argues that the deletion of the patient as subject, and of the 
appropriation of  her experience by the ‘voice of medicine’, at least seriously limits and 
possibly excludes the possibility of the provision of humane health care, which, he argues, 
depends on prioritisation of the patient’s lifeworld as the basis for action. Instead of 
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encouraging or even allowing the ‘voice of the lifeworld’ to emerge in medical encounters, 
Mishler (1984: p. 127) argued that the dominance of the ‘voice of medicine’ “impairs and 
distorts essential requirements for mutual dialogue and humane interaction.” In terms of the 
dualistic perception of mind and body, considerations of ‘spirit’, psyche, meaning and 
purpose are excluded from medical practice and patients, invisible as active subjects, are 
eliminated from participation in their own care, their feelings and beliefs disregarded 
(Mizrahi, 1986) and all aspects of their experience not classifiable in terms of scientific 
descriptions cast aside as irrelevant to medicine. These discarded concerns include 
humanistic ones (Lewhinsohn, 1998) and doctors’ perceptions of their role in relation to 
patient care are limited to a concern with biology. Any thoughtful consideration of who 
patients are or of their suffering are thus firmly placed outside the boundaries of medical 
activity (Savett, 2002). Authors including Katz (1984) and Helman (2001) refer to the 
compromise of key elements of the treatment process when the patient’s subjectivity is 
unrecognised. For example, the principle of informed consent is based on that of self-
determination, a concept that makes little sense when the subjectivity of the relevant ‘self’ is 
denied (Katz, 1984). And perhaps the disregard for p tients’ subjectivity described by these 
authors might represent a useful extension of the explanations offered by Turnbull, Flabouris 
and Iedema (2005) for the inattention displayed by staff in an intensive care unit in an 
Australian hospital to matters such as patients’ dignity or possible humiliation in their 
forgetfulness of ordinary social requirements of etiquette, such as pulling the sheets over a 
female patient’s exposed breasts or discussing the chances of a conscious patient’s survival in 
front of that same patient. 
 
The approach to medical practice that these authors describe excludes a whole range of 
material that Lewinsohn (1998), Fisher (1986) and Clark and Mishler (1992) have argued is 
relevant not only to humanistic interaction but in fact to both diagnosis and treatment, as well 
as recovery. Mishler illustrates the core of this argument in a comparative analysis of two 
medical encounters, in one of which the patient’s story is heard and in the other it is 
suppressed. In his analysis he shows not only the relationship between the different 
approaches and treatment processes, such as the maintenance of a cooperative relationship 
between doctor and patient, but also the relationship between the extent to which the patient’s 
story is told and treatment outcomes. These authors make a case for the relevance of Cassell’s 
(1982) argument that the cure of disease and the relief of suffering, rather than distinct 
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activities, represent the ‘twin obligations’ of the medical profession if it is to be considered 
devoted to care of the sick. More than twenty years later, Mishler (2005), critical of the 
earlier narrow focus on the individual doctor-patient dyad, to the exclusion of social 
inequality, in which the causes of patients’ suffering are often to be found, has extended this 
argument, emphasising the importance of an understanding of medical encounters that 
includes not only that which occurs between individual doctors and patients, but the larger 
health care system in which these interactions take place. This later turn that Mishler’s work 
takes toward an integration of an “ethics of humane care” and an “ethics of social justice” 
(2004: p. 97), while broadly relevant to any discussion of ethical medical practice, moves 
beyond the narrower confines of my focus in this thesis, namely to explain the occurrence of 
inhumane or abusive medical practices. The direction that Mishler’s work has taken, 
however, is likely to lead to further shifts in thinking in this area. 
 
One of the relatively small number of authors who directly relate these themes to acts of 
abuse on the part of medical professionals, Mizrahi (1986) has discussed the relationship 
between the depersonalisation of patients and abusive action, showing how objectification is 
both the result and generator of hostile feelings of medical staff toward their patients. Mizrahi 
argues that objectification of patients in fact breeds contempt, quoting interns as explaining 
that denial of the human subject obviates the need for caring, and referring to instances in 
which patients become the objects of doctors’ ridicule and verbal disparagement. Mizrahi 
uses her illustration of this process to explain the development of an attitude toward the 
delivery of health care that she terms ‘Getting Rid of Patients’ (GROP) Syndrome, in terms 
of which premature discharge and even death are construed as solutions to the problem of 
patient overload. In the words of one of the interns in her study, patients are transformed into 
“piece(s) of shit” (p. 34), which can justifiably be thrown out of any emergency room. 
 
While a few authors, such as Dreyer and Geist (1993) and Arney and Bergen (1984) argue 
that depersonalisation in medicine is becoming a thing of the past and that the presence of the 
patient is reemerging within medical talk, their numbers are not great. In addition, their 
argument, namely that the scope of medicine is expanding to include not only the scientific 
but also the social and moral aspects of existence are somewhat beyond the domain of the 
arguments proposed in this thesis.  
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Medical culture and religion 
Interacting with this dominant presence of science at the heart of medicine is the relationship 
between the institution of medicine and that of religion. This issue is discussed in any depth 
by only a very few authors, most notably Sjaak van der Geest, whose 2005 paper, 
“Sacraments in the hospital: exploring the magic and religion of recovery,” explores the 
interaction between medicine and religion in a hospital setting. However, a number of authors 
have noted the parallels between science and religion, as well as the convergence of the 
historical development of these institutions (Fox, 1989; Good, 1994; Obholzer, 1994; 
Kellerher, Gabe and Williams, 1994). This area of work does not form a significant body 
within the field that addresses the issue of medical culture, but has significance for the aims 
of this thesis, nevertheless, and is therefore worthy of discussion. 
 
Van der Geest (2005), amongst others, points out that doctors in modern society have come 
to assume the role previously occupied by priests. Indeed, the medical and religious 
professions were once the same, priests exercising both religious as well as healing duties, a 
practice which continues in some cultures and even persists, to some extent, in Western 
culture, as priests are considered to have certain healing powers and are in fact expected in 
many instances to exercise magical powers (Obholzer, 1994).  Doctors have thus come to 
represent society’s defence against death (Obholzer, 1994), a commonality between medicine 
and religion, that exists not only on a symbolic level (Van der Geest, 2005) but one that 
authors such as Kelleher, Gabe and Williams (1994) remind us has distinct material reality, in 
that doctors are in fact the ‘gatekeepers’ to access to life-saving drugs and medical 
procedures. In addition, authors such as Millman (1977) and Mizrahi (1986) observe the 
disturbingly real enactment of this role as doctors take decisions about who will receive what 
treatment, and consequently about who will live or die. Thus, a note scribbled by a doctor on 
a patient’s chart, or an implied but unspoken agreement between doctors may serve as an 
instruction not to resuscitate a patient should he experience a life-threatening condition. 
 
With the decline of organised religion, Kelleher et al. (1994) argue that doctors are not only 
required to heal physical ailments but also to offer advice on how to live the good life, 
through definition of healthy practices. Having access to what van der Geest (2005: p. 139) 
terms ‘the most relevant physical reality’, namely the human body, doctors are able and 
required to formulate the rules for good living. As Fox (1989: p. 150) points out, hospitals 
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are, in addition, constructed around “the perils of human existence” and, as the places in 
which a great many people are born and die, they are charged with concerns about the 
meaning of life, good and evil, mercy and justice and so on. In the author’s words,  
 
“In the hospital the comedy and tragedy of human existence, its nobility and its ignominy, lie 
close to the surface, are juxtaposed, and intermingle. Not only do people’s life stories begin 
and end here, but they are elicited and revealed, in all their sameness and variety, while the 
overseeing ‘central clock that is to be found in practically every hospital unit’  ticks neutrally 
and endlessly on” (Fox, 1989: p. 151-152).  
 
Thus, birth, death, suffering, care and cure, along with the experiences of hope, anxiety, trust, 
doubt and so on that they evoke (Van der Geest, 2005), are religiously resonant experiences 
and part of the everyday life of the hospital.   
 
This area of work, while small and having exerted limited influence on the rest of the field, is 
nevertheless important as it has major implications for the powerful position that doctors 
occupy, as well as for the relationship between the medical profession and society. In this 
sense, the discussion of the relationship between medicine and religion is of particular 
importance to the aims of this thesis, having implications both for the fact that doctors and 
the medical profession hold immense power and for the unquestionable status attributed to 
their acts and decisions. 
 
Certainty vs. uncertainty 
The combination of the scientific and religious aspects of medicine and the medical 
profession, with the status and expectations they have acquired in society, and the god-like 
nature of the decisions doctors are required to make, set the scene for the construction of 
doctors as omnipotent and in possession of knowledge that is certain. Renee Fox’s seminal 
1957 work, “Training for uncertainty,” which continues, half a century later, to represent a 
key work in the area, and in which she argues that medical students are trained to deal with 
the uncertainty inherent in medical knowledge and practice, has spawned a discussion 
centered on the tension that exists between certainty and uncertainty in medical thinking and 
practice. Fox’s work, while engendering probably as much criticism as it has respect, has 
initiated a discussion of the role played by this tension in medical culture, which is argued to 
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have huge implications for the possibility of ethical medical practice. 
 
Opposing the view proposed by Fox that medical students are trained to deal with the 
uncertainties inherent in medical knowledge and practice, authors including Katz (1984), 
Atkinson (1981; 1984) and Allsop and Mulcahy (1999) have argued that they are trained 
instead to adopt a standpoint of certainty, defending themselves against their own 
unanswerable questions, doubts and anxieties, as well as those of their patients and of the 
broader society. These authors thus argue that doctors are, in contrast to Fox’s claim, trained 
for certainty (Atkinson, 1984). However, they alert us also to the existence of a paradox in 
terms of which the omnipotent status and the position in which doctors are placed, and which 
they assume, coexists with an inherent and unshakeable uncertainty that pervades medical 
knowledge and practice. Evidence for the reality of the uncertainties of medicine lies in 
statistics suggesting that between six and sixteen percent of visits to the hospital actually 
cause a deterioration in the patient’s health, and three to four percent result in permanent 
disability or death (Finkler, Hunter and Iedema, 2008). This combination of omnipotence and 
uncertainty, it is suggested in the literature, provides the motivation for the profession’s 
insistence on its authority and on its sole capacity for regulation of its own activities and for 
the development of the culture of silence that pervades medical practice.  
Uncertainty and authoritarianism 
It is widely accepted amongst researchers in the field that the medical context is indeed filled 
with uncertainty for all concerned – uncertainty regarding the nature of the presenting 
condition, uncertainty regarding the patient’s likely response to treatment and uncertainty 
regarding the potential outcomes of the healthcare process (Martin and Dreyer, 2001). 
Medicine has assumed the status of ‘hard science’, but both the human body and disease 
remain highly dynamic and therefore unpredictable. In contrast to Fox (1957), Atkinson and 
others have argued that the process of medical training, instead of equipping students with the 
skills and resources to deal with inevitable uncertainty, primes them to deny its existence and 
to assume the possession of absolute knowledge, and the authority associated with it 
(Atkinson, 1995). While authors such as Rosenthal (1995) and Katz (1984) emphasize the 
importance of authoritative confidence in medical decision-making, which often needs to be 
conducted with immediate effect, these authors, as well as Erickson (1999), also note the 
potential consequences of doctors’ attempts to “clutch… certainty out of the jaws of 
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uncertainty” (Erickson, 1999: p. 119), arguing that their vain attempts in this regard can lead 
to such attitudes as diagnostic dogmatism and authoritarian, rather than authoritative 
decision-making.  
 
The doctor’s position is, however, more complex than might be surmised from this single 
aspect of the discussion. Mizrahi (1984) goes on to discuss the self-doubt that “gnaws” at 
doctors when, for example, a patient dies. Although only taken up by a limited number of 
authors in the field, this relationship between uncertainty and the self-doubt that is prevalent 
amongst doctors was first raised by Fox as far back as 1957 in her categorisation of the 
uncertainty inherent in medicine in terms of three dimensions: First are the limitations of 
medical knowledge. Second are individual doctors’ own limitations due to the impossibility 
of complete mastery of all aspects of the field of medicine. And third, arising from the 
combined existence of these, is the doctor’s difficulty in determining which of the two is 
predominant in any particular instance. Fox describes what she terms the “emotional, moral 
and existential” conundrum this creates for doctors, faced with uncertainty in the face of dire 
situations: 
 
“To be puzzled, ignorant, unable to understand; to lack needed knowledge or relevant skill; to 
err, falter or fail, without being always sure whether it is ‘your fault’ or the ‘fault of the 
field’…is especially painful and serious when the work that you do is medical” (Fox, as cited 
in Atkinson, 1995: p. 114). 
 
Within this context, rather than the opportunity to confront uncertainty and potential error, 
doctors are encouraged within the cultural milieu to defend themselves psychologically 
against it. Doctors’ defences against uncertainty also avoid the shattering of their omnipotent 
status that might occur should they engage openly and honestly with their patients and others 
about the realities of the limitations of medical knowledge and their own fallibility (Katz, 
1984). Thus, doctors are encouraged to withhold information from their patients, justified and 
reinforced by the paternal dimensions of medical culture, in terms of which the patient’s 
absolute faith in his doctor is construed as necessary for cure (Millman, 1977). Believing that 
patients can neither comprehend nor emotionally manage the complex and pervasive 
uncertainties with which medical knowledge is fraught, doctors are discouraged from 
revealing these, or possible disagreements between the experts regarding the nature of a 
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patient’s condition or the best available options for her treatment. A culture of silence is thus 
entrenched in the medical profession and the withholding of information from the patient is 
justified. 
Self-regulation 
Professional self-regulation is a concept that has become prominent in discussions of medical 
culture and the medical professions, primarily through the highly influential work of Eliot 
Freidson during the 1970s, who addressed the matter in his sociological analyses of the 
organisation and practice of medicine. The issue remains of interest to the present day, and is 
particularly prominent in the work of those authors dealing with medical error and 
malpractice. Arising from the high levels of uncertainty and perceived infallibility discussed 
above, the general consensus that only a doctor can judge the performance of another doctor 
is the consequence of what Rosenthal (1995: p. 27) describes as a “cumulative logic of 
permanent uncertainty, necessary fallibility, shared personal vulnerability, understanding and 
forgiveness…” And it results in not only doctors’ reluctanc  to criticise one another but also 
in the fact that only the grossest misdemeanours are ever given disciplinary attention (Allsop 
& Mulcahy, 1999). Since the notion of accountability is reliant on the sanctioning of the 
actions of groups or individuals by a larger collectivity, which itself includes those affected 
by the relevant actions, the accountability of the medical profession and of individual doctors 
within it is seriously called into question (Mizrahi, 1984). It is noteworthy that when errors 
do occur and are discussed, Rosenthal reports that doctors tend to shift footing, no longer 
proclaiming a position of certainty and infallibility but emphasising the uncertainties in the 
process that led to the relevant negative outcome.  
 
Thus, according to Rosenthal (1999) and a number of other authors who have investigated the 
ways in which medical errors and poor outcomes of medical treatments are handled by the 
profession, pervasive uncertainty engenders a sense of solidarity between members of the 
medical profession, producing a sense of shared vulnerability, and hence leniency, when it 
comes to mutual criticism. These two elements of the world of medicine, namely uncertainty 
and collegiality, represent, according to Rosenthal, the ‘twin pillars’ of its culture, forming a 
dangerous mix, in terms of which doctors are protected to a very large degree from the 
likelihood of criticism by colleagues and are shielded from their own feelings of 
responsibility when things go wrong. They are thus able to identify with the collectivity and 
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so spread the responsibility, rather than perceive themselves as personally culpable (Mizrahi, 
1984).  A norm has developed within the culture of medicine in terms of which the doctor’s 
competence is assumed. In keeping with his superior status, he is not checked up on; instead, 
the maxim “Thou shalt trust physicians” is preserved and adhered to in medical settings 
(Freidson, 1975: p. 124). Deviance from this norm, rather than poor medical practice, is 
discouraged by the profession, as is evident, for instance, in examples provided by Mizrahi in 
her 1986 study (p. 31), in which she describes a situation in which a new and relatively senior 
doctor reprimanded one of his juniors on his decision not to resuscitate a patient: “The gossip 
that ensued…demonstrated ‘the norm of non-interference’.” Thus, Rosenthal and others 
(Millman, 1977; Mishler et al, 1981; Paget, 1988) note that the collegiality found within the 
medical profession has “many faces,” ranging from mutual esteem and support to closing of 
ranks against patients and others and protecting the profession’s own interests at the expense 
of outsiders. 
Silence 
As noted above, amongst the consequences of the assumption of authority and claim doctors 
make to medical certainty, and the self-regulatory position of the medical profession is the 
culture of silence and the norm of withholding information from patients. This theme 
emerges in the work of a great many authors with a diverse array of aims and perspectives, 
from those writing about the ways in which medical practice in its current form can be honed 
and improved, to those adopting a critical standpoint to the assumptions underlying medical 
practice, to those concerned specifically with abusive practice and the violation of patients’ 
rights. From the point of view adopted in this thesis, two works emerge as most important in 
this area, namely that of Millman (1977) and of Katz (1984).  In a highly influential work that 
explores the centrality of silence about medical error to medical culture and practice, Millman 
argues that the paternalistic quality of medical practice that comes with its authoritative 
stance means that doctors routinely withhold information from their patients both about their 
illnesses and about the wisdom of other doctors’ decisions (Millman, 1977). In terms of this 
paternalistic discourse,  
 
“Even if patients ask to be told everything, you shouldn’t necessarily listen to them. You 
can’t just tell people things because they say they want to know, because they’re curious. 
Children are curious – they always want to know things – are you going to tell them 
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everything they want to know? No, you don’t load up a child with the weight of knowledge 
and you can’t do it to patients either” (Millman, 1977: p. 149). 
 
Millman argues that, while decisions to withhold information from patients are indeed 
sometimes taken with the intention of protecting them from what their doctors believe they 
can neither understand nor cope with, such decisions are also sometimes taken with the 
doctor’s interests in mind. The less patients know about their conditions and treatment, the 
less trouble they can make for their doctors. Medical culture thus promotes silence, hiding 
even the possibility for error and misjudgement before they have had the chance to occur.  
 
The argument against this culture of silence is eloquently conveyed by Katz (1984), in a 
sensitive, insightful and compassionate analysis of the mute engagement of doctors with their 
patients. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Katz argues that the requirement of informed 
consent is intended to protect patients from the sense of abandonment they suffer when 
treated with silence and that patients need to know what is wrong with them, what the 
possibilities for treatment are and what their prospects of recovery are thought to be, in order 
that they might assume responsibility for their lives and illnesses. Like Millman (1977), Katz 
argues that this information is repressed in favour of professional interests, protecting the 
profession at the patients’ expense.  
 
While these works, in particular that of Millman (1977), have exerted their influence on the 
formation of this field, little has emerged in the area since that offers similar depth of insight 
into the silence that pervades medical practice. More recently, in work carried out in the 
emergency department of an Australian hospital, Scheeres et al. (2008) observed the state of 
confusion in which patients were left with regard to the workings of the hospital system. 
These authors note the time and clinical pressures under which emergency medical staff work 
as the reason for their omission to provide much needed information. This somewhat limited 
interpretation of the hospital staff’s silence might be extended by reference to such factors as 
the paternalistic constructions outlined by Millman, Katz (1984) and others, which perhaps 
interact with the more pragmatic concerns of Scheeres et al to render the option not to inform 
the patient readily available.  
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Masculinity in medical culture 
Related to this authority that doctors assume relative to their patients, and on the grounds of 
both superior scientific knowledge and unassailable wisdom, is the presence of traditional 
constructions of masculinity in medical culture. The traditionally masculine features of 
medical culture are widely discussed with respect to its paternalistic nature, a characteristic 
that was taken for granted as the natural order of things and as a desirable state of affairs prior 
to the 1970’s (for example, Talcott Parson’s functionalist perspective, through which his 
notion of the ‘sick role’ was seen to lead to a parent-child-like relationship between doctor 
and patient), when criticisms of the dictum, ‘trust thy doctor’ began to become audible. The 
image of the paternalistic male imbues doctors with the authority to make decisions and the 
right to withhold relevant information from their patients, through its invocation of his all-
powerful but benign and protective intent toward his inferiors.  
 
A much more limited number of authors, however, refer to a broader range of images than 
those invoked by the paternalistic father-figure, also derived from the traditional masculine 
ideologies that pervade medical discourse. Authors such as Wicks (1998), noting the 
importance of metaphor in shaping knowledge and experience, and hence doctors’ attitudes 
to the practice of medicine, argue that understanding of these metaphors is not only important 
in comprehending the forces that drive particular practices, but also provides the basis for 
subverting those forces that support problematic practices (Wicks, 1998). For example, Fisher 
and Groce (1990) point out that both masculinity and status are associated with strength and 
femininity and lack of status with weakness. The implication of this is that those actions 
performed by doctors that are in keeping with traditional masculine identities and ideologies 
will be more likely to acquire them status than those actions, such as caring ones, 
traditionally associated with femininity. Thus, doctors’ understandings and evaluations of 
their own and each others’ competence are interrelated with broader cultural understandings 
of gender (DelVecchio-Good, 1985). This creates pressure for doctors to conform to 
particular culturally produced stereotypes, in this case, those embodied by Sir Lancelot of 
King Arthur’s round table (Drife, 1998).  
 
Again one of the landmark texts with respect to the manifestation of masculine metaphors in 
medical culture derives from the 1980s.Mizrahi’s 1986 work, “Getting rid of patients,” 
referred to already in this review, and to be discussed with reference to themes of masculinity 
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below, provides a vivid illustration of the transmission and enactment of traditionally 
masculine values, amongst others, within a hospital setting. Other authors, while their 
endeavours have left less of an imprint than Mizrahi’s, perhaps, have also produced some key 
studies, more singularly focused on masculinity in medicine. Erickson (1999), for example, 
has described the presence of what he terms ‘medical machismo’ in medical culture, in terms 
of which the doctor’s script is one of heroic action and the ‘real doctor’ is not merely 
technically competent and committed to his patients but takes on the identity of the ‘lone 
ranger’. In similar vein, Cassell (1992), in an investigation of surgeons, explores the everyday 
talk and behaviour in which the surgeons in her study engage, showing their talk to be 
comprised mainly of subject matters such as sport and cars; and their behaviour to include 
such propensities as a refusal to wear safety belts or overcoats, even in subzero temperatures. 
Cassell further brings into relief the pervasiveness of masculine ideology not only in 
peripheral conversation but in surgical discourse itself, in which the surgeons in her study are 
described as needing “balls” to do their jobs and as “invulnerable, untiring, unafraid of death 
and disaster” (p. 173). In fact, she quotes one of the participants in her research, providing an 
explanation for a colleague’s success as a well-respected surgeon, which he attributed to his 
characteristics as “smart, aggressive and a little bit of a son-of-a-bitch” (p. 177).  
The military metaphor 
Amongst the metaphors within the repertoire of traditional masculinity is the war metaphor, 
one that has been argued to have particularly disturbing consequences for the construction of 
doctors’ and patients’ identities and for medical practice. Cassell’s (1992) study of surgeons 
further provides quotes in which surgeons describe their occupation as a “brutal” game and 
argue that “you have to approach an operation like a battle” (p. 174). Mizrahi’s (1986) 
primary contribution to the discussion of masculinity in medicine also centres on the military 
metaphor. She shows how this metaphor affects medical students’ understandings of their 
identities and purposes, and of the means available to them, arguing that the students she 
studied viewed all of these through a lens applicable to combat, rather than caring action. 
Students and new doctors described their experiences as “being ordered into the trenches” (p. 
3) and as representing the “first line of defence against disease and trauma” (p. 3). Authors 
such as Wicks (1998) have produced similar findings, quoting doctors who described their 
experiences as akin to being on the frontlines, and, in discussions about the health care they 
provided, using words such as “aggressive” and claiming to employ means such as “shotgun 
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therapy.” The military metaphor extends not only to doctors’ constructions of themselves and 
their work but also to their understandings of disease itself, which, in these terms, becomes an 
invading enemy (Arney & Bergen, 1984).  
 
Perhaps most disturbing of all, however, is the associated construction of patients in these 
terms, who become, within this combative context, the ultimate enemy (Mizrahi (1986). Both 
Mizrahi and Wicks (1998) produce numerous examples of medical talk in which patients are 
described using words that connote violence and military action. For example, Mizrahi argues 
that use of the word ‘hit’ to describe a patient who is admitted evokes images of air strikes 
and, through use of the word in military contexts to refer to enemy planes, ships and so on 
that have been struck in an attack, even reduces the patient to enemy material. Other 
violence-invoking language that Mizrahi’s doctors used to describe their dealings with their 
patients included phraseology such as “crashing and burning,” “getting killed” and being 
“under fire.”  
The importance of action 
Associated both with traditional masculine ideology in general and with the military 
metaphor in particular is the importance of dramatic action in defining worthwhile endeavour 
and success. Authors including Erickson (1999), Katz (1985) and Millman (1977) have 
provided insight into the role that this value plays within medical practice, the central 
argument being that the importance placed on dramatic action leads to more positive 
evaluations of decisive acts and a devaluation of actions that progress thoughtfully and 
carefully (Katz, 1985). Thus, what Erickson terms “stunningly insightful diagnoses in the 
midst of competing possibilities” (p. 119) feature amongst those actions that are esteemed 
and that doctors are motivated to accomplish, whereas management of conditions that do not 
lend themselves to certain diagnosis or that cannot be cured are undervalued and even 
sneered at by ‘successful’ doctors (Erickson, 1999; Millman, 1977). Within a context in 
which medical practice is construed as the exertion of power over disease and physical 
decline, such actions, that fail to produce immediate and tangible results, are equated with 
“doing nothing,” (Hahn, 1985) the only relevant response to an ailing body being to “figure it 
out and fix it” (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993). Thus, doctors are driven to define 
problems, do something about them and see results (Cassel, 1992). By implication, those 
problems that fall outside of these narrow parameters run the risk of being defined as 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
39 
 
unworthy of their time. Not only are problems that are not amenable to such action or that are 
unlikely to yield the desired results dismissed on these grounds, but actions themselves that 
are not deemed likely to contribute directly to this chain of events are similarly dismissed as 
pointless and even as cause for embarrassment on the part of their agents (Konner, 1997). In 
his study, Konner, for example, found doctors to be more likely to be embarrassed when 
observed speaking words or performing actions that were not entirely instrumental than by 
brusqueness, the slow and undramatic nature of caring actions being viewed, in these terms, 
as ineffective (Stokes, 1994).  
 
The dichotomy established through the dominance of the scientific narrative in medical 
culture, in terms of which caring and curing actions are diametrically juxtaposed, is thus 
reiterated through the operation of metaphors of traditional masculinity, further reinforcing 
the placement of effectiveness and humaneness in opposition to one another, as reflected in 
the quote from a doctor to which Mishler (1984) refers: “Do you want to be a nice guy or a 
good doctor?” 
 
Summary  
In this chapter I have attempted to weave together those threads in the literature addressing 
the institutional power of the medical profession, as well as medical culture, that are relevant 
to the arguments proposed in this thesis. I have attempted to synthesize these in such a way as 
to show their interrelationship and the logical train by which they might be argued to enable 
inhumane and abusive medical practice.  
 
I have discussed those themes in the literature that explore the social context of medical 
practice, identifying key elements of medical culture that emerge in the literature as common 
to the majority of medical settings. In this respect, I have described how the various aspects 
of scientific, religious, and masculine discourse as represented in the literature are 
interrelated, weaving together the most prominent themes and showing how they relate to the 
potential for inhumane or abusive care. Tracing themes in the literature that pertain to the 
contradiction that exists between the assumptions of infallibility and associated authority, and 
the uncertainty inherent in medical knowledge and practice, I have further explored in this 
chapter those threads that discuss the self-doubt and defensive responses exhibited by 
doctors, highlighting the potential for these, too, to lead to inhumane or unethical practice.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CULTURE AND IDENTITY 
 
Discussed as a core point of focus by only a few authors, but emerging as a theme that 
threads its way through the work of many, is the construction of doctors’ identity in medical 
culture. In this chapter, I review that work that focuses specifically on the production of 
identities within medical settings. Those authors who make reference to this issue argue that 
not only medical knowledge and practice but also doctors’ selves and self-concepts are 
produced through the process of their training, transforming students into doctors, with all the 
associated ‘doctorly’ characteristics (Mishler, 1984; Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993). 
Authors such as Cicourel (1999) note that this process begins even before the first class is 
held, as selection procedures cast students allowed entry into medical school as ‘special’. 
Thus, the effects of medical socialisation on doctors are deep, affecting not merely their 
professional behavior but their thoughts, feelings and most personal values.  
 
Approaches to the discussion of identity 
Those authors who address the issue of identity do so from a variety of angles. Good and 
DelVecchio-Good (1993) explore what they refer to as the ‘reconstitution’ of medical 
students’ identities as part of the process of socialisation undergone during medical training. 
Martin and Dreyer (2001) address the matter making use of the idea that individuals are 
positioned relative to one another within particular social settings. And Fox (1989), Weiss 
(1993) and Apker and Eggly (2004) have discussed the production of doctors’ identities 
through medical practices such as grand rounds, case conferences, morning report and other 
discursive practices. Other authors have taken different approaches, exploring, for example, 
the narrative reproduction of medicine’s cultural milieu within doctors’ autobiographies 
(Pollock, 2000) and the manner in which the penetration of the medical gaze into the body 
directs the formation of doctors’ identities (Arney & Bergen, 1984).  And Cassel (1992), in 
her study discussed in the previous chapter with reference to the masculine attributes of 
surgeons, goes so far as to claim a personality specific to surgeons. She argues that surgeons 
generally display attributes well-suited to the tasks that they perform, suggesting that the job 
of cutting into human flesh tends to be associated with such characteristics as machismo, 
omnipotence, arrogance and a tendency to paranoia. 
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Apker and Eggly (2004) show how, within routine practices such as morning report, 
communication is employed in the construction of identities consistent with the principles of 
biomedical culture. And again, the importance of science as the basis of medical knowledge, 
culture and practice is central to some of the core works that explore the production of 
doctors’ identities. Both Mishler et al. (1981) and Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993), for 
example, argue that medical students’ and doctors’ perceptions of themselves as scientists is 
fundamental to their understanding of their professional and personal identities. Not only 
does the medical profession prioritise scientific activity, therefore, but doctors actually take 
on the identity of scientists, adopting the associated values of rationality, objectivity and 
neutrality (Mizrahi, 1986; Mishler et al., 1981). Mishler et al. (1981), Mizrahi (1986), as well 
as Apker and Eggly (2004) have argued that the identity of bioscientist, to which doctors 
generally aspire, exerts a profound influence on the way in which medicine is practiced, 
promoting the value of objectivity, marginalising humanistic appr aches to medical practice 
and emphasising the value of scientific accomplishment, irrespective of the patient’s needs. 
In the terms used by Strong and Davis (1978), identities are associated with rights that can be 
invoked to make possible and to justify certain actions, doctors sometimes employing these to 
force particular lines of action within medical encounters.  
 
A number of authors who have addressed the issue of identity in medical practice have 
stressed its dialogical nature, emphasising the production of identity in the interaction 
between doctors, between doctors and patients, and between doctors and other staff within 
the medical setting. Fisher (1986; 1995), and Fisher and Groce (1990), in particular, have 
explored the negotiation of identities within the medical consultation, arguing, for example, 
that the construction of patients as incompetent reinforces the competence and powerful 
position of their doctors, and that not only doctors but patients, too, are active participants in 
these negotiations. Thus, not only do the medical profession and its members influence the 
construction of doctors’ identities, but patients, too, exert their own influence, albeit 
frequently in the form of expectations derived from the values and images put forward by the 
medical profession. For example, patients frequently expect authoritative superiority from 
their doctors, such expectations constraining the extent to which doctors can assume 
alternative identities (Dreyer & Geist, 1993).  
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Doctors as bioscientists 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in terms of the dominance of the scientific perspective 
in medical culture, doctors are shown in the literature to assume the identity of bioscientists. 
Also discussed in the previous chapter, amongst the more disturbing corollaries of this 
identity is the fact that admission of uncertainty or, worse still, of error, becomes an 
unacceptable flaw in the self-confident facades that doctors must wear (Millman, 1977). The 
identity of doctors as bioscientists is thus tightly bound up with constructions of medical 
knowledge as certain and true and with medical definitions of competence in terms of 
potency in the exertion of power over the realities of disease and death (Good & DelVecchio-
Good, 2000). In the words of Obholzer (1994: p173), “Doctors are caught up in the societal 
fantasy about their omnipotence, an unconscious social projective system in which the 
capacity to do heroic things is imputed to them, and they are expected to perform.” As 
discussed with reference to their silence on matters of uncertainty and error, the threat posed 
by the discrepancy between these expectations and the reality produces a situation in which 
individual doctors battle with self doubt and patients remain unprotected from their doctors’ 
attempts to conceal their vulnerability through, for example, withholding information and 
suppressing error (Millman, 1977). 
 
Group identity 
The discussion of identity in the medical profession refers to both individual and collective 
dimensions and a number of authors have noted the existence of a ‘collective identity’ that 
members of the medical profession share. Again, Mizrahi’s work is prominent in reference to 
this topic and she, along with Fox, Good and DelVecchio-Good, amongst others, has 
investigated the socialisation process that medical students undergo on the way to becoming 
doctors and beyond, noting that much of medical education involves learning what it means 
to be a member of the profession. Not only are the identities of individual doctors thus shaped 
through their socialisation in medical training but the ‘rites of passage’ that medical students 
undergo bind them together and set them apart from anyone outside of the medical fraternity 
(Fox, 1989). The identity of bioscientist to which doctors aspire further sets them apart 
through their associated employment of discourses that privilege science and marginalise all 
other forms of practice (Apker & Eggly, 2004), creating a distinct group of medical scientists, 
the boundaries of which are demarcated through the use of technical language, or jargon 
(Wodak, 1996). Authors such as Wodak and Erickson, have explored some of the means by 
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which doctors assert and reaffirm their belonging to the group, for example through rituals of 
talk such as grumbling and moaning (Wodak, 1996), and through the use of linguistic devices 
such as ellipsis when elaboration seems warranted, or alternating between formal scientific 
and casual speech (Erickson, 1999). Erickson notes also some more dangerous markers of 
belonging, including the denigration of patients’ conditions as ‘medically uninteresting’. 
  
The defensive nature of collegiality 
A number of authors have suggested that the collective medical identity developed as a 
defensive response to doctors’ shared sense of vulnerability to error and potential criticism, 
noting that doctors enter the world of medical work as part of a ‘protective cohort’, within 
which they remain, and that provides them both with a sense of belonging and with protection 
from potential criticism (Mizrahi, 1986). However, in the very midst of this ‘protective 
cohort’, there exists the potential for the growth of self-doubt within the individual doctor. 
Between the objective certainty of the group point of view and the individual doctor’s 
attempts to manage inevitable uncertainty within the medical consultation, there exists the 
potential for strain. The uncertainties of the consultation demand that the individual doctor 
exert ethical discretion, bringing his personal subjectivity into view, and at the same time 
rendering him the observer and judge of his own performance (Armstrong, 2002). Other 
authors perhaps allude to the same phenomenon in their discussion, for example, of the ‘twin 
pillars of medical culture’ (Rosenthal, 1999: p. 150), namely medical collegiality and medical 
uncertainty, arguing that these produce both the need and the means for adoption of a highly 
defensive position.  The continuous presence of uncertainty and fallibility mean that doctors 
share a powerful sense of vulnerability (Rosenthal, 1995). In her interviews with doctors, 
Rosenthal (1995: p. 20) reveals the frequency with which they make statements in respect of 
the errors of others such as “that could happen to me,” and “there but for the grace of God go 
I.”  She argues that this shared sense of vulnerability reinforces doctors’ mutual identification 
with one another, producing what she terms a “powerful mix of blame...and professional 
leniency” (1999: p. 162), in terms of which explanations are sought in the patient or 
anywhere else outside of the profession when things go wrong.  
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Collegiality and accountability 
Particularly relevant to the arguments proposed in this thesis is the relationship identified by 
Mizrahi, Fox and Rosenthal between group solidarity, or collegiality, and accountability. 
According to Fox (1989), the existence of the collective medical identity is amongst those 
factors contributing to the belief that doctors alone are qualified to evaluate and regulate their 
activities, a belief that has resulted in the establishment of autonomy of the medical 
profession, as discussed above, and hence its relative immunity to external attempts at critical 
evaluation and regulation. Within the professional group too, individual doctors are 
discouraged from facing the consequences of, and accepting responsibility for, questionable 
actions. Not only does membership of the collectivity enable individual doctors to avoid 
experiencing responsibility for unfortunate actions as specifically their own (Mizrahi, 1986), 
but the norm of non-criticism discourages doctors from voicing or even inwardly 
acknowledging the occurrence of erroneous or otherwise questionable events. As Millman 
(1977) points out, as soon as one doctor calls attention to his own or to the errors of another, 
or admits to a feeling of guilt, the fallibility of the entire institution of medicine and of all its 
members is made visible. Instead, medical students are carefully taught not to recognise as 
error what the outside world would, and medical routines such as case reviews are not so 
much intended to reveal the truth about what actually happened, as designed to restore the 
image of the meticulous practitioner and to disguise the carelessness of unfortunate actions.  
 
According to Paget (1988), not only do the rules of professional etiquette forbid the 
expression of criticism of a colleague but even the assumption of a critical attitude. Paget 
argues that the prevalence of this norm both unites doctors defensively against the lay 
community and, at the same time, allows individual doctors a maximum level of 
independence and autonomy, the combination rendering the medical profession a “delinquent 
community” in which etiquette is prioritised over accountability. Hence, knowledge of poor 
practice remains unrecognised within a closed community, resulting, according to Alsop and 
Mulcahy (1999), in a failure of the medical profession to appreciate the concerns of its 
patients or even their right to be heard. Poor practice remains unaddressed and the collective 
understandings that enabled its occurrence are reinforced, free from the intrusion of 
competing discourses. In addition, these authors argue that exclusion of non-members, 
including hospital management, from information about complaints or other indicators of the 
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possible occurrence of poor practice means that the pathways leading to its taking place are 
never examined and both learning and risk management are, in the process, inhibited.  
 
‘Us and them’ 
As Zagier-Roberts (1994) points out, the identity of any group always includes a dimension 
of being alternative to some other group. In the case of the identity of doctors, authors such as 
Rothman (2003) and DelVecchio-Good and Good (2000) have pointed out that the ‘iron 
curtain’ that exists between doctors and patients has been erected in part through the 
profession’s historical development, leaving doctors isolated in a world of disease and death 
(Rothman, 2003).  
 
In the years after 1945, the house call disappeared as the doctor’s primary means of accessing 
his patients and was replaced by the current system, within which patients visit their doctors 
in unfamiliar medical surrounds, isolated from their lived environments, their personal 
contexts hidden from the doctor’s view (Rothman, 2003). This situation, Rothman points out, 
has produced a real gap between doctors and patients, compounding the effects of the 
symbolic one and resulting in a situation in which, by the 1960s, few people could be 
expected to remember the last time they met their doctors with their clothes on! In addition to 
the disappearance of the house call, the ever-increasing trend toward specialisation within the 
medical profession has meant that the majority of doctors are trained in the functioning of 
one specific part of the human body, increasing their tendency to lose sight of the whole 
person to which that part belongs. This, in addition to the increasing emphasis on 
technological medicine and the external pressures placed on doctors’ time, has resulted in a 
view of “linger(ing) at the (patient’s) bedside” (Rothman, 2003: p. 131) as a luxury in which 
few doctors can afford to indulge (DelVecchio-Good & Good, 2000).  
 
Katz (1984) and Dreyer and Geist (1993) have highlighted the opposing constructions that 
dominate the characterisation of doctors’ and patients’ identities within medical culture, 
arguing that these revolve around constructions of doctors as entirely rational and patients as 
utterly irrational. Both Katz and Zagier-Roberts (1994) have pointed to the defensive nature 
and function of these polarisations, suggesting that doctors project their irrationalities onto 
their patients in what Katz (1984: p. 150) calls “one of the most pervasive and fateful 
countertransference reactions.” Thus, the medical world is characterised by what Fisher 
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(1986) refers to as a ‘two-place logic’, in terms of which people are defined as ‘doctor’ or 
‘not doctor’.  
 
As Fox (1989) points out, within the world of the hospital, the distinction is not merely a 
conceptual one. Rather, it is enacted and made real by its participants, groups of doctors and 
patients coexisting and interacting with one another but their experiences remaining 
altogether separate. This social distance between groups is not merely brought into being 
through the actions of individuals who perceive themselves as different from one another but 
is in fact formally prescribed. According to Goffman (1961), within ‘total institutions’, of 
which the hospital is one, the flow of communication between groups is restricted, in 
particular with regard to the flow of information. This restriction manifests inevitably in the 
familiar situation in which doctors withhold information from their patients about the plans 
that they have for them. Even talk between the groups may be conducted in a special tone of 
voice, reserved for interactions across boundaries. In another landmark publication by Ruth 
Wodak in 1996, entitled, ‘Disorders of discourse,’ this author details the linguistic means by 
which understanding between groups - in particular patients’ understanding of doctors - is 
obfuscated by the use of jargon, acronyms and complex sentence constructions. As Wodak 
points out, the technical jargon used by members of the medical profession serves not only to 
construct doctors’ identities but simultaneously produces an opposing marginalised group, 
namely patients, whose talk is worth much less than that of doctors and who are unable to 
understand their doctors’ speech. The result, Wodak  argues, is misunderstanding between 
mutually distinct ‘cognitive worlds’ and a situation that she terms ‘frame-conflict’, and that 
involves the collision of separate worlds of knowledge. This collision, she notes, has a 
predictable outcome, namely the dominance of that group most linguistically competent 
within the setting.  
 
In the more recent work of Maynard (2003) and Andersen (2004), as well as that of Mizrahi 
(1986), these authors have discussed the potential effects on care of the rigid distinction 
between groups in hospital contexts. Maynard explores the increased likelihood that doctors 
will be non-empathetic toward patients who are more dissimilar from themselves, frequently 
displaying ‘cold’ and ‘heartless’ behaviour toward those whose socio-economic backgrounds 
are markedly different from their own. Offering an explanation of this finding, Andersen 
argues that indifference and discrimination tend to be perceived as more justifiable when 
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directed toward members of an out-group. This allegation is well illustrated in Mizrahi’s 
1986 study in which she quotes a doctor as explaining that “you’re allowed to disparage 
patients and to objectify them and to care less about them as people...when you turn them into 
something other than human...” (p. 34), implying the importance of identification in applying 
the norm of good treatment.  
 
Labelling patients 
Not only is it argued that doctors and patients differentiate themselves rigidly from one 
another but also that they conceive of each other in terms of hostile stereotypes. As early as 
1961, Irving Goffman, in “Asylums,” described the staff in what he termed ‘total institutions’ 
as tending to see the inmates as bitter, untrustworthy and secretive, and they, as seen in turn 
by the inmates, as mean, high-handed and condescending. Such stereotypes have nevertheless 
been found to reflect feelings of anger and hostility and to be associated with the delivery of 
less compassionate care (Mizrahi, 1986).   
 
Amongst the more frequently discussed labels applied to patients are those attributed to 
‘problem’ patients who in one way or another fail to conform to the expectations held of 
‘good’ patients.  While ‘good’ patients cooperate unquestioningly with hospital staff, 
allowing medical routines to continue uninterrupted, ‘problem’ patients violate these norms 
and fall short of the values dear to the medical relationship (Fisher & Groce, 1985). Murcott’s 
(1981) argument that such categorisations aim merely to improve the efficient functioning of 
hospital staff appears thin in the face of the number of instances in which social distance has 
been shown to be associated with classification of patients as ‘bad’ (Fisher & Groce, 1985; 
Strong & Davis, 1978).  
 
Other authors, such as Mizrahi, have argued that not only those patients who violate accepted 
medical norms, are from different socio-economic backgrounds than their doctors or are 
identified as derelicts, drunks or otherwise morally reprehensible, are labelled as ‘bad’. 
Mizrahi (1986) argues for a situation in which all patients are ‘damned if they do and damned 
if they don’t’, either seeking medical help too early or for too minor concerns, and thus 
establishing themselves as ‘system abusers’, or attending to their ailments too late and thus 
fixing their identities as ‘self-abusers’. In both instances, these identities render the relevant 
patients less worthy of care and are associated with avoidant behaviour on the part of the 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
48 
 
relevant professional. Disturbingly, Mizrahi (1986) found that two thirds of the house staffers 
in her study admitted differential treatment of pejoratively labelled patients, a figure that rose 
to three quarters when differential treatment was defined to include acts of omission. The 
characterisation of patients in terms of disempowering traits justifies their marginalisation, 
obviating, for example, the need for informative communication with people who are too 
ignorant or otherwise incompetent to participate effectively in the medical relationship. Such 
characterisation, says Millman (1977: p. 202), “is the prime justification for the profession’s 
inclination to make the client at best a passive participant in the work – to, in essence, remove 
from the client his everyday status as an adult citizen, to minimise his essential capacity to 
reason and his right to dignity.” Not only is the quality of care administered to ‘bad’ patients 
thus inferior by the doctors’ own standards but the very existence of labels deprives patients 
of their dignity and in itself, Atkinson (1995) argues, represents the “utmost abuse of 
professionals’ discursive power” (p. 33). The asymmetry in the relationship, he continues, is 
such that the consultation’s overtly benign purpose is overridden by a situation in which the 
patient is transformed from the interaction’s beneficiary into its victim. 
 
Medical culture, identity, self-doubt and defences 
A number of authors (Fox, 1957; Mizrahi, 1986; Katz, 1984; Cassell, 1992; and Zagier-
Roberts, 1994) have argued that the above features of medical culture, along with the 
associated construction of the identities of both doctors and patients, produce conflict and 
self-doubt in the management of doctors’ identities, and frequently result in their assumption 
of defensive attitudes and strategies, with potentially harmful consequences. Authors 
including Freidson (1970) and Speck (1994) have argued that traditional medical 
understandings, in terms of which the all-powerful doctor literally holds the patient’s life in 
his hands, lead to the contingent belief that doctors are necessarily to blame for poor 
outcomes of care. In these terms, doctors tend to perceive and experience even seemingly 
inevitable deaths as indicators of failure (Mizrahi, 1986). Obholzer (1994) suggests that this 
perception stems from the unspoken collusion in which both doctors and patients are 
motivated to maintain the belief that good medical care prevents illness and death in their 
joint effort to protect patients from their fears of dying and doctors from the anxiety 
engendered by recognition of their fallibility. Obholzer (1994: p. 174), echoing the earlier 
comments of Paget (1988), further argues that, on the contrary, “a great deal of what goes on 
(in the hospital) is not about dramatic rescue but rather about facing one’s relative 
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helplessness in the face of illness and death.” The lack of preparation in medical education 
and socialisation for this reality, he argues, accounts for much of the low morale and high 
turnover observable amongst doctors and other hospital staff. And Zagier-Roberts (1994) 
notes that one of the primary features of care work is that it is the carer’s self that is seen as 
the instrument. Thus, medical failure is equated with failure of the self and can produce 
doubts that endanger the maintenance of doctors’ positive self-identity.  
 
A very little explored area, these constructions set doctors up to grapple endlessly with issues 
of culpability and responsibility (Mizrahi, 1984), a pastime that Mizrahi, amongst others, 
including Dreyer and Geist (1993) and Andersen (2004), have shown to be fraught with 
evidence of avoidance. Atkinson (2004) discusses extensively the attribution of responsibility 
in talk between doctors, as they establish their own competence in discussing patients and the 
evidential bases of their assessments. As discussed by a number of authors, including Good 
and DelVecchio-Good, Dartington, Oberholzer, Mizrahi, Mishler and Goffman, amongst 
others, doctors’ deep fear of failure can provoke defensive reactions. As these authors point 
out, there are a whole variety of compelling reasons why doctors are particularly prone to the 
development of defensive coping mechanisms. In addition to the constructions prevalent in 
medical culture and to the formation of doctors’ identities in tandem with these, doctors are 
trained under immense pressure, including long hours, sleep deprivation, overwhelming 
workload and extreme pressure to perform (Mizrahi, 1984; 1986). Combined with the 
powerlessness they experience to reverse many disease processes, these pressures are highly 
conducive to the development of defensive strategies (Mizrahi, 1986). Medical culture also 
makes no allowance for doctors to process their emotional responses to what are often deeply 
distressing or horrific events. Rather than training or otherwise assisting doctors to cope with 
their experiences, events such as death are medicalised, addressed only in technical terms and 
their affective dimensions obliterated from view  (Good & DelVecchio-Good, 2000).  
 
Some healthy defences are certainly in order if doctors are to protect themselves from stress 
in order to continue the work task (Dartington, 1994; Cohn, 1994) and to maintain emotional 
balance so as to be able to function effectively in their work roles (Coombs and Goldman, 
1973). And overwhelming numbers of cases sometimes necessitate that doctors narrow the 
scope of their interactions with their patients in order to be able to attend to all of them 
(Mizrahi, 1986). However, these and other authors have argued that in many instances, the 
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defences that doctors develop in order to cope with their situations are in fact maladaptive. 
While the process whereby doctors become hardened to horror and to the suffering of their 
patients has been referred to as one of ‘settling in’, Obholzer, arguing for its pathological 
nature, calls it instead a “flight from reality” (p. 174). Mizrahi (1986) and Dartington (1994) 
argue that many of doctors’ defences produce negative consequences, for example 
indifference, or, in extreme cases, ‘manic denial’, a defensive response in terms of which 
doctors manufacture excitement  in order to obliterate despair (Dartington, 1994).  
 
The notion of ‘detached concern’ provides a good example of the potential for healthy coping 
mechanisms to become maladaptive defences. In the first years of medical training, students 
are taught to develop detachment so as to assist them in coping with their feelings of 
helplessness and vulnerability when exposed to distressing realities. Later in the curriculum, 
they are encouraged to develop concern, the intended outcome being a stance of ‘detached 
concern’ from where doctors are able to offer empathic but nevertheless objective treatment 
to their patients (Mishler et al., 1981). However, what can and all too frequently does happen 
is that doctors become overdetached, no longer able to empathise with their patients and 
indifferent to, rather than somewhat distantiated from, their suffering (Mishler et al., 1981). 
In Mizrahi’s (1986) study, such overdetachment is shown to foster the GROP approach to 
patient care.  
 
One of the key elements of these defences is that they are not just theorized as individual 
responses to emotionally distressing circumstances but are perceived as features of the 
medical culture, arising from shared feelings of guilt and responsibility (Mizrahi, 1984). As 
Mizrahi points out, the inevitability of error is so pervasive in medical practice that those who 
do not believe that they have killed a patient by the end of their medical training are 
considered lucky. Thus, medical culture makes available a repertoire of means for dealing 
with distress and for avoiding responsibility, comprising, for example, of commonly held 
beliefs such as, ‘everyone makes mistakes,’ designed to help doctors cope with the 
sometimes horrific, unintended consequences of  their actions. Medical culture does not 
encourage emotional responses to events, as these represent threats to the whole system 
(Dartington, 1994). Instead, senior doctors effectively say to junior ones, “This is how we 
ignore what is going on. Pretend along with us and soon you will be one of us” (Obholzer, 
1994: p. 174). Thus, through examples set by senior doctors, as well as through the pressure 
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exerted by the peer group in the form, for example, of humour or ridicule, doctors are 
socialised into culturally prescribed ways of responding to events (Hafferty, 1991). 
 
Blame is the most frequently mentioned avoidance mechanism and the shared understandings 
invoked to justify what might otherwise be viewed as bad practice generally include 
externalisation of responsibility onto an object or other, such as the bureaucracy, a 
subordinate or the disease, that is beyond the relevant doctors’ control (Mizrahi, 1984; 
Wodak, 2006b). Blame represents the all-time justification for poor delivery of care, for 
patients’ mistreatment and for their doctors’ acquittal, anchoring the cause of problematic 
events outside of the relevant organisation, and transforming the patient into the hospital’s or 
doctors’ ultimate enemy, against whom they need to be defended. Mizrahi (1986; 1984), 
Paget (1988) and Zagier-Roberts (1994) explore and illustrate the relationship between blame 
and bad practice, arguing, in essence, that “blaming the other...sets the other apart,” and that 
“the apartness of the other is like the apartness of the self who has disowned his own faults” 
(Paget, 1988: p. 154). As the ultimate ‘other’ and prime targets for this externalised 
responsibility, patients are thus ‘discredited’ (Mishler et al., 1981), blamed for their doctors’ 
failings, for being sick in the first place and for not getting better. Hostility and aggression on 
the part of doctors are experienced as originating, not from themselves, but from external 
sources; and the tables are turned, doctors experiencing persecution by their patients (Zagier-
Roberts, 1994). Both aggressive acts and errors can therefore be pinned on patients, who are 
perceived as having failed to reveal the information required for accurate diagnosis, as ‘poor 
historians’ or even as having intentionally deceived their doctors (Mizrahi, 1984). Mizrahi 
thus describes a “world of contradictions wherein the patient (is) oppressed while being 
characterised as the oppressor” (p. 35). Patients, despised as abusers, are thus subjected to 
abuse, shunned by their doctors, given perfunctory care or, for example, resuscitated without 
vigour (Mizrahi, 1986). 
 
In combination with the status of object that is ascribed to patients, encouraging doctors to 
disidentify rather than empathise with their patients, Szasz and Hollender (1997) have argued 
that blame increases the likelihood that doctors will subject their patients to inferior 
treatment, as they are transformed not only into enemies but into enemies devoid of their 
human nature. Lorber (1975) has documented the kinds of treatment that these negatively 
intoned interactions can produce, arguing that these include acts and omissions that constitute 
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punishment and neglect. 
 
Other defences discussed in the literature include denial, in terms of which doctors are 
alleged to avoid feelings of guilt, anxiety and grief for any damage the patient might have 
suffered as a result of their ministrations (Zagier-Roberts, 1994), or in terms of which they 
negate concepts such as that of error, in order to redefine questionable actions on their part as, 
for example, judgement calls within ‘grey areas’ of medical practice (Mizrahi, 1986). Related 
defences, such as repression, may enable doctors to actually forget what really happened, 
remembering instead a less threatening version of events. Such means of dealing with 
affective responses such as anxiety and guilt have huge implications for accountability, 
especially when they occur within the context of collegiality that characterises medical 
culture. Iedema (2007) analyses what he refers to as critical incident reports, in which doctors 
narrate instances of medical failure in which they have been involved. Exploring such aspects 
of these narratives as the use of the passive voice to describe erroneous actions, euphemistic 
references to death and the structure of the texts, Iedema shows how some of the authors of 
these texts respond defensively to the task of narrating failure and make use of these 
constructions to diminish the serious nature of the relevant errors. Also employed are devices 
involving the attribution of responsibility, and depersonalisation of responses, with potential 
consequences for the management of clinical activities and associated risks. Mizrahi (1986) 
argues that even in instances in which neglect or harm do not result from the adoption of 
these defences, the dehumanising climate that they create is unconducive to harmonious 
relationships between doctors and patients (Mizrahi, 1986) and can create feelings of 
estrangement and abandonment in patients (Katz, 1984). 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have addressed representations of the construction of identity in the literature 
on medical culture, attempting to integrate themes exploring the collective nature of medical 
identity with those investigating the relationship between collegiality and accountability. 
Through articulating this relationship I have attempted to highlight linkages between these 
aspects of medical culture and the possibility for poor medical practice.  I have explored the 
association of this collective identity with the binary construction of doctors and patients, 
resulting in the potential for hostile and discriminatory treatment, a potential that is enhanced 
by the psychic defences shown in the literature to be engendered by these aspects of medical 
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culture, contributing to the possibility of over-detachment, avoidance of responsibility and 
distressing emotion, and patient blame, with associated consequences for the delivery of care.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POWER IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 
 
The power of the medical profession is multi-dimensional and multi-layered, existing at all 
levels of the professional body, from its institutional structure and relationship with the rest 
of society, to the minutiae of its members’ interactions with their patients in medical 
encounters. This chapter sets out to review discussions of power within the literature on 
medical practice, with a particular view to articulating the relationship between themes 
arising in these discussions and the possibility for abusive practice and delivery of inhumane 
care. As in the previous chapters, these links are sometimes made explicit by the authors 
themselves and at other times not. Interrelationships between the various themes discussed 
under this broad construct are represented in this body of work only to the extent that the 
different authors are responsive to one another’s work. My aim in this chapter is once again, 
therefore, to establish the linkages between the sometimes disparately appearing themes in 
discussions of medical power and between these and violations of medical ethical standards 
and of patients’ rights. 
 
Discussions of power in medicine largely parallel those of culture and identity in medical 
practice. This is partly because these issues are closely interrelated in the literature, 
frequently appearing as part and parcel of the same discussions by the same authors. The 
reader will note that many of those authors whose work is most prominent in the previous 
chapters occupy the same position in this chapter. The separation of the three themes in this 
review is thus somewhat artificial and serves my purpose of attempting to organise a complex 
mass of material, rather than representing distinct bodies of work. However, there are also 
distinctions between the areas of discussion, although not in the work of every author. Some 
authors deal only with issues of medical culture and or identity, ignoring the matter of power. 
These authors appear in the previous chapters but will not be included in this chapter. Others 
tackle the issue of power explicitly and with little reference to other features of medical 
culture or the identities that emerge within it. Their work appears in this chapter but not in the 
others. From my point of view, the relationship between issues of medical culture, identity 
and power can most usefully be construed as reciprocally related. Each informs and enables 
the others in such a way that none can be adequately understood without reference to the 
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others. This relationship will be evident throughout this chapter, as discussions of medical 
power cohere around key themes in those of medical culture and identity and vice versa. The 
core distinction between the three chapters, then, is that the first highlights in discussions of 
medical practice themes that can be classified as describing elements of medical culture; the 
second highlights in these same discussions themes that can be classified as describing the 
identities that emerge within medical culture; and the current chapter lifts out, again often 
from the same material, those themes that can be characterised as primarily addressing the 
issue of medical power.  
 
The institutional power of medicine 
The power held by the medical profession as an institution is the first theme that I will 
address in this chapter. As is the case with respect to the relationship between medical 
culture, identity and power, that between the institutional power of the medical profession 
and the manifestation and enactment of power at the interpersonal level is reciprocal. Any 
separation of the two areas of discussion thus represents a conceptual distinction, intended to 
clarify concepts and assist in effective organisation of the relevant material, rather than to 
imply their independent functioning. Having said that, there is, however, a more clear-cut 
distinction in the literature dealing with medical power between those authors who address 
the issue at the institutional level and those whose focus is more attuned to the operation of 
power at the interpersonal level. Rather than driven by a conviction that the two aspects of 
power exist independently of one another, however, this division seems to arise from the 
theoretical backgrounds of the relevant authors, which channel their focus toward either the 
macro or micro dimensions of social reality. As will be discussed in the course of this 
chapter, there are also those authors who, more in keeping with my own theoretical 
orientation, which will become more evident as I address their work, highlight the 
relationship between the two levels. As my chief concern is with abuse of patients by doctors 
and delivery of inhumane care, which, while occurring in a reciprocal relationship to the 
institutional context, are manifest at the interpersonal level, I will address those aspects of the 
discussion of medical power within the literature that are limited to a concern with the 
institutional dimension only relatively briefly.  
 
Theoretical approaches to institutional power  
Those authors who have addressed the institutional power held by the medical profession 
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have done so from various theoretical perspectives. Since the focus in this thesis is on tracing 
pathways through which imbalanced power contributes to inhumane and abusive practices, 
theoretical discussion of the nature and concept of power is outside of its scope. Suffice to 
say that, while very few authors make their theoretical stance explicit, the variety of 
perspectives has led to substantive differences in the ways in which these authors have 
approached the issue of the institutional power of medicine. Functionalist perspectives, 
predominant in the literature prior to the 1970’s, conceptualise power as the inevitable and 
necessary outcome of expert knowledge. Headed up by Talcott Parsons, this viewpoint has, to 
a very large extent, been shouted down by approaches more critical of medical power, led 
early on by the sociologist, Eliot Freidson (1970a; 1970b; 1975). A modified functionalist 
approach does, however, continue to inform the work of certain authors in the field. While 
Parsons’s original perspective denied the possibility for conflict between doctors and patients, 
and for the abuse of power by doctors (Turner, 1995), more recent writers who adopt a 
functionalist stance make allowance for these possibilities. David Silverman, for example, 
argues that the fact that doctors have greater medical knowledge than patients is necessary to 
the medical relationship and that a power imbalance is an unavoidable consequence of this 
fact. He acknowledges, however, that this power imbalance holds the potential for both 
positive and negative consequences. The very thing that enables doctors to successfully treat 
their patients, the powerful position that results from greater knowledge is also open to abuse. 
To ask of the medical profession that it relinquish its power would, however, be to ask that it 
dissolve itself altogether, a suggestion that would serve the interests of no one (Silverman, 
1987).  
 
Other approaches conceptualise power as the product of the relationship between the medical 
profession and lay society. Power, in these terms, is conceptualised by some authors as 
produced through a consensual relationship within which lay society willingly subordinates 
itself in the interests of a common goal, namely the prevention and cure of disease. Power is 
thus not inherent in superior knowledge but revolves around its use, and domination is 
perceived as legitimate (Cicourel, 1999). Other authors have opposed this benevolent 
construction of the workings of power within the medical profession, proposing that, rather 
than a consensual and mutually beneficial relationship between medicine and society, the 
relationship is a conflictual one, in terms of which each party struggles to achieve power and 
status. Medical dominance is the result of this struggle and is maintained through the 
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autonomous control exercised by the medical profession over its work (Lupton, 2003). In 
Foucauldian terms, knowledge and power are almost inseparable, networks of power 
producing knowledges, such as medical knowledge, which in turn further the power of some 
groups over others – in this case furthering the power of the medical profession over the lay 
public (Lupton, 2003). Constructionist approaches prioritise interpersonal interaction in the 
production of structural arrangements, exploring the moment-by-moment processes within 
which medical power is produced and reproduced between individuals. While I mention these 
here because they do represent an approach to understanding the institutional context of 
medical power, constructionist standpoints tend to direct authors’ focus toward the micro-
details of interpersonal interaction and will thus be addressed in that section of this chapter 
that deals with this aspect of the discussion.  
 
Most in keeping with my own theoretical standpoint, and as detailed in the previous chapter, 
Fisher (1986) brings together structuralist and constructionist approaches in her ‘contextual 
web metaphor’, highlighting the reciprocal relationship between the “organisational and 
structural arrangements of society” and the “core of spoken interaction” (p. 18). Fisher’s 
contextual web allows for both the very real influences of social structures and for the agency 
of the individual in his response to these, in particular contexts and in interaction with others.  
Thus, power is produced both by broad social structures and by individuals’ responses to 
these and to each other within such structures.  
 
Key elements of the medical profession’s institutional power  
Within the literature addressing the institutional power held by the medical profession, two 
key themes emerge as representing the basis of medical dominance – possession of esoteric 
knowledge and freedom from external control. The two are clearly interrelated as esoteric 
knowledge is precisely what frees the medical profession from outside evaluation, allowing 
the claim that only a member of the profession is competent to judge the practice of another. 
The two are clearly related also to key components of the discussion of medical culture, in 
which the construction of scientific knowledge as superior and issues of medical silence and 
non-accountability represent core dimensions. In this section I will attempt to synthesize 
threads that appear in the literature addressing these themes that have relevance for the aim of 
this thesis to provide insight into the occurrence of inhumane care and medical abuse. 
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Medical knowledge 
At the core of almost every discussion of both the structural, or institutional, and 
interpersonal manifestations of medical power resides the issue of knowledge, and perhaps all 
other themes pertinent to this discussion are in one way or another related to it. The immense 
power generated by the possession of knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular, is 
clearly articulated by Habermas, who characterises scientific knowledge as “ideology par 
excellence, precisely because it claims to be above – that is, objective and value neutral” 
(Habermas, cited in Waitzkin, 1989: p224). Whether medical knowledge is accepted as 
superior in nature and therefore inherently powerful, whether it is viewed as a resource to be 
controlled and used in the interests of control, or whether it is conceptualised as inseparable 
from the power relations and social interactions within which it is produced, and which it 
maintains, it is generally accepted that superior knowledge, or the claim to superior 
knowledge, is the cornerstone of medical power.  
 
By virtue of its esoteric nature, medical knowledge, deemed incomprehensible to anyone 
outside of the profession, is under the sole control of medical professionals. In addition to the 
status that such knowledge confers on its keepers, the control of medical knowledge renders 
the lay public dependent on the medical profession for access to and interpretation of the 
relevant knowledge, maintaining the cycle of domination (Borges, 1986) and posing serious 
implications for the public’s ability to participate responsibly in their own treatment 
(Millman, 1977), or to evaluate the treatment provided to them by professionals. As Katz 
warns, “the esoteric knowledge excuse has been employed sweepingly in order to keep silent 
about the simplest as well as the most complex medical interventions” (1984: p. 92).  
 
Not only esoteric in nature, medical knowledge, as scientific knowledge, has a very special 
status, as detailed in the previous chapter with reference to the superior status attributed to 
scientific knowledge over all other forms of knowledge. Through its claim to objectivity, 
scientific knowledge assumes direct access to absolute truth, differentiating itself from all 
other knowledge, which is acknowledged to be produced through a process of interpretation. 
In distinguishing itself thus from the personal and political interests associated with human 
interpretations, scientific knowledge simultaneously shields itself from any external 
evaluations of the ‘truths’ it reveals (Wicks, 1998). The “hallmark of masculine power” 
(Benjamin, as cited in Wicks, 1998: p 94), objectivity promotes the development of a 
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patriarchal relationship between the medical profession and lay society, one that allows 
further justification of medical non-disclosure under the guise of protecting patients and the 
public from truths that lend themselves, in these terms, to construction as possibly damaging 
to their health and well-being (Katz, 1984). 
 
A further feature of scientific knowledge pertains to its supposed ability to predict and 
thereby control the natural world. In the words of Borges (1986: p. 27), this power renders 
scientific, and hence medical, knowledge “the archetype of domination.” And, Borges argues, 
“with the domination of nature follows the domination of man.” The promise of the 
eradication of disease afforded by this control places the medical profession at the pinnacle of 
society's hope for salvation, conferring on them a monopoly over health (Katz, 1984) and, 
along with its claim to objectivity, giving medical knowledge a status that no one has the 
right to resist. The medical profession is thus granted the freedom to do anything, “including 
violating all social rules of modesty and decorum” (Arney & Bergen, 1984: p. 3), so long as 
its actions can be shown to be in the patient’s best interest. In conjunction with its esoteric 
nature, in terms of which it is impossible to disclose to anyone outside of the profession 
exactly what such medical actions are, or why they are necessary, the door is opened to the 
abuse of power and of those who seek medical help.  
 
Again outlined in the previous chapter, some of the authors mentioned above, as well as a 
number of others, have argued that these attributes confer on medical knowledge a status that 
parallels that of religion. Foucault is amongst the key figures pointing to the parallel between 
science and religion, arguing that, with the rise of science, doctors came to fill the role 
previously performed by priests. This parallel has been persuasively argued to be more than 
merely metaphorical. With the universally desired ideal of health and postponement of death 
in mind, and with scientific knowledge at their disposal, doctors are able to formulate the 
rules for correct living (van der Geest, 2005). Science, and biomedicine in particular, thus 
becomes the canon of ultimate truth (Turner, 1995). Medical power lies, therefore, “in the 
capacity to speak to another who must listen silently if he wants to hear the truth spoken” 
(Arney & Bergen, 1984: p. 4).  Medicine thus acquires a position of total authority over not 
only medical needs but, more broadly, the rules of healthy living for society in general and 
for individual patients in particular, who must accept medical judgments without question 
(Katz, 1984). Doctors, Katz argues, having thus established their access to the truth and their 
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ability to cure disease and prevent imminent death, become not just like priests but like gods, 
to whom we all turn for mercy in times of crisis - in the words of Hippocrates himself, “The 
gods are the real physicians” (Katz, 1984: p. 8). Thus, a highly exaggerated belief in the 
infallibility of medical knowledge, as science applied by the new gods, is constructed and, to 
maintain the professional identity, needs to be itself maintained.  
Autonomy 
Almost certainly the most influential writer in shaping this field, Eliot Freidson (1970a; 
1970b; 1975) was amongst the first to address the issue of the autonomous control of the 
medical profession over its own regulation. The monopoly exercised by the medical 
profession over both access to and application of medical knowledge, renders the profession 
autonomous or self-regulating. As a self-regulating body, members of the medical profession, 
by virtue of their status as such and their presumed dedication to their patients' best interests, 
have sole authority to monitor their own and each other's practices (Freidson, 1975). 
Exercised indirectly through licensing and training requirements, this form of regulation is 
considered by those authors who discuss it to be less effective in practice than in theory, the 
vestige of so much authority in one group raising concerns about the effectiveness of 
regulatory measures, and about their susceptibility to the influences of the said group's 
interests (Freidson, 1970a; Millman, 1977).  
 
While the crux of the medical p ofession’s argument for independent regulation lies in its 
claim to esoteric knowledge that is objective and consequently neutral, Millman (1977) 
argues that it is in fact social, economic and political judgments and evaluations that 
determine the application of medical knowledge. Since such judgments are, theoretically, as 
accessible to the general public as they are to the medical profession, Millman (1977) argues 
that social and political power, rather than expertise, determines the doctor’s ability to make 
them. Initially, during the nineteenth century, anyone could take up the practice of medicine, 
making use of violent measures to purge patients of their illnesses and employing very little, 
if any (by later standards), scientific knowledge (Fisher, 1986). Close connections between 
educated groups and, initially, kings and subsequently parliament and other legislative 
bodies, enabled these groups to support one another in their mutual pursuit of power and 
authority, setting the stage for the development of the current medical monopoly, in fact 
established before medical procedures became either sophisticated or safe (Katz, 1984). 
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Rather than driven by objective scientific knowledge, therefore, medical practice is shown to 
be guided by moral and inevitably self-interested decision-making. In short, Millman (1977: 
p. 201) argues that medical decisions are made on the basis of the “convenience, interests and 
limited perspectives of those who take them,” all under the guise of protection (Borges, 
1986). As Millman (1977) notes, when doctors in an emergency room punish patients who 
present with conditions not deemed to be real emergencies, these actions are guided by the 
self-interested application of medical knowledge to protect their own and their group 
members' interests. And, as Fisher (1986) points out, it is generally accepted that young 
doctors practicing in teaching hospitals are motivated to perform procedures and treatments 
on less powerful patients for the learning opportunities that they provide, rather than for the 
benefit to the patients.  
 
In the light of these arguments, the danger of ineffectiveness in the medical profession’s self-
regulatory measures seems all the greater. Wherever there is power, there is potential for 
abuse, and when the less powerful party is dependent on the more powerful one, as is the case 
in the relationship between the medical professional and society, all the more so. In the case 
of medicine these dangers are compounded by its esoteric status and protective guise, in 
terms of which it is assumed, on the one hand, that the profession’s absolute authority is 
necessary and unavoidable and, on the other, that its altruism protects its patients from abuse 
(Katz, 1984). With what Borges (1986: p. 28) refers to as “the invincible ideology of 'service' 
and protection as its justification,” obscuring not just the incidence but the possibility of 
malpractice, the “potential for exploitation is enormous.”  
 
The escalation of medical power has been argued by some authors (see, for example, 
Lewinsohn, 1998; Kelleher et al., 1994; Charles, Gafnia &Whelan, 1999; Lupton, 2003; 
Phillips, 1996; Scambler & Britten, 2001; and Hogarth & Marks,1998), to have been slowed 
by a variety of factors including the advent of medical consumerism, which has returned 
some power to patients (Potter & McKinlay, 2005). While no doubt valid in claiming that 
neither individual doctors, nor the medical profession holds power to quite the extent that it 
used to, these arguments are of limited relevance to this thesis, which addresses and attempts 
to explain a situation in which power was actually abused. In the remainder of this chapter I 
will turn to discussions of the workings of power between individuals and the opportunities 
that they present for abuse. 
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Interpersonal dimensions of medical power 
The workings of power in actual medical settings are complex and, for the most part, 
intangible, providing a rich area for investigation, and one that has been addressed thoroughly 
in the literature. In the words of Wicks (1998: p. 91),  
 
“Power is ever-present within health care settings. It is evident in the way people walk, in the 
way they communicate, in who gets recognised as having a presence and who gets ignored. It 
is evident in the tone people use when they speak, whether loudly or softly, and whether or 
not their words receive answers.”  
 
While the presence of power is manifestly obvious in medical settings, therefore, its basis, 
operations and effects are not always equally so.   
 
In this section I will review those themes in the literature that pertain to the power imbalances 
between individual doctors and patients in medical encounters. As in the case of discussions 
of institutional power, many of the same themes in terms of which I have organised 
discussions of medical culture will structure those of the workings of medical power at the 
interpersonal level, highlighting the interrelatedness of these discussions and their inseparable 
nature in reality. This chapter therefore combines additional elements of the work of many of 
the authors discussed in the previous chapter with that of other authors whose focus is more 
narrowly on the enactment of power, arguing that the status of the profession and the 
elements of medical culture, as enacted within the imbalanced power relationships that 
characterise medical encounters, further enable inhumane practice and the violation of 
patients’ rights.  
 
Approaches to the operation of power at the interpersonal level 
A great number of authors have discussed the power imbalances that result from the 
institutional and cultural settings discussed in the previous chapter, as they manifest in the 
interactions between individual doctors and patients. As in the case of the treatment of 
medical culture in the literature, the operation of power at the interpersonal level is addressed 
from a variety of theoretical viewpoints, the majority of which are also not made explicit by 
the relevant authors. Again, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt an analysis of this 
work that would comprehensively capture all the theoretical standpoints adopted or 
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categorize every author accurately. However, in order to locate the discussion in the 
remainder of the chapter within its theoretical context, I will provide a very brief overview of 
the dominant approaches, offering a slightly more detailed account of those taken by the most 
influential authors. 
Power, society and the individual 
From a structuralist viewpoint, social action is conceptualised as the direct result of structural 
arrangements (Fisher, 1986), individuals merely performing the roles cast for them in the 
social organisation. Much of the Foucault-inspired literature, too, attributes greater influence 
to the discursive terrain that shapes social action than to the active choice and participation of 
individuals. In Foucauldian terms, individual doctors and patients collude in the enactment of 
social discourses, and the routine operations of medical practice, such as the examination, 
become the apparatuses of power, through which doctors and patients live out their respective 
parts (Lupton, 2003).  
 
The weight in the body of literature that focuses on the interpersonal dimension of power in 
medical settings falls, however, within the constructionist camp, which has spawned a great 
number of investigations of the function of language practices in the production and workings 
of power in medical settings (Lupton, 2003). In these terms, power is conceptualised as 
enacted by individuals, who are able to resist or employ it to serve their own ends (Fisher, 
1986). Rather than a relatively static phenomenon, determined by structures in the broad 
social arena, power becomes a dynamic relationship, negotiated and renegotiated by its 
participants (Lupton, 2003), who take up some and reject other subject positions offered by 
available discourses.  
 
While in the writings of many authors, constructionist formulations exist in contrast to those 
produced from structuralist vantage points, Fisher (1986), amongst others, has proposed that 
power can be better understood making use of both viewpoints. She proposes that power 
resides in the interplay between the institutional and interpersonal dimensions of social life, 
each reflecting and reinforcing the other. Thus, doctors, in whom the authority of the state is 
vested, and who possess unequal knowledge, conferring additional power on them, animate 
and amplify, and in other cases minimise, these institutional forms of power through their 
individual actions. The mechanism through which this interplay between the macro and 
micro dimensions of social life occurs is well represented, Fisher (1986) argues, by the notion 
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of situated practices, a concept that articulates the manner in which the broader social context 
is brought to life within the ordinary language and practice of individuals engaged in 
particular settings. Thus, ideology is employed by individual doctors in the specific contexts 
of actual situations. More in keeping with my own theoretical standpoint, which I will 
elaborate in the chapter detailing the methodology informing this research, such an approach, 
while retaining its acknowledgement of individual agency, also gives credit to the 
opportunities and constraints imposed by structural aspects of the environment, including the 
discursive environment. The marriage of the two approaches better resists the temptation 
presented by a more narrowly constructionist view to cast those in power, and thus doctors in 
the context of this thesis, as purposeful oppressors, out to serve their own purposes in any 
way that they can. Rather, doctors, as well as patients, are subject to the workings of the 
structural elements of their environments, and they, too, have greater access to some 
discourses and associated actions and less access to others (Atkins n, 1995). This view thus 
allows for the possibility of resistance by individual doctors to established norms and 
expectations, but also for the possibility that such resistance may provoke serious 
consequences. Authors such as Mizrahi (1986) and Fox (1989) have also cautioned against 
simplistic characterisation of doctors as employers of medical discourses to suit their 
interests, arguing that they, too, are co-opted into adopting the norms and language of those 
in power, through a process of socialisation that begins with medical training.  
Power as an interactional accomplishment 
A number of authors, whose work I will review in this section, have, from a variety of 
different perspectives, highlighted the nature of the power imbalance between doctors and 
patients as an interactional accomplishment achieved by all parties to a given interaction. As 
Fisher (1986) points out, neither does this joint production and maintenance of the status quo, 
within a context in which neither doctors nor patients are free from the influence of ‘the 
powers that be’, represent an argument against the indisputable fact that doctors possess 
institutionally-given power that patients do not, nor does it deny the very real effects of this 
power, evident, for example, in the routinely stifled voices of patients in medical encounters. 
What it does suggest is that patients can fight against their own domination, and in fact that 
they sometimes do, and also that doctors can and sometimes do subvert their own positions of 
supreme authority. This latter, I believe, is the most important contribution of the work 
highlighting the interactional accomplishment of power. Its production through interaction 
foregrounds its dynamic, and therefore changeable, nature rendering every moment in the 
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doctor-patient interaction a moment in which not only domination but change can occur.  
 
While the basic premise that power is an interactional accomplishment is recognised by 
many, the manner of this interaction is conceptualised in a number of different ways. Mishler 
(1984) conceptualises the interactional production and distribution of power between doctors 
and patients in terms of a battle between the voices of medicine and of the lifeworld, 
animated through their moment-to-moment interactions, as detailed in the previous chapter, 
and in terms of which the ‘voice of the lifeworld’ is suppressed in medical encounters. The 
dominance of the voice of medicine accounts for the fact that these conflictual interactions 
are generally deemed unremarkable and are viewed, by both doctors and patients alike, not as 
suppressive endeavours, but as routine clinical practice. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this binary construction in terms of which medical dominance is seen as a battle between two 
voices only is rejected by authors such as Fisher (1991), Silverman (1987) and Wodak (1996; 
2006a), who argue that multiple voices characterise the medical setting and  conflicts 
between them are disguised by the imposition of myths by those in power, myths that 
institutional members are obliged to believe and that represent a version of reality that claims, 
and indeed demands, consensus but that in fact exists to obscure disagreement and to protect 
the interests of the powerful. For example, the belief that doctors possess superior knowledge 
and are infallible silences contrary points of view and obscures courses of action alternative 
to those proposed by doctors (Wodak, 2006a).  
The conversation analytic approach 
Much of the work by those authors who conceptualise power as an interactional 
accomplishment falls within the conversation-analytic genre. Work in this genre was 
particularly prominent in the 1980s and 1990s, during which time there was an upsurge in 
explorations of the accomplishment of medical dominance through conversational means in 
medical encounters. (For key works in this area see, for example, Fisher, 1980, 1984, 1986, 
1991; Mishler et al., 1981; Mishler, 1984; Silverman, 1987; Fisher & Groce, 1990; West, 
1984, 1990, West & Frankel, 1991; ten Have, 1991; Waitzkin, 1991) While some of these 
authors employ a strictly conversation-analytic methodology, with its associated limitations, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, authors such as Sue Fisher and Elliot Mishler, while 
employing some of the methods of conversation analysis, adopt an approach that goes well 
beyond the limitations of any given conversation.  
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These authors have made use of conversation analysis to explore the production and 
distribution of power within the interactions between doctors and patients. Through analysis 
of the details of talk, this body of work explores the production of domination in the details of 
verbal interaction. In particular, conversation analysis, through its attention to the minutiae of 
verbal interactions, is able to explore the implicit components of talk (Gill et al., 2001), often 
obscured by methods that make use of broader brush strokes. West (1990), for example, 
shows how the distribution of questions between doctors and patients in medical encounters, 
in terms of which doctors’ questions grossly outnumber those of their patients, is not simply 
the consequence of doctors’ efforts to suppress patients’ contributions, but is also the product 
of patients’ own hesitance to ask questions, evident, for example, in the frequency with which 
they stammer when asking a question, as well as in the infrequency of the questions that they 
ask. Thus, West argues, doctors and patients cannot be simply construed as villains or victims 
of the power imbalance, respectively. Rather, both actively contribute to the prevailing 
situation.  
 
Fisher (1986), while perhaps employing a more eclectic approach to the analysis of talk than 
the majority of her conversation-analytic contemporaries, makes use of conversation analysis 
and the sequences within and through which talk is undertaken, to illustrate the importance of 
the distribution of opportunities for speech between conversational partners for the 
production of inequality, as well as the modes of domination and resistance employed by 
doctors and patients in their interactions. She displays the usefulness of this method in 
detailing the means that doctors and patients employ as they struggle for power, making use 
of such conversational manoeuvres as correction, comment on the interaction, ‘back 
channeling’ and overlap as they grapple for the floor. Not only are such techniques able to 
highlight the subtle means of domination and resistance employed by doctors and patients 
(Maynard, 2003) but they further offer the potential for advancing alternatives through their 
consequent ability to reveal conversational possibilities for symmetry in the ways in which 
relationships are mutually achieved (West, 1984).  
Conversational mechanisms and evidence of power 
In addition to the potential for transformation highlighted by that more general body of work 
that defines power as an interactional accomplishment, probably the most important 
contribution of the conversation analytic literature to the discussion of power is that it has 
rendered visible the often implicit mechanisms through which power is produced and 
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negotiated in medical settings. As Fisher and Groce (1990) argue, conversations can be seen 
as micro political events, their ‘architecture’ revealing the means of subordination and 
domination as they occur in the enactment of practical activities ostensibly aimed at the 
diagnosis and treatment of patients’ conditions. As noted above, in her 1984 work, “Routine 
complications,” West explores questions centered on the actual means employed in the 
enactment of the social roles adopted by doctors and patients within specific interactions. She 
explores how medical definitions are superimposed on lay ones through the organisation of 
talk and how power and control become integral to their relationships through the range of 
actions and interactions that occur within doctors and patients’ encounters with one another.  
 
Also in a relatively early contribution to this field, Mishler (1984) shows how doctors use the 
position made available to them within the structure of the medical interview to dominate 
their patients, controlling the sequence of turn-taking that occurs in conversation, as well as 
the topics discussed. This they achieve, he argues, through use of the basic structure of the 
traditional medical interview, in terms of which the doctor opens the interaction with a 
request or a question, assesses the patient’s response and uses this assessment to close the 
conversational cycle. She then opens the subsequent cycle with a further request or question. 
In such a way, the doctor monopolises the initiation of topics and responds selectively to the 
patient’s contributions. Discussed by a number of authors working in the area, Heritage and 
Maynard (2006) show further how this structure is used to control the extent to which a topic 
is allowed to develop and to which patients are allowed to respond, thus exerting a profound 
influence on the nature of any communication that follows. Dreyer and Geist (1993) similarly 
show how doctors employ the three-part structure to deny their patients the opportunity to tell 
their stories and to construct the meaning of whatever is under discussion such that it is 
consistent with medical knowledge. This three-part sequential structure, therefore, not only 
facilitates but also provides evidence for the domination of patients by their doctors in the 
details of their interactions (Fisher, 1986).  
 
Many other authors have focused, in similar vein, on, for example, other means of topic 
dominance by doctors, including the use of record cards in the initiation of topics by doctors 
(Atkinson, 1981), the simultaneous monopolisation of topic initiation and withholding of 
information (Sarangi & Roberts, 1999), the uneven distribution of acceptances and rejections 
of accounts offered by doctors and their patients (Fisher & Groce, 1990) and even the 
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distribution of laughter and civilities (West, 1984). Fisher (1986), Heath (1992), West (1984), 
Boyd and Heritage (2006) and Heritage and Robinson (2006), amongst others, have discussed 
the opportunities and constraints afforded doctors and patients within the dominant interview 
structure, arguing that the only phase of the medical interview in which patients are allowed 
to voice their concerns in keeping with their own agendas, is what is often referred to as the 
‘problem-presentation’ phase, during which patients are invited to describe their reasons for 
visiting the doctor. Also discussed above, Mishler (1984) and Fisher and Groce (1990) have 
argued that during all other phases of the medical interview its structure is designed to do the 
exact opposite, namely to inhibit the emergence of the patients’ lifeworlds. Robinson (2006), 
amongst others, has argued that utterances perform social actions and thus that doctors’ 
questions influence the ways in which patients can respond. West (2006), for example, shows 
how the closing sequences employed by doctors as they terminate the medical interview 
dissuade patients from bringing up additional concerns. And Boyd and Heritage (2006) show 
that the questions put by doctors themselves contain preferences and presumptions, inviting 
some responses from patients and discouraging others.   
 
West (1984) goes beyond description of the apparatuses of power in medical conversations. 
She argues that conceptualisation of the medical interview as an opportunity within which 
doctors can deductively test hypotheses about their patients’ conditions, in combination with 
the construction of diagnosis as a process that occurs inside the doctor’s head, rather than 
between him and his patient, renders it logical that patient’s questions should be viewed as 
interruptions and consequently ‘dispreferred’. She argues further that the associated 
reluctance on the part of patients to question their doctors and the doctors’ frequently 
suppressive responses to any contraventions of this norm account, in large part, for the god-
like status that doctors acquire within these interactions, in which they are construed as, and 
indeed become, unquestionable. She goes on to conclude that not only does this arrangement 
have consequences for the manner of communication that can occur in the medical interview, 
but that this in turn has consequences for the outcomes of health care, leading, in some 
instances, when mishearings and misunderstandings remain unresolved, to misdiagnosis, 
mistreatment and charges of malpractice. 
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Agency 
A concept that recurs throughout the literature addressing the production and distribution of 
power between doctors and patients is that of agency. While conversation analysis represents 
the dominant approach to the exploration of agency within doctor-patient interactions, it is by 
no means the only one and the literature that addresses this concept is diverse. The bulk, if 
not all, of the literature that explores the operation of power in the interactions between 
doctors and patients can be discussed with reference to this concept. However, only a few of 
the authors writing on this topic actually make use of the word and perhaps the only feature 
that the writings discussed in this section have in common is that they all, in one manner or 
another, deal with the power of doctors and patients to act within their relationships with one 
another. Agency thus represents an underlying theme evident in the work discussed in this 
chapter.  
 
Defined as the power to act, agency is, I argue, a very useful concept for exploring this 
capacity in the relationships between doctors and patients. It is not prey to the same short-
comings that Atkinson (1981) points out with reference to the concept of decision-making in 
medical settings, which can be deceiving in that it assumes a bounded and discernible event 
within which either one or both parties comes to a decision about a treatment or other action. 
On the contrary, the concept of agency is sensitive to the potentially fragmentary and 
incremental nature of the decision-making process and to the possibility that there may be no 
particular, identifiable event within which a decision to act in a particular way is taken. It is 
also not restricted to use within a particular theoretical or methodological framework, or in 
the analysis of particular kinds of events, such as conversations. Such sensitivity is 
particularly important to the topic under discussion in this thesis due to its concern with the 
subtleties of power and its exercise, and with the mechanisms by which it is sometimes 
abused without ever being overtly or even consciously acknowledged. 
 
The analysis of power is thus undertaken by a variety of different authors through multiple 
lenses. While the focus of this thesis is on the discursive dimensions of power and its 
employment, no discussion of the imbalance of power between doctors and patients can 
afford to avoid mention of the fact that this power imbalance stems not only from the stuff of 
discourse, ideology, social arrangements, language practices and so on. As Zaner (2000) puts 
it, the power in the relationship between doctors and patients in fact has an existential reality. 
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Doctors have the means, including the knowledge, skills and material resources, limited 
though they may be, to diagnose and treat patients’ illnesses and patients do not. Their power 
resides, therefore, not merely in institutional bodies or in the dynamics of interpersonal 
interactions, or even in the interplay between the two, but in the actual physical prevention of 
death and alleviation of pain and suffering that is the doctor’s primary task. Authors such as 
Katz (1984) and Fisher (1980), for example, note the salience of the organisational context in 
limiting patients’ contributions and of their internal fears, which doctors regularly exploit, 
such as those of illness and death, in rendering them susceptible to silent cooperation.  
 
As stated, the focus of this thesis is, however, on the discursive context of medical encounters 
and the vast majority of work that addresses power in interpersonal interactions does so 
through an investigation of the use of language in medical settings. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will therefore trace themes that emerge in the discussion of the discursive 
dimensions of the power imbalance between doctors and patients that have relevance to an 
explanation of inhumane medical practice. While there is a body of work, within which 
Howard Waitzkin probably represents the key figure, that addresses the ideological content of 
doctor-patient interactions, in terms of which broader social structures are seen to play 
themselves out in medical encounters, with potentially harmful effects, I will not address this 
topic in this review. The harm with which these discussions deal is related to maintenance of 
an oppressive social order, rather than to inhumane or poor quality treatment that leaves the 
individual patient feeling abused or neglected, and is therefore not directly relevant to my 
focus.  
Knowledge and agency 
As indicated in my discussion in this and in chapter two, addressing medical culture and 
institutional power, the superior knowledge possessed by doctors occupies a key position in 
discussions of power imbalances in the interpersonal relationships between individual doctors 
and patients in medical encounters. Much of the literature that explores this phenomenon 
departs from the point of view that doctors and patients enter their relationships from 
positions of power and weakness, respectively, as defined by their access to knowledge. Not 
only are patients often frightened and in unfamiliar surroundings, but they are unable to 
comprehend much of the talk and other events that are happening around them. Doctors, on 
the other hand, are on their home turf – they understand and are even influential in how the 
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medical context operates, they are exceptionally well-versed in the production and 
interpretation of the language spoken, and they have the knowledge and skills required to 
address the given problems (Fisher, 1986). Greeting each other from these asymmetrical 
positions, individual doctors and patients then proceed (more often than not) to reproduce and 
enact them through the routine and mundane elements of their encounters. The lack of 
information traditionally provided to patients, along with the evasion of their questions and 
the deliberate use of medical jargon, for example, denies patients the resources required to 
contribute to the process of diagnosis and treatment (Phillips, 1996), perpetuating and 
reinforcing their disempowerment. 
 
Also discussed in chapter two, Katz (1984) and others argue that this power derived from the 
doctor’s possession of medical knowledge rests on the fallacy of its certainty. The power that 
doctors hold through possession of ‘certain’ medical knowledge is maintained, Katz argues, 
through individual doctors’ poor communication practices, as they fail to provide adequate 
information and explanations, which would reveal uncertainties, to their patients. Instead, 
they encourage reliance on the commitment to trust nd obedience captured in the maxim, 
“Obey your doctor and you start getting well” (Katz, 1984: p. 7), a maxim that reinforces 
doctors’ power by encouraging silence on the their part and unquestioning compliance on the 
part of their patients.  
 
Doctors are thus construed as collectors and analysers of (superior) information, which they 
must simply elicit from their patients, who make no active contribution to the process 
(Mishler, 1984). The capacity of the patient to make informed and reasoned decisions is thus 
denied and blind trust in the now god-like doctors the only readily available option. The 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship, as defined in these terms, both obstructs the 
possibility of shared decision-making between doctors and patients and imposes an infantile 
participatory role on patients, whose relative power is further reduced (Katz, 1984). Doctors 
and patients are thus construed as active and passive, respectively (Arney & Bergen, 1984). 
Sole keepers of the knowledge required to make informed decisions, doctors assume the 
position of actors and patients that of acted upon. Interestingly, the very words ‘doctor’ and 
‘patient’ – and the related word ‘passive’ – are derived from the Latin words for ‘teacher’ and 
‘sufferer’ or ‘one who just puts up with it’, indicating the status of these constructions as 
embedded in language itself (Oxford English Dictionary, 1971). Patients’ agency is thus 
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denied, any actions that they do commit become reactions to stimuli produced by their 
doctors (Armstrong, 2002), and the possibility of acting with or for them is effectively 
obscured (Mizrahi, 1986). Such constructions render doctors’ silence, and their demands for 
faith and obedience from their patients, logical and reasonable (Katz, 1984), undermining any 
potential for dialogue between them.  
 
Silverman (1987) discusses this issue with respect to what he refers to as the “autonomy / 
responsibility couplet.” While they may wish to acknowledge their patients’ autonomy, 
doctors are simultaneously aware of their own responsibility for their patients’ care. In these 
terms, doctors are justified, and indeed obliged, to undertake whatever actions they deem are 
for the patient’s good. The extreme case of this relationship, which, as discussed in the 
previous chapter is ultimately transformed into one between subject and object, is illustrated 
by that between surgeons and their anaesthetised patients (Szasz & Hollender, 1997). The 
unequal distribution of agency between doctors and patients is, however, evident also in the 
routine activities performed between doctors and conscious, lucid patients. As Szasz and 
Hollender (1997) point out, the roles of doctors and patients as active and passive, 
respectively, may be entirely appropriate for certain instances of emergency treatment, for 
example when a patient is unconscious, delirious or severely injured, in which instances 
treatment takes place irrespective of the patient’s contribution. It becomes, however, at once 
inappropriate as soon as the patient emerges from the coma, or other incapacitating condition, 
at which point an accompanying change in the doctor-patient relationship is essential to the 
doctor’s continued ethical practice. 
 
While Katz (1984) is careful to point out that the motives underlying doctors’ operation in the 
above terms are, in the vast majority of cases, intended to ensure the patient’s best interests, 
he notes also the potential that this situation creates for these ends to be employed in 
justifying an unmonitored range of means, including those such as deception, manipulation, 
threat and force, all employed for the patient’s own good (Szasz & Hollender, 1997). While 
such means, Katz maintains, are not driven by malice, they represent doctors’ concern with 
their patients’ wellbeing but not with their liberty. Arguing that the sharing of decisions about 
medical care can enhance not only the patient’s autonomy but can alleviate her suffering, 
Katz repeatedly notes the dedication of the majority of doctors to their patients’ physical 
wellbeing, but their simultaneous inattention to their right and need to make informed 
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decisions.  
 
The potential inherent in these constructions for harmful effects on the patient have been 
illustrated by a number of authors who have shown, for example, that the absence of dialogue 
means that patients’ concerns are more often than not left unexplored, while continuing to 
represent a valuable and unused resource for understanding their medical problems (Heritage 
& Maynard, 2006; Scheeres, et al., 2008). Heath (1992) and Barry, Bradley, Britten, 
Stevenson and Barber (2000), in an investigation of patients’ unvoiced agendas, point out that 
the implications of these omissions frequently extend beyond the consultation, not only as a 
result of the potentially major misunderstandings that they produce and that can lead to 
misdiagnosis and thereby inappropriate treatment, but through their effects on the likelihood 
that patients will follow their doctors’ recommendations. And Slingsby (2004) notes that 
shared decision-making between doctors and patients has in fact been associated with 
improvements in treatment efficacy.  
 
Just a little way further along the continuum, other authors, such as Wicks (1998), provide 
examples of the more brutal enactment of the unequal agency between doctors and patients, 
for example when doctors override their patients’ objections to intrusive procedures, or 
simply fail to ask their permission to perform them. And Fainzang (2002) has shown that the 
unequal attribution of agency to doctors and patients serves to encourage and justify doctors’ 
lies to their patients, which are told in order to serve their own ends. Such lies, often told for 
the patient’s alleged ‘protection’ or to persuade him or her to comply with the doctor’s aims, 
may result in patients’ consent to procedures about which they lack information and, in some 
cases, even to unnecessary medical procedures, to which their consent represents not a 
reasoned decision but a response to their doctor’s authority and their own incapacity (Fisher, 
1986). Not only overt lies but the withholding of information falls into the same category, 
and authors such as Costello (2002) provide extreme examples such as those in which the 
patient is neither informed nor consulted with regard to the issuing of orders not to resuscitate 
him or her, should the need arise. Under such circumstances, implementation of the notion of 
informed consent becomes, as Katz (1984) puts it, a ‘mirage’, as doctors claim to support it 
but show no appreciation of the necessity for disclosure associated with it. Almost twenty-
five years later, Kaja Finkler, in her 2008 discussion of the need for locally situated, as well 
as universally-oriented, bioethical frameworks, notes that it is common practice, 
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internationally, for doctors to employ the nominal practice of getting patients to sign lengthy 
consent forms of which the doctors are aware they have little understanding. While, as 
Millman observed in 1977, these acts of deceit are conducted ostensibly to protect patients 
from undesirable and unnecessary anxiety, they simultaneously serve doctors’ interests, 
reinforcing their power within medical settings.  
 
Authors such as Armstrong (2002) have argued that, since the years immediately after World 
War II, medical thinking has begun to acknowledge the volitional nature of the patient, whose 
behaviour has come to be seen as important to the process of illness prevention and 
management. Thus, according to Armstrong, patients are no longer construed merely as the 
objects of medical practice but rather have become more complex entities that are, 
simultaneously, its agents, choosing whether or not to follow their doctors’ recommendations. 
As Luftey (2005) observes, many authors writing on such topics as promoting patients’ 
compliance (see, for example, Stivers, 2006; Winefield, Murrel, & Clifford, 1995; Williams, 
McGregor, King, Nelson, & Glasgow, 2005; Schmaling, Blume,  Afari, & Niloofar, 2001; 
Francis, Rollnick, McCambridge, Butler, Lane, & Hood, 2005; and Buller, Connell, & 
Spencer, 2005, amongst many others) have shifted to a terminology that characterises doctor-
patient relationships as partnerships, rather than the more overtly paternalistically conceived 
‘parent-child’ descriptions of the past. However, Luftey goes on to note that this shift in the 
language of description remains unmatched by actual practice, within which doctor-patient 
relationships retain much of their more authoritarian qualities associated with the past. No 
longer aimed explicitly at ensuring their patients’ obedience, doctors’ efforts are, in these 
terms, intended to elicit their compliance. 
Agency and blame 
Related to the construction of doctors as active agents and patients as the passive objects of 
their knowledge and practice, is the issue of responsibility, a topic that is highly relevant to 
this thesis but that is only touched on by a few authors (see for example, Katz, 1984; Fisher, 
1984; Maynard, 2003; and Atkinson, 1995, 1999; 2004, who discusses the matter extensively 
with respect to doctors’ attributions of responsibility within collegial discourse, for example 
to own or disown the production of a piece of evidence presented on a ward round). Maynard 
addresses the issue of the attribution of responsibility for good and bad events, referring, in 
particular, to the delivery of news in general, and to doctors’ delivery of diagnostic news or 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
75 
 
news related to the progress of illness or success of treatment. News delivery, he argues, 
invariably encompasses a moral dimension, raising the question of who is responsible for the 
good or bad event being reported. In this context, Maynard shows how people work to seek 
credit for the positive events they report and avoid blame for negative ones, denying or 
attributing responsibility to themselves accordingly. This issue is thus clearly related to the 
projection onto others discussed in the chapter on culture and identity in medical settings, in 
terms of which doctors blame patients for adverse events with respect to which they run the 
risk of being credited with responsibility, as sole agents within the discursive context.  As 
Katz (1984) argues, doctors’ denial of causal responsibility for adverse events necessitates 
their relinquishment of the sole agency they otherwise possess, through the employment of 
syntactically passive linguistic constructions, or through embellishments of their accounts 
that attribute blame elsewhere and deflect responsibility from themselves (Maynard, 2003). 
However, while not directly addressed by either of these authors, it may be a point worth 
noting with respect to the aim of this thesis to explore aspects of the medical context that 
precipitate abuse, that while doctors in these instances deny their agency, the reality is one of 
concealment, rather than actual avoidance. It remains the doctors who are dominant in 
making the attribution, and it is they who exercise the choice, successfully, in deciding who 
gets credited with the responsibility for which event.  
 
While the mechanisms whereby agency is produced and distributed between doctors and 
patients are often subtle, its consequences for the processes and outcomes of healthcare can 
be serious, as detailed in the preceding chapter on culture and identity.   
Patients’ passivity 
It is important to note that neither doctors nor the medical or broader context in which they 
work can be attributed with the sole responsibility for the medical dominance described, a 
point that I referred to briefly above with reference to the interactional production of power. 
In addition to some of the more ‘objectively’ discernible characteristics of doctors and 
patients, such as patients’ illness and pain (Sasz & Hollender, 1997), which contribute to their 
passivity, and doctors’ actual possession of the knowledge and resources required for the 
treatment of disease, which gives them an unarguable and indeed desirable power in their 
encounters with their patients, patients are argued by a number of authors to be complicit in 
the production of their own passivity. While doctors may exert effort in controlling their 
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patients, patients actively relinquish control to their doctors (Dreyer & Geist, 1993). Neither 
do patients compel their doctors to take their concerns seriously, nor do they interrupt them 
when they hog the floor (Gill, 1998) and it is they who render their own bodies, as objects, 
for medical examination and treatment (Heath, 2006). In fact, some doctors actually 
encourage their patients’ participation to no avail, as they remain reticent despite invitations 
requesting their responses (Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Heath, 2006). Perakyla’s (2002) study in a 
Finnish primary health care setting, showing that only one third of doctors’ invitations were 
met with more than an acknowledgement from their patients, provides a useful illustration.  
 
A number of authors have explored some of the reasons for this passivity on patients’ part. 
Most obvious, perhaps, is the fact that patients are dependent on their doctors for such 
matters as the relief of pain and avoidance of death. Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (as cited in 
Atkinson, 1995: p. 125) put the matter succinctly: “(The doctor-patient relationship) is a 
manifestly benevolent relationship: disobeying a teacher or boss might be seen as gutsy, but 
disobeying a doctor can only be construed as irrational.” Authors such as Dreyer and Geist 
(1993) and Phillips (1996) argue that patients’ perceptions of their doctors as busy, aloof and 
not wanting to be bothered by their concerns further mean that patients may feel that that they 
cannot impose upon their doctors with, for example, unwanted questions.  
 
In addition, Fisher (1984) and Fisher and Groce (1990) note that, as inhabitants of the same 
social world, doctors and patients share mutual understandings of their positions and both 
parties, by and large, act accordingly. These authors point out that not only treatment 
decisions but identities are in fact negotiated in medical encounters, and that doctors and 
patients, positioned differentially in terms of the institutional and broader social structures, 
have differential access to the interactional resources through which the construction of 
identities takes place. Thus, both doctors and patients act in accordance with the identities 
that they have negotiated for themselves and each other. Most notable here are the 
stereotypical constructions in terms of which patients are characterised, for example as 
ignorant, irrational, unintelligent and emotionally disturbed (Millman,1977; Dreyer & Geist, 
1993),  traits that remove both their capacity and their right to dignity, justifying their 
objectification and obscuring their potential for agency. In the words of Dreyer and Geist 
(1993: p. 241), such constructions “mandate(s) that physicians lay down rules.” These 
dynamics are exacerbated when broad socially structured differentials come into play, 
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exaggerating doctors’ constructions of the difference between themselves and their patients, 
and thence between their own and their patients’ logic (Dreyer & Geist, 1993), and leading to 
situations in which, as Fisher (1986) illustrates, poor women patients, for example, are denied 
even those choices commonly made available to their middle class or male counterparts and 
are consequently provided with inferior care. Patients who have had less access to resources 
such as education are even less inclined to challenge their doctors, or the above constructions 
of themselves (Atkinson, 1995). 
Patients’ resistance 
As demonstrated by a large body of research from the 1960s onwards, the above mechanisms 
of domination, as employed by both doctors and by the patients themselves, have, by and 
large, “effectively inhibited all but the mildest rebellion on the patient’s part” (Annandale & 
Hunt, 1998: p. 119). However, it has also been demonstrated that patients can and sometimes 
do resist and even challenge the power of their doctors. Gill and Maynard (2006), Strong and 
Davis (1978) and Katz (1984), amongst others, argue for the importance that both theorists on 
the subject and doctors themselves should acknowledge not only the tradition of domination 
of patients, but also their resourcefulness. In many instances patients can be seen to counter 
the authority of their doctors by exercising their own agency (Perakyla, 2006). Many authors, 
including Fisher (1984; 1986; 1991), Perakyla (2002, 2006), Atkinson (1995), Heath (1992) 
and Maynard (2003) offer examples of instances in which patients challenge their doctors or 
the passivity of the role traditionally ascribed to them as patients. There are multiple citations 
in the literature of instances in which patients ask questions, fight for the conversational floor 
(Fisher 1986), resist or take a stance with regard to their doctors’ diagnoses (Maynard, 2003; 
Perakyla, 2002, 2006; Mishler, 2004), or attempt to neutralise the power of hospital staff by 
mocking senior doctors and making jokes between themselves (Zaman, 2004). In fact, 
Tanassi (2004) argues that in some instances, although patients may seem merely 
‘compliant’, they are actually choosing to follow their doctors’ recommendations because of 
their belief that they are suitable in the pursuit of their own goals – in the example Tanassi 
provides, fulfillment of their desire to become mothers.  
While patients’ agency thus should not be and has not been entirely overlooked in the 
literature, therefore, Fisher (1986) points out that their efforts at balancing the distribution of 
power frequently fail. Perakyla (2002; 2006) argues, perhaps for this reason, that instances of 
open disagreement are very rare and patients prefer to design their contributions to the 
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medical encounter in such a way as to avoid challenging or competing with their doctors’ 
positions (Heath, 1992). As Mishler (2004) points out, patients are unarguably dependent on 
their doctors and, as a result, need to ensure that they receive the care they require. Thus, 
patients’ expressions of agency tend to be in conjunction with simultaneous efforts to 
maintain the power differential in their doctors’ favour, for example presenting their 
reasoning as subjective and approximate and avoiding addressing evidence supplied by their 
doctors, even when their contributions are intended to encourage the doctor to reconsider his 
point of view (Perakyla, 2002, 2006). While these tentative and indirect measures serve in 
part to reinforce the status quo, Fisher and Groce (1990) point out that in fact they are more 
likely to ensure that the relevant patient’s concerns will be heard than might be the case were 
they to opt for more direct means of challenge.  
 
Fisher and Groce (1990), Cicourel (1999), Fainzang (2002) and Zaman (2004), amongst 
others, note also, however, that not only do many challenges to medical authority occur in 
indirect ways but that many patients, unable even to tentatively suggest an alternative point of 
view or course of action, resort instead to alternative means of expression. For example, in 
the absence of the ability, or perceived ability, to initiate more direct challenges, some 
patients resort to means that may not be in their own interests (Fisher & Groce, 1990). 
Cicourel gives examples of instances in which patients obstruct communication, for example, 
offering inadequate replies or appearing to agree. He argues that these actions do not always 
result simply from the patients’ inability to offer more extended contributions, but are 
sometimes intended to subvert a process by which the patient feels dominated and unable to 
otherwise resist. In such instances patients may refuse to follow their doctors’ 
recommendations or may discontinue treatment, failing to return for continuation of their 
care. These acts of resistance take the form not of reasoned actions in keeping with specific 
disagreements with diagnoses or treatment plans but of more infantile means of resisting 
domination (Zaman, 2004). Other authors, including Wodak (2006a), Annandale and Hunt 
(1998), Katz (1984) and Ten Have (1991), have also linked patients’ lack of cooperation, 
nonadherence to treatment recommendations and discontinuation of treatment to doctors’ 
domination of their patients and patients’ (real or perceived) inability to resist through other 
means. And Fainzang (2002), in her analysis of lying within the medical encounter, argues 
that doctors’ lies, usually told in order to produce a behaviour in their patients, represent the 
exercise of power but that patients’ lies are told in order to avoid their doctors’ reprobation 
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and thus, rather than displaying their power, in fact confirm their lack thereof, representing a 
form of submission rather than resistance against an authority they dare not contradict. Such 
actions, obviously, can be detrimental to the treatment process, providing doctors with 
misinformation or concealing information necessary for accurate diagnosis and appropriate 
treatment.   
 
The means through which patients may effectively exercise power have been debated in the 
literature. Mishler’s construction of the battle between the voices of medicine and of the 
lifeworld implies that patients’ power can be enhanced through assertion of the voice of the 
lifeworld. However, authors including Silverman (1987) and Fisher (1991) have challenged 
this suggestion, arguing that, “Patients cannot, as a call for a discourse of the social implies, 
speak the truth about themselves in authentic social voices and in so doing liberate 
themselves” (p. 176). While Fisher goes some way in agreeing with Silverman’s point of 
view, namely that medical power might even be enhanced through introducing a ‘discourse of 
the social’ into its domain, thereby further expanding the reach of medical jurisdiction, she 
stops short of his argument that power is productive nd that the problem is purely “one for 
the subject who acts” (p. 177). Fisher criticises this stance for its ultimate implication that if a 
patient’s struggles against medical domination fail, this should be interpreted as indicating 
that the patient has not fought long enough or hard enough. Fisher wants, and I believe 
rightly, to maintain an acknowledgement of the strength of institutional power that lies at the 
root of medical dominance and that explains the failures of patients’ most virulent struggles.  
 
While this conversation, held initially between Fisher, Mishler, Silverman and Waitzkin, has 
not been pursued to resolution, partly because the relevant authors have either stopped 
publishing or diverged into less directly related lines of thought, Mishler’s recent works (see 
Mishler 2004 and 2005) have perhaps resurrected the issue, and now pursue a line of thinking 
that echoes Waitzkin’s earlier direction, proposing that in order to effectively challenge 
medical dominance doctors themselves need to become engaged in political action to address 
the social inequality that is responsible for much of the illnesses suffered by the poor. As I 
pointed out with reference to the work of Waitzkin, this line of argument exceeds the scope 
of this thesis, in that it extends far beyond the reaches of the perpetration of acts of abuse by 
individual doctors against individual patients, albeit located in and informed by a social 
context. Since the issue of patients’ agency is such a relevant one, in light of the various 
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negative effects on quality and outcomes of health care proposed by those authors who have 
written on the subject, this conversation seems worth reestablishing. 
Doctors’ responses to patients’ resistance 
Whatever their form, patients’ actions that deviate from the trust and obedience demanded by 
their doctors tend to be met with responses that reassert the power imbalance and the doctor’s 
superior position. While ‘put downs’, rejections, blacklisting of patients amongst other 
doctors (Atkinson, 1995), interruptions, cut-offs and ignoring (Wodak, 2006a) are all 
reported to be everyday occurrences, and more often than not go without conscious 
apprehension on either the part of the patient or the doctor, the attribution of stigmatizing 
labels to patients who challenge the conventional order is sometimes associated with more 
serious consequences. Lorber (1975), Fisher and Groce (1985) Armstrong (2002) and 
Andersen (2004),for example, discuss the moral labelling of ‘deviant’ patients, who are 
characterised as ‘defaulters’ or as ‘bad’ or ‘problem’ patients. While the ‘good’ patient 
recognises her own ignorance and powerlessness, accepts the institutional procedures to 
which she is subjected without question, provides the necessary information, takes the 
required medication correctly and so on, those patients who do not accept the absolute 
authority of the medical staff, or who reject their doctors’ monopoly over medical knowledge 
are characterised as ‘bad’ patients and are treated accordingly, sometimes in the form of 
verbal and even physical reprimand (Andersen, 2004). Lorber (1975), amongst others, 
provides examples of instances in which “problem patients” were tranquilised, discharged 
prematurely or referred for psychiatric treatment, arguing that, “the consequences of 
deliberate deviance in the general hospital can be neglect or a stigmatizing label, while 
conformity to good-patient norms is usually a return home with only a surgical scar.”  
 
Summary  
I began this chapter by addressing those aspects of the literature that pertain to the 
institutional power held by the medical profession. Pulling together threads in the various 
discussions that address the characteristics attributed to medical knowledge, and showing 
how these place medical knowledge and practices beyond either question or scrutiny, I have 
attempted to articulate in this chapter the role that these characteristics play in establishing 
the powerful position held by the profession, disguising the social, economic and political 
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judgements and evaluations that inform application of medical knowledge, and creating the 
opportunity for inhumane or abusive practices to occur and to go unacknowledged. 
 
I then reviewed in this chapter those themes in the literature relevant to the power imbalances 
between individual doctors and patients in medical encounters, articulating the relationship 
between these and key aspects of the medical profession’s status and of medical culture, as 
described in the literature discussed in the previous chapters.  The chapter has detailed those 
aspects of previous discussions that explore patients’ domination by the medical profession, 
as well as their complicity and resistance. Pulling together themes from a diverse array of 
literature, the chapter has identified the doctor’s possession of esoteric medical knowledge as 
a central point on which the play of power between doctors and patients hinges, highlighting 
the potential for unequal agency between doctor and patient to result in patients’ diminished 
participation in their own care, as well as in patient blame, with potentially serious 
consequences.  
 
The chapter goes on to review discussions in the existing literature of the ways in which 
patients may resist medical domination, noting also those threads in this discussion that 
indicate both the possibility for their failure, as well as for the ‘distortions’ of resistance that 
can occur within a context in which patients have limited power. These acts of resistance are 
shown to be not always in the patient’s best interests and can lead, for example, to the 
patients’ discontinuation of their own treatment or to their subjection to inferior care. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PARTICULAR CONTEXTS AND INDIVIDUAL 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
While the authors discussed in the previous three chapters have identified strands that run 
broadly through medical settings, some of these and others have also noted the importance of 
individual doctors acting within particular contexts in determining action, as well as in the 
production of valid interpretations of that action. Indeed, many of the studies that produced 
the picture of the medical world and its inhabitants represented in the preceding chapters 
placed considerable importance in their theoretical and methodological approaches on the 
internal worlds and or specific locales from which the doctors in their studies approached 
their patients. Much of this work has thus produced interpretations not only of medical 
culture in general but also of the interactions between the various features of medical culture 
and the diverse local contexts, as interpreted by the unique individuals who operate within 
them. This chapter thus represents another attempt to tease out discernible themes from an 
interwoven mass, rather than a review of a separate body of literature or discussion of 
concepts that are distinct from those discussed in the other chapters. 
 
Medical culture and the individual doctor 
A few authors have highlighted the importance of the individual doctor as the agent in 
medical settings, who is seen by authors such as Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993) as 
drawing on a diverse set of medical discourses in the mediation not only of institutional 
struggles but also of his own personal meanings. Studies exploring the internal worlds of 
individual doctors are relatively few. However, their contribution is nevertheless important in 
that it highlights the relevance of individual interpretation of cultural meanings as well as of 
individual agency in responding to these.  
 
According to Armstrong (2002), there were no studies of the individual doctor prior to the 
1960s and the turn of the investigative gaze on the doctor represents a change of 
revolutionary status. In the 1960s, researchers involved in the study of medical socialisation 
began to turn their attention to the formation of the doctor’s identity as part of this process. 
These studies, while introducing the doctor as the subject of research, nevertheless portrayed 
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him in relatively uniform terms as the product of a universal medical culture. Only in the 
1970s did the idiosyncratic self of the doctor emerge, and it was not until the 1990s that the 
doctor’s body came into view as the ordinary and vulnerable body of any other. With the 
emergence of the doctor’s body came the appearance of what Armstrong (p. 172) calls its 
“hidden baggage of self-interest and desire.”  
 
With the emergence of diversity between individual doctors (see for example Cassel’s 1982 
study of surgeons for an early example), and therefore the possibility of diverse styles of 
practice, came not only the development of a language of doctors’ subjectivity but also a 
challenge to the supposition of objectivity in the practice of medicine (Armstrong, 2002). 
Authors such as Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993; 1995) began drawing attention to the 
role of doctors as creators, rather than merely readers or even interpreters of clinical 
narratives and the individual doctor’s viewpoint became distinguishable from the collective 
medical view (Armstrong, 2002). This recognition of doctors’ identity and experience further 
transformed the view of the medical encounter, which came to be seen, rather than in terms of 
an objective observer viewing a medical object, as an interplay between personalities, within 
which pathological processes could potentially occur (Armstrong, 2002).  
 
The individual doctor’s emotional response 
The most prominent area of focus in those studies addressing the doctor as an individual is 
his emotional response. Authors such as Hahn (1985) and Speck (1994) have noted the less 
recognised emotions that frequently plague individual doctors, including a sense of guilt and 
powerlessness. And a number of authors, including Good and DelVecchio-Good (2000) and 
Hilfiker (1997) have discussed the failure of medical culture to provide the space within 
which doctors can process their emotions. Mishler, Back, Meier and Morrison, Lazare, 
Holman, Hilfiker and Speck, amongst others, have discussed the potentially negative effects 
of this omission on the quality of care that doctors provide. Mishler et al. (1981), with 
reference to a study by Grove, have described the potential for negative emotions such as 
hatred to result in doctors’ unavailability and avoidance of their patients. Lazare (1987) refers 
to the shame and humiliation that doctors sometimes experience in their encounters with 
patients and has noted the tendency of some doctors to respond by engaging in ‘counter 
humiliation’ of their patients. And Back, Meier and Morrison (2001) have discussed the sense 
of powerlessness, grief, fear, guilt, insecurity and inadequacy that many doctors experience, 
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arguing that these emotions all too frequently lead to the relevant doctors’ avoidance of their 
patients.  
 
In particular, these authors argue that doctors’ unacknowledged emotions are those most 
likely to lead to compromised care (Back et al., 2001; Holman, Meyer & Davenhill, 2006). 
Holman et al. and Speck (1994) provide examples of such instances, such as when doctors 
avoid dying patients rather than acknowledge their own responses to death (Holman et al., 
2006) or when they engage in what Speck (1994: p. 96) refers to as ‘hit and run tactics’, 
which involve communicating an unfavourable piece of news, for example a patients’ 
diagnosis or prognosis or a relative’s death, in brusque and abrupt terms and then leaving as 
quickly as possible. With the potential for such consequences in mind, Katz (1984) argues 
that if doctors wish to carry out their professional responsibilities it is vital that they learn to 
manage their emotional reactions to distressing events such as death, pointing to the 
importance of self-reflection in medical practice.  
 
The importance of particular contexts 
Not only have the individual responses of particular doctors been recognised as important in 
determining the extent and manner in which meanings and power imbalances stemming from 
the broader medical culture and its institutional context are likely to be enacted. The 
importance of the local context in influencing and interpreting medical practices has also 
been acknowledged and has come further to the fore in the last few years. Hospital 
ethnography that focuses on the unique nature of particular medical settings is emerging as a 
growing domain of study (see for example Wind, 2008; Zaman, 2008, 2004; Finkler, 2004, 
2008; Warren & Manderson, 2008; Kelly, Pearce and Mulhall, 2004; Scheeres et al., 2008; 
Andersen, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Tanassi, 2004; Vermeulen, 2004; and van Amstel and van der 
Geest, 2004). While not all of this work is relevant to the focus of this thesis, as the various 
ethnographic studies address a wide range of questions, some of which have little 
consequence for the occurrence of abuse and inhumane care, the approaches evident in the 
various works comprising the burst of ethnographic studies in medical settings in recent years 
signifies a developing interest in the relevance of the nuances of local contexts for the 
interpretation of medical practice. In her 2006a paper, “Medical discourse: doctor-patient 
communication,” for example, Wodak specifically sets out to illustrate the importance of the 
immediate context to the interpretation and analysis of the details of medical encounters, 
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showing how the events of an entire morning are central to production of a valid 
interpretation of a snippet of conversation that took place on that morning, and of its meaning 
for the people involved.  
 
The animation of discourse in particular settings 
Fisher (1986) has employed the concept of situated practices, as elaborated in the chapter on 
power in medical settings, a concept that articulates the animation of elements of the broader 
social context, including discourses and other features of the cultural milieu, within the 
everyday practices in which people engage in particular settings. In terms of this notion, 
available discourses, ideological constructs, identities and so on, as well as opportunities and 
constraints made available by the structural features of the environment, are employed by 
individual doctors in the specific contexts of actual situations. While not always making use 
of the term, a number of authors writing in this field have made use of similar theoretical 
approaches to the one proposed by Fisher.  
 
As Cicourel (1999) points out, such an approach is essential to answering questions 
concerning how people decide which norms or constructs are relevant in a given situation and 
it acknowledges individual agency as well as differences in subjective experience. A dual 
focus on the general trends in medical culture and context and on the specifics of actual 
settings and events thus allows movement beyond generic discourses and encompasses an 
understanding of people’s everyday lives in interpreting their perspectives and actions 
(Halford & Leonard, 2006). In the words of Halford and Leonard, “Particular organisations 
are embedded in specific times and places. They have complex histories, spatialities and 
associated meanings. These different contexts offer multiple, fragmented and distinctive 
discourses on which individuals may…draw in the production of subjectivity.” (p. 659) Thus, 
the categories of ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’, for example, specify general characteristics and 
parameters but can be performed differently in different situations, in keeping with available 
opportunities and constraints (Strong & Davis, 1978). Hospitals come to be seen, in these 
terms, as ‘small societies’, each with their own unique culture (Helman, 2001), in terms of 
which broader meanings are actualised in concrete situations (Mishler et al., 1981). These 
authors argue, therefore, that studies of biomedical practice should focus on the relationship 
between what DelVecchio-Good (1995) calls “local and international worlds of knowledge, 
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technology and practice” (p. 1) rather than on either one or the other.  
 
Some authors, most notably Kaja Finkler (1991; 2008), have explored variations in medical 
practice in different broad cultural settings. For example, in Finkler’s case, in Mexico, as 
opposed to the United States. Finkler’s 2008 paper, “Can bioethics be global and local, or 
must it be both?” makes an argument for the need to incorporate into an ethical framework 
the lived experiences of the society in which it is to be implemented, if is to be appropriate 
for the said context. While Finkler’ s argument is most interesting in terms of a theoretical 
understanding of the importance of particular contexts both for the kind of action that can 
occur and for that which can be expected, those authors with whose work I am primarily 
concerned in this review, have dealt with  more micro-scale environments, most especially 
within particular hospitals. For example, Cicourel (1987) has investigated the ways in which 
doctors and patients, pressured in particular directions by various social norms, negotiate 
their interaction within the context of particular settings. Mizrahi (1986) has shown how both 
external conditions and the particular organisational environment, including the policies and 
procedures in terms of which doctors are obliged to justify the length of each patient’s stay to 
federal bodies providing medical insurance, the magnitude of the workload, the shortage of 
available beds and the exploitation of house staff by hospitals, contribute to development of 
the ‘GROP’ approach amongst the doctors and interns in her study. Similarly, Dreyer and 
Geist (1993) have shown how the working conditions of hospital staff inform the delivery of 
health care, arguing that the conflict and potential for strain inherent in the expectation that 
doctors be the “unfailing gods of healing in a bureaucratised industry jammed with patients, 
bounded by insurance inflation, swarmed by epidemic diseases and urban breakdown” 
(Elliott, as cited in Dreyer & Geist, 1993: p. 237) influence their willingness to engage in 
dialogue with their patients.  
 
More recently and more rarely, various studies have focused on the unique contexts of 
particular hospital units, for example intensive care units (Turnbull, Flabouris, & Iedema, 
2005; Slade et al., 2008) and emergency departments (Scheeres, et al, 2008), both of which 
represent contexts with unique stresses and strains due to the high-risk nature of the 
conditions from which the patients are suffering and due to the unpredictable nature of the 
work.  
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While the focus in this review is on the content of the work that attempts to explain or has 
relevance for an understanding of inhumane or abusive medical practice, and not on the 
methodological means by which this information has been produced, it is worth noting the 
very wide variety of methods that have been employed to this end. The most commonly 
employed methods in this area include audio-recordings of doctor-patient interactions, 
interviews and participant observation. Most prominent, perhaps, in the context of 
explanations of inhumane or abusive practices are those studies that employ an ethnographic 
approach to studies of medical settings, making use of multiple methods to produce their 
findings. (See in this regard the work of authors including Coombs & Goldman, 1973; Hahn, 
1985; Fisher, 1986; 1995; Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 1989; Wicks, 1998; Atkinson (1995); 
Engeström, Brown, Engeström & Koistinen, 1990; Finkler, 1991; Halford & Leonard, 2006; 
and Moreira, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). In the context of this review, and of the argument for the 
importance of the interplay between broader and specific settings, the major contribution of 
these ethnographic studies is that they have brought into focus the everyday routines and 
activities in which more general meanings are employed. These studies have thus highlighted 
the importance of the particular settings and individuals within which and by whom these 
meanings are enacted and interpreted.  
 
The South African context 
One such context is, of course, the South African context within which the research for this 
thesis was conducted. My theoretical standpoint, to be outlined in greater depth in the chapter 
detailing the methodology for this study, acknowledges the importance of broader cultural 
meanings as well as individual interpretations and responses to these by individuals enabled 
and constrained by the features of particular contexts. A review of the literature addressing 
issues relevant to inhumane practice within the context of the South African health care 
system is therefore an important precursor to the research presented in subsequent chapters.  
 
While the newspapers describe the state of disarray in which the South African public sector 
health system finds itself, and the not less than horrific conditions in which patients are 
treated and the periodic instances in which their rights are grossly violated, as detailed in my 
introduction to this thesis, there remains very little formal research on the institutional abuse 
of patients (Lucas & Stevenson, 2005; 2006). News reports sometimes mention particularly 
traumatic instances, ones in which a patient or relative was particularly outspoken in airing 
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her complaints, or in which the nature of the event provoked a public outcry. But 
significantly absent in both formal and informal investigations of medical practice in the 
South African public sector health system is a concern with the ordinary, routine nature of 
aberrations of ethical practice, although this is documented by a handful of authors, whose 
contributions ought to raise significant concern, both on the part of other researchers and of 
those responsible for South Africa’s public sector health services. 
 
Swartz (1989) was the first to explore these issues in South African health care, investigating 
oppression in the day-to-day functioning of a psychiatric hospital, with particular reference to 
issues of race and culture, matters of serious concern in light of South Africa’s oppressive 
Apartheid regime, in its heyday during the 1980s. Since then, the majority of research into 
patients’ abuse has been conducted by staff of the treatment facilities themselves, presumably 
impacting on the relevant researcher’s ability to probe those aspects of routine practice that 
have been normalised within the organisational culture. In addition, the majority of this 
research relies either on official reports of abuse, which almost certainly underestimate its 
occurrence (Lucas & Stevenson, 2005), or on interviews with patients, producing only a 
partial picture of events and eliciting information only about those most deeply imprinted on 
patients’ memories (Fassin, 2008). In addition, such reliance on patients’ accounts presumes 
an ability on the patients’ part to engage critically with the manner of their treatment,  and to 
articulate any discomfort experienced, an assumption that seems dangerous in view of the 
emphasis placed in much of the literature described in the previous chapters on the joint 
production of patients’ passi ity and mutual acceptance of the identities, and associated rights 
and obligations, ascribed to doctors and patients within medical settings. There are, however, 
some authors who have conducted ethnographic studies, including first hand observation of 
inhumane and abusive practices taking place in South African public sector hospitals, 
including Gibson (2004); Jewkes et al. (1998); Baldwin-Ragaven, de Gruchy, and London. 
(1999); and Fassin (2008), whose work I review in this section. 
 
Medical culture, identity and power in the South African literature 
Those authors who have addressed the violation of patients’ rights and inhumane practice by 
health care providers within the South African public sector health system include Swartz 
(1989); Jewkes et al. (1998); Baldwin-Ragaven et al. (1999); Muller (1999); Williams (2000); 
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Gibson (2004); Levin (2005a; 2005b); Lucas and Stevenson (2005; 2006); Lund and Flisher 
(2006); and Fassin (2008).  
 
A number of these authors refer to the more universal aspects of medical culture discussed in 
the previous two chapters. For example, Swartz refers to the processes whereby psychiatric 
patients’ stories are turned into case histories and their identities reduced to diagnostic 
categories; Muller (1999) discusses the production of biomedical identities through 
demarcation of spaces that create relationships of exclusion or belonging, structuring 
identities in terms of the distinct categories of ‘us’ and ‘others’; and Gibson (2004), from a 
Foucauldian point of view, explores the medical gaze as a means of producing knowledge 
and controlling bodies, in the process transforming patients into objects of “observation, 
measurement and surveillance” (p. 2016). While issues pertinent to more general discussions 
of medical culture do thus appear in the South African literature, the focus of the majority of 
these authors lies on the unique South African context, and in particular on the impact of the 
segregation and Apartheid legislation that dominated the country’s history prior to 1994 and 
that continue to cast their shadow on most aspects of the country’s functioning.  
 
The role of the medical profession in Apartheid 
In 1977 Steve Biko’s death in a South African prison cell focused the attention of the 
international medical community on the part played by South African health professionals in 
the gross violations of human rights occurring under the Apartheid regime (Baldwin-Ragaven 
et al., 1999). Baldwin-Ragaven et al. and Williams (2000) have noted that the role played by 
the South African medical profession in this country’s history of oppression cannot be 
singularly characterised as one that supported the violation of the rights of black people, 
pointing out that some of its members have also played an active role throughout South 
Africa’s history in protecting human rights. However, while little objective evidence exists to 
confirm the occurrence of human rights violations by members of the medical profession 
during the Apartheid years (Lucas & Stevenson, 2006), the role played by the South African 
medical profession during and prior to this time is generally acknowledged as ‘shameful’ 
(Williams, 2000).  
 
This shameful role included both passive complicity and more active involvement in 
producing the inequities that continue to characterise South African health care along racial 
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lines, as well as in gross violations of black patients’ rights.  Despite many reports of abuse, 
the South African Medical and Dental Council, one of the two bodies regulating the 
profession’s activities at the time, failed to investigate doctors alleged to be involved in 
human rights violations (Williams, 2000).Its partner organisation, the South African Medical 
Association (SAMA), acknowledged its own role in a submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, as follows: 
 
"[Prior to 1981] MASA was relatively silent on human rights initiatives and was part of the 
apartheid system.... The period [1982-1988] started with justification and defence of 
apartheid medicine." (MASA, as cited in Williams, 2000, p. 1167-1168). 
 
In its own report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission condemned MASA for its failure 
to draw attention to:  
"(a) the effects of the socioeconomic consequences of apartheid on the health of black South 
Africans, (b) the fact that segregated health care facilities were detrimental to the provision of 
health, (c) the negative impact on the health of millions of South Africans of unequal 
budgetary allocations for the health care of different 'racial' groups,(d) the fact that solitary 
confinement is a form of torture and (e) the severe impact of detention on the health of 
children"  (TRC, as cited in Williams, 2000: p. 1168). 
 
Further, the TRC found that the medical profession, “through apathy, acceptance of the status 
quo and acts of omission, allowed the creation of an environment in which the health of 
millions of South Africa s was neglected, even at times actively compromised, and in which 
violations of moral and ethical codes of practice were frequent, facilitating violations of 
human rights” (TRC, as cited in Baldwin-Ragaven et al., 1999: p. 6). 
 
While the Apartheid era ended officially in 1994 and its duration, as described above, was 
characterised by an extreme instance of medical professional involvement in human rights 
abuses, which certainly no longer is the case in this country, it has contributed, as must the 
historical context of any set of circumstances, to the landscape that currently characterises the 
public health sector in South Africa. 
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The South African public sector health system 
The profundity of the sense in which the South African health care system has been marked 
by racial segregation and apartheid is noted by the majority, if not all, of the authors working 
in this field. Jewkes et al., in 1998, noted the scars left on the system by decades of 
separatism, oppression and inequality. Baldwin-Ragaven et al. (1999) note the limited 
services available in certain parts of the country, particularly its rural areas. And almost ten 
years later, Lund and Flisher (2006) and Fassin (2008) describe the “fragmented, under-
resourced and inequitable public health sector” that South Africa has inherited from its 
oppressive past (Lund and Flisher, 2006, p. 587), arguing that it remains scarred by the 
Apartheid system, evidenced by the understaffed and poorly equipped  health facilities of the 
former townships. The process of transformation of the health services, Baldwin-Ragaven et 
al.  (1999) observe, has been hindered both by the severe budget constraints that the health 
sector faces and by the fact that South Africa still does not have a “deeply rooted and 
universally shared culture of human rights” (p. 47).  In these less fortunate parts of the 
country, in which health services are already understaffed and underequipped, suffering as a 
result from patient overload and an inability to supply adequate services, staff have to operate 
under the added pressure of fear of exposure to crime. Muller, for example, cites an instance 
in which staff were obliged to close a facility for a period of hours as they were  “terrified by 
gangs fighting and shooting outside the hospital” (Cape Argus, as cited in Muller, 1999: p. 7).  
 
Abuse in South African hospitals 
While the extreme, state-sanctioned abuse of the Apartheid era is a thing of the past, human 
rights violations and routinely abusive practices continue to be reported in the South African 
public health sector. Arguing that ethically unacceptable practices in obstetric services in the 
South African public sector in fact represent a barrier to access to health care, Jewkes et al. 
(1998) have documented both clinical neglect and verbal as well as physical abuse of birthing 
patients by nurses, arguing that while some instances may be described as ‘reactive’ in 
nature, others are ritualised manifestations of professional and institutional norms. Other 
authors, including Wood (1997), Stadler (1997) and Mathai (1997) have documented similar 
types of abuse.  
 
Five years after the official demise of the Apartheid regime, Baldwin-Ragaven et al. (1999) 
also documented ongoing violations of patients’ rights, arguing that while the South African 
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Medical and Dental Council and the South African Medical Association had changed in 
structure, they continued to refrain from proactive investigation of professional misconduct. 
Furthermore, these authors argue that while South Africa’s new constitution enshrines human 
rights, these had not at the time of writing been effectively incorporated into the curricula 
offered to medical students.  
 
Acknowledging the complex issues with which health care providers are confronted in 
delivering health care within the context of the South African public sector health system, 
these authors raise questions pertaining to the ‘coincidental’ nature of the continued suffering 
of particular groups within the South African health care system, identifying those who self 
harm (most likely to be women), those who are infected with HIV (the majority of whom are 
black) and those who abuse alcohol (the majority of whom are poor) as those patient groups 
most likely to receive inferior care. These concerns are echoed six years later by Levin 
(2005a), who observes the continuing relationship between language, ethnicity, race and 
socio-economic factors and access to adequate health care within the South African public 
health sector. 
 
In an interesting analysis of the functioning of the South African medical profession as 
inseparable from that of its social and political context, Baldwin-Ragaven et al. (1999) cite 
instances of the difficult ethical decisions with which hospital staff in this context are faced. 
For example, asking questions about the possibility of acceptable use of physical restraint, 
they discuss the use of shackles to restrain convict patients currently serving prison sentences 
and considered to be potentially violent. The authors provide an example in which a 
convicted rapist was brought to hospital in shackles, which were removed by the hospital for 
an unknown reason. His subsequent escape had consequences, including the necessity for his 
victim to abandon her studies and flee to another city.   
 
Muller, also in 1999, documented the mutual abuse of staff and patients, detailing accounts of 
insensitive and disrespectful treatment, angry outbursts, shouting and ‘smacking’ of patients 
by staff and of staff by patients. And in 2006 Lucas and Stevenson provide evidence of the 
continued prevalence of abusive treatment in South Africa’s public sector hospitals, finding 
that of the 127 patients they interviewed, 50% reported that they had been subjected to abuse 
by hospital staff. 37% of the patients in their sample reported verbal abuse from staff and 
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28% reported physical abuse. Of those patients reporting physical abuse, the majority were 
incidents in which a staff member had pushed a patient. One patient, however, reported 
having been beaten about the ears by a staff member, one sexually abused and three having 
been strangled by a staff member, one with a towel. Reported verbal abuse predominantly 
included threats, insults and ridicule. While measures were in place at the hospital for the 
processing of complaints and disciplinary action, less than half of those patients who formally 
reported the relevant incident received any response. As Lucas and Stevenson argue, while in 
some of these instances it may have been the case that patients provoked staff members, who 
reacted abusively, such actions are inexcusable even in light of provocation, especially when 
the perpetrator is a professional caregiver.  
 
Fassin’s 2008 publication provides further documentation of continuing violent, abusive and 
otherwise inhumane practices within the South African public health care sector. Making use 
of ethnographic methods and spending long hours in the hospital in which he conducted his 
research, in order to observe its routine functioning, Fassin has provided evidence of 
disconcerting levels of unethical practice amongst both the doctors and nurses in his study. 
Among the incidents he mentions are the following: patients being sent by doctors to ‘step-
down’ facilities without adequate investigation of their presenting conditions; patients being 
ignored who had fallen from their beds and were left lying on the floor; patients waiting to be 
transferred to another facility not being looked at or fed, sometimes for periods of days, until 
someone discovered that they were already dead; others who had not been provided with 
information either about their conditions or about medical procedures, which had been 
eventually performed without their consent; agitated patients being tied to their beds, so that 
their agitation increased, while they developed consequential oedema of the extremities, 
leading after several days to deep sores. Fassin documents these and other instances of abuse 
and neglect, occurring with disturbing frequency almost up until the present day. 
Explanations for abuse in the South African context 
Those authors who have documented the above abusive practices in the South African public 
health service have proposed a range of reasons for the occurrence of this abuse. Jewkes et al. 
(1998) have argued that reasons for the prevalence of abuse in South African hospitals 
include the ideological construction of patients as inferior, social norms in terms of which 
violence is viewed as acceptable, perceptions of staff victimisation by patients, nurses’ need 
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to maintain control, as well as certain structural features including working conditions. The 
combination of the construction of patients as inferior, a view of compliance as not altogether 
voluntary, and the culturally acceptable nature of coercive and punitive measures, renders 
violence a means of establishing the social distance nurses require from their patients in order 
to maintain their own middle-class and professional identities. In addition, these authors 
document the existence of a dominant perception that nurses are themselves victimised by 
patients, viewed as particularly unjust in light of their status as especially deserving of 
respect, and further justifying their own abusive actions. 
 
Furthermore, these authors relate that, in certain obstetric units, professional insecurities 
resulting from the inherent uncertainties of childbirth, during which unanticipated 
complications can arise very suddenly, motivate nurses to strive for an ultimately elusive 
control over their patients and the environment. As nurses fruitlessly attempt to control what 
is inherently unpredictable, they frequently resort to scolding and beating their patients, if not 
to gain immediate control then to ensure it next time. Within this context, patients’ failure to 
comply with nurses’ requests and demands tended to produce a sense amongst nurses that 
they were no longer obligated to provide these uncooperative patients with care, who could 
therefore justifiably be left, for example, to deliver on their own in the corridors or toilets of 
the hospital (Jewkes et al., 1998).  
 
In addition to a lack of powerful competing ideologies informing patient care, Jewkes et al. 
(1998) argue that structural conditions also contribute to nurses’ abuse of patients. While the 
majority of work that has documented patients’ abuse has foregrounded structural issues in 
the explanations they provide, Jewkes et al. argue that it is not so much the structural 
conditions themselves that encourage inhumane and abusive patient care but rather the 
tendency toward lack of accountability that these conditions appear to engender in managers, 
who offer staff’s working conditions as a reason for their failure to take action against 
abusive staff members. For example, these authors quote records of an inspection of nursing 
quality in KwaZulu-Natal, in which the inspector herself stated that “under existing 
conditions it is idle and utterly unjust to complain of lack of deportment, courtesy and sense 
of responsibility among…nurses” (Marks, as cited in Jewkes et al., 1998: p. 29). Also critical 
of the over-simplicity that characterises explanations prioritising structural factors in the 
abuse of patients by health care providers, Lucas and Stevenson (2006) argue that while low 
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salaries, poor working conditions, burnout due to long-term exposure to stress and the social 
instability characteristic of overcrowded institutions unarguably play their part, social norms 
swing the compass, determining the direction that the reactions of hospital staff to structural 
conditions will take. In South Africa’s social context, these authors argue, violence has 
assumed the role of “dominant  problem-solving strategy” (p. 200), exerting a profound 
influence on the functioning of all aspects of the country, including its health system. Lucas 
and Stevenson’s argument is supported by Muller’s (1999) observation that physical pain and 
the threat of physical pain represent the primary means through which hospital staff are 
empowered, using, for example, patients’ fear of pain to protect themselves from those 
considered potentially violent.   
 
Baldwin-Ragaven et al. (1999) have highlighted the autonomy given the health profession in 
implementation and monitoring of its ethical codes of conduct, arguing that, while the 
relationship between society and the medical profession is one of trust, in terms of which 
health professionals are expected to protect the rights of their patients in return for their right 
to self-regulation, this trust is open to abuse. In light of the difficult ethical dilemmas that 
health care professionals face, these authors argue that the ‘optional’ nature of adherence to 
ethical codes and the ‘moral fortitude’ on which such adherence relies represent the greatest 
flaw in the health professions’ codes of conduct. This concern is echoed by Gibson in her 
2004 publication, in which she argues that the lack of funds available within the South 
African public health sector, in particular, amplifies the difficulty of the ethical decisions that 
medical staff are required to make. For example, decisions about who should get access to 
limited beds and to optimal care, the need to empty beds as quickly as possible in order to 
make space for incoming patients and so on render the neutral implementation of policy 
objectives impossible.   
 
Fassin (2008) discusses the justifications that doctors and nurses provide for discrepancies 
between their claimed norms and actual practices. This author notes that these justifications 
revolve in the main around lack of resources, patient workload and patients’ deviance and 
include beliefs such as that nurses and doctors know better than their patients, that patients 
prefer to have their doctors make decisions on their behalf, that patients are too uneducated to 
be able to decide for themselves or that patients are undeserving of treatment as a result of 
having come to the hospital for inadequate reasons, having concealed aspects of their 
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histories from their doctors, feigned physical pain, defaulted on their treatment regimens or 
due to being drunk or aggressive. Fassin argues, however, that justifications are not 
explanations and suggests a more complex interpretation. These moral evaluations of 
patients, he argues, represent, rather than a simple reason for the relevant patients’ subsequent 
mistreatment, a psychological defence on the part of hospital staff. The differentiation of 
patients as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ enables doctors and nurses to tolerate their own lack of 
compassion and interest in their patients, identified as ‘bad’ and hence undeserving of 
optimal care. In addition to this defensive evaluation of patients, the technical orientation of 
doctors renders curative activities the only important ones and humanistically-driven actions 
as incidental. When combined with the organisational imperatives, in terms of which nurses’ 
priorities are to get the round done and the drugs distributed and doctors’ are to empty beds 
as speedily as possible, the disjuncture between ethical codes and actual practice is almost 
complete.  
 
For this reason, Fassin makes the important argument that assessing ethical practice is less 
about verifying the extent to which practices conform to specified rules and more about 
observing practice with a view to determining and accounting for the principles at work. 
Ethics is therefore about “how everyday practice is performed and justified and how it can be 
interpreted.”  
 
Summary  
This chapter has discussed the importance placed within much of the literature on the 
relevance of the particular context, in terms of which specific individuals are enabled and 
constrained in the production of action, determining which of the features of medical culture 
will manifest, and how these will be employed, in the activities of a given setting. A number 
of authors have discussed doctors’ emotional responses to the conditions and illnesses with 
which they are faced, arguing that, on the one hand, they are not allowed the space within 
medical settings and (medical) cultural understandings to process these and, on the other, that 
unacknowledged emotions represent the greatest danger to the quality of care that doctors are 
able to deliver, leading to an important conclusion, namely that self-reflection, generally 
discouraged in medical settings, is crucial to ensuring humane medical practice.     
 
The chapter goes on to  discuss literature concerning  the importance of the particular context 
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of health care in influencing its form and in producing valid interpretations thereof, 
identifying a growing field, namely that of hospital ethnography, that attempts to account for 
this view in its analysis of health care settings. A context particularly relevant to the research 
presented in this thesis is that of the South African public health system, in which the data for 
this study was collected. This chapter has therefore reviewed the limited research available on 
this context, in particular that which relates to the occurrence of abusive practice.  With a 
specific focus on the socio-political context that pervades South African history and 
continues to exert its influence on a “fragmented, under-resourced and inequitable public 
health sector” (Lund & Flisher, 2006; Fassin, 2008), the small body of literature that 
addresses the delivery of inhumane care in South African hospitals documents its 
continuation into the present.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I set out the theoretical framework in terms of which this project was 
undertaken and a description of the methods employed in producing the arguments I present. 
Drawing on Bakhtin’s theory of language and consciousness and on Billig’s reintroduction of 
the unconscious into discursive psychology, I begin by discussing some of the key theoretical 
ideas that informed my thinking. I then set out the ways in which the ethnographic approach 
and the concept of narrative help to translate these theoretical ideas into research practice and 
go on to tell the story of the study in such a way as to make my methods accessible for 
critical review. 
 
The theoretical framework 
I set forth in this thesis from a vantage point in terms of which language is understood to 
represent the medium through which we interpret and communicate our experiences. While I 
do not maintain that language encapsulates all of human experience (Frosh, 2002), I do 
believe that its fundamental role in bringing experience into conscious awareness, and its 
property of rendering that experience visible for empirical investigation, justifies a focus on 
it. As Frosh points out, those aspects of human experience that cannot be expressed in words 
are beyond the reaches of research and we can do no more than guess at their nature. The 
arguments presented in this thesis are therefore a product of my focus on linguistically 
mediated experience through attention to the details of talk.  
 
From the variety of approaches, ranging from a strict focus on the structure of language to its 
characterisation as a key to the unconscious recesses of the individual mind, I have chosen to 
treat language in a manner that emphasizes the use to which it is put in particular contexts, 
and the effects thereof on the meaning that experiences assume for the various actors within 
those contexts. Such an approach enables exploration of meaning as fluid and changeable, 
allowing insight into the particular meanings produced in a given situation and highlighting 
the possibility for changing those meanings and hence the contexts and actions of those 
within them. The exploration of language thus becomes not merely a neutral investigation of 
a supposedly fixed reality, but the emphasis on its formative and therefore potentially 
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transformative nature allows for the more politically or morally driven activity of exploring 
the manner in which language is used to structure power relations between people.  
 
The discursive movement in psychology  
The value of knowledge produced by traditional methods in psychology is undeniable. 
However, these methods tell only a part of the story. Attending only to “the firmest, most 
stable, least changeable and most monosemic aspects of discourse” (Bakhtin, as cited in 
Shotter & Billig, 1998: p. 21), traditional methods banish the phenomena that are the focus of 
this thesis beyond the realm of consideration. The “distinctive ‘sensings’ we get when 
involved in our discourse-intertwined everyday activities with others – the responsive 
understandings in terms of which we judge whether it is our turn to speak or not, whether 
others are questioning us or requesting something of us, or are acting sincerely, or ironically, 
and so on,” (Bakhtin, as cited in Shotter & Billig, 1998: p. 22) are vitally relevant to the 
domain of interpersonal relationships but are rendered invisible by traditional methods. As 
the medium through which our consciousness is experienced (Chomsky, 1979), a focus on 
language as approached in this thesis provides us with a means of getting a grasp on these 
often chaotic, sometimes ephemeral, and ever-changing elements of social existence. 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of language  
Central to the methodological approach that I take in this thesis is an emphasis on the 
interactional nature of discursive action and on its occurrence in meaning-laden contexts. 
Bakhtin proposed an approach to the study of language that prioritises the communicative 
event and the meaning of the utterance as spoken (Morrow, 1998), as opposed to its structural 
form. In his own words, “language lives only in the dialogic interaction of those who make 
use of it” (Bakhtin, as cited in Shotter & Billig, 1998: p.13). More structuralist approaches to 
the interpretation of talk make for a conception of language in terms of which meaning is 
seen as finite, complete and carried in the words themselves. From Voloshinov’s (Bakhtin) 
interactionist point of view, this exclusive focus neglects the creative and evaluative nature of 
language, denying its capacity to generate new meaning, as well as the creative agency of the 
individual speaker and the situated nature of human experience in time and space. Instead, 
Bakhtin’s approach to language allows for the possibility that any particular statement can 
have multiple meanings. It is only in terms of the context within which a statement is actually 
uttered that we can know which of these is realised. Rather than carried in the words 
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themselves as the fixed meaning given in the dictionary, the meaning of words is actualised 
in the specific context of their use (Voloshinov, 1994a). All utterances are conceptualised as 
inherently responsive to others in the discursive context and are tailored to account for the 
responses they themselves anticipate (Nofsinger, 1991). Thus Bakhtin’s approach 
acknowledges both the creative agency of the individual speaker as well as the social context 
in the production of meaning. It is within this interplay between the individual and the social, 
he argues, that language assumes its generative potential.  
 
In terms of Bakhtin’s approach to language, and its implications for an understanding of 
consciousness, the self is not the reified, self-contained entity of modernity, composed of 
‘personality-objects’, such as traits, attitudes, emotions and so forth. Instead, it is constituted 
within linguistically reinforced social practices. Since the social context is a dialogical one, 
thinking is necessarily also predominantly dialogical, and psychical content is constructed 
between people, rather than inside their heads (Shotter & Billig, 1998). The individual is 
therefore inseparable from the social, and the meanings of the words uttered by individuals 
reflect both personal action and social meanings (Burkitt, 1998). Not only do the utterances 
of individuals respond to other utterances, and attempt themselves to elicit responses, but the 
words uttered by individuals are never original. Rather, they have been used countless times 
by other individuals in other contexts. Thus, words enter particular settings “trailing debris of 
meaning from the past, ‘tasting’, to use Bakhtin’s…term, of the settings and intentions of 
their use elsewhere and when” (Smith, 1998: p. 65). The particular utterance of an individual 
makes use of an already existing language. Language thus not only enables speech, and 
indeed consciousness, but also sets constraints on what it is possible to say (Voloshinov / 
Bakhtin, 1994a), and, consequently, on who it is possible to be. In this sense, “Any human 
verbal utterance is an ideological construct in the small,” (Voloshinov / Bakhtin, 1994a: p.45) 
These key aspects of Bakhtin’s understanding of language form the theoretical basis of the 
methodological approach that I adopt in this thesis. Thus, I approach the talk analysed in the 
subsequent chapters not merely as reflective of the experiences of individual speakers but  as 
representative and productive of shared social meanings, in this case those characteristic of 
medical culture, as animated by individuals within a particular context, namely the 
emergency unit in which this research was conducted.  
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The return of the unconscious 
While drawing on Bakhtin’s philosophy, I have attempted also to go beyond it, following the 
direction taken by Billig in his reintroduction of the unconscious into social psychology. 
Voloshinov (Bakhtin) (as cited in Shotter & Billig, 1998: p.15) believed that “social 
psychology is in fact not located anywhere within (in the souls of communicating subjects) 
but entirely and completely without – in the word, in the gesture, the act. There is nothing left 
unexpressed in it, nothing ‘inner’ about it – it is wholly on the outside, wholly brought about 
in exchanges.” Billig (1999) argues, however, that this is not so – that all experience is not 
outwardly expressed. Through a reformulation of Freud’s concept of repression, Billig argues 
for the existence of a dialogic unconscious, created silently, rather than by “the word, the 
gesture, the act,” by what is routinely not expressed. In opening up certain areas of talk, 
others are at the same moment closed down. Just as conversation creates the said, it 
simultaneously creates the unsaid – in as much as it expresses, it also represses. Thus, Billig 
reintroduces the notion of the unconscious, this time as a dialogical phenomenon created in 
conversation.  Of particular importance to the arguments presented here, this linguistically 
oriented approach to psychical phenomena renders visible those aspects of human experience 
traditionally conceived of as internal, and therefore inherently unobservable (Shotter & 
Billig, 1998). Thus, not only do I treat the talk that is the subject of this thesis as 
representative and indeed generative of the social context. I also foreground the silences and 
alternatives that it closes off in the process of its production, exploring the simultaneous 
impact of these on the possibilities for being and for action.  
 
Translating theory into practice 
The above discussion sets out the core theoretical ideas with which I approached this 
research. Two key concepts were central to my translation of these ideas into research 
practice and to my choice of the particular methods that I used in producing the arguments at 
which I eventually arrived. The first is ethnography and the second narrative. The remainder 
of this section will detail the relevance of these approaches to the above theoretical tenets. 
 
Ethnography  
Rather than a clearly demarcated, coherent set of ideas and practices, the field of ethnography 
is “marked by diversity” (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p257) and might be better 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
102 
 
described as an approach to exploring and understanding a given context (Atkinson & 
Pugsley, 2005), or even as a ‘way of being’ in a context that one is studying (Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 1994). This emphasis within what is broadly termed the ethnographic approach 
represents the central reason for which this approach is relevant to my theoretical standpoint, 
with the primacy that it gives to the use of language in context, rather than in terms of its 
structural features. In the words of Rampton (cited in Creese, 2008, p 229), speaking of the 
focus on language within much ethnographic research, “Linguistic ethnography generally 
holds that language and social life are mutually shaping, and that close analysis of situated 
language use can provide both fundamental and distinctive insights into the mechanisms and 
dynamics of social and cultural production in everyday activity.” Such an approach therefore 
lends itself to exploring social reality as conceptualised in Bakhtinian terms. 
Exploration of meaning in dialogical contexts 
Historically employed in the study of foreign cultures, ethnography was later used to study 
subcultures within the researcher’s broader cultural background and has, in more recent 
times, become widely used as an approach to the study of culture much more broadly defined 
as systems of meaning. This emphasis on meaning represents a further reason for which the 
ethnographic approach is so useful to my aims, namely to explore the ways in which the use 
of language influences the meanings that experiences hold for the actors in a particular 
context, imbuing the individual’s experience with the ‘flavours’ already present in that 
context. Focusing not merely on the explicit meanings evident in the content of a particular 
setting but attempting to shed light on the implicit or underlying meanings in terms of which 
social life in the relevant context is interpreted and produced, the ethnographer does not 
assume that people are necessarily consciously aware of the meanings in terms of which they 
live (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Ethnography therefore enables exploration also of the 
unstated components of a context, in other words of Billig’s conversational unconscious, or 
‘unsaid’, audible between the ‘fleeting little words’ in people’s dialogue. 
 
This latterday form of ethnography, with its focus on culture as comprised of “webs of 
significance” (Geertz, 1973, cited in Eisenhart, 2001, p5),  “inseparable,” in Kondo’s words 
(cited in Eisenhart, p215), “from the ‘deepest’ aspects of one’s ‘self’,” is associated with a 
shift in attention from reified cultural systems to the identities that emerge against a backdrop 
of meanings. This shift foregrounds not only the fluid, dynamic nature of meaning, of which 
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Bakhtin speaks, but also the interplay between the individual and the social, bringing the 
agency of the individual speaker into view, as he employs an existing language, already 
imbued with the “taste” of its use in other contexts and at other times. Ethnography thus 
defined is therefore well-suited to the study of the dialogical production of social meanings, 
as animated by individuals through their interaction within specific contexts. Such an 
approach thus enables exploration, in this case, of medical culture, as enacted by individual 
doctors (and patients) within a particular hospital’s emergency unit. 
Meaning and action 
In terms of the fundamental assumption of ethnography then, namely that social life is 
meaningful, human beings are understood to experience their lives and to act in ways that are 
rooted in their interpretations of the world around them, and of themselves and each other 
within it (Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). According to Gobo (2008), ethnography seeks to 
understand this meaning-laden context in order to explain social action, thus directly 
addressing my aim in this thesis, namely to provide insight into how the cultural context of 
medical practice might explain the provision of inhumane care. As Atkinson and Pugsley 
note, and of particular importance to my aims here, the ethnographer attempts to understand 
the culture in which she is interested in its own terms, a stance to which these authors refer as 
cultural relativism. In these terms, the actions and identities of those we study are seen to 
make sense in terms of the meanings prevalent within the context in which they occur 
(Atkinson & Pugsley, 2005). Human beings are thus assumed to be rational, in terms of the 
particular ‘webs of significance’ into which they have been socialised. It should be noted that 
this relativist position does not imply that ‘anything goes’, as in moral relativism. Rather, it 
acknowledges that moral condemnation alone does not further understanding. In the case of 
this thesis, therefore, while I, the ethnographer in question, have a clear moral stance on the 
provision of inhumane care and indeed an aim to contribute to its prevention, I require, 
paradoxically, an insider’s view, in terms of which the actions I would prevent can be 
understood as rational.  
 
Shedding light on the tacit knowledge of which the social context is composed and through 
which its inhabitants construct and reconstruct the context in which they operate in the 
ordinary processes of their daily lives, ethnography is further able to raise questions about the 
meanings and power relations that a context engenders, and thus to challenge the inevitability 
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of its consequences for the identities and actions of those within it. This last brings us to what 
Manias and Street (2000) call critical ethnography, an approach that extends this 
ethnographic ‘way of being’ in the context under study  to include not only the purpose of 
understanding that context, but also of “bringing about human emancipation” within it 
(Hammersely, cited in Manias and Street, 2000, p 96). This study, which aims to identify 
discursive practices that enable inhumane care, in order to facilitate the construction of 
pathways to more humane care, might then be positioned as critical ethnography. 
 
Narrative  
Similarly broad in concept and diverse in definition, if more singularly related to the 
discursive components of the social context that are the focus of this thesis, the concept of 
narrative provides a further useful tool for bridging the gap between my theoretical ideas and 
the practical methods employed in this research. Narratives can be described as (partial) 
representations of the world (Ochs & Capps,1996), which, in terms of a theoretical approach 
that highlights the relationship between language and consciousness, structure our 
representations of reality, selfhood and experience, and thus the meanings that ethnography 
seeks to explore.  
 
While there are diverse and abundant definitions of narrative, I make use of one particular 
feature to differentiate it from other conceptualisations of discourse. In the words of Rapport 
and Overing (2007), “A narrative account involves a sequence of two or more units of 
information ...  such that if the order of the sequence were changed, the meaning of the 
account would alter.” I thus use the concept of sequentiality to differentiate a narrative 
approach from other similar approaches to understanding the discursive environment. Like 
Rapport and Overing, I further use it in its broadest sense to refer not only to temporal 
sequences, as do the majority of authors writing in this field (see, for example, the work of 
Ochs, 2004) but to any form of sequencing, be it spatial, thematic or in terms of emotional 
significance (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000b). I thus distinguish between narratives and stories, 
which might be much more narrowly defined, and allow within their definition not only for 
obviously bounded units of discourse but also, for example, for snippets of conversation, seen 
as jointly produced narratives (Ochs, 2004), and indeed for any series of words not randomly 
generated.  
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This concept of sequence is especially useful in enabling exploration of the possible 
implications of discursive constructions for the actions and identities of individuals. Mary 
Gergen (2001) provides an alternative retelling of a traditional fairy tale, in which a princess 
saves her prince from an evil dragon. Dismayed by the prince’s expression of dissatisfaction 
with her ruined attire after she has slain the beast, the princess proceeds to ride off alone into 
the sunset. Our almost inevitable surprise within Western culture at the sequence of events in 
this story illustrates the power of the original version to influence our understanding of our 
experiences, and thereby our responses to them, rendering some courses of action far more 
likely than others. Narratives thus tell us how stories are likely to begin and end, who is likely 
to initiate what events, commit what actions, possess what characteristics and so on, 
structuring our understandings and expectations and thereby influencing our actions. While 
the concept of sequence thus distinguishes narrative from other approaches to the 
interpretation of discursive activity, a narrative approach to the study of talk involves much 
more than a focus on sequence. Important simply to note at this juncture, the point will be 
elaborated in the section below in which I describe the process of analysing talk as narrative.  
 
A further important feature of the narrative approach is its ability to render visible the agency 
of the individual speaker in the production of discourse. While discursive approaches in 
general tend to prioritise discourse itself, focusing on the appearance of various features 
within talk, a narrative approach, through its attention to the relationships between the 
various elements of an utterance, highlights the creativity of the individual narrator in its 
production. The concept of narrative thus enables exploration of discursive activity in terms 
that foreground the social context through facilitating exploration of the “debris of meaning” 
carried by words that have been used in other contexts, and at the same time highlight the 
agency of the individual in the way that he makes use of them.  
 
Finally, a narrative approach allows exploration not only of what is said but also of what is 
not said or, in Billig’s terms, of what is conversationally repressed. Narratives represent 
versions of reality (Ochs & Capps, 1996), attributing certain meanings and not others to 
people, events or whatever the phenomenon being apprehended. As Ochs and Capps put it 
revealingly, albeit surprisingly, rather than its opposite, “remembering is a form of 
forgetting” (Kundera, as cited in Ochs & Capps, 1996: p. 21, my emphasis). Narratives thus 
produce some and close off other ways of understanding reality, again making particular 
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possibilities for being and for action more or less available (Fordred, 2002). I thus employ 
Billig’s concept of the unsaid to allow the exploration of narrative to give insight not only 
into what is immediately obvious, but into what Hollway and Jefferson term ‘defended 
subjects’, or those aspects of selfhood and experience of which we may not be consciously 
aware or that we may not intentionally convey. The concept of narrative is particularly 
sensitive to these ‘unsaid’ meanings of talk, enabling their exploration through investigation 
of the relationships between various parts of an account, and thus allowing ambivalence and 
contradiction to be brought to light and subjected to interpretation. 
 
Defined in these terms, a narrative approach to investigating human experience fits well with 
the dialogically-oriented vantage point outlined above, sharing its subject-centred, yet non-
individualist, interaction-based perspective (de Peuter, 1998), and thus facilitating exploration 
of the meeting point between self and society, or between the contextually structured 
meanings and individual actions pertinent to this thesis. These theoretical ideas informed the 
manner of my approach to this project from its inception to its completion. Far from leaving 
this theory behind, therefore, the remainder of the chapter will detail its application in 
practical terms.  
 
The story of the study 
The project’s inception 
The story of this research begins with a conversation I had with a doctor who told me that 
there was an alarmingly high incidence of diabetic keto-acidosis at a certain secondary-level 
hospital, located in a poor residential area, adjacent to a major industrial centre in South 
Africa. Keto-acidosis is a condition often resulting from uncontrolled blood sugar levels over 
a relatively long period of time, and is thus frequently the result of patients’ poor monitoring 
and management of their conditions. The doctor believed the problem was caused at least in 
part by the fact that these patients very often failed to return to the hospital for follow-up 
visits after receiving their initial diagnoses, resulting in crises that might otherwise have been 
avoided. This in turn, she suspected, was the result of poor relationships between doctors and 
patients in the emergency unit, where these cases are diagnosed and to which they return 
when the subsequent crises strike. With these concerns in mind, she suggested that I design a 
project that might offer some insight into the factors contributing to this situation.  
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Wanting to produce something with obvious relevance, I fixed on the implications of 
interactional events for patients’ assumption of responsibility for the management of their 
conditions. After having submitted my proposal and gained approval from the university’s 
and then from the hospital’s ethics committee, I was invited to present my research intentions 
to the doctors and to begin. I therefore attended a meeting held in the doctors’ tea room at 
which the hospital’s entire team of doctors was present and I briefly introduced what I 
wanted to do. With the exception of one doctor who seemed genuinely supportive of my 
work and another who candidly flung his head into his hands and emitted a groan – “Jesus 
Christ!” – on hearing that my interest was in interaction with patients, all the doctors 
professed to believe the project important but raised methodological concerns that suggested 
their hospital was not the best one for the study. For various reasons they all felt I would be 
much better off elsewhere. Humouring them by pretending to take their concerns (which were 
all wholly irrelevant to mine) seriously, but carefully winding the c nversation back to a 
point at which I professed my belief that it remained worth conducting the study at their 
hospital, I embarked on a set of relationships within which I was obliged to tread very 
carefully for the duration of the study. While I was un ware at the time of the significance of 
the defensive front with which I was met at that meeting, and of my response to it, this 
dynamic was to shape my relationships with the doctors for the duration of the study, and 
indeed the content and form of the arguments here presented. 
 
Having successfully steered the conversation, if not convinced the doctors of the importance 
of the project, it was agreed that I would begin the very next Monday. I thus began an initial 
period of exploratory observation and embarked on a process of searching for evidence of the 
causal relationships between doctor-patient interactions and patients’ subsequent 
management of their illnesses and treatment.  But the more closely I looked the more elusive 
the treasure became. Not only did the lines of causality in which I was interested become 
increasingly difficult to pin down but my attention was diverted from these tenuous 
connections by events that I witnessed and experienced over and over again as the inhumane 
treatment of patients and the violation of their human dignity. Far from elusive, these events 
hit me like slaps across the face and left me restless and disturbed, confirming the continued 
occurrence of abusive and otherwise inhumane practices documented by Lucas and 
Stevenson (2006) and Fassin (2008) in South African public sector hospitals. A moment that 
stands out in my memory as a turning point for this project was one that occurred during the 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
108 
 
first week of my observations at the hospital. I had joined the doctors’ round that morning 
and we stood at the bed of a man, probably in his late thirties, who was obviously dying. It 
was the first time that I had ever witnessed the last moments of a human life and I was 
overwhelmed by the image of what struck me as the slow and painful process of death as it 
devoured this man’s body. As I stood there, attempting to process the scene and my own 
response to it, the doctors chuckled and laughed somewhat bitterly around the bed, making 
cynical jokes about the events that had led to what was now certain death. As the ward round 
moved on and I walked away with the doctors, I felt slightly sick at the flippant manner in 
which (we?) had treated this man and now left him to die alone and I began to reformulate the 
causal lines that I was originally intent on exposing into questions about how such 
undignified treatment of the suffering and dying could have come to be standard procedure.  
 
My focus thus shifted from one that aimed at establishing the causal connections between two 
sets of events to one on the processes whereby particular kinds of events, namely those that 
struck me as examples of inhumane care, had become commonplace in an environment 
ostensibly dedicated to caring for the sick. The project thus evolved with my exposure to the 
realities of the hospital, eventually producing insights that reflected my shift in focus but that 
nevertheless have relevance, I believe, for the concerns that the doctor expressed in the 
conversation in which it was born.   
 
Research questions 
The question I ended up posing, and to which this thesis represents a response, centres on the 
means by which various aspects of medical discourse, as described in the literature reviewed, 
and as animated by particular individuals in the context of Greenlands hospital, enable 
doctors in the emergency unit to provide inhumane care and, on occasion, to violate their 
patients’ rights. A number of sub-questions break this broad question down in parallel with 
the overarching themes of culture, power, identity and the importance of individual 
participation in particular contexts, identified in the preceding review chapters. They further 
facilitate exploration of these themes and of their relevance to the provision of inhumane care 
in keeping with the theoretical tenets of the approach taken in this thesis, namely those 
discussed with reference to the importance of language and dialogue in the production and 
reproduction of culture, identity and action by individual agents acting in contexts. The 
subquestions addressed in this thesis are therefore as follows: 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
109 
 
 How is power distributed between the various actors in the emergency unit? What 
aspects of medical discourse contribute to the attribution of power to doctors and 
patients within the Greenlands emergency unit? How are these features of medical 
discourse animated within the context of the Greenlands emergency unit? What, if 
any, is the relationship between these constructions and the provision of inhumane 
care? 
 What features of medical discourse, as animated within the emergency unit, 
contribute to the attribution of unequal power to doctors and patients at Greenlands 
hospital? What is the relationship between these attributions of power and the 
provision of inhumane care? 
 How do the various elements of medical discourse, animated within emergency room 
talk, enable and constrain doctors’ and patients’ identities and actions? For example, 
what identities are readily available to doctors and patients? What identities are less 
easy for doctors and patients to assume within the discursive context? What courses 
of action are rendered most and least likely or desirable for the various actors present 
in the unit? What, if any, is the relationship between the relevant constructions of 
identity and action and the provision of inhumane care? 
 How do the various features of medical discourse contribute to the attribution of 
agency and responsibility within the unit? How, if at all, do these attributions enable 
the provision of inhumane care?  
 What aspects of the emergency unit’s discursive context challenge or contradict the 
dominant discourses and how are these threats discursively managed? 
 
The setting 
Greenlands Hospital serves a population of 1.1 million people and holds a total of 224 beds, 
processing approximately seven and a half thousand in-patients per month (a total of 91 101 
in the financial year 2006 / 07), the period during which the data for this project was 
collected. According to the hospital’s statistics, the ratio of beds occupied in that year was 
112% and the fatality rate 7,08%, having decreased from 9,31% in 2005 / 06 and 10,19% in 
2004 / 05. The hospital’s fatality rate was thus 3,15% higher than that of the secondary-level 
hospital with the next highest fatality rate for that year, a difference that has remained 
roughly constant over the last eight years. The hospital consists of four wards (two general 
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medical and two surgical), a high care unit, an emergency unit and an outpatients department. 
The hospital’s patients are exclusively poor and attend this hospital only for want of 
preferable medical facilities. The hospital is generally feared by the community it serves, 
where it is commonly known as “the morgue,” and thus represents a last resort for those 
obliged to use it. Its doctors, predictably, are from middle class backgrounds and, in the 
context of South Africa’s political legacy, live existences outside of the hospital that are 
entirely separate from their patients’ lifeworlds.  
The emergency unit 
As the point of entry into the hospital, all the patients who come to the hospital pass through 
the emergency unit first. Thus, while the hospital’s statistics are incomplete and not kept up 
to date, based on the figures for 2006 / 07 an estimated average of 250 patients present at the 
unit each day. The triage system by means of which patients are classified in terms of the 
urgency with which they require attention means that not all of these patients ultimately see a 
doctor. Some are sent home or to a primary healthcare centr  on the basis of relatively 
reassuring results of the initial screening, conducte by urses in the triage area. While records 
of the exact number of patients who are in fact attended by an emergency room doctor are not 
kept up to date, staff estimate an approximate number of eighty patients in the unit at any 
given moment.  
 
The emergency unit is contained in a large room, in the centre of which is the doctors’ 
station, a set of dilapidated tables pushed together to form a long table and chairs where the 
doctors write their notes and where certain routine medical equipment is kept (gloves, bottles 
for blood samples, gauze bandages and so on). Two large open bins stand one on either side 
of the table displaying warnings in large red letters that they contain dangerous substances 
and revealing the blood-stained cast-offs of various procedures, used needles and other 
components of medical waste. The beds are arranged around the edges of the room, and the 
nurses’ station, a counter and cupboards with basic nursing supplies, stands in one corner. 
The medical holding area juts out from one end of the room. It contains five beds and is lined 
along its walls with benches, usually overflowing with patients for whom there is no bed 
available, who sit or slump while they wait to be attended to, sometimes for as long as 
seventy-two hours. A security guard stands at the gate that leads into the rest of the hospital, 
preventing traffic in and out of the unit and ready to intervene in the not infrequent scuffles 
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that break out between patients or between patients and staff. These incidents are almost 
invariably initiated by an outburst from one of the psychotic patients, whose rantings and 
ravings form a major part of the proceedings in this area of the unit, where they wait for 
attention.  
 
A room known as the ‘padded cell’ leads off the medical holding area and was originally the 
nurses’ tea room but was converted into a locked area for violent or otherwise unmanageable 
patients. The door opens only from the outside and an alarm that can be activated from the 
inside should a doctor or patient need urgent assistance wails constantly and is ignored. The 
relatives’ ‘comfort room’ leads off the medical holding area just next door to the ‘padded 
cell’. It contains a number of chairs and serves as a space in which relatives are informed of a 
patient’s death or can sit to recover from such news. The surgical holding area contains a 
further four beds and three rows of benches for patients awaiting emergency surgery. This 
area is more often than not pervaded by an odour of rotting flesh as patients await the 
amputation of gangrenous toes and feet. Leading off the surgical holding area is the 
resuscitation area, a confined area with four beds reserved for patients requiring resuscitation 
but used also, when necessary and possible, for other patients who require a bed. The ECG 
room is a very small room opposite the resuscitation area containing a bed and an ECG 
machine.  
 
In general, the unit has an unkempt, dirty and chaotic feel about it. The floor is often 
spattered with blood and other spillages and a pungent smell, including the odours of urine, 
faeces, gangrene and disinfectant, permeates the air. The busier the unit, the more marked 
these features become. Some days the unit hums quietly along but often it is characterised by 
continuous movement and noise, as patients scream in pain or sing insanely, trolleys are 
wheeled in and out and doctors rush about the room in a frenzy of constant activity. While 
there are three doctors’ rounds at regular times each day – at 6am; 8am and 4pm – there is 
otherwise very little evidence of routine. The unit is geared to addressing whatever comes in 
through its doors and its staff simply respond as and when the need arises and in whatever 
manner circumstances permit. In theory, each patient, after passing through the triage system, 
is either sent elsewhere or ‘clerked’ by a doctor in the emergency unit, during which process 
the doctor identifies the presenting complaint, takes the patient’s history and examines him 
before making a diagnosis and prescribing a treatment. The patient then waits, either on a 
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bench or a bed, if available, to receive treatment and then be discharged, transferred or 
admitted into one of the hospital’s wards. In practice, however, this intended sequence of 
events does not always occur. In a great many instances, the emergency is too imminent for 
the triage and clerking routines to be warranted or justifiable and the patient is rushed directly 
into the resuscitation area or into emergency theatre to have, for example, a bullet removed 
from the head or a stab wound to the heart repaired. On other occasions, an immediate threat 
of violence may require sedation before any further action can be taken, or the pressure of 
other patients might mean that no action at all is taken for as long as seventy-two hours. 
Coupled with the practical goings on in the unit, therefore, is a strange sense of what might 
be described as bored expectancy – the sense that the unexpected or bizarre could occur at 
any moment, and indeed that it is only a matter of time before it does. All this is combined 
with a tired or dull resignation to the fact that, as one doctor put it, “this place is like reality 
cranked up by ten notches.”  
 
The participants 
At the unit’s helm is the head of department, a senior physician, seconded by two rotating 
consultants and then by two senior medical officers. These more senior staff members work 
only from Monday to Friday and between seven and sixteen hundred hours. Assisting them 
and running the unit independently after hours are eighteen medical officers (six on duty at 
any one time) and a number of interns. The medical officers are, with few exceptions, 
recently qualified doctors, serving out their compulsory community service period, and are 
rotated every six months. The interns are similarly rotated and there is therefore a constant 
turnover of staff in the unit. A registrar admits patients into the rest of the hospital and the 
medical staff are supported by the nurses, two of whom are on duty at a time, and by the 
security guards. 
 
 A total of 22 doctors participated in the study over the year I spent collecting the data. Due to 
the high turnover, not all doctors were present for the duration of the data collection. While 
the nurses and security staff might be considered participants to the extent that they were 
present and that my observations of them and conversations with them did comprise part of 
my background knowledge of the unit, my primary concern with the discourse of medical 
culture and its implications meant that my focus was on the doctors. Largely because of the 
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high-stress work environment, the majority of doctors working in the unit were in the early 
stages of their careers, there to serve out the required community service period or to acquire 
the experience necessary to find more comfortable positions. Thus even the most senior 
doctors in the unit were probably not yet forty. Two of the doctors who participated in the 
study held the position of senior medical officer, three were consultants, two were registrars 
and the remaining fourteen held the position of medical officer. Thirteen of the doctors who 
participated in the study were male and nine female. Particularly relevant within the 
racialised South African context, it is noteworthy that, while the doctors represent diverse 
racial groupings, other staff and patients were exclusively black and coloured. In addition, 
while all the doctors were from middle class backgrounds, patients were all poor. The 
following table summarises the characteristics of those doctors who participated in the study 
in terms of professional rank, gender, race and class. 
 
Rank Gender Race Class 
Snr. medical officer Male White Middle class 
Registrar Female White Middle class 
Medical officer Male Black Middle class 
Medical officer Male White Middle class 
Medical officer Male White Middle class  
Medical officer Female Black Middle class 
Head of Department Male Black Middle class 
Consultant  Male Black Middle class 
Medical officer Female Black Middle class 
Medical officer Female White Middle class 
Registrar Male White Middle class 
Consultant Female Black Middle class 
Medical officer Female Black Middle class 
Consultant Male Black Middle class 
Medical officer Female White Middle class 
Medical officer Male White Middle class 
Medical officer Male White Middle class 
Snr. medical officer Male White Middle class 
Medical officer Female White Middle class 
Medical officer Male Black Middle class 
Medical officer Female Black Middle class 
Medical officer Male Black Middle class 
Table 1. Doctors in terms of professional rank, gender, race and class. 
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The number of patients who participated in the study was great. The constant movement of 
patients into, within and out of the unit, along with the generally chaotic nature of the 
environment, made it impossible to record the number of patients included in the research. 
During the course of the year that I spent collecting the data, however, it is safe to say that 
there must have been many hundreds. 
Ethnographic methods 
As noted above, ethnography encompasses a range of diverse methods. Amongst the defining 
features of its practical application, however, is engagement with the everyday world of the 
context and actors under study, for an extended period of time (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007; Atkinson & Pugsely, 2005; Pope, 2005) so as to acquire an understanding of the tacit 
knowledge and implicit meanings of which it is composed and in terms of which it is 
produced and reproduced.  
Participant observation 
The primary medium for achieving this aim is participant observation. Again not a 
clearly defined or bounded set of practices, participant observation can involve varying 
degrees of participation in the context of interest, making use of whatever data sources 
that context makes available. In addition, the role assumed by the researcher engaged in 
participant observation is not static but adapts in relation to the demands, constraints 
and possibilities created by the research setting and the actors within it (Pope, 2005). 
Participant observation is thus a dynamic, evolving practice, the defining feature of 
which, according to Atkinson and Pugsley (2005, p231) is “the investigation of everyday 
social life in situ,” and by means of which the ethnographer attempts, through observing, 
listening and participating in the given context, to gradually bring its implicit symbols and 
meanings to light (Gobo, 2008). 
 
After having introduced the study to the doctors in the tea room, therefore, I began an 
extensive period, spanning almost a year between April 2006 and March 2007, but with 
numerous interruptions, during which I ‘hung out’ at the emergency unit. In response to the 
constraints imposed on my time by other responsibilities and to my periodic need to withdraw 
from the unit in order to reflect and refine my strategies, this period might be described as 
consisting of ‘phases’, during some of which I spent two months at a stretch attending the 
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unit every day and during others of which I ‘popped in’ at the unit for two mornings a week 
or even spent a few weeks fleshing out my field notes and engaging in the early stages of 
analysis. All in all, I spent approximately six months’ worth of solid time making my 
observations. As noted, the study design and therefore the collection of data was dynamic 
but, as Atkinson and Hammersley (2007) point out, this equates in no way with haphazard. 
While unstructured and without a predefined set of steps, the design of an ethnographic study 
is nevertheless crucial to the nature of the knowledge produced. Thus, definition of the task 
remains open-ended and the design emergent rather than set but the process is no less 
deliberate and involves continual reflection and decision-making at every step of the way.  
 
I began this process by making use, initially, of as wide a range as possible of the tools of 
ethnography in an attempt to gain an understanding of how the discursive environment 
operated to render permissible actions that almost anywhere else would have been deemed 
unacceptable. At first, the research process literally consisted of just ‘hanging out’ – watching 
the goings on, listening to the doctors’ talk as they went about their activities, chatting to the 
patients, reading notices stuck up in the room and generally trying to notice whatever seemed 
relevant to the place and its inhabitants. On the one hand, I wanted to familiarise myself with 
the workings of the unit sufficiently, so that I could make some decisions about which aspects 
of it I wanted to record. And on the other, I sensed instinctively that to be too hasty in 
whipping out pen and paper might make people uneasy and would be unwise. Instead, I tried 
unsuccessfully to make myself useful by offering my help with tasks that required no medical 
skill, but was never taken up on any of these offers, except by the patients, who were only too 
happy to accept my services in whatever form they were available! 
 
During the months that followed I visited the emergency unit as often as my other 
responsibilities would allow, arriving in the early morning in time to gain the patients’ 
consent to record the eight o’clock round, spending the morning chatting with the doctors, 
observing and recording the events in the unit and leaving in time to allow for a few hours of 
writing about what I had witnessed and indeed been part of.  
 
The focus of my observations began very broad and I attempted initially to screen out as little 
as possible, in keeping with my aim to gain a thorough understanding of the context in which 
the actions I was interested in occurred. I cannot argue, however, that I made no selection in 
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the events I chose to record. Since I speak and understand only English and Afrikaans, I 
could not follow the words of those conversations held in Xhosa and I paid only detailed 
attention to linguistic constructions in the context of English talk, my home language and the 
tongue in which I am most able to make the kinds of interpretations I offer in this thesis. 
Later, as my background knowledge became more developed and my concerns more clearly 
defined, my focus narrowed to hone in on those events that might be characterised as 
inhumane, and on those other, more routine events, that offered the potential to explain these, 
either due to their proximity to the event in question, their relevance to that event, as in the 
case of a conversation about its occurrence, or their broader thematic relevance, as in the case 
of doctors’ private expressions of antagonism toward their patients. The data that I collected 
thus consist, in keeping with the emphasis in ethnographic work in general, of the everyday 
and indeed of the unremarkable occurrences in the unit. However, these have not been 
randomly included and the events that I recorded comprise, rather than a representative 
sample of all that goes on in the unit, a selection of negative events and those likely to be 
useful in explaining them.  
The research relationships 
Inhorn (2004), amongst others, has written about the difficulties ethnographers face, often as 
unwelcome intruders, in gaining access to medical settings, either due to attempts at 
exclusion on the part of ethics committees or due to restrictions on the extent to which the 
ethnographer is permitted, formally or informally, to penetrate the medical setting.  
Inhorn (2004) explores how ethnographic access is shaped and limited by participants’ 
powerful feelings concerning privacy and protectiveness. While research very often involves 
relationships in which the balance of power is tipped in the researcher’s favour, this is seldom 
the case in medical settings, in which the ethnographer is likely to occupy a junior position, at 
least in terms of professional status (Pope, 2005). 
 
I felt the effects of these power relationships throughout the data collection for this research 
but most acutely in its early stages. While I was happy to help in any way that I could, those 
tasks directed by the patients and described above brought me no closer to the doctors, whose 
conversational arena I was battling to enter. Having picked the emergency unit as that part of 
the hospital to which it was easiest to gain and maintain access, I found it no small task 
establishing working relationships there, despite the fact that the doctors and I were of similar 
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age and socio-economic background. Rather than acceptance of my presence, the doctors’ 
extreme indifference to it, expressed not only in their failure to question or object to my being 
there, but in the total absence of any of the standard forms of polite acknowledgement, felt 
more like an extension of what I had already noted as their remarkable ability to ignore 
disturbing stimuli, from screams of pain or madness to death itself – and, obviously, to 
unwelcome intruders! Attempting all the usual means of approach – introducing myself 
individually to each doctor, expressing interest in their activities or striking up conversations 
about some object or event of mutual concern – I found it impossible to maintain a 
relationship with any of them beyond the bounds of each isolated conversation, or to establish 
any kind of rapport. What I needed, in order to gain the kind of access I wanted to the unit’s 
discursive context, was, firstly, acceptance into the doctors’ ordinary conversations and, 
secondly, the kind of relationships with them within which it would be acceptable for me to 
join them behind the curtains they so frequently drew around the beds before communicating 
with their patients, excluding me from these important events. 
 
As the weeks went by, and I sat listening to the doctors’ talk, I became, in spite of my 
exclusion, very well versed in the language spoken in the unit, and indeed learnt, I believe, to 
speak it myself. I learnt the doctors’ unflinching responses to pain and suffering, and to its 
callous treatment - or at least to hide any contrary reaction - and I learnt to understand their 
humour. Bizarrely, and disturbingly, I began to see the hilarity in the hopelessly 
unmanageable circumstances and events of the unit, as well as the boredom of continual, 
repetitive horror. While the process I underwent is a tempting avenue for extensive 
discussion, suffice it here to say that I began to walk a dangerously fine line between 
reflecting and assuming the doctors’ attitudes. Intending to reassure them by providing a 
mirror image of what they wished to project, I began the dubious process of contributing to 
the discourse I hoped to observe – laughing at their jokes, affirming their perspectives at 
every opportunity and indeed genuinely identifying with them on numerous occasions. I thus 
allowed myself to become immersed in the unit’s culture, slowly shifting from a position 
from which the doctors’ actions frequently seemed incomprehensible and repugnant to one 
from which they began to be understandable. This precarious new position, often infused 
with a subtle deception and just as often poised on the brink of denying my personal values, 
became my modus operandi at the hospital. While I never escaped its inherent discomfort, I 
remained assured of its necessity, initially by the doctors’ exaggerated indifference and later 
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by their smiles of relief when I finished a sentence for them in the way I guessed they would 
most like to hear it, or when I agreed without question to their attempts to convince me that 
the reason for their failure to produce an adequate history lay wholly with the patient, that a 
conflict resulted only from a patient’s obnoxious character or that his ignorance of how to 
take his medication was the product of his failure to listen. The louder I laughed at their 
jokes, the more communicative their glances became and I established, eventually, a place for 
myself from which I could watch, almost unhindered, the activities in the unit.  
 
Slowly but surely I was included in the snippets of conversation around the table – the 
outbursts of frustration when their jobs were made, by some or other circumstance, 
impossibly difficult, the cynical jokes that seemed to keep them afloat and the discussions 
about matters outside of the hospital when the unit was quiet. Believing me a ready buyer for 
their stories, I became someone in conversation with whom the doctors could reassure 
themselves, opening up the space for the emergence of narratives that my supervisor later 
read with some surprise as ‘confessions’.  I think my initial exclusion signalled the 
underlying insecurities in the unit that my presence as n observer brought to the fore, 
insecurities that, I will argue later, are almost inevitable in the light of the power imputed to 
the doctors and the reality of a situation that is, more often than not, beyond their capacity to 
change. Being watched thus elicited their fears of what inadequacies might be seen, 
exaggerating their need for reassurance. Thus, they explained to me, the eyes and ears, 
perhaps, of their own pricking consciences, why they behaved in the ways that they did, why 
they could not and should not have done otherwise, and why failure was never their fault. 
And I, in return, reflected what I sensed they wanted to see and hear, opening a space for the 
production of what might be termed, rather than confessions, ‘justificational narratives’.  
A point of interest with respect to the nature of the relationships I established with the 
participants in this research concerns the vast discrepancy between the reception the project 
received from the doctors and that which I received from the patients. In contrast to the 
defensive, if eventually obliging, response I evoked in the doctors, the patients, with the 
exception of a few who did not want to be bothered and a few more who remained suspicious 
of my intentions, believing me a spy for the doctors or an undercover surgeon hungry for a 
limb, were enthusiastically supportive of my work, wishing to contribute in any way that they 
could.  
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Field notes 
As Pope (2005, p1182) notes, “Ethnography is rooted in writing.” Only a very short time of 
observation may take many hours of writing if the details of events, relationships and so on 
are to be captured and carefully recorded. Those notes taken in the field tend to be merely 
jottings and represent a starting point only for what are likely to become copious field notes. 
In the words of Atkinson and Pugsley (2005, p231), “Observations are not undertaken merely 
for the observer to glean general impressions on the collective personal experiences of 
settings and events.” Rather, “Detailed observations are…transformed into detailed field 
notes.”  
 
With the development of the research relationships, it became easier to record the events 
taking place. I began to keep a journal of events in the unit, from the tiniest snippets of 
conversations I overheard or in which I engaged, to descriptions of the expressions assumed 
by the doctors in response to an event or other set of circumstances, and to records of more 
major events, such as the arrival of a “gunshot”. I scrawled initial notes sometimes openly, 
sometimes surreptitiously, as if my attention were focused on the other side of the room or on 
some distant memory, in the process of making my observations, either as the event was 
happening, or immediately thereafter, working from my memory before any significant time 
elapsed and obscured the details. In either case, I fleshed these notes out when I returned 
home each day, adding details as well as descriptions of my impressions and interpretations 
of what had occurred and eventually producing almost eighty thousand words of field notes.  
Audio-recording interaction 
Once comfortable working relationships were established, I began asking doctors if I might 
join them when they attended their patients for the day, a request that was never met with 
delight but that, in view of our now amicable relationships, was difficult to deny. I thus began 
observing and audio-recording, in that great majority of instances in which patients agreed, 
the conversations between doctors and their patients, both during individual consultations and 
on the rounds, or between doctors, either formal, as on rounds, or informal conversations held 
around the doctors’ station. In total, I audio recorded approximately forty-two hours of verbal 
interaction in the emergency unit. I accompanied these recordings with further field-notes, 
describing what I saw and felt during recorded events and linking these descriptions to the 
relevant audio-tracks so that they could be analysed together. 
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A reflexive experiential perspective 
The experiential perspective, in terms of which I not only observed and recorded the unit’s 
events but began to assimilate its norms and to identify with its inhabitants, while 
nevertheless a most valuable vantage point, led to the danger of reproducing, rather than 
critically analysing, the experiences to which I was exposed (Parker, 2005). I therefore 
alternated between observing and writing about that which I had seen, making use of my 
field-notes journal to aid movement between absorption into the unit’s culture and a more 
distantiated position. Each day, after returning from the hospital, I spent time writing and 
reflecting on what had occurred and on my own perceptions and responses to it. Thus, I 
attempted to maintain my ability to treat the representations of the unit produced within its 
walls with the suspicion that Parker advises, and thus to avoid the illusion of order and 
coherence they invariably promised to create.  
 
The interviews  
In addition to the wealth of data I had already collected, interviews with the doctors presented 
an opportunity to elicit their reflections on the events I had observed in the unit, as well as 
more extended stories depicting these events, useful in terms of my narrative approach and in 
terms of gaining insight into how they explained and justified their actions and those of their 
colleagues. Only toward the end of the process, and after I had a much clearer idea of the 
questions I wanted to answer,  did I begin interviewing the doctors, by which time I knew the 
unit and its workings well. In spite of the friendly relations I had managed to establish, 
pinning the doctors down to an interview proved difficult and time consuming. Most agreed 
readily in principle, but in practice the interviews just never happened. The doctors would 
promise to let me know as soon as they had a spare moment, but that moment, in most cases, 
never arrived and I spent many days waiting for interviews that never took place. My 
attempts to secure an interview with doctor S illustrate the push and pull that the process 
entailed: 
 
“Any chance I might persuade you to an interview?” I asked one day as we stood together at 
the doctors’ station. 
“Possibly,” she replied. 
“Well, would you mind if I interviewed you then?” I pretended to joke. 
“I’m keeping my options open,” she returned. 
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“Shall I keep working at it?” I laughingly feigned. 
“Ja. Get me after a weekend off,” she replied. “I might be more reasonable.” 
After an awkward pause during which I subtly, I hoped, refused to drop the matter, she 
finally agreed – “No, that’s fine,” only to revert to her original position by following up her 
commitment with, “Sometime.” 
 
Eventually I discovered that I could persuade the doctors to honour their promises by 
suggesting that we conduct the interview after hours, at which point they almost invariably 
found a spare moment during the working day, and I successfully completed interviews with 
twelve of them. I conducted the interviews in the hospital’s various tea rooms, where the 
relevant doctor and I could sit, largely undisturbed, and chat. The interviews lasted between 
half an hour and two hours each and were conducted as ordinary conversations, but with an 
explicit purpose and focus.  
 
Employing a narrative approach to the interview method, as described by Hollway and 
Jefferson (2000a) I gave the doctors primary responsibility for determining the interview 
content, thus allowing them to structure the account that they offered and thereby to exert as 
much influence as possible over the discursive form that it took and the meanings that it 
generated. I introduced the interviews simply by telling the doctors that I was interested in 
their reflections on life in the unit, so that I could make use of these in interpreting what I had 
already observed. I encouraged them to begin by telling me about their experiences of 
working there, as they saw them, beginning their accounts at any point that seemed important 
or suitable to them. After this initial request I asked as few questions as possible. Those 
questions that I did ask were open-ended and requested clarification or further information on 
a subject that the doctor had already introduced. In recalling issues to which the doctor had 
alluded earlier in the interview, I attempted, as far as possible, to use the same words that she 
had chosen, so as to stay within her meaning frame. Following the advice of Anderson and 
Jack (1991), I probed not only for concrete details but also for the meanings doctors gave to 
the words that they chose. Anderson and Jack show very clearly the importance of not 
assuming that a word has the same meaning for one as it does for one’s interviewee. Asking 
about participants’ personal meanings for words used to describe emotional responses, in 
particular, can prove very useful in gaining insight into their meaning frame. For example, if 
a doctor used a word such as ‘stupid’ to describe a patient, event or set of circumstances, I 
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might ask, “Stupid in what way?”; “What kind of stupid?”; or, “What exactly do you mean by 
‘stupid’ in this context?” I further explained to the doctors that I was interested in the details 
of actual events, inviting them to recall specific instances in as much detail as possible, and 
attempting to steer them away from the general terms in which they preferred to speak, and 
toward story-telling, rather than abstract reflection. Thus, I pushed throughout the interviews 
for stories, following abstract reflections with questions such as, “Can you tell me about a 
time when that happened?”  
 
In addition to these techniques that might be described as those aimed at ‘following’ the 
participant’s narrative very closely, I also, if somewhat more tentatively, asked questions that 
challenged some of their statements (Parker, 2005) or what I suspected might be their 
omissions. Attempting to employ, to a limited extent, an approach to which Parker (2005: p. 
56) refers as one that both “challenges and charms,” I allowed myself slightly more freedom 
in my responses than merely to humour the doctors. For example, while I encouraged their 
stories for the most part with affirmative responses – “Of course,” “yes,” “absolutely,” – I 
also asked, on occasions, questions that implied my potential disagreement – “Do you think 
so?” – or even overtly stated an alternative point of view. During my interview with Dr P, for 
example, he complained that his patients refuse to take responsibility for their illnesses, to 
which I replied that it could also be said that the medical profession tends not to equip them 
with the information they would require in order to do so. Thus I attempted in my interviews 
with the doctors to move beyond an approach that simply involves “being nice” to the 
participants, and to make use also of disagreement or challenge to elicit data (Parker, 2005).  
 
The interview relationships were, however, such that we were both acutely aware that the 
doctors were doing me a favour by agreeing to spend their valuable time talking to me, and 
that they reserved the right to cut the conversation short at any moment – after all, it could 
never be argued that they did not have better things to do. Each interview’s continuation was 
thus dependent on its ostensible relevance and acceptability from the doctor’s point of view. I 
felt that the doctors obliged my requests for interviews because I had established 
relationships with them within which it was hard to refuse, but that their agreement remained 
conditional on the interview’s potential to maintain their positive self-evaluations. At no 
point, therefore, did I venture to ask such confrontational questions as, for example, “How 
d’you feel about giving patients double the standard valium dose?”, “What do you think 
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about the way you treated that patient who refused to sit down this morning?” or, “Why do 
you think the doctors here are able to crack jokes at the beds of patients who are obviously 
suffering?” Instead, I felt compelled to maintain my reassuring responses to their stories and 
explanations for much of each interview with more accommodating remarks and comments. 
Interested, furthermore, in the form that their responses took, and in what they tried to convey 
(Parker, 2005), rather than in ascertaining an irrefutable truth, I had little interest in pinning 
the doctors down to one point of view or attempting to force them to resolve contradictions, 
and, by and large, I went along with whatever account they gave me.  
 
In addition to my interviews with the doctors, I chatted to patients informally throughout the 
time I spent at the hospital and conducted over thirty audio-recorded interviews with them. I 
similarly conducted numerous informal conversations with nurses and with cleaning and 
security staff working in the unit. However, as my focus narrowed during the course of the 
research, and became more finely attuned to the doctors’ perspective, I used these interviews 
only in the sense that they contributed to my general understanding of the emergency room 
context, and they were never formally analysed.  
 
Analysis 
Transcription 
The mass of data produced by the above means was not only more than I could manage but 
patchy in quality. The constant noise in the unit meant that recordings of doctors’ rounds and 
of conversations between doctors and patients were frequently interrupted by the overriding 
sounds of a passing trolley, an announcement on the intercom, another simultaneous 
conversation and so forth. I therefore transcribed selectively, making use of pieces of 
conversation that were both audible and of interest for the purposes of the project. I chose 
pieces of conversation according to the themes that emerged from the observational data, 
isolating interactions that illustrated the various points. While this means that the 
conversations presented here were not always transcribed in their entirety, and that some 
elements of their context may have been lost, I have treated them as snippets of talk located 
within the broad context of activity in the emergency unit.  
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I made use of Jefferson’s transcript notation (Jefferson, 1984), which emphasizes both detail 
and readability, making it possible to capture the nuances in talk without compromising 
intelligibility, adapting it where necessary so as best to convey the meaning as I heard it. For 
the reason of preserving intelligibility, I adopted a less detailed approach than is used in much 
of the literature analysing doctor-patient conversations, including such attributes as pauses, 
indicated by rough approximations of length (one dot represents a momentary pause, two a 
short pause of a few seconds’ duration and three a long pause), false starts, audible breaths 
and emphasis, as opposed, for example, to every rise and fall in pitch, and without becoming 
so bogged down in the minutiae of speech as to obscure from view the conversational flow. 
Transcription was therefore a personalised process of conveying conversations and other 
snippets of talk in such a way as best to communicate their meaning as I understood it.  
Analysing talk as narrative 
While much of the material analysed assumed the form of conversation, my analytic method 
cannot be classified as conversation analysis, which involves employment of specific 
methods for exploring the structure of conversations, in terms of such features as turn-taking 
or adjacency pairs, seeking evidence for the explicit presence of specific categories in talk, as 
opposed to the taken-for-granted assumptions with which this thesis is concerned. My 
purpose was thus better served by approaching the talk in the unit as narrative, albeit for the 
most part jointly produced. I therefore employed analytic techniques more often associated 
with narrative analysis. I refer to my analysis as narrative analysis, distinguishing it from 
other means of analysing discourse due to its focus on the interrelationships between 
elements of talk, as discussed above with reference to the concept of sequence. It should be 
noted that the concept of sequence plays an important part both in distinguishing narrative 
from other methods as well as in the analytic process itself. However, while it serves to 
foreground the relationships between elements of talk, it does not exclude, and indeed 
encompasses, the use of a wide range of other tools for exploring these elements. The 
assortment of tools that I employed in this analysis is common to a range of approaches to 
interpreting discourse and will be detailed later in this section.  
 
For now, the focus on the sequences in terms of which units of meaning are related to one 
another allows investigation of such narrative features as the relationships between characters 
and between characters and the events and actions narrated. It thereby allows insight into the 
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likely roles that might be played by various characters and the actions that might be 
committed by them, as well as into constructions of causality, attributions of agency and 
responsibility and so on. Mary Gergen (1988), describing grand narratives, or overarching 
sequences of meaning that structure whole paradigms of thought, provides an example. 
Scientific narratives employ linear causal sequences, in terms of which stimulus A is 
understood to directly cause effect B. In these terms, single causes become identifiable as 
responsible for specific events, allowing for the production of stories that might, for example, 
blame individual people for unwanted occurrences. Such constructions are in contrast to 
those made possible by different sequential forms. From a systems perspective, for example, 
causal relationships are construed as more complex, the relationships between the various 
events and characters being reciprocal in nature and thus rendering individual blame more 
difficult.   
 
As stated, however, while the concept of sequence distinguishes narrative from other 
approaches to the analysis of discourse, a narrative approach to the study of talk involves 
much more than a focus on sequence, and, as understood in this thesis, may include attention 
to almost any of the characteristics of talk, including, for example, metaphor, positioning, 
lexical choices, and so on. From this point of view narrative might then be seen as falling 
beneath the broader umbrella of discourse, and narrative analysis beneath the umbrella of 
discourse analysis – sharing many of its features but distinctive in its attention to sequence 
and thus in its foregrounding of the relationships between elements of discourse.  
Using shared cultural understandings 
In analysing the narratives that I present in this thesis, I did not adhere strictly to any step-by 
step method that can be termed ‘narrative analysis’ and connotes a clearly demarcated set of 
procedures. As Rom Harre points out (1978: p. 52), the study of social life involves skills that 
“are more like the skills of literary or dramatic criticism and of poetics than the skills of 
physical scientists.” I therefore used the understandings I had gained through ethnographic 
exploration of the context within which the talk was produced in approaching the data, 
employing these in my use of the variety of analytic tools that I will detail below.  Thus, my 
reading of the material was guided both by the broader cultural knowledge that I share with 
participants and by my observations in the emergency unit and my experiential knowledge of 
the space and the people, events and activities within it. Much of the work of interpretation 
therefore made use of my ordinary skills that, as a communicating individual, I share with 
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both participants and readers, and that might be described by some as intuition, by others as 
cultural knowledge and yet by others as, for example, free association (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000a).  
 
I extended the knowledge thus gained by continually asking myself, “How do I know this?” 
and thus forcing articulation of the interpretative aspects of understanding that we ordinarily 
take for granted. For example, my own cultural knowledge, which I share to a large extent 
with the participants in the study, and was able to articulate through the use of various tools 
for analysing talk, gave me insight into the meanings of metaphors employed by the doctors. 
For instance, I understood their characterisation of the emergency room, with its high 
concentration of cases of drug-resistant tuberculosis, as a time-bomb to imply both the war-
zone-like nature of the unit, as suggested by the projected explosion of the bomb, and to 
convey a sense of the inevitability of approaching disasater, suggested by the image of the 
ticking clock with its connotation of the unstoppable passing of time. These images are well-
worn in Western culture and their use in other contexts, such as suspense thriller films, 
accounts for the ‘debris of meaning’ of which Bakhtin speaks and with which the members of 
any given culture are intimately familiar. In the same sense, my knowledge of the literature 
on medical culture and my experiential knowledge of the culture in the Greenlands hospital 
emergency unit in particular, informed the interpretations that I produced through the use of 
various interpretative tools. 
Focusing on the effects of talk 
Due to my interest in the implications of discursive practices for the quality of healthcare 
provided, a key focus of my attention throughout the analytic process was on the effects of 
talk. I was less interested in establishing the relationship between narrative and some 
objective reality than I was in imagining the possible social realities that might be produced 
through the form of its telling. Thus, as a basic point of departure, I approached the talk and 
other communicative acts I had collected in the emergency room as action and explored their 
potential effects. I embarked on analysis from the departure point proposed by Bakhtin, 
therefore, namely that language is not merely reflective but is also productive of the social 
environment and of individuals’ experiences of and responses to it. Speech act theory 
provides a useful means of concretising this notion.  Making use of Austin’s (1976) notion of 
‘perlocutionary force’, or the capacity of language to act on its environment, I therefore 
focused the analysis on the impact of talk on the social context of its occurrence. Shotter 
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(1993) illustrates this potential impact of talk poignantly in his analysis of a conversation 
between two people in which the one tells the other that he loves her. Not only does this 
statement reflect the speaker’s feelings but it fundamentally alters the nature of the 
relationship between the two people, attributing new roles and responsibilities to each in 
relation to the other. 
 
Not only such dramatic statements, however, exert an influence on the social context and the 
individuals of which it is composed. As Billig observes (1999), even the ‘fleeting little 
words’ such as ‘but’ and ‘anyway’ serve to change the subject of conversation, ‘only’ to 
minimise the concept it precedes, ‘perhaps’ to cast doubt on the truth of a statement, and so 
on. An example will illustrate the point. In one instance, a doctor, speaking to a patient who 
had not taken his medication correctly, and whose condition may have been averted by 
proper usage of the medication, asked the man what brand of cigarettes he smoked. When the 
man told him, the doctor replied sarcastically, “Oh, so you can read.” This passing comment 
made by the doctor, while short and trivial in its explicit content, fundamentally alters the 
relationship between doctor and patient, and offers a problematic identity to the patient. By 
drawing attention to the man’s ability to read, the doctor implies his fault in not having read 
the instructions on his medication, representing him as to blame for his own illness and, by 
implication, as negligent and irresponsible. A further example, in which a doctor requests 
information about a patient’s test results, illustrates the influence that even more fleeting 
instances of talk can have on the social realities that they generate. Wanting to know a 
patient’s iron level, a doctor asked of her colleague, “What’s the iron level?” Following 
Billig’s lead, I argue in this thesis that the choice of even such seemingly insignificant words 
as ‘the’, as opposed, in this case, to ‘her (iron level)’, which would have been more 
grammatically correct, can achieve effects as great as to negate the patient as a subject, and 
thus to relegate concerns about her subjective experience to the background.  From this 
viewpoint, therefore, in terms of which language acts to shape the social environment, I 
approached the data with questions such as, ‘What follows logically from the assumptions 
inherent in the way that reality is narrated in the emergency room?’, ‘How do the narrative 
constructions visible within emergency room talk enable and constrain possibilities for the 
identities of its inhabitants?’ and, ‘What actions therefore become comprehensible?’ in the 
forefront of my mind. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
128 
 
Tools for analysing narrative 
As stated, I employed an eclectic mix of techniques to explore the sequences by which the 
talk was characterised and the relationships between its various components and between 
these and the surrounding medical discourse. In addition to the creative, even intuitive, 
process alluded to with reference to shared cultural knowledge and my experiential 
knowledge of the emergency unit’s unique culture, I employed more concrete tools for 
articulating the meanings that I gleaned from the data. These techniques included exploration 
of such elements of the narratives as lexical choices; deixis; pronouns; conjunctions; subject 
positions; verb forms; metaphor; metonymy; emplotment; and settings. In this section I will 
briefly describe the insights offered by some of these tools and the manner in which I made 
use of them.  
 
Lexical choices, or word choices, convey meanings associated with the particular words 
chosen, ascribing characteristics to objects, people or events. A narrative approach to analysis 
of the words people choose to convey their experiences involves investigation not only of the 
individual words chosen but also of the juxtaposition of these choices in relation to one 
another. For example, while the choice of the word ‘feral’ to describe a patient’s actions 
might on its own ascribe an irrational, animalistic quality to the relevant actor, its placement 
in a story alongside the ‘systematic’ actions of a doctor further produces a sense of stark 
differentiation and possibly even hierarchical comparison between the two characters. A 
number of concepts facilitated my exploration of these choices and their implications for the 
construction of social reality in the emergency room.  
 
The concept of deixis refers to a word’s function of pointing at its referent and assisted 
investigation of the relationships between speakers and objects of talk. Use of words such as 
‘that’, for example, produce distance between speaker and object, and ‘this’ the reverse 
(Simpson, 1993). Thus, the doctors’ repeated references to patients as “that patient” imply 
their separation from the patients indicated, while introduction of a patient as “this woman” 
brings her closer to the speaker and his audience. Exploration of the use of pronouns 
produced similar insight into the often implicit relationships between people and between 
people and actions (Fairclough, 2001). For example, ‘we’ implies collectivity – “We thought 
she might be diabetic” and thus shared responsibility – as opposed to ‘they’, which indicates 
separation between speaker and object – “They didn’t check the patient’s sugar level” – and 
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therefore disassociation of the speaker from the action described. Similarly, analysis of 
conjunctions can provide interesting insights into the relationships between events. Use of the 
word ‘so’ to link two events might imply a causal relationship between them – “He kicked 
me so I had him restrained.” In contrast, linking the same two events with the word ‘and’ – 
“He kicked me and I had him restrained” – merely implies their coexistence. 
 
Analysis of verb forms, or transitivity, produced many useful insights into the ways in which 
the participants attributed responsibility and blame for actions and events (Simpson, 
1993).For example, a doctor who narrates his role in an event in such a way that affords him 
the position of active subject – “I prescribed erythromycin” – foregrounds his responsibility 
for that prescription, whereas one who narrates her role in a medical mishap in passive terms 
– “The chest drain wasn’t put in quick enough” – relegates her responsibility for the lack of 
speed with which the procedure was conducted to the background. While this latter 
construction still allows the question of who put in the chest drain, she might disappear even 
further into the shadows of her representation of the same event – “The chest drain didn’t go 
in quick enough” – by deleting all trace of a responsible agent. 
 
Exploration of subject positions enabled me to locate speakers and others within narrative 
landscapes, defining not only their relationships to one another but the rights and 
responsibilities associated with their respective positions (van Langenhove & Harre, 1999). 
For example, the doctors’ positions in relation to the body of medical knowledge gave them 
ultimate responsibility and decision making power, and therefore power over the other 
occupants of the unit. Similarly, patients’ positions as unable to access this body of 
knowledge rendered them powerless and excluded them from much of the talk in the unit, in 
which they were unable to participate due to lack of knowledge. The opposite nature of 
doctors’ and patients’ positions in this sense further created a gap between them, making for 
distant relationships, characterised by limited communication.  
 
Metaphor and metonymy revealed ways in which thought and action might be structured by 
cultural understandings of one thing in terms of another, obscuring some and highlighting 
other possible ways of apprehending things (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). Rather 
than conceptualising the consequences of transmission of drug-resistant bacteria using the 
metaphor of a time-bomb, for example, and thus implying a sense of inevitability and 
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possibly even hopelessness, the doctor might have conceptualised the bacteria instead as 
devious vermin, implying a need for activity on the part of the doctors to outwit them. And 
the concept of emplotment enabled me to investigate the means by which narrators created 
coherent stories from multiple incidents, actors, and other features of talk (Ricoeur, 1991), 
relating these to one another and to their aftermaths, for example through causal as opposed 
to coincidental relationships (Ochs, 2004).In this regard settings, too, are critical in 
establishing a plot, not only situating an event but creating a rationale for its occurrence by 
depicting the preceding events, prior conditions, relevant shared knowledge, and so on (Ochs, 
2004).  
 
With the above equipment in the back of my mind, rather than meticulously applied to each 
and every sentence, I read and reread the data in light of the knowledge I had gained through 
the process of participant observation, asking questions of the material to aid the analytic 
process. For example, I asked, what grand narratives are invoked in emergency room talk and 
what are their consequences for the range of possible identities its inhabitants might assume, 
or the actions they might commit? Which actors are described as active and which rendered 
passive by these constructions? What interpretations of reality would one have to accept for 
the identities they assume and the actions they commit to seem reasonable and warranted 
(Parker, 2005)? Which events are highlighted and which suppressed in emergency room talk, 
and what are the consequences of this for the various actors? What silences exist in the stories 
told? In terms of what story lines do actors attempt to justify the power they wield over 
others, and their exploitation and suppression (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001)? Are there 
ambiguities and contradictions in the stories told? What other possible stories might have 
been told in place of the ones that were? And, finally, how are the answers to the above 
questions related to the events, in addition to the audio-recorded instances of talk, that I 
observed in the emergency unit? 
Making meaning of narrative 
While attending to questions such as these, and in order to aid the production of critically 
reflective analysis, and to guard against the possibility of reproducing what I was told, along 
with the norms, values and understandings that I had, to some extent, half consciously, half 
unwittingly, allowed myself to internalise, I began the process of writing about what I had 
seen, heard and felt in the emergency unit. I make no pretence in the analysis offered to the 
production of objective knowledge. As Atkinson (1990, p2) points out, reading (and writing) 
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the products of ethnographic research involve participation in “complex processes of reality 
construction and reconstruction.”  Rather than an objective representation, therefore, what I 
present here is my interpretation, produced from within my particular perspective, along with 
a trail of evidence so that the reader might see how I came to it. My position in the research is 
central to the analysis, having structured the arguments presented from the very beginning, 
from the construction of the research questions, to the relationships I formed within the 
emergency unit, allowing some and not other things to happen during the research process 
(Parker, 2005),  and finally to the sense that I made of it all.  
 
Ethical considerations 
From the first chaotic moments of my observations at the hospital I felt the need for what 
Reissman (2005) refers to as “a situated ethics ... (that) provide(s) room for particularities that 
unfold during the fieldwork” (p. 487). I began by attempting, relatively unthinkingly, to 
employ the traditional ethical procedures required by every ethics committee, involving 
obtaining written consent from research participants in return for assurances of anonymity, 
confidentiality, respect for the right to withdraw at any stage, and so on. I found, however, no 
sooner had I begun, that traditional ethical practices offer a highly regimented and abstract 
solution to the management of dilemmas that arise in often chaotic realities, frequently 
fraught with unpredictable difficulties. As Pope (2005) notes, standard ethics procedures are 
designed primarily with quantitative experimental research in mind and frequently fail to 
address the kinds of issues that arise in ethnographic research. 
Consent 
While establishing the doctors’ consent for their participation in the research might be viewed 
as a straightforward procedure, and was, at face value, indeed so straightforward, accepting 
this interpretation of the consent process would be inconsistent with my approach to the rest 
of the material presented in this thesis. As noted by Pope (2005), neither ethnography nor 
consent to participate in it are single events but rather involve protracted processes of 
negotiation. As described above, I introduced the research for the first time to the doctors 
before it commenced, at a meeting where all professed their esteem for the project but where 
I heard, too, the first sounds of their ambivalence. Indeed, each doctor that participated in the 
research went on to agree whole-heartedly with the project’s aims as I explained to them in 
subsequent individual conversations held with each of them, and to sign the consent forms I 
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offered. However, the research relationships that persisted throughout the time I spent at the 
hospital belie the apparent simplicity of these interactions, which must, I believe, be seen, 
along with the rest of the material produced, as aspects of the doctors’ self-presentations and 
thus must be viewed with suspicion (Parker, 2005). With such benign aims as the analysis of 
doctor-patient communication and the promise such analysis holds for the future benefit of 
patients, what doctor who wishes to believe herself a concerned professional, dedicated to 
quality patient care, and who wishes further to be perceived in this light, could refuse? 
 
In addition to the often thinly concealed ambivalence I perceived in the doctors’ willingness 
to participate, I discerned also what might be described as a ‘paradigm difference’ between 
us, in terms of which I knew that they, with their background in natural science, would 
perceive in my intentions only those aspects relevant to “the firmest, most stable, least 
changeable and most monosemic aspects of discourse,” discussed by Bakhtin, as above. 
Already convinced of their ambivalence with respect to the project, I was not about to 
contradict them. I was unready to believe, had I detailed my intentions – “No, no, I believe 
you misunderstand me! I mean to go through the smallest details of your speech with a fine 
tooth comb in order to reveal not only what you say but also what you wish to conceal, both 
from me and from yourself!” – that a single one of them would have agreed to continue. 
While I maintained throughout the research process an ongoing conversation with the doctors 
with whom I worked about its shape and focus, I gave them an outline, rather than a detailed 
understanding of my object and means of inquiry. I told them that I was interested in the 
difficulties that arise in the communication and relationships between doctors and their 
patients and I guessed, I believe correctly, that they would assume I referred only to those 
related, for example, to the successful conveyance of information, the inappropriate use of 
medical jargon or the problems doctors face when they and their patients do not speak a 
common tongue. While I told them I was interested in agency and responsibility within these 
relationships, and even in their production through the details of language, I knew they would 
think only of how better to ensure that their patients comply.  The process of establishing the 
doctors’ consent was thus problematic from the outset, largely due to the nature of my 
research interests, which led me and the participants into waters in which neither of us was 
able to be entirely honest. 
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Interestingly, in spite of prevalent ideas about the vulnerability of patients to exploitation and 
their consequent need for protection from people like researchers, who might appropriate 
their misfortunes for personal benefit, the process of gaining the patients’ consent was, I 
believe, far more straightforward. Perhaps because they were there to receive care rather than 
to give it, and so less susceptible to the performance anxieties doctors may have experienced, 
and perhaps because many of them were too ill to be much bothered with the trivialities of 
politeness, I sensed a far greater honesty in my interactions with them. The vast majority of 
patients responded enthusiastically to hearing about the project, indeed expressing gratitude 
rather than any sense of powerlessness to refuse their participation. I explained to the patients 
that I was a researcher from the University of Cape Town and that I was studying the 
communication between doctors and patients at the hospital with the intention of finding 
explanations for the problems that frequently occurred. These introductions were met, in most 
cases, with a torrent of stories proclaiming the patients’ identification with the subject and 
asserting its importance.  
 
Producing consent forms, however, was less well received and, as reported by Inhorn (2004), 
has been identified by many ethnographic researchers as an impediment to building rapport 
with participants. My initial approach was to supply patients with an information sheet, in 
English, Afrikaans and Xhosa, so that each patient could read it in her mother tongue, 
outlining the project’s aims and patients’ rights and requesting a signature.  However, many 
even of those patients who responded most enthusiastically to my accompanying verbal 
explanation expressed suspicion and reluctance as soon as I produced a pen. It struck me, on 
consideration, that when patients in a hospital are asked for a signature it is frequently to 
confirm their consent to a risky procedure, more often than not anaesthesia and surgery. I 
think that this connotation contaminated what were almost always their otherwise very 
positive responses to the project and I therefore opted instead to audio record their consent, 
an option to which only very few raised objections. I explained that the purpose of the 
recording was to satisfy the university that I had in fact received their permission and that I 
had informed them of their right not to participate at all, to withdraw at any stage, and to 
confidentiality. In the vast majority of cases, these explanations led to sincere gratitude from 
the patients, in place of the suspicions that followed requests for signatures on forms.  
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Having resolved the matter of obtaining a verifiable record of consent, I faced other 
unanticipated difficulties, such as those surrounding the recording of the doctors’ talk at the 
foot of an unconscious patient’s bed. Of course, the unconscious patient was emitting no 
sound and therefore could not be recorded. But was it a breach of his right to confidentiality 
to record the doctors’ words spoken about him? Since my focus was on the doctors and their 
actions in these instances, not on the patients, I decided it was not. In addition, I felt that it 
would be the more unethical practice to leave all unconscious patients behind closed doors. 
These patients are amongst the most vulnerable, as illustrated by the rough treatment of them 
I observed on occasions. In one instance, a doctor attempted to show another doctor, for 
interest’s sake, or so it seemed, the extent to which an unconscious man was unresponsive to 
pain. Twisting the man’s nipple violently, he displayed the lack of reaction repeatedly and 
then sauntered away from the bed. It was instances such as this one that settled the matter for 
me, convincing me of the importance of reporting the treatment of unconscious patients 
precisely for the reason that they could neither give their consent nor report the treatment 
themselves.  
 
I opted not to make audio-recordings of doctors’ conversations with psychotic patients, 
however, who would similarly be unable to give their legal consent, and who were seldom 
accompanied by a relative from whom I might obtain it instead. The psychotic content of 
many of these conversations further suggested the need for a different approach to analysis 
and thus rendered their exclusion relatively unproblematic for the purposes of the research. I 
did, however, continue my observations as usual in these instances for the same reasons 
discussed with respect to unconscious patients.   
Confidentiality 
Again, confidentiality presents more complex issues for the doctors than it does for the 
patients. As regards the patients, confidentiality could be guaranteed from the outset – even I 
would have trouble tracing instances of talk to individual patients, each being merely one 
amongst more than I would be willing to count, and only snippets of their talk being here 
employed. The doctors, however, are in another category. Relatively lengthy narratives were 
often required to gain insight into the psychological phenomena in which I was interested, 
rendering the excerpts presented in this thesis, while modified to disguise any definitively 
identifying features, potentially recognisable both to the doctors who produced them and in 
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many cases, I am sure, to their colleagues. As Hollway and Jefferson (2000a) point out, the 
nature of the subjects of psychological research as defended subjects means that some of the 
interpretations offered may come, should participants discover them, as a painful surprise. 
While the findings of this thesis can be fed back to the hospital in a manner sufficiently 
abbreviated that these concerns are alleviated in that context, similar abbreviation of 
publications based on the project would obscure too much of the insight it offers. There thus 
remains an unresolved conflict of interest between possible harm to participants in the, albeit 
unlikely, event that they stumble upon interpretations that challenge their defences or offend 
in some other way, and the possible benefits to future doctors and patients of the availability 
of this information.  
 
Concealment of the hospital’s identity produces similar issues. While overtly identifying 
information has not been given, someone intimately familiar with the hospital may well 
recognise it. My personal belief is, however, that the findings of research such as this should 
be published as part of the attempt to improve the lot of patients in already overcrowded and 
under- resourced hospitals, and that the possibility of this benefit outweighs any possible 
harm. 
Sensitive research 
While standard ethical procedures were clearly, therefore, not developed with projects such 
as this one in mind, I believe that a situated approach to conducting research ethically can be 
successfully implemented by attending to and respecting both researchers’ and participants’ 
emotional responses during the course of the research (Reissman, 2005). I was therefore 
attuned throughout to my intuitive experiences of the research relationships, avoiding 
intruding on patients whom I sensed would prefer not to be bothered, whether or not they 
verbalised this, leaving private spaces when I felt my presence might be a disturbance, for 
example in the case of an examination that might be humiliating, when relatives were 
informed of a patient’s death and the presence of an observer seemed potentially offensive, or 
when I sensed that my observations made a doctor particularly uncomfortable. As Reissman 
(2005) and Hollway and Jefferson (2000a) have already pointed out and begun the process of 
amending, no guidelines exist to structure the judgements required, and the ethical conduct of 
research of this nature thus remains a process of feeling one’s way along with only those 
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most distrusted components of the research process – one’s own emotional responses and 
intuitive sensings – as guide.  
The project’s aims 
At the outset, a word in clarification of my purpose in undertaking this project is in order. My 
intention is to offer an explanation of how the discursive context in the emergency unit, 
framed by the meanings imposed by broader medical culture and animated by the individual 
inhabitants of the unit within its unique social space, paves the way for the provision of 
inhumane care and, at times, the violation of patients’ rights. The inimical actions of doctors 
therefore constitute my area of focus but should not be taken to be representative of all that 
occurs in the unit. Rather, they are illustrative of that which I have identified as contributing 
to the possibility for oppression and abuse. The reader should note also that doctors’ actions 
are responses not only to their positions in the narratives outlined here, but also to the 
immense pressure they are under as doctors at the point of entry to the one of the busiest 
hospitals in the province, within a system that all too frequently leaves them feeling 
frustrated, angry and impotent. My argument, therefore, is not intended to damn the doctors 
present in these pages, but rather to offer an explanation of how the discursive surrounds 
make certain actions and identities more, and others less, available to doctors reacting to the 
hugely demanding circumstances with which they are faced; and thereby hopefully to open 
up possibilities for finding alternative ways of responding to an environment that, in its 
material features, is unlikely to change dramatically for the better in the foreseeable future.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PILLARS OF MEDICAL POWER: GODS, SCIENCTISTS, AND 
MEN IN THE EMERGENCY ROOM 
 
A variety of both discursive and material factors combine in the emergency unit at 
Greenlands hospital, enabling doctors to assume identities of power. Focusing on the 
discursive features that are the primary concern of this thesis, I will explore in this chapter the 
ways in which narrative frameworks identified in the literature on medical culture and 
available within the Greenlands emergency unit, facilitate the adoption of identities by the 
doctors and enable justification of actions that would, under other discursive conditions, be 
unacceptable to both patients and staff but that in this environment go almost unnoticed. I 
will further attempt in this chapter to shed light on what might be termed the narrative 
‘underbelly’, or those aspects of emergency-room talk that appear discordant with the 
powerful position that these narratives afford the doctors, offering insight into the 
relationship between the sometimes paradoxical elements of the doctors’ discourse.  
 
Gods in white 
Along with the narrative framework that I will explore in this chapter, there are a number of 
other factors, including socio-cultural and historical features of the broader environment and 
opportunities and constraints offered by the institutional environment, that are less the focus 
of this thesis but that nevertheless influence the power available to doctors in the Greenlands 
emergency unit. The more tangible origins of doctors’ power indeed bring a god-like aspect 
to their construction and doctors are transformed from mere health care workers into ‘götter 
in weiss’, as they are sometimes known in German (Wodak, 1996). A number of authors, 
including Fox (1989), Good (1994), Obholzer (1994), Kellerher, Gabe and Williams (1994) 
and van der Geest (2005), have drawn attention, as discussed in chapter two, to the parallels 
in the historical development and social roles played by medicine and religion. Others (for 
example, Millman, 1977; Mizrahi,1986; and Kellerher, Gabe and Williams,1994) have noted, 
however, that irrespective of these more interpretive dimensions, doctors are in fact involved 
in the practice of saving lives and relieving pain, a practice that involves making decisions 
about who will receive what treatment and therefore, ultimately, about who will live and who 
will die (Millman, 1977; Mizrahi, 1986). Patients are inevitably, therefore, dependent on 
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doctors to a very great extent, a material circumstance that itself gives rise to power 
imbalances and makes easy the doctors’ assumption of dominant and indeed god-like 
positions. The following extracts reveal the very real power that doctors hold over their 
patients:   
  
“There was a case of a man who’s had TB in the past. HIV positive, (.) probably late forties, 
fifties. Not- not old at all. Thin guy, wasted.  Seen last night (.) very distressed and short of 
breath. They saw his chest x-ray, they were- they weren’t quite sure if it was from lung 
destruction or if he had a pneumothorax with air outside the lung and they decided (.) no – 
cos it was very busy last night – no, it’s just from lung destruction (.) just admit him and he’s 
gonna die. (..) And (.) with the luxury of a bit more time this morning we said no and I put a 
chest drain in him and he’s now fine. (..) Completely changed. Doesn’t need oxygen 
anymore.”  
 
Dr G, standing over the bed of a woman during his ward round, decides: 
“If she doesn’t have miliary2 TB, its untreatable at the age of eighty. I think, basically, she 
goes to Rosedale
3. TB treatment. If she doesn’t get better, nothing else. [To the other doctors] 
Do you agree?” 
 
And a premature baby, delivered at twenty four weeks, would receive some of the available 
treatments but not others, since she was “not going to do well anyway.”  
 
These extracts illustrate the extent to which doctors in fact ‘play god’. In an under-resourced 
hospital such as Greenlands, treating a patient sometimes means deciding to withhold 
treatment based on a poor prognosis, and instead employing scarce resources where they are 
likely to have more effect. In the first example, insufficient time led to an inaccurate 
diagnosis and the patient would have been left to die, if there had not been more time to 
consider all the possibilities the following morning, leading to a radically altered outcome. In 
the second instance, the patient is given the chance to respond to one treatment attempt only, 
since her age makes justifying the employment of further resources impossible. And in the 
third instance, only limited treatment will be made available to a baby with a poor prognosis. 
                                                 
2
 Tuberculosis in parts of the body other than the lungs. 
3
 An external ward. 
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The first doctor clearly embraces his position, entering the story as a distinct individual for 
the first time as hero – “And I put a chest drain in him and he’s now fine.” The very real 
power that he exercises, as do the second and third doctors in their somewhat antithetic role, 
makes his paramount position, however, arguably inevitable.  
 
While my emphasis on narrative therefore by no means denies the simultaneous relevance of 
doctors’ tangible power, for example, to avert death and relieve pain, my aim is to outline, 
through an analysis of the characters, storylines and events, values, assumptions, humour and 
lexical choices that they employ, the ways in which the discursive features of medical culture 
enable and constrain understandings of the doctors’ identities and actions within this 
particular context. My argument is, in keeping with my theoretical recognition of individual 
agency, that the ways in which doctors respond to the circumstances with which they are 
faced and the positions available to them are never really beyond their control but are 
engendered through their persistent animation of the relevant narratives. One might imagine 
the doctor’s position in this sense as a point in time and social space on which many different 
stories converge to produce possibilities for being and for action (Fordred, 2002). In keeping 
with the arguments of authors such as Fisher (1991), Silverman (1987), Wodak (1996) and 
Atkinson (2004), namely that medical settings should not be understood in terms of a 
monologic discourse but that they encompass multiple discourses, some in parallel, others 
potentially contradictory, I will attempt to show how individual doctors choose to pursue, 
forgo or even creatively adapt the identities and actions available within medical discourse. In 
the remainder of this chapter I will detail the narrative landscape that the emergency unit’s 
doctors inhabit and bring to life, attempting to trace potential pathways between these and the 
acts of inhumane care in which I am interested. 
 
Narrative pillars of medical power 
Two broad narratives, the features of which are prominent within the literature describing 
medical culture in general, dominate doctors’ self-presentations in the unit, and contribute, 
along with their material control over life-saving resources, toward their elevation to the 
position of power that they occupy, a position that, I will argue later in the chapter, is 
nevertheless fraught with ambivalence. The first of these narrative frameworks is that of 
science and the second that of masculinity. The characters of scientist and of strong, 
masculine hero are, as pointed out by a number of authors, available to doctors within the 
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broader medical culture. So too are the associated causal sequences, attributions of agency 
and responsibility, beginning and end points of stories, plot lines and so on that are reflected 
and reproduced in the discourse at Greenlands emergency unit. The combination of the 
narratives of science and of masculinity is a particularly potent and dangerous one: the appeal 
to science implies that doctors are both superior and unquestionable; and traditional 
narratives of masculinity offer the opportunity for aggressive domination. These 
constructions, I will argue, enable the justification of acts and omissions that, in terms of 
other story-frameworks, would surely be seen as reprehensible.  
 
The narrative of science  
As discussed in the review of the literature on medical culture in chapter two, authors 
including Mishler (1984), Fisher (1991), Mizrahi (1986), Wodak (1996) and DelVecchio-
Good (1995) have noted the pervasive nature of scientific discourse throughout medical talk 
and practice. These and other authors have drawn attention to key features of scientific 
discourse. Most importantly in this context are its claims with respect to the objective, 
rational and certain nature of scientific knowledge, which is consequently construed as 
superior to all other forms of knowledge. Contingent upon this premise, scientific endeavour, 
directed by superior knowledge, or designed to produce such knowledge in order to direct 
future actions, assumes greater importance than all other forms of activity. This 
preoccupation with scientific knowledge and action has been shown to have facilitated a shift 
from the practice of humane to technological medicine (Mishler, 1984) and, I will argue, 
enables and justifies the delivery of inhumane care. 
 
I have chosen to call this aspect of medical discourse the ‘narrative of science’, rather than 
merely scientific discourse, in order to highlight the relationship between its components and 
to convey its coherence as a structure for making sense of the world. I treat its features, in 
these terms, as related parts of an overarching framework, rather than as independent 
elements of talk, that together and in relationship with one another, have the potential to 
influence people’s understandings of how stories are likely to begin and end; why events 
occur; what is likely to happen first and what is likely to happen next; who is more or less 
likely to play the protagonist; possess what kinds of character traits; be responsible for what 
events; capable of what action; and so on and so forth. Through the ways in which it 
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structures understandings and explanations of diverse events, I argue that the narrative of 
science enables actions that are driven, paradoxically, not by science but by pragmatic or 
even less rational concerns and that sometimes result, rather than in the provision of good 
quality medical care, in the violation of patients’ rights. The presence of this narrative, rather 
than overtly identifiable through explicit statements of allegiance, is visible in the patterned 
appearance of its characteristic features throughout the details of the doctors’ talk. In the 
remainder of this section I will detail key characteristics of the narrative of science and 
suggest relationships between these and the occurrence of inhumane care. 
Knowledge and superiority 
As argued by the authors referred to above, medical knowledge is construed as superior in 
terms of its scientific and hence objective, rational and certain status. Authors including 
Atkinson (1981; 1984), Mishler (1984), Katz (1984), Wodak (1996), Allsop and Mulcahy 
(1999) and Helman (2001),  argue further that its construction as such protects doctors from 
the self-doubt they might experience were they to recognise the limitations of medical 
knowledge, as well as from the doubts of their patients, maintaining the prevailing norm, 
“Thou shalt trust physicians” (Freidson, 1975: p. 124), and thereby contributing to the 
establishment and maintenance of doctors’ supreme positions. 
 
Echoing the findings of the authors referred to above, the importance of doctors’ knowledge 
in establishing their superior status in the Greenlands emergency unit is evident in a wide 
range of discursive practices in the unit, including their ‘knowledge displays’ for each other 
and their use of knowledge to position themselves and assign places to others in the 
hierarchy, and to include some and exclude others from the communication ambit. For 
example, junior doctors who have recently arrived in the unit can often be heard casually 
employing scientific jargon with a nonchalance that asserts their familiarity with the language 
and claims for them their membership of the medical fraternity. More senior doctors can be 
seen pelting students with questions that they are unable to answer, leading to the students’ 
embarrassment and an opportunity for the doctor to display his superior status. While in itself 
all of this may be relatively harmless, and I have never seen it done with any malice, amongst 
its effects is the demarcation of boundaries between doctors and others, marking some as 
superior and others as inferior and thus contributing to the possibility for domination.  
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This particular form of superiority bestows more weight on the content of the utterances of a 
doctor than can be attributed to the words of any other. Not only is the doctor elevated in 
stature, but his power to act is increased by the presumed excellence of his judgement, with 
the result that his conduct requires very little justification and leaves even less room for 
questioning from anyone outside of the medical fraternity.  Doctors’ knowledge in the 
emergency unit at Greenlands is very often treated as the most, often the only, reliable source 
of information, while, as noted in previous research by authors including Mizrahi (1986), 
Atkinson (1995), Antaki, (1994) and Donnelly (1997), patients’ accounts are treated as 
possessing all the suspect qualities of subjectively based information and dismissed as fiction 
rather than fact (Arney and Bergen, 1984). For example, a doctor might ask his colleague for 
background information about a conscious and lucid patient who is standing before him – 
“What’s her name?”; “When did she come in?” While such an observation might seem to 
overemphasize a minor detail of conversation, imagining this scenario in another context 
reveals its strangeness. The incongruity of looking on while being introduced by a mutual 
acquaintance to someone else, who enquires of the acquaintance after your name and recent 
movements, who in turn responds on your behalf, is so conventionally inappropriate, and 
your surprise and dismay likely to be so great, that one can only guess at the effect on the 
feelings of the patient of such a practice in the hospital. While this is so, the fact should not 
be ignored that these ‘oversights’ in terms of which doctors fail to communicate directly with 
their patients are certainly not intended to disrespect or offend them. Rather, they represent 
responses available within the discursive environment and employed in the negotiation of 
excessive time constraints, in a context in which the assortment of obstacles to effective 
communication with patients frequently render bypassing this route in favour of an option 
that seems, in terms of its immediate effects at least, to be more efficient. 
 
But more disturbing than the breeches of normal etiquette in which the patient is either not 
addressed or in which his contributions to the conversation are ignored, are the opportunities 
this authority offers doctors to override their patients’ rights, for example to accurate 
information about their conditions, or to use what one might call their ‘easy access’ to 
credibility to achieve their own ends. Dr F was finding a patient accompanied by her daughter 
difficult to manage. The patient and daughter were asking for explicit information: What 
were they waiting for? When would the doctor be back? How long before the test results 
would be available? What were the doctor’s suspicions as to the cause of illness? Feeling 
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under pressure to provide answers she did not have, Dr F admitted, out of the patient’s 
hearing, “I’m just hoping that there is something on the X-ray so that I can say that is your 
problem.” If not, however, she assured me she would “probably end up telling the patient 
she’s got pneumonia and discharge her with amoxicillin – not because that is what I really 
really think but because she wants an answer.”  
“Really?” I replied in surprise. “You’ll actually just make something up?” 
“Definitely!”, she said. “We make up stories big time – all the time. Because you have to get 
rid of patients somehow.” 
 
This extract represents an interesting example of the complex interplay between the narrative 
of science and the other features and constraints of the emergency unit setting. On the one 
hand, the doctor in this example is overtly engaged in a scientific activity, namely attempting 
to find the cause of the patient’s illness and thus to make a diagnosis. Simultaneously, 
however, she has a second pragmatic rather than scientific objective, namely to discharge the 
patient, an aim she intends to achieve with or without the diagnosis. Dr F thus employs her 
position within the narrative of science, namely that of someone who can make scientific 
pronouncements, not only to accomplish the hoped for diagnosis and to give a prescription, 
but to allow her, should her attempts in this regard fail, to proceed in “get(ting) rid of (the) 
patient somehow.” Thus, she uses the fallacy of certainty conferred on her pronouncements 
by the narrative of science to allow her to claim scientific knowledge that she in fact does not 
have, and get away with it, defending herself against this patient’s questions and doubts 
(Katz, 1984; Allsop & Mulcahy, 1999) and against general patient overload. Exempt from the 
requirement of justifying her diagnosis before her patients in terms of the pre-existing 
assumption that her statements are rationally derived and objectively true, the doctor uses the 
opportunity thereby afforded her to unburden herself of the patient by providing a diagnosis 
that will facilitate speedy discharge. She thus uses her authoritative position, as Katz (1984) 
and Millman (1977) suggest is all too often the case, to protect her own, rather than her 
patient’s interests. 
 
The position of ignorance that the patient occupies within this narrative not only keeps the 
doctor safe from possible questions about the correctness of her diagnosis, thus, as Wicks 
(1998) argues, shielding her from external evaluation. It also renders her intention to provide 
her patient with misinformation appropriate and quite inconsequential. In terms of the 
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narrative possibilities, the patient’s ignorance cannot substantially change, as she is incapable 
of comprehending medical realities (Millman, 1977), and the lie is therefore insignificant and 
permissible. The doctor thus paradoxically puts her own and her patients’ position within the 
narrative of science to anti-scientific use, revealing both the power of the narrative of science 
and the simultaneously moral and political (and thence antiscientific) nature of medical 
practice, as discussed by Fisher (1986), Mishler (1984), Mizrahi (1986), Lewinsohn (1998), 
Wodak (1996) and Donnelly, (1997) amongst others. 
 
While more disturbing than the omission to greet the patient described above, it should also 
not be overlooked that this extract does not simply represent an abuse of power for its own 
sake. Rather, the doctor is responding to the circumstances within which she finds herself, 
namely ones in which she is faced with massive patient overload and is probably suffering 
from both stress and exhaustion, by employing the means discursively available to her. 
Indeed, the urgency of some patients’ conditions requires that doctors manage the load by 
“get(ting) rid” of others. My argument, therefore, is not that Dr F particularly wants to lie to 
the patient or otherwise violate her rights, but rather th t the discursive context makes this 
option readily available and that, faced with a difficult set of circumstances, she employs it 
for her own protection and, coincidentally, at her patient’s expense. The status associated 
with access to superior knowledge is thus made available to doctors through their position 
within the narrative framework, rather than merely through their actual possession of such 
knowledge. It is further employed to bolster this position, as Phillips (1996) has shown, 
through the moment-to-moment production and reinforcement of their patients’ ignorance.  
The supremacy of scientific practice  
As Mishler (1981) points out, not only scientific knowledge, but the practice of science is 
charged with greater importance than any other activity. Doctors’ duties and actions are 
therefore prioritised, both because they are presumed to be guided by superior knowledge and 
because they represent scientific endeavour, with its valued attributes of rationality, 
objectivity, linear causality and technical action (Mishler, 1981; 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; 
Conrad, 1988; Stokes, 1994; Wodak, 1996; Atkinson, 1999; Good and DelVecchio-Good, 
2000). This ‘truth’ underlies a great deal of the activity in the emergency unit and Dr S makes 
it explicit in the following extract from my conversation with her:  
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Dr S: Although they claim that we should take breaks there’s no ways we take breaks, it 
doesn’t happen...You never see the nurses not taking their breaks, the doctors do not. 
I: Really (..) Why d’you think that is? 
Dr S: I don’t know, I suppose we have more sense of guilt that you can’t sit around (.) for an 
hour on your arse (.) while (.) there’s so many sick people out there.  
I: So why would doctors have more of a sense of guilt than nurses? 
Dr S: Because if anything- I m- I- I mean because we just more- we do more of the things to 
change the co- the outcome. 
I: Ok. 
Dr S: That’s why.  
 
While this excerpt overtly states the primacy of doctors’ activities, interesting too is Dr S’s 
uncertainty in attempting to provide a reason for their greater importance – “if anything- I m- 
I- I mean because we just more-” – eventually formulating the maxim that, “We do more of 
the things to change the...outcome.” The cause-effect sequence identifiable in this syntax is 
identified by Helman (2001), amongst others, as a key characteristic of scientific discourse 
and affords doctors, in view of their superior knowledge and supremely important activity, 
the primary position, namely that of arch-agent. This unidirectional, linear patterning of 
events represents one of the main arteries of the scientific narrative, and of doctors’ power 
within it, and, through its availability within medical culture, provides a ready answer to a 
difficult question. Not only, however, would the truth of Dr S’s statement most likely be 
hotly contested by the nurses, but it falls short of providing evidence that doctors’ greater 
tendency to guilt is indeed warranted. In fact, it does little more than assert their greater 
importance, through invocation of the cause-effect storyline made available by the narrative 
of science and positioning doctors as sole agents of changing the ‘outcome’.  
 
Amongst the consequences of judging doctors’ activities as of paramount importance is the 
belittling of other concerns. As such, all non-technical aspects of treating and caring for sick 
people, are relegated, as Good & DelVecchio-Good (1993), Mizrahi (1986), Waitzkin (1991) 
and Fisher (1986; 1995), amongst others, have argued in the past, at best, to irrelevance. The 
following extract reveals the presence of this feature of the scientific narrative in the 
discourse prevalent at Greenlands emergency unit: 
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I: So, um, what would you say are the various elements that make up working as a doctor 
here? 
Dr S: OK, well that’s easy (.) there’s the doctor part, which does the medicine, there’s the 
nurse part of the doctor that does all the nurse shit too, there’s the porter part of the doctor 
that does that too, and there’s the dressing part of the doctor that undresses and dresses the 
patients too.  
 
All the tasks mentioned are performed by the doctor. However, Dr S’s resentment about 
having to conduct the tasks she enumerates other than “the medicine” is clearly audible. And 
her description of those she attributes to nurses as “shit” and belittling of those she assigns to 
porters, merely referred to as “that,”  distinguish them in status from the “medicine” that, she 
implies, is the only worthwhile element that is real doctors’ work.   
 
Similar contempt for the concerns of others is audible, for example, in a conversation 
between two doctors about the efficient management of “psych patients” in the unit. A box, 
designated for the hospital folders of these patients, had been removed from the unit. “There 
were concerns about labelling,” explained Dr N, a smile spreading across his face.  
“Labelling is the least of my worries,” Dr P responded. 
“Exactly.” 
In this case the psychiatrist’s concern with the psychological effects of singling out patients 
suffering from mental illnesses, and of managing them separately, is deemed trivial, and even 
foolish, as implied by the smile.  As “the least of my worries,” it contrasts directly with the 
matters of far more importance with which the two doctors are occupied. While narratives of 
science remain unstated in this extract, their presence is suggested by the importance 
attributed to doctors’ ‘concerns’ through denigration of the concerns of others.  
 
While few can deny the satisfaction we derive from the sense that our pursuits are important, 
or that prioritisation is an indisputable pragmatic requirement, there are unfortunate 
consequences arising from the preference accorded to some activities to the exclusion of all 
others. For one thing, as discussed extensively by a number of authors (Mishler, 1981, 1984; 
Mizrahi, 1986; Conrad, 1988; Good and DelVecchio-Good, 1993; Stokes, 1994; Konner, 
1997; Helman, 2001; amongst others), caring activities fall squarely outside of the doctor’s 
domain, resulting in some striking omissions and, at times, callous treatment. A patients’ 
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physical comfort or emotional plight is seldom granted attention. And his calling for help is 
unlikely to earn a response. A doctor I once observed, for example, who had removed a 
patient’s blankets to enable an examination, did not think to replace them once it was 
complete. Patients are also often roughly handled, as if all finesse in the performance of the 
doctors’ core task were superfluous.  
 
In addition to waiving the obligation to perform with finesse, the paramount status of doctors’ 
activities offers justification for stamping out any interference with them, using, potentially, 
an unmonitored range of means (Szasz & Hollender, 1997). “Psych patients” are frequently 
silenced or immobilised by sedating them chemically or tying them up. Patients are not only 
“put to sleep” for threatening to attack doctors or other patients. Loud crying, singing or 
praying is likely to be dealt with in a similar manner and the zealously pious songs and 
prayers that issue from time to time from the beds around the room can be heard suddenly to 
dwindle away after an injection of valium. Dr N’s choice of words to convey his intention to 
sedate a patient who had been bothering the doctors with continuous complaints and demands 
are revealing:  “I think we must put her to sleep.” “We must” (not “we will”) implies the 
necessity of the doctors’ intended action, euphemistically described as “put(ting) (the patient) 
to sleep” and warranted by the indisputably supreme importance of doctors’ tasks.  
 
Through the invocation of these narrative ‘truths’, that the doctor knows best and is engaged 
in a task of unparalleled importance, certain actions that might otherwise have been 
unthinkable are thus brought within the realm of possibility. In addition, such ease of 
justification in the words of Arney & Bergen (1984: p. 3), grants the medical profession the 
freedom to do anything, “including violating all social rules of modesty and decorum.”  
While, as Katz (1984) argues, such actions are seldom driven by malice and may even be 
directed in many instances by a concern for the patients’ well-being, the constructions that 
enable them fail to respect or even acknowledge their liberty and are liable to result in actions 
that, for example, override patients’ objections to intrusive procedures (Wicks, 1998) . On 
one occasion that I witnessed, a woman fiercely resisted a lumbar puncture that Dr J, 
suspecting that the patient might be suffering from meningitis, wanted to perform. Having 
abandoned the struggle to persuade her patient of the necessity for the procedure, the doctor, 
apparently frustrated to the point of desperation by the fruitlessness of her efforts in this 
regard, emerged from behind the curtain where the confrontation had taken place:  
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“I need someone to come help me with an LP. Get that woman onto the bed and hold her 
down. She doesn’t want an LP but she hasn’t got a frigging choice.” 
Moments later shouts of protestation dissolved into cries of pain. 
 
Doctor J’s choice of words to describe the conflicting wishes of doctor and patient echo those 
of Dr N when stating his intention to “put (his patient) to sleep.” While the doctor needs help 
to perform the procedure, the patient merely wants to resist it. As a requirement based on 
necessity, the doctor’s intention is given implicit priority and the patient’s dismissed as 
bloody-mindedness. No justification for the doctor’s proposed action is required. It is 
presumed to be imperative and is itself an unquestionable reason for overruling the patient, 
who simply “hasn’t got a frigging choice” by force of the circumstances implied (but not 
specified) by the doctor’s request. Interesting, too, is Doctor J’s characterisation of her 
patient’s intention, but not her own, as one of opposition – “She doesn’t want an LP” – 
presenting the patient’s purpose as contrary to what is obviously necessary, in this case her 
own decision to perform the procedure. Descriptions of patients’ intentions and actions as 
ones of resistance recur throughout emergency room discourse and will be discussed in 
greater detail with reference to the ways in which doctors suppress patients’ agency.  
 
Narratives of masculinity 
The association between medicine and masculinity is widely discussed in the literature on 
medical culture (see for example the work of Arney & Bergen, 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; Fisher 
and Groce, 1990; Cassell, 1992; DelVecchio-Good, 1995; Drife, 1998; Wicks, 1998; 
Erickson, 1999; amongst others) I argue in this section that traditional narratives of 
masculinity have a profound influence on the ways in which doctors in the emergency unit at 
Greenlands hospital bring the power available to them to life, encouraging certain ways of 
being and acting, and prohibiting others.  
 
It should be noted at the outset that narratives of masculinity are not available only to male 
doctors. A number of authors have drawn attention to the possibility for girls and women to 
adopt masculine identities, or to incorporate components of traditionally masculinity into 
their identities (see the work of authors including Paechter, 2006; Cooper, 2002; and 
Halberstam, 1998). Goodwin (1992), for example, discusses masculinity in terms of preferred 
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communicative practices, which females are able to adopt when necessary or otherwise 
desirable. Thus, while males may have easier and more frequent access to narratives of 
traditional masculinity, females are also able to employ them, and some behaviours remain 
‘masculine’, even when performed by females (Skelton & Francis, 2002). In the words of 
Halberstam (1998, p.2), “What we understand as heroic masculinity has been produced by 
and across both male and female bodies.” In terms of this viewpoint, narratives of 
masculinity are simply available within the socio-cultural context, albeit more so to some and 
less so to others.  Within the context of the Greenlands emergency unit, women doctors’ 
ability to employ masculine narratives is enhanced by their powerful positions and the 
cultural associations between both power and masculinity and medicine and masculinity.  
 
As in the case of the narrative of science, narratives of masculinity are not explicitly stated 
but are audible through their characteristic patterns in the doctors’ talk. The paternalistic 
image of the doctor as benign and all-knowing father-figure, as discussed by a number of 
authors writing in this field (see for example Millman, 1977; Katz, 1984), is undoubtedly 
supportive of the presumed authoritative status of doctors’ knowledge and actions. This 
image is thus complicit in enabling problematic actions such as the ‘easy way out’ that Dr F 
took in telling an unquestioned lie. There are also, however, as discussed in chapter two’s 
review of the work of authors including Wicks (1998), Fisher and Groce (1990), DelVecchio-
Good (1985), Drife (1998), Mizrahi (1986), Erickson (1999), Cassell (1992) and Arney & 
Bergen (1984), a host of other metaphors that characterise both traditional masculinities and 
the practice of medicine and that are prominent in the discourse at Greenlands.  
 
Foster, Haupt and de Beer (2005) argue that three primary ‘types’ can be identified within 
traditional discourses of masculinity: the ‘military-bureaucratic’ type, the ‘action-man’ or 
‘gung-ho’ type and the ‘warrior-hero’. Each of these types of masculine identity is, they 
argue, characterised by particular metaphors and associated with particular values, pursuits 
and actions. Foster, Haupt and de Beer’s (2005) characterisation represents a useful tool for 
analysing some of the talk amongst doctors in the Greenlands emergency unit,  which 
becomes, in these terms, the arena in which  doctors are cast as ‘gung-ho’ heroes, displaying 
what Erickson (1999) refers to as ‘medical machismo’. The ‘gung-ho action man’, according 
to Foster et al, seeks excitement, is at home in the bush, revels in contact with the enemy and 
might be described as an ‘adrenaline junkie’. Wicks (1998) argues for the importance of 
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understanding the metaphors in terms of which we narrate our experiences, in that they drive 
current practices and provide opportunities for change. In accordance with this argument, I 
will show in this section how the metaphors that characterise doctors’ talk in the emergency 
unit create the opportunity for aggressive domination and potentially for inhumane care.  
Masculinity and danger  
In keeping with the action-man’s quest for excitement and desire for ‘contact with the 
enemy’, the emergency room is portrayed as dangerous to the doctors, enhancing their 
potential to establish bravado masculine identities by displaying the “balls” to which Cassell 
(1992) refers and their characters as “invulnerable, untiring, unafraid of death and disaster” 
(p. 173). It is important at this point to note that I do not intend to dismiss the doctors’ 
allusions to the dangers of the unit as groundless. To a large extent, the hospital is genuinely 
unsafe. Doctors face real danger travelling to and from work at night, as many of them 
frequently do, along roads known for hijackings and violent crime. Many of the patients wear 
on their bodies the evidence that they have themselves been convicted of violent crimes, in 
the form of tattoos indicating membership of prison gangs. Encounters, whether medical or 
otherwise, with strong, tattooed men, forcibly brought to the unit by police, after displaying 
violent, psychotic behaviour, cannot be construed as without risk.  And to cast doubt on the 
possibility of contracting any one of the many, largely undiagnosed and potentially 
contagious diseases would be foolish. Aside, therefore, from the reality of the dangers the 
doctors describe, my purpose is to draw attention to the ways in which their constructions of 
the unit as a dangerous environment resonate with the metaphors of war that authors 
including Cassell (1992), Mizrahi (1986), Wicks (1998) and Arney and Bergen (1984) argue 
is characteristic of medical culture. In so doing, I intend to show how such metaphors 
contribute to, and are employed in, the production of tough, masculine identities; and how 
these representations of danger play a part in shaping the selves that doctors become in the 
unit, and the behaviour that they consequently exhibit, encouraging them, for example, to 
“approach an operation like a battle” (Cassell, 1992, p. 173) and to view their actions in terms 
of combat rather than caring (Mizrahi, 1986).  
 
The dangers that doctors attribute to the emergency unit are primarily those of contracting 
disease or of being assaulted. The opportunities they thereby establish for achieving 
impressive masculine identities are especially obvious in the case of new, junior doctors who 
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can be heard painting pictures of the horrors of the previous hospitals in which they worked – 
“There’d be weekends where there’s stab hearts, gunshots, … (the list continued)” – as they 
attempt to establish their competence and belonging.  
 
But more senior doctors, too, frequently tell stories in which the doctors’ exposure to the 
hazards of the unit are stated or implied. Relating the story of a patient who  had waited two 
months after a positive TB test to be given treatment, who was now suspected of drug 
resistant TB, and was likely to wait another two months before receiving the appropriate 
medication, “meanwhile spreading it like wildfire,”  Dr N remarked,  
“This is a perfect place for a TB outbreak. (..) It’s just a matter of time. (..) Tick (.) tick (.) 
tick (..).  If this were the States, we’d all be wearing masks and be in isolation.” However, the 
air changes required to reduce the spread of airborne disease in the room, he continued, 
“would require a jet engine.” 
 
And Dr P tells a story of the extreme dangers that doctors are expected to confront with 
unparalleled fortitude and dexterity: 
Dr P: Ja (laughs) I mean six policemen came here last night- 
I: Were you here last night? 
Dr P: Ja- well, we were leaving, it was about four o’ clock. 
I: OK. 
Dr P: And they- they come up to (.) one of my colleagues who is probably like forty five 
kilograms, this very (.) um (.) thin girl, ok, and they come up to her, six policemen, and says, 
‘Doctor, we can’t get the patient out of the van, he’s too violent. Can you go inside the van 
and sedate him?’ I looked at him and I said, ‘What the hell are you talking about?’ You 
know, you want her to go inside to sedate the patient and you are- can’t get him out cos he’s 
too violent! Six police officers! You know, use your head. How does that make any sense?’ 
(.) You know?  
 
These examples illustrate the ways in which the dangers of the emergency unit are construed 
by the doctors and the opportunities for macho self-presentation that are thereby created. This 
point is particularly well illustrated by Dr S’s response to the unusually gruesome condition 
of a patient she is about to see. Striking her chest with her fist she roars, “Bring it on!” While 
the risk is not to herself in this instance, but to the patient, the example illustrates perfectly 
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the scope created by blood, gore and peril for the display of muscle. Not only, therefore, do 
these descriptions reflect doctors’ perceptions and interpretations of their environment, they 
also rank amongst their efforts to define and present the desired image of themselves.  
 
Dr N’s prediction of a “TB outbreak,” characterised as a time-bomb, in defence against which 
they should “all be wearing masks and be in isolation,” implies not only the risk to which the 
doctors are exposed but sets the scene for the emergence of brave and powerful heroes, 
whose task is suitable not for a mere man but for “a jet engine.” Indeed, according to Dr P, 
what is expected of frail lady doctors is beyond the capabilities of six burly policemen! 
Rather than merely reflecting the risks of work in the unit, therefore, I argue that these 
constructions of medical practice and of the Greenlands emergency unit as dangerous 
facilitate the adoption of strong, powerful identities and, on occasion, allow justification of 
inhumane care. In this respect, Dr P’s ambiguous response to my question about Dr J’s attack 
is intriguing: 
“My god! Was she hurt?” 
“Well, she was punched twice on the back!” 
 
His reply (“Well,…”) reveals an inability to state categorically that Dr J had been hurt and, 
simultaneously, a reluctance to deny it. I believe the ambivalence audible here is an 
indication of the usefulness of danger to the doctors’ desired self-presentations. While Dr P 
paints a picture that alludes to and implies grave danger, he is unable to substantiate it, in this 
instance, with evidence of a real injury. Rather than simply referring to a risk he believes to 
exist, my argument is that doctors employ the invocation of danger in building their identities 
and justifying their acts of aggression. On the one hand, the presence of threat creates 
possibilities for masculine heroism, one of the key features of which is aggression. And on 
the other, it invokes the possibility of justifiable defence, thus enabling doctors to reconstruct 
their aggressive acts as strong and heroic, rather than inhumane. That Dr P unabashedly 
admits that “The psychiatric patients actually make me physically- (.) I get a rage inside me 
when I even think about psychiatric (patients),” is testimony to the tolerance afforded such 
sentiments in the unit.  
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Danger, action and violence 
Within this context, not only do doctors narrate their treatment of patients in terms of bravado 
action – “You just bash them on IV, sedate them, chuck them on a bed and then ... if they 
don’t get well then in three days time you boot them out and just wait for them to do it 
again,”  and, “You… just grab the sick patient, you can toss somebody else off a bed and just 
sort them out then.” The cultural acceptability of such ‘gung-ho’ action and indeed of 
aggression (as described above and by Cassell, 1992; Erickson, 1999; Mizrahi, 1986; and 
others), in terms of which a good doctor is required to be “aggressive and a little bit of a son-
of-a-bitch” (Cassell, p. 177), enables the enactment of actual violence. In addition, beyond 
the discursive landscape in the unit, its practical demands and constraints encourage doctors’ 
involvement in the prevention of patients’ violence. And preventing violence paves the way 
for meting it out. Dr N, making a case for the discharge of a patient brought in by the police 
for manic behaviour, argues that “he’s not aggressive, he’s just breaking furniture. We’re not 
furniture protectors, we’re health care workers.” Statements such as this one both reflect and 
create what I believe to be a dangerous link between doctors (“health care workers”) and ‘real 
aggression’, as opposed to the mere “breaking (of) furniture.” Because the patient is not 
really aggressive, he is not the charge of the emergency room doctors, who are responsible 
only for the prevention of actual violence against persons.  
 
The more serious displays of aggression that I witnessed in the unit tended to occur around 
the prevention of patients’ violence, brought within the doctors’ domain partly through lack 
of resources for the more appropriate management of these patients and partly through the 
discursive practices illustrated above that characterise doctors as responsible for curbing 
aggression. During the first months of my observations in the emergency room, the situation 
was especially difficult – lack of resources meant that potentially dangerous patients roamed 
the room, sometimes for days on end, and it was quite usual for the unit to hold a number of 
aggressive psychiatric patients at any one time. While there was always a security guard 
present, proximity frequently determined who intervened in a sudden, unanticipated violent 
outburst. The situation was in some respects improved by the addition of what became known 
as ‘the padded cell’, a separate room for violent “psych patients,” with a door that could only 
be opened from the outside, and in which they were imprisoned. What took place in that 
room I could only gauge from the expressions of those coming out, which were, on occasion, 
alarming. The mother of a patient locked in the room, for example, emerged wailing and 
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beseeching the other patients to help her stop the doctors from “strangling” her son. And the 
sound of the alarm being set off inside the room often preceded the charge of security guards, 
who then disappeared behind the closed door, leaving to the imagination the events within.  
 
Sometimes, in the process of restraining aggressive patients, for example by means of a 
technique known as “the Greenlands take down” and, as told to me by one of the doctors, 
developed on the rugby field, the door is opened for doctors to become involved in the 
language and practice of violence:    
Dr P: Two doctors, two nurses and two patients have been assaulted in the last three months 
by psychiatric patients.  
I: Mm. Really. 
Dr P: One patient sexually assaulted- Two patients sexually assaulted. (..) In the casualty. By 
psychiatric patients. (..) So-  (..) The problem is that (.) you can- you either ignore them or hh 
when you with them you get almost a feral reaction, almost- Like an animalistic type of like 
(..) You know, take this person down, (.) you know, destroy this (.) this threat  (..) as quickly 
as possible.   
I: Can you remember the last incident? 
Dr P: Name a time! (laughs) Um- I mean I was- uh- some guy who came in (..). I’ve been hit 
twice by psych patients. But (.) the one was bad, it was in here, hh um (.) he (.) I don’t know, 
he was talking or something like that, we sat him down and sedated him and he stood up, was 
a bit drowsy, and then comes at me and said, ‘I’m gonna f-ing shoot you, I’m gonna kill you.  
So I said, ‘Don’t talk to me like that,’ and then he just came at me like that. So I pulled back 
and (.) next- then it was o longer hh doctor – patient. Then it was like right, all best to all, 
lets play this game, buddy. And then the security guards were on him and (.) I mean (.) there 
was a full-on (sounds like: skive). Got (.) some sense beaten into him. You, know, and that’s 
not the way it should be done, but the point is that (.) should he ever have been allowed to 
take a swing at me? No. There should have been security guards there holding him. (..) Cos 
once you take a swing, then you change out of that mode and start changing into Rocky mode 
or- (laughs) 
 
Dr P details the process whereby prevention of violence frequently leads to its enactment – 
“Once you take a swing then you change out of that (doctor-patient) mode and start changing 
into Rocky mode.” Confirming that he is not alone in his stance, he continues: 
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“You can- y can ask any one, you ask any doctor who’s worked in the casualty here. (.) And 
(.) probably, well- one of the first things he’ll say to you is (.), ‘Ja, the psych patients (. ) ja, 
we take them down’.” 
 
I in fact witnessed one of these incidents, in which a “psych patient” was “take(n) down” – I 
was sitting at the doctors’ station chatting to Dr P when another doctor came over: 
“We need your help.” 
Dr P got up from his chair, turning to me, his eyes glinting: “The Greenlands takedown! 
Come watch, if you want.” 
We followed the other doctor around the corner where a scuffle had broken out involving a 
patient, six doctors and two security guards. In the centre was the patient, a tall, strongly built 
man in nothing but his underpants, screaming incoherently. Suddenly, the guards and doctors 
rushed simultaneously toward the man, one of the doctors tackling him so that he fell to the 
floor. Once on the floor, they all jumped on him, Dr S kneeling beside him, one knee pressed 
into his throat. Looking down at him, she asked sarcastically,  
“Oh! It’s a little difficult to breathe now, is it?” 
The other doctors busied themselves holding the man down by his arms and legs, Dr Q 
standing casually with a foot on the patient’s chest. After administering an injection of 
valium into the man’s arm, they successfully carried him onto a stretcher, where he continued 
to struggle. Having placed him face down, Dr V turned his efforts to applying the full weight 
of his body to the back of the man’s head, squashing his face into the hard stretcher until Dr P 
intervened: 
“Okay, don’t actually kill him.” 
When the man had been tied down, Dr P began explaining to me the details of the procedure 
– the patient is given a double dose of valium, in case he has developed a resistance through 
frequent prior sedation, all the while having his airways blocked (by the knee in his throat) to 
render him passive until the sedative has taken effect.  
 
While the discursive environment renders these happenings both understandable and 
permissible to the participants – “You get almost a feral reaction ... You know, take this 
person down, (.) you know, destroy this (.) this threat  (..) as quickly as possible” –  a 
simultaneous awareness of the unacceptable nature of this behaviour lurks in Dr P’s words. 
Within the same sentence, Dr P both justifies his behaviour and denies his culpability – “You 
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get almost a feral reaction” – characterising his actions as irrational (animalistic) responses to 
an outside agent (the patient). Rather than planned actions, they are “feral reactions” that 
“you get” from another. And not only I but you get them, implying a universal vulnerability 
to these reactions that further reduces Dr P’s personal responsibility. He then reconstitutes 
“this person,” half a sentence later, as “this threat,” transforming what might otherwise be 
construed as a violent assault on a human being into the mere negation of danger, a protective 
rather than an aggressive act, an interpretation belied by his prior statement that “it was no 
longer ... doctor – patient ... it was like right ... let’s play this game, buddy.” Together with 
his introduction to the story, in which he sets the scene for his subsequent actions, portraying 
himself as the repeated victim of the threat he later sets out to destroy – “I’ve been hit twice 
by psych patients” – these features of Dr P’s story read like an unsolicited denial of his 
culpability and appear suggestive of a contrary accusation. His conclusion firmly establishes 
the patient’s causal responsibility for the ensuing events – “Cos once you take a swing...” – 
and thereby his own innocence of them, as he uncontrollably “starts changing into Rocky 
mode.” The patient’s action is portrayed as entirely unprovoked – “he just came at me” – and 
follows the benign rendition of his own action – “Don’t talk to me like that” – with the words 
“and then,” implying a lack of causal relationship between the doctor’s words and the 
patient’s attack. Dr P’s subsequent action, however, is a direct result of the patient’s coming 
at him – “So I pulled back” – again highlighting the patient’s causal responsibility and 
absolving himself from his own, as he portrays his deeds as reactions. Eventually, the patient 
“got (.) some sense beaten into him” by an unidentified agent.  
 
Thus, the cultural acceptability of aggressive sentiments and violent intentions toward the 
patients create an atmosphere in which such attitudes become possible and permissible, 
setting the scene for their enactment. Events in which aggressive sentiments are physically 
enacted take place on a scale that ranges from rudeness to outright physical assault. The more 
serious incidents tend to occur during the process of controlling violent patients, brought 
within the doctors’ jurisdiction, partly as a consequence of inadequate facilities for their 
management, and partly as a product of the social construction of doctors as brave, masculine 
heroes. Briefly touched on in the above discussion and to be discussed further in chapter nine, 
the discursive environment further facilitates the subsequent justification of doctors’ violent 
acts, allowing doctors to blame patients for their assaults on patients and to diminish personal 
culpability for their aggression.  
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Science, masculinity and care 
Of course, the discourses of science and masculinity do not operate in isolation from one 
another and a number of consequences for the kinds of actions in which doctors are 
encouraged or discouraged to participate ensue from their interaction.  In this section I will 
explore key themes that emerge through the interaction of the narratives of science and 
masculinity and that, I believe, contribute to the further possibility for the violation of 
patients’ rights.  
The importance of action with impact 
 A number of authors (see for example the work of Millman, 1977; Hahn, 1985; Katz, 1985; 
Cassel, 1992; Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993; Stokes, 1994; Konner, 1997; and Erickson, 
1999, whose work is reviewed in chapter two) have discussed the cultural supremacy 
afforded the direct, observable results of dramatic action in medical practice, and the 
consequent devaluation of those actions not likely to be associated with such effects.  In the 
words of Obholzer (1994: p173), “Doctors are caught up in the societal fantasy about their 
omnipotence, an unconscious social projective system in which the capacity to do heroic 
things is imputed to them, and they are expected to perform.” Within this environment, 
doctors have little opportunity to earn respect and establish positive identities based on 
compassion or careful consideration of patients’ conditions. Instead they are drawn to cases 
that promise immediate, direct actions and results, affording the chance to establish without 
doubt their scientific competence and masculine heroism. Describing the potential afforded 
by resuscitating a patient for doctors to “shine” through their engagement in extreme action, 
Dr P responds to my probes:  
I: Ja. (...) So you were saying about seeing the best and the worst in people here, um- 
Dr P: Mm. (clears throat) 
I: Something that I’m interested in is stories of actual events. (..) Is there a particular time you 
can remember when you were struck by seeing the best in people? 
Dr P: Well (...) it inevitably happens in (.) kind of a major, I suppose resuscitation situation 
(...) where (.) people just forget all about their issues and just get on with the job. (.) And (..) 
then you see kind of everyone working together and (.) working well and (.) you know, 
everything like that and (.) It doesn’t happen that often but when it does happen you really 
see (.) that people shine… 
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Making a similar distinction, Dr S describes some patients as “sick” and others as “stupid”:  
“So what’s the difference between the sick patients and the stupid ones?” I asked. “I don’t get 
that difference.” 
“Well the sick patients,” replied Dr S, “are half dead.  They’re resusc patients. Then you can 
just get into it immediately. It’s not somebody that you’ve gotta like (.) fucking find a bed for 
and (.) clamber around an- you know, get yourself involved in the whole ‘there’s no bed’ 
crisis and all that bullshit. (.) You can just grab the sick patient, you can toss somebody else 
off a bed and just sort them out then. There isn’t like the whole (..) hh you do wanna see 
them, you wanna log roll them, but they still haven’t found a bed yet (.) and then, you know, 
its just (.) you sort of half- half seeing them but (.) it hasn’t quite happened yet.” 
“So the resusces are the least frustrating in terms of all those other side issues that crop up.”  
“Probably, ja. And they’re the most challenging. Medically.”   
“Right, ok. (...) In what way are they the most medically challenging?” 
“Well because if we don’t do something then the person’s gonna die.”  
“Yes. (...) And is that not the case with some of the other patients?” 
“No. (..) This is an immediate thing.” 
 
Since it is true only in terms of immediately observable cause-effect relationships that those 
patients not requiring resuscitation will not die if the doctors don’t “do something,” I believe 
the difference between “sick” and “stupid” patients refers rather to the differential 
opportunities they afford doctors for displaying and proving their power. Again, my intention 
is not to deny doctors their rightful reward for the life-saving work that they do. My aim is to 
point out that the narratives predominant in medical culture, in this case the traditional 
masculinities espoused by the doctors, in conjunction with the narrative of science, which 
similarly foregrounds the importance of observable cause and effect, encouraging certain 
actions to the exclusion of a great many other activities, which are classified as “bullshit.” 
The masculine hero / all-powerful scientist cannot be created through contemplation or 
caring. It the doctor’s ability to act on his environment and to produce effects, not his 
thoughtful approach, or displays of compassion, that confirms his potency. Thus, only those 
actions that highlight the doctor’s ability to “do something” that achieves “immediate” results 
are valued, producing an exclusive focus that, I argue, can have dangerous consequences.  
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As Obholzer argues, echoing the earlier comments of Paget (1988), and discussed in chapter 
three, (1994: p. 174), “a great deal of what goes on (in the hospital) is not about dramatic 
rescue but rather about facing one’s relative helplessness in the face of illness and death.” Dr 
R makes clear the consequences of this reality for the doctors’ identity:  
“The weekend before that we had a trauma- we had a- we had a big trauma the weekend 
before that with head injuries and whatever. Came in in a very bad way. And we were 
actually able to sort of (.) not get him right but (.) get him in a stable enough position that we 
could send him somewhere that could get him right. (..) And those are the moments when you 
feel like (.) you’re doing something. (..) There’s- there’s- (laughs) there’s need for you to be 
here. (..) You know, it’s just- it’s very- it’s difficult now with HIV. Because (.) you get the 
feeling that like why do we even bother? (.) You know, these patients come in in stage four, 
this woman (.) that I saw now (.) stage four, they’ve got PCP4 pneumonia and they’ve had 
like reactions to all the medication they on and (.) you know, there’s really nothing you can 
do at that stage. It’s just (.) sit and wait and make them comfortable. And (.) 70% of the 
patients we’re seeing are like that. (.) Hh you know you kind of feel like why did I become a 
doctor if I’m gonna sit here and say, ‘Well you a right off, you a right off, you a right off?’ 
You know, it’s kind of- you know, it sounds harsh but that’s what’s happening. You know, 
you not gonna say to a patient ‘Well, you a right off,’ you gonna say, ‘Well, let’s look for 
some palliative care or-’ and you don’t ever feel like you’re doing something.” 
 
In this extract, Dr R makes evident the necessity of a particular kind of result, namely clearly 
identifiable diversion of the course of disease, for a doctor’s action to be considered worthy 
of the term – “those are the moments when you feel like (.) you’re doing something.” Actions 
unlikely to produce these effects, for example those involved in “palliative care,” produce, 
instead of the positive self-evaluations associated, for example, with successful 
resuscitations, questions about the value of the effort spent. Unlike other actions, identifiable 
as the causes of immediate effects, these actions are constructed, essentially, as non-actions – 
“there’s really nothing you can do at that stage” – equated to “sit(ting) and wait(ing).” That 
the value of the doctors’ identity is bound up with their potency as defined in these terms is 
hinted at by Dr R’s question in response to the many patients she sees suffering from full-
blown AIDS – “Why did I become a doctor”? It seems, therefore, that the doctors’ 
characterisation as action-men, as the all-powerful causes of their patients’ emergence from 
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disease and death, places their very identities under threat every time they are faced with a 
reality that defies their ability to live up to this expectation.  
 
Again, therefore, I argue that these narrative frameworks, through their foregrounding of the 
directly observable cause-effect sequence, and thus of dramatic action with impact, and their 
devaluation of caring, thoughtful or other less observably potent actions, are likely to result in 
inferior care through the lack of any reward for the doctors associated with such actions. This 
point will be discussed again in greater detail in chapter nine. 
Power and emotion 
The power that doctors possess is defined not only in terms of their ability to produce 
immediate, observable effects though dramatic action but also through their immunity to 
emotion. The narrative of science, with the value it places on objectivity (discussed 
extensively by authors reviewed in chapter two, including Cassell, 1982;, Mishler 1984; 
Fisher 1991; Mizrahi 1986; Atkinson 1995; DelVecchio-Good and Good, 2000, 1993; 
Helman, 2001; Savett, 2002, Finkler, 2004; Apker & Eggly, 2004; amongst others) 
discourages emotional responses of any sort and glorifies indifference in the attitude of 
doctors. And amongst the distinguishing characteristics of the masculine hero is his immunity 
to the more tender emotions.  
 
Something that struck me repeatedly during the time I spent in the emergency room was the 
total lack of reaction to what I found the most disturbing of events. While patients scream in 
pain, utter their dying sounds or cry out for help, not an eyelid flickers, not a head turns 
anywhere in the room, suggesting the obliteration of doctors’ conscious emotional responses 
of which Good and DelVecchio-Good (2000) speak. During one of my first visits to the 
hospital a patient was dying in the resuscitation area. Dr A, who was attending to the patient, 
strolled over to Dr F and a nurse, who were standing over a patient in the neighbouring bed:  
“Can someone who can drop some adrenalin give me a hand here?”  
Neither doctor nor nurse appeared to have heard the question and after a short pause Dr A 
asked irritably,  
 “Is this patient dying? Because that one is.”  
Apologising, Dr F and the nurse accompanied Dr A to the bed of the dying patient, where a 
student stood casually pumping her chest. Looking for a pulse, Dr A commented indifferently 
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that he was unable to find one. An intern arrived on the scene, shambling over and 
apologising for his tardiness: 
“I got over-involved in my breakfast.” 
 
Dr L jokingly plays on the similarity between a patient’s name and the likely outcome of his 
condition: 
“His surname is Kaput5 and he’s having an MI6!” 
 
When asked directly about their feelings with regard to patients’ suffering and death, the 
doctors’ responses are strangely barren. Dr S’s reply to my question about her feelings after a 
patient she was attempting to resuscitate died illustrates: 
I: So how do you walk away from those events feeling? 
Dr S: Well tha- I- ge- just irritated... 
And in another conversation: 
I: I mean I have the luxury of having to write up everything I’ve seen when I get home. It’s 
very therapeutic! (laughs) So I’m just wondering what you do with your emotional responses 
to the things that happen here. 
Dr S: I dunno. (.) I suppose you speak to- er- well- we speak to colleagues about it or- Uh (.) I 
dunno. Ja. 
 
While irritation struck me as an unlikely reaction to death, Dr S became quite incoherent in 
her attempts to offer any other response, rendering her eventual claim that “we speak to 
colleagues about it or-” unconvincing. Dr S further distanced herself from the emotional 
response I imputed to her by my question, by deviating suddenly from the “I” in her reply to 
the impersonal “you” and the collective “we.” While “you...” and “we speak to colleagues 
about it,” “I” merely “suppose” that this is the case, admitting no direct connection to the 
actions discussed.  
 
Indeed, expressions of vulnerability, caring or other tender emotions are jeered at in the 
emergency room and cynicism and even malice advanced as the more commendable stance. 
Individual members of the peer group can be observed, as in Hafferty’s 1991 study, putting 
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 Slang word for ‘finished’ that connotes finality. 
6
 Myocardial infarction.  
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pressure on one another to respond to events in culturally prescribed ways, and confirming 
their own membership of the group through engaging in what Wodak (1996) refers to as 
‘rituals of talk’. Responding to my suggestion that the doctors might derive emotional support 
from each other, Dr S retorted, “No, I mean we don’t have big heart-to-hearts,” sneering at 
the possibility and highlighting the sentimental nature of what I had suggested. One of the 
interns, apparently commenting on his progress during the few months since I had last seen 
him, remarked that he was now even more “jaded” than he had been before. And Dr N 
comments, with reference to a disturbed and disturbing story told to me by one of the “psych 
patients,” that, “We don’t even listen anymore,” confirming my sense that the intern’s 
“jad(ing)” was proffered as a desired progression, not an unfortunate development.  
 
Dr N’s statement, through its suggestion of doctors’ past attempts at listening to their patients 
and its inclusion of all those who no longer listen in the collective pronoun “we,” presents 
this cynical and non-empathic attitude as evidence both of experience and of belonging, and 
is reminiscent of Obholzer’s (1994: p. 174) rendition of the way in which junior doctors are 
socialised into the cynical attitude that the medical profession demands of its members: “This 
is how we ignore what is going on. Pretend along with us and soon you will be one of us.” 
Narrations of patients’ conditions are thus delivered in monotone and all descriptions of 
illness and suffering reduced to numbers and scientific terminology. Shifts in topic between 
the horrific and the mundane are a routine feature of doctors’ conversations and go unmarked 
by tonal modulations. Having completed her story, above, of the weekend of gunshot and 
other horrific abominations, Dr T asks Dr J, “So where you off to after this?” displaying not 
only her experience and competence in dealing with such events but also her ability to remain 
unaffected by them. That this emotional dearth is not confined to the doctors is confirmed as 
porters go by, pushing bodies on trolleys, singing on the tops of their lungs and cracking 
jokes like, “I’m taking him to heaven!” Illustrating the junior doctors’ admiration for such 
displays from their seniors, another intern tells of the approach of one of his seniors to 
diagnosing very sick patients’ conditions. While the intern would put considerable effort into 
arriving at long, complicated diagnoses involving identification of multiple, interacting 
conditions, the senior doctor, on consideration of the evidence, would routinely say, “I think 
this patient is (..) fucked.” The story implies the desirability of an attitude that not only 
dispenses with careful consideration but displays a total lack of empathy or caring for the 
patient, describing him or her dismissively as “fucked.” 
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Thus, rather than one amongst many characteristics of medical competence, caring acts are 
devalued and construed in terms diametrically opposite to the dramatic and effective action 
that is the hallmark of the competent doctor. In the words of one doctor, quoted by Mishler 
(1984), medical competence can be represented in terms of a simple choice: “Do you want to 
be a nice guy or a good doctor?” In practice, this discursive stance translates into a dearth of 
caring activities performed by the doctors.  
Power, vulnerability and humour 
Amongst the culturally prescribed ways of responding to such events are, as Hafferty (1991) 
describes, humour and ridicule, which are encouraged as desirable alternatives to expressions 
of distress. It was a fascinating, if somewhat disturbing, process by which my own 
perspective slowly changed from one of the deeply shocked observer to that of someone 
adequately accustomed and desensitised and with sufficient insight into the lived reality of 
the doctors’ experiences to be able to empathise with what I initially found wholly 
incomprehensible and abhorrent. After some time ‘hanging out’ in the unit, I began to be able 
to imagine something of what it must be like to be in the doctors’ position. It is not easy to 
explain how the events that take place in that room can begin to strike one as morbidly funny. 
But something about their overwhelming nature, whether horrific, tragic or simply bizarre, 
the constant frequency of their occurrence and the impossibility of meeting the unspoken 
expectation that the doctors should be able to “sort them out,” can create an almost irresistible 
sense of despairing hilarity. This unexpected and uncomfortable transformation on my part 
involved a shift from the aghast position of moral outrage I had initially occupied to one that 
included a simultaneous sympathetic identification, in which the doctors’ humour began to 
make intuitive sense. 
 
This process was enabled by my slowly acquiring the ability to empathise with what I sensed 
the doctors experienced as the absurdity of the situation in which they found themselves, the 
total incongruity between it and any possible expectation, hope or dream they might have 
had, and the constant barrage of events that, once sufficiently distantiated from the horror of 
it all, seemed ludicrous.  A married couple with wounds from bites inflicted by each other, 
psychotic men prancing about in their underpants with some suggestive accessory, others 
emitting guffaws of laughter into their own faces reflected in the mirrors above the 
washbasins are all scenes that are commonplace in Greenlands’s emergency unit. And amidst 
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it all, doctors are attempting to resuscitate, diagnose and treat very sick people. The 
unmanageability of these situations, coupled with the impossibly unrealistic expectations to 
which the doctors are subject, can, and in the context of the Greenlands emergency unit 
frequently do, produce a sense of hopelessness that often translates into bursts of sardonic 
laughter at their own inevitable defeat, rather than simply in mockery of the patients. The 
intern’s reference to his senior’s standard diagnosis – “I think this patient is (..) fucked” – Dr 
W’s professed desire to be a mechanic, Dr V’s desperate question with regard to a patient 
who had been dubbed “Miss Cryalot”: “Has anyone got a gun? It sounds like a labour ward in 
here,” and Dr P’s suggestion, “Why don’t we all just prescribe things beginning with z 
today?” all reveal, clearly audible beneath the laughter, a sense of pessimistic frustration or 
cynical futility.  
 
The doctors’ jokes therefore appear to represent a means of saying what, in terms of the 
narratives of science and of masculinity, is otherwise not permissible, of communicating a 
sense of powerlessness and even vulnerability within a framework in which power and 
unfeeling machismo are highly valued, and any contrary sentiment associated with weakness 
and inferiority. 
Humour and malice  
Beyond mere cynicism or lack of caring, however, doctors in the Greenlands emergency unit 
actually portray themselves as malevolent, creating the opportunity to act, on occasion, with 
animosity toward their patients – albeit under the guise of humour. For example, Dr P’s 
sarcastic question about the state of mind of a patient approaching the doctors’ station, wild-
eyed and wielding a plastic bag containing what looked like half a loaf of bread and a small 
milk carton, invites an image of the doctors as evil game-players: 
“I wonder if he’s paranoid?” 
[Smirks from the other doctors around the table.] 
 “Let’s make him paranoid! (…) [Whispering and looking down at the table] They’re coming 
to get you, they’re coming after you.”  
Dr B, sauntering with an exaggerated ease that emphasized the inevitability of his victory and 
the futility of the patient’s retreat, walked over to the man, who shrank back and began 
scurrying about in a forlorn attempt to escape.  
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“Come here, boet7, I just want to look at you.”  
Using the table as a barrier between himself and the doctor, the patient attempted to ensure 
that they remained on opposite sides of it. When he was obscured momentarily from the 
doctor’s view as he scuttled behind a notice-board that stands at one end of the table, Dr B 
took the opportunity to initiate a mock game of hide-and-seek, peeping out animatedly from 
behind one and then the other side of the board, to the somewhat bored amusement of the 
observing doctors.  Dr P joined the ‘chase’, rising heavily from his chair and ambling in the 
patient’s direction. 
 “No one wants to hurt you,” he called in a sing-song voice. “Don’t you wanna come lie 
down?”  
At some point they were joined by two security guards, the anticipated clinching of the 
patient’s successful capture. Taking hold of the man’s arm, Dr B pulled him towards the bed. 
The four of them lifted him on and held him down while Dr P administered a sedative 
injection. As the valium began to take effect, the man sat up in bed, dozily rubbing his eyes.  
“Why am I feeling so woozy? Scratch, scratch,” laughed Dr P, sitting down again to continue 
writing his notes.  
 
While done with humour and without real malice, these and similar constructions create a 
space for the abuse of power and the expression of pretended malice toward the patients, 
allowing doctors to say and do the unacceptable, and to detract from the dignity of the 
patient, all under the cloak of ‘good humour’. Thus, humour allows doctors to take the image 
of the masculine hero beyond its generally acceptable boundaries, all the while confirming 
the actual good nature of their acts and denying their potentially serious consequences. Dr 
R’s request, in response to the loud crying of a child, “Can we not give that child something 
for the pain? Cos I’m going to go and break his other leg soon,” Dr V’s question, “Has 
anyone got a gun?” and Dr Y’s suggestion that a patient be pushed out into the yard where 
she would “die in the rain,” rather than in his presence, become possible, and even locally 
acceptable, responses to the sounds of patients in pain. Dr P’s description of the 
‘management’ of psychiatric patients becomes equally permissible: 
“We sedate them, tie them to the bed. (.) If they (.) stop breathing (.) bonus.” 
 
                                                 
7
 Afrikaans word for ‘brother’. 
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Kindness, while not entirely absent, is much less common and indeed is often met with 
negative sanctions. For example, Dr H arrived in the unit with some bread rolls left over from 
the surgeons’ meeting that she intended to give to the “psych patients.”  
“Are they old?” asked Dr P, feigning incredulity. “Have they got salmonella?” 
To Dr H’s negative reply, he continued: 
“Well perhaps you should put some salmonella on!” And then, more seriously, “No, man, 
don’t give it to them – give it to the nurses rather.” 
 
I too received little reprimands for displaying what seemed to me just ordinary politenesses. 
After hearing a story in which I told of my difficulty in exiting a conversation with a talkative 
patient, and of my feeling that I had to remain involved long after I had ceased to be 
interested, Dr S vigorously contradicted me – “No, you didn’t!” And, after I attempted to 
politely explain to a demanding but not seriously ill man that he was not being purposefully 
ignored, but was simply in a queue for the doctors’ attention, Dr P admonished me: “Stop 
being so nice to people!” 
 
It is my argument here that the cultural acceptability of ‘black humour’ and ridicule, along 
with the associated prohibitions against caring and ‘niceness’, create the possibility for the 
‘acceptable’ transgression of ordinary social norms against the expression of aggressive 
desires, intentions and behaviours, and thus for the violence that is widely reported in medical 
practice (Mizrahi, 1986; Zaman, 2004; D’Oliveira, Diniz and Schraiber, 2002; Malterud & 
Thesen, 2008; Andersen, 2004). 
 
Defences 
Supporting my allusions above to the possibility that this cynical humour and these 
expressions of aggressive intent represent alternatives to a prevalent but unspoken sense of 
powerlessness and distress, there is evidence too of the doctors’ employment of other 
defensive strategies in the emergency room talk.  
 
Death in the doctors’ narratives 
For all their indifference and machismo, for example, stories of death are near impossible to 
obtain from doctors, who tend to delete the event from their narratives, or make only 
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euphemistic references to it, as found by Iedema (2007), suggesting the avoidance that 
Mizrahi (1986), Dreyer and Geist (1993) and Andersen (2004), amongst others, argue stems 
from an underlying anxiety about their competence and culpability, and from other 
distressing emotions, such as guilt or grief (Zagier-Roberts, 1994).  
 
Dr G, instructing a group of junior doctors on the treatment of patients with diarrhoea, tells 
them, “We’ve had patients who were sent home just after rehydration and then we’ve had to 
fill in death certificates,” referring only to the surrounding events and leaving us to surmise 
the rest. Doctors shy from explicit references to death in their stories – “And then uh massive 
resusc ensued and then, ja, he didn’t- it wasn’t successful.” On those occasions when I 
persisted in prying or a doctor did spontaneously make explicit reference to a patients’ death, 
their remarks tended to be characterised by flippancy or humour. The following example 
illustrates both the doctor’s reticence, when asked for a story of death, and the subsequent 
offhand description that I succeeded in coaxing out of her: 
 
I: And what about the guy who died, what happened there? 
Dr S: What happened to him? 
I: Ja – how did it happen? 
Dr S: He- What d’you mean how did it happen? 
I: Well, he came in the door and then? 
Dr S: And then I don’t know, cos he’d been there for a good few hours with his adrenalin neb 
or something, with his upper airway obstruction, and then on handover was given that (.) 
what do you call it? That (inaudible) and then promptly decompensated and stopped 
breathing. At which point who knows? Nobody was looking at him.  
 
In another similarly extracted story, 
“We had five (.) major resusces. CPR8 resusces. And one died and the other four survived. 
There was that lady. (.) Probably would have died eventually anyway. The stabbed guy who 
I’m sure he’s fine. (...) The high care lady who- she’s probably still alive, who knows, maybe 
she’s dead, and the (.) medical patient who, I dunno, he’s probably dead too, to be honest.” 
 
                                                 
8
 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
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In the first extract, Dr S’s reluctance to tell the story gives way to a callous sounding 
rendition that remains incomplete. Her lack of specificity in referring to the patient’s 
“adrenalin neb or something” conveys a lack of interest in the details of the story, implying 
an absence of really caring. While she concedes that the patient “stopped breathing,” she 
leaves the result of that event open to speculation – “who knows?” and, by implication, who 
cares? Again, however, something more emerges through the chinks in the surface of her 
narrative. The juxtaposition of her reluctance to refer directly to the event of the man’s death 
with her bored and unaffected eventual narration of the story represent an uncomfortable mix 
that might be read as a defensive manoeuvre to protect Dr S from a more distressing 
emotional reaction. In view of her references throughout my interview with her to the 
situation in which the doctors are overburdened and therefore unable to adequately address 
their patients’ needs – “In the ideal world there wouldn’t be this many patients that one 
person had to see. And be responsible for” – her bitter conclusion, “who knows? Nobody was 
looking at him” might be read as an indictment of the working environment and simultaneous 
reiteration of her own lack of interest in the patient’s death. Thus, while Dr S overtly presents 
her only reaction to a patient’s death as one of boredom in the details of its occurrence, in 
keeping with a hard, non-emotional and masculine identity, closer inspection reveals a 
subtext in terms of which she is engaged in a defensive manoeuvre aimed at protecting 
herself from her own emotional response, thereby implying an underlying sense of 
vulnerability.  
 
The second extract promises to confirm these interpretations. Here, Dr S’s use of the word 
“probably” displays her lack of interest, this time in the outcomes of the patients’ ailments 
and treatments, as does Dr L’s joking reference to the possible outcome of Mr Kaput’s MI. 
Some of the patients Dr S discusses are “probably still alive” and others are “probably dead” 
but those in both categories provoke the same response – “who knows...I dunno.” This time, 
she conveys not only a lack of interest but also her own lack of responsibility for the 
outcomes – “that lady...probably would have died eventually anyway.” The tone conveyed by 
her alternate categorisation of patients as “probably dead” and “probably still alive” creates a 
sense of randomness that denies the possibility that she or the other doctors could or should 
have done anything to change the outcome. Again, the picture she creates is one of bitter 
hopelessness and consequent apathy. But each time she implies the doctors’ powerlessness 
and corresponding blamelessness, these implications resonate uncomfortably with the many 
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other instances in which she battles with the weight of responsibility for her patients. “Every 
patient there, any resusc that happens is my responsibility, every (.) hh person who dies who 
shouldn’t cos they haven’t been seen ... it is my problem and (.) it does all reflect and (.) you 
know, land on my conscience.”  
 
Not only are stories about death difficult to obtain, but when doctors do speak of death, it is 
often euphemistically – “he’s not going to do well,” or, as above, “he didn’t- it wasn’t 
successful.” This additional circumvention underlines the question raised by their reluctance 
to tell these stories at all – if they are indeed unaffected, why the avoidance? – suggesting that 
they are not as untouched as they would have us, and themselves, believe. Rather than a 
product of their experience and competence, the indifferent responses of the objective 
scientist and callous responses of the masculine hero thus appear to be a defence against 
distressing reactions to death, in a context within which the doctors’ power to intervene is 
seriously challenged, partly by fate and partly by lack of resources, and in which his 
contruction as omnipotent renders him, if all-powerful, then also to blame for negative 
outcomes (Friedson, 1970; Obholzer, 1994; Speck, 1994; Mizrahi, 1986). Thus, in a narrative 
context within which doctors are granted absolute power, are faced with a glaring and 
unavoidable discrepancy between expectation and reality, and in which the above defences 
are readily available, what struck me initially as surprising seems in retrospect very much less 
so. An extract from a conversation with Dr P appears to reinforce this interpretation: 
 
“It was a busy day (.) and she was very breathless (.) and (.) it was a quick examination and 
then she was- (.) you know, she was doing very badly and the decision was, ‘Ag no, she’s not 
gonna do well’.”  
 
While apparently emotionally at ease with regard to the decision to terminate a patient’s 
treatment – “Ag, no” – the agent of the decision is curiously obscured from view – “it was a 
quick examination,” (performed by no one in particular) and “the decision was...” 
(anonymously made). In contrast to the ease with which he suggests the decision was taken 
and is now being narrated, Dr P evades the issue of ‘who did it?’ denying his own and 
possibly others’ responsibility for something he claims leaves him unperturbed but that he 
nevertheless continues to justify – “It was a busy day.” Repeated use of the conjunction ‘and’ 
to link the various events in this extract implies an interesting absence of causal sequencing. 
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Instead, events in this story co-exist, now obscuring causal processes when they fail to serve 
the purpose of bolstering the doctors’ position or justifying their actions. 
 
Thus the doctors’ lack of emotional response to the pain and death of their patients, and the 
avoidance, callous flippancy or humour that replaces it, are made available by the role of 
bioscientist and the exaggerated masculinities in terms of which they structure their identities. 
However, their surreptitious and, most importantly, unsolicited, denial of responsibility for, 
or affective response in the face of, these events is suggestive not only of an objective 
scientist or emotionally invincible hero but of a defensive attempt to ward off distressing, 
unacknowledged emotions. My argument is that doctors’ affirmations of their innocence and 
indifference are perhaps not merely reflections of their inner states, or mechanisms whereby 
they affirm and enhance their power. Rather, these assertions perhaps represent defensive 
performances whereby they attempt to protect themselves from the disconcerting implications 
of the discrepancies, and the self-doubt that arises in the gap between narratively-structured 
expectations of causal potency and heroism and the reality that falls short of opportunities for 
such displays. That doctors’ unacknowledged emotions are likely to lead to compromised 
care has been argued, as discussed in chapter four, by Katz (1984), Speck (1994), Back et al. 
(2001) and Holman, Meyer and Davenhill (2006), and is well illustrated by many of the 
examples presented here. 
 
The lack of compassion, or any emotional response, apparent in scenes such as the one 
presented above in which Dr A requests help from someone who can “drop some adrenalin,” 
as well as the ‘gung-ho’ attitude evident in the tone of his request, is visible also in doctors’ 
detached and frequently delayed reactions to patients’ pain. Any number of administrative 
tasks, such as writing up notes, filling out referral forms or filing test results may take 
precedence over the administration of morphine to a patient in intense pain, which may occur 
only hours after the examination. A man lying in one of the beds was making a frightening 
sound with every breath. Feeling alarmed, I nervously attempted to direct the attention of the 
nearest doctor towards him. But my tentative question, “Is that alright?” was met by Dr F 
with a snigger and countered by a corresponding question – “How can it be alright?” – as she 
continued leafing through the list to choose her next patient. The man was dead twenty 
minutes later.  
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Again, the argument I propose is not so straightforward as to suggest that all emotional 
defences are bad and contribute to inhumane practices in the hospital. On the contrary, as 
Dartington (1994) and Cohn (1994) point out, some emotional defences are necessary to 
enable doctors to keep doing their work. However, as these authors, along with Obholzer 
(1994) and Mizrahi (1986) argue, such defences can and all too frequently do become 
maladaptive, producing negative behaviours rather than facilitating the continuation of 
positive ones. As Mizrahi (1984) observes, one of the key features of these defences is that 
they are not merely individual responses but are the products of shared features of medical 
culture. My argument here is that the excessive, and therefore maladaptive, adoption of such 
defences, such as the indifference or ‘manic denial’ to which Dartington, Mizrahi and 
Mishler et al. (1981) refer, is encouraged, in particular, by the dominance in medical culture 
of the narratives of science and of traditional masculinity with which this chapter is 
concerned.  
Powerless gods 
While a great deal of the talk in the emergency room serves the purpose, as described above, 
of boosting the doctors’ power and sense of power, and of warding off the lurking threats to 
their god-like masculinity that seems to teeter on the edge of an abyss of vulnerability and 
self-doubt, there are occasions on which the doctors can be heard openly voicing the 
helplessness they feel in the face of the constant stream of desperately ill patients, and the 
limited resources they have at their disposal for dealing with them.  
 
Dr N, for example, describes his work as “just putting out fires” and speaks of a constant 
awareness of the fact that the underlying problems remain untreated and will inevitably recur. 
Dr O speaks of the limited power he and his colleagues have over their patients’ health 
outcomes, claiming, “in fact,” that “we are being paid to have no impact on health,” and 
alluding to the thwarted expectations, in this case of the government, who is paying them to 
achieve an unattainable result. And Dr P casts doubt on his father’s pride in him, suggesting 
its misplacement and unmasking himself as “the guy with his finger up someone’s bum at 
three in the morning.” These more seldom but overt statements of the doctors’ sense of 
powerlessness appear to verbalise and verify what most of the time lingers just beneath the 
surface, visible only in the form of defensive strategies against an implied but rarely stated 
vulnerability.  
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This point will be elaborated and will become clearer in the final analytic chapter, in which I 
deal specifically with this aspect of the doctors’ narratives. Suffice it at this point to say, 
partly with reference to the material hinted at at various intervals throughout this chapter, and 
partly pre-empting that to be presented in subsequent ones, that the co-existence of this 
counter-discourse, in terms of which the doctors depict themselves as discredited and 
impotent, lends support to the argument that their bravado displays represent a defence 
against the more dubious personages that lurk in the shadows of their self-presentations. 
These spectres, threatening to reveal themselves and thereby the doctors’ ‘real’ selves, thus 
shattering the illusion of their god-like power, drive the doctors to louder and more vehement 
assertions of their infallibility. Not only does the existence of this counter-discourse lend 
support to the argument offered here but it offers insight into the enormous difficulty of the 
position in which doctors find themselves, opening the door to a more compassionate view of 
what all too frequently results in the abuse of power. Without condoning the doctors’ 
(mis)management of the contradictory discourses in which their threatened identities are 
formed and animated, this insight reminds us of their humanity in the face of disease and 
death. Not only are they paid, as Dr O points out, to save the lives and improve the health of 
patients, many of whom are beyond help or in need of far more than they can offer, but the 
enactment of the only positive identity available to them within the discursive environment 
depends upon the actual success of their endeavours.  And the extent to which they are 
doomed to failure, through no fault of their own, but as a consequence, for example, of the 
late attendance by so many patients and the limited resources available for their treatment 
negates the possibility of always living up to this expectation. I believe it is this fraught 
position in which the doctors are caught that renders so tempting the opportunity to assert and 
reassert the identity of power that they feel to be crumbling between their fingers. 
 
Infinite alternatives 
It is essential to my purpose in this thesis to note that, while the influence of the narrative 
context discussed may be important, it is not deterministic. On the contrary, rather than 
merely lamenting the entrapment of doctors within this narrative frame, my aim in drawing 
attention to it is to highlight the possibilities for alternative ways of managing the discursive 
environment and responding to events. Thus, for example, in spite of their ready availability, 
the options that Dr F suggests, namely to lie to her patient, and that Drs P and B take up to 
ridicule the ‘paranoid’ man, are not the only ones available. Indeed, Dr A can regularly be 
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heard employing discourses that make way for very different actions, regularly qualifying her 
statements of a patient’s diagnosis or her recommendations for treatment, for example, with 
words such as “I think” and “maybe.” These and similar markers serve to highlight her 
opinions as such and her recommendations as open to suggestions for change, thus denying 
the certainty of her knowledge and making available possibilities for more negotiable action. 
Of a patient whose X-ray she had finished viewing, for instance, Dr A says, “I think she must 
go to (name of hospital).” And of another, communicating the patient’s diagnosis to her 
colleagues, she says, “I think maybe its TB.” While these ‘micro-deviations’ from the 
dominant discourse may seem insignificant, they in fact position the doctor’s knowledge in a 
very different way, offering no pretence of certainty and allowing, in their construction, for 
the possibility of disagreement and for negotiated action, as well as for the requirement of 
justification, all of which have potentially major implications for the relative ease with which 
doctors can commit various actions, including inhumane ones.  
 
A multiplicity of other factors 
While I have argued, therefore, that the context of medical culture has profound, albeit not 
deterministic, implications for the ways in which doctors narrate their experiences and for the 
actions in which they can more or less justifiably engage, it is also important to note that 
there are no doubt many other factors that also contribute to the form that events in the 
Greenlands emergency unit ultimately assume. In addition to the resource constraints already 
mentioned as contributing factors, van der Geest and Finkler (2004) show how characteristics 
of the broader local contexts in which medicine is practiced are replicated in that practice, 
influencing its form. Most obvious within the South African social context, factors such as 
race and class distinctions between doctor and patient, shown by authors including Mishler 
(1984), Fisher (1986) and Waitzkin (1991) to be highly relevant to the quality of doctor-
patient interactions in other parts of the world, almost certainly serve to inhibit the likelihood, 
for example, that a patient will challenge a doctor’s diagnosis or any other of his 
pronouncements. However, doctors at the Greenlands emergency unit are from a variety of 
racial categories, very often the same as that of their patients. In many of the examples 
presented above and in the chapters to follow both doctor and patient are of the same race and 
gender, making for a difficult task of disentanglement that would require an analytic lens 
specifically attuned to these issues. To do justice to the role played by these and other 
sociological factors, therefore, would require analysis more complex than is warranted in 
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terms of the focus of this thesis, namely the features of medical culture per se that contribute 
to the provision of inhumane care. 
 
Summary  
This chapter has presented an understanding of the narrative context within which the doctors 
in the emergency unit construct and enact their identities, providing some insight into the 
processes whereby the violation of patients’ rights become possible and justifiable. The 
chapter has identified themes described in previous research as prevalent in the broader 
medical culture and has shown how these manifest and are played out in the local context of 
the Greenlands emergency unit, frequently facilitating the delivery of inhumane care. For 
example, past research has shown that scientific knowledge is afforded superior status in 
medical culture (Mishler, 1984; Fisher,1986; Mizrahi, 1986; Wodak, 1996; Helman, 2001). 
This analysis has illustrated the supreme status conferred on doctors in the Greenlands 
hospital emergency unit by their presumed possession of this superior knowledge. It has 
shown further how this status increases the doctors’ power and diminishes the need for them 
to justify their actions, offering them the opportunity to pursue more pragmatic programmes, 
sometimes at the expense of the rights and needs of their patients. In similar vein, previous 
research has indicated the prioritisation of scientific activity over all other actions in medical 
settings (Mishler et al., 1981; Mishler, 1984; Atkinson, 1999; Good and DelVecchio-Good, 
2000). And this chapter has shown how, in the context of the Greenlands emergency unit, 
construction of the doctors’ activities as scientific endeavour obviates the need for 
‘superfluous’ acts of caring and justifies the suppression of any perceived interference by 
means that, in other circumstances, would be deemed unacceptable. In addition to their 
obvious power to save patients’ lives and relieve their pain, these aspects of the broader 
medical culture, within which the Greenlands emergency unit is located, afford the doctors 
the position of arch-agents and render them beyond question or reproach.  
 
This chapter has further illustrated the animation, in the Greenlands emergency unit, of 
traditional narratives of masculinity, also identified in previous research as prevalent in 
medical culture (DelVecchio-Good, 1985; Mizrahi, 1986; Fisher & Groce, 1990; Cassell, 
1992; Erickson, 1999).. Through the features of these narratives, doctors are transformed 
from ‘götter in weiss’ into action-men and even military style heroes. The analysis shows 
how the Greenlands doctors draw on these narratives, exaggerating their bravado identities 
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and portraying the unit as one fraught with danger and opportunity for daring. Promoting the 
avoidance of tender responses to the suffering with which they must deal, and offering the 
chance, through masterful action, to establish and maintain powerful identities, metaphors of 
masculinity encourage the doctors to respond, all too often, with callous humour or brute 
force.  
 
The façade thus created is not, however, without cracks. The self-doubt described in previous 
research (Fox, 1957; Mizrahi, 1984; Katz, 1984;Atkinson, 1995)as inherent to the medical 
identity can be heard between the lines and words of the Greenlands doctors’ discourse of 
ostensible power. As doctors attempt to perform dramatic cures under difficult, even hopeless 
conditions, they simultaneously voice fears of failure, vulnerability and powerlessness, 
fuelling their need to prove their power, sometimes through displays of aggressive 
dominance. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
A MUTUALLY ANTAGONISTIC SYMBIOSIS: THE 
RELATIVE NATURE OF DOCTORS’ AND PATIENTS’ 
IDENTITIES 
 
The analysis that I present in this chapter is based largely on the premise that identity is 
constructed in interpersonal interaction and that it is relational in nature, in keeping with 
Bakhtin’s theory of language and consciousness, as detailed in chapter six. It is further 
based on that assumption fundamental to the ethnographic approach employed in this 
thesis, namely that people’s identities and actions make sense in terms of the meaning-
contexts in which they occur (Atkinson & Pugsley,2005). The previous chapter explores 
the ‘grand narratives’ that dominate life in the emergency room at Greenlands hospital, 
depicting the discursive landscape in which the events in the unit take place. This chapter 
offers an analysis of the positions that doctors and patients occupy relative to one another 
within this narratively structured context, and of their implications for the relationships 
that develop between them and for the possibilities for action available to them.   In this 
chapter I therefore discuss the ways in which doctors build their identities relative to 
those they attribute to their patients, and in response to the relevant features of medical 
culture, as identified by previous work. I then propose an argument for the ways in which 
these identities depend upon and represent the breeding grounds for the unbalanced 
power that doctors hold within the unit, enabling and justifying acts of inhumane care.  
 
Us and them 
In keeping with Zagier-Roberts’s (1994) observation that a group’s identity always 
involves its being alternative to some other group, the doctors in the emergency unit at 
Greenlands hospital differentiate themselves from others, producing Fisher’s (1986) 
‘two-place logic’, within which everyone is defined as either ‘doctor’ or ‘not doctor’, and 
emphasising both the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the bond between members 
of their own group. After briefly introducing the production and maintenance of firm 
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boundaries around the group of emergency room doctors, I explore in this section the 
construction of opposite and even antagonistic identities for doctors and patients. 
 
The firm bounds of collegiality 
The solidarity that exists between members of the medical profession has been widely 
noted (see for example the work of Millman, 1977; Mishler et al, 1981; Mizrahi, 1986; 
Paget, 1988; Fox, 1989; Wodak, 1996; Apker & Eggly, 2004). Indeed, collegiality is 
identified by Rosenthal (1999) as one of the ‘twin pillars’ of medical culture, thus 
representing a core element of the meaning-context in terms of which identities and 
relationships are defined and actions taken.  Amongst the key features of this collegiality, 
as enacted and produced by the doctors within the Greenlands emergency unit, is the 
definition of airtight boundaries around the doctors’ group. The boundaries of the 
emergency unit doctors’ group are impermeable not only to patients but to anyone 
outside of its demarcations. As discussed in my narration of the research process in 
chapter six, I was struck by the impenetrability of this social group and felt it acutely in 
the early days of my presence at the hospital. The extent of my exclusion was such that 
not a word of greeting, not a conversational remark nor even a glimmer of friendly 
recognition was extended to me.  I would arrive in the unit and find that my attempts at 
friendly hellos were met with averted eyes and failures to respond. Neither was my 
presence acknowledged by those who knew me, nor questioned by those unfamiliar with 
my purpose. None of the ordinary means of social access seemed available and I battled 
for weeks to attain even the first promises of inclusion. Not only I but other ‘non-
doctors’, too, were alienated from the doctors, through conversational means (as detailed 
by authors such as Wodak, 1996, and Erickson, 1999, in his analysis of the use of ellipsis 
as a means of demarcating group boundaries within medical culture), as well as through 
other features of the social environment, such as its spatial divisions (see the work of 
Muller,1999).  
 
While my focus in this thesis is on the contribution of talk, specifically, to the facilitation 
of identities and actions in the emergency unit, a brief description of its spatial 
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arrangements will serve to depict the physical setting in which the ensuing talk occurs, 
echoing Muller’s (1999) analysis of the ways in which relationships of exclusion and 
belonging are created through spatial demarcations. Within the unit, doctors occupy the 
central space, congregating around the doctors’ station, a long table and chairs in the 
middle of the room. Seated at this table, they face each other with their backs to the other 
occupants.  The nurses’ station is located in a corner of the unit and the patients lie in 
beds and sit or sprawl on benches around the perimeter. The practical reasons for the 
arrangement described are clear. The doctors’ central position facilitates maximum 
surveillance of patients, who are most easily visible laid out, as they are, around the edges 
of the room, and who, from this position, present minimal obstruction to medical activity. 
Any spatial arrangement, however, whatever its nature, acquires meaning through our 
engagement with it and activity within it. Thus, the spatial demarcations, adherence to 
and enforcement of them, not only serve their intended (practical) purposes but contribute 
to the social separation of doctors and others and to the possibilities (and prohibitions) for 
action within them. In addition to these spatial dimensions, a further material 
circumstance should not be overlooked – the tangibly unavoidable distinction between 
doctors and patients in terms of which one is fit and able and the other incapacitated by 
illness, further sets them apart and renders them powerful and dependent, respectively. 
 
The wall thus erected between doctors and patients is reflected and maintained in 
multiple ways. Doctors’ references to their patients frequently take the form of referrals 
to “that patient,” “they” and “them,” linguistically distancing the speaking doctor from 
the patient of whom he is speaking, and reinforcing constructions of ‘us’ and ‘others’. 
Talking to his junior colleagues about the administration of enalapril
9
, Dr G tells them, 
“One dose is not gonna kill them. Ok?...So- so what if you did it? It’s not like you giving 
them potassium. (..) So you just give it to them.” 
 
                                                 
9
 A drug for the treatment of high blood pressure 
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Later, speaking of confusing cases, he tells his juniors again,  
“In the beginning you have a reason to admit them...Now, the next morning they getting 
better and you don’t know what is going on with them. (..) That tells you you can’t 
actually send them home.” 
 
In both extracts the doctor speaks of patients as members of a broad category of people 
who are not ‘us’. ‘They’ are thus brought into being as a coherent entity, the same as each 
other and different from ourselves. The existence of such a group enables a set of 
associated constructions, in terms of which doctors establish and confirm the unity of 
their own group, referring to themselves and each other as “we” and “us.” Again, these 
constructions highlight the dialogical nature of their own and their patients’ identities, a 
clearly defined ‘other’ enhancing the definition of a more coherent self. The doctors are 
brought closer together, as they stand in contrast to the throng of others and a strong 
sense of camaraderie develops between them, reflecting and enhancing the strength of 
their group identity and mutual identification.  
 
Once again, humour plays a key part. The jokes and other humorous comments illustrated 
throughout this thesis represent the medium through which doctors narrate much of their 
experience. These communications appear to form a key mechanism by which ‘we’ 
recognise ‘us’, as it was through sharing in their humour that I was eventually able to 
penetrate the heavily guarded boundaries of the doctors’ group. As discussed in chapter 
six, the recognition I eventually achieved from the doctors began when I started laughing 
at their jokes. The doctors’ cynical humour thus affirms their identities as strong, 
masculine heroes, unaffected by sentimental responses to horror, tragedy and the like. 
Simultaneously, it produces a sense of mutual empathy and identification between 
speaker and hearer, the latter confirming the affinity of his experience and person by 
making regular similar remarks, which reassure the speaker that he is in good company.   
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Us vs. them 
The Greenlands emergency unit’s doctors thus differentiate and define themselves in 
relation to everyone outside of the closed borders of their group. However, it was that 
aspect of the relationship between them and their patients, specifically, that struck me 
most vividly and that bears most relevance for an explanation of inhumane care: namely, 
its antagonistic nature, in terms of which they are constituted in not just different but 
perpetually opposing positions. This aspect of the relationship between doctors and 
patients has been dealt with fairly extensively in the literature on medical culture, most 
notably in terms of the binary construction of medical knowledge and the patients’ 
subjective experience (Mishler, 1981; Helman, 2001), characterised in much of the 
literature as a confrontation between conflicting agendas (Francis & Hester, 2004; 
Atkinson, 1995; Mishler, 1984; Hogarth & Marks, 1998; Kirkmayer, 2000; Heritage & 
Maynard, 2006).  Not only are the polarities between them defined in terms of broad, 
socially structured dimensions, such as class, culture and level of education. Their 
characterisation within the details of the emergency room’s local culture produces figures 
that exist, as argued by Katz (1984) and Dreyer and Geist (1993) with reference to other 
medical settings, in opposition to one another in almost every respect and in fact in 
conflict:  
 “At least that patient’s calmed down – it’s like revenge of the annoying patients here 
today!”  
 
In addition to this and other expressions of the doctors’ frustration and feelings of 
victimisation by their patients, the antagonism in the relationships between doctors and 
patients is audible in the variety of terms doctors use to describe them – “helicopters” 
who “circl(e) us,” “crazies” and “bastards” are by no means complimentary and manifest 
a hostility between the two parties. Patients, too, can be heard occasionally referring to 
their doctors as “perdedokters,10” a similarly unflattering term implying their fitness only 
to treat animals.  
 
Dr P provides insight into the resentment with which doctors often regard their patients: 
                                                 
10
Afrikaans word for veterinary surgeons 
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“And you’re cross with someone for moaning about their pain because you’re busy with 
something and don’t irritate.”   
 
He goes on to describe his and his colleagues’ responses to the paramedics who bring the 
patients to the hospital, providing an explanation for the animosity with which they are 
received: 
“I think the thing is here it’s like, oh god, not another patient. You know? Ahhh I cannot 
handle another patient right now. So you almost ignore them and (.) pretend that they’re 
not there and (.) etcetera etcetera. And blah blah blah hh ... But they (the paramedics) 
doing their job, they not doing it to spite you. (.) But that’s how you feel – you’re  like, 
god dammit, you’re bringing me this patient, you bastard! You wanna ruin my life 
because hh (.) you know, I already got (.) 25 patients here now and (.) I mean people are 
sleeping on the floor and now you bring in another one, well good luck finding a stretcher 
(inaudible)! You know? That’ll show you! You know?” 
 
It thus seems that the overload that doctors experience produces a sense of victimisation.  
And the sense of being overwhelmed produces anger toward those who submit the 
unmanageable demands. Perhaps resonant with Wodak’s (1996) suggestion that ‘medical 
moaning and grumbling’ represents a means of producing and affirming group identity, 
the relationship between between doctors and patients seems transformed from one in 
which the doctors’ role is to help their patients into one in which doctors become their 
patients’ victims  and endeavour to protect themselves from them. Comments such as the 
handy hint Dr P gave a student – “Here’s a tip – if you want to survive in this unit, never 
speak to the patients,” and Dr L’s statement, as she avoided the medical holding area, 
that, “I’m not going in there to face that crew,” illustrate the point and show how doctors 
become more and more guarded against what they perceive as the threat posed by 
patients, who have become in their constructions a menacing crew, rather than merely a 
queue of sick individuals, thus complicating and exaggerating the distance and distinction 
between them. 
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Doctors, patients and personhood 
Patienthood and subjectivity 
In a manner related to, and exacerbating, the difference between doctors’ constructions of 
themselves and their patients, the emergency room doctors in fact fail to acknowledge 
their patients as subjects. Eliminating patients’ personal identities in their talk through a 
variety of means, the Greenlands emergency unit’s doctors enact the historically-rooted 
disappearance of the patient as subject (Mishler et al., 1981; Hogarth & Marks, 1998; 
Rothman, 2003), or in Foucault’s terms, of the ‘sick man’ (Hak, 1999).  
 
Probably most striking in the emergency unit doctors’ talk about their patients is their 
almost exclusive reference to them merely as ‘patients’, almost never calling them by 
name or referring to them in more particularising terms. Doctors, in fact, tend not to 
distinguish between one patient and another, beyond references to the diseases that 
differentiate them. Recalling Misher’s (2005: p. 449) argument with reference to the 
notion of a ‘patient’ that “there is always a person whose complexity and fullness is not 
captured by this characterisation,” I argue that such extensive use of this generic term 
translates in emergency room discourse into ‘not us’ and contributes to the repression of 
more personal, subjective identities, as illustrated in the following excerpts from 
emergency room talk. Dr T introduces a woman to her colleagues on the ward round: 
“‘This patient is a thrity-seven year old woman, hyperglycaemic11 with positive TB, 
RVD
12
 and red blood cell count of 4+.” 
 
Dr J relates the sequence of events since a woman’s arrival at the hospital: 
“This patient came in...” 
 
And Dr A informs her colleagues of a woman’s need to be admitted: 
“This patient is for admission.” 
 
                                                 
1111
 Having a high blood glucose level 
12
 Retroviral drug – an encoded reference to HIV intended to protect the patients’ privacy.  
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In addition to the labelling of patients as ‘patients’, doctors tend to describe them in very 
limited terms (Donnelly, 1997), such as in terms of the numbers produced by laboratory 
tests (Atkinson, 1995) or simply as embodiments of the diseases from which they suffer 
(Helman, 2001). Dr T (above) continues her description of the patient in question solely 
in terms of her test results – the woman’s only characteristics relevant to herself and her 
colleagues. Similar descriptions abound. But doctors go further than merely neglecting to 
point out their patients ‘superfluous’ characteristics, actually equating the person with the 
disease itself. Requesting advice from the psychiatrist on duty, Dr J refers to her patient 
as the embodiment of her condition: 
 “This patient came in- (.) she’s a drug induced psychosis so we don’t need to keep her, 
hey?” 
 
In Dr J’s description “this patient” is “a drug induced psychosis,” rather than a person 
suffering from one. A person who has been stabbed in the heart is a “stab heart,” in the 
face a “stab face” and in the abdomen a “stab abdomen.” Someone known to be suffering 
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is a “known COPD” and a person who has 
suffered a heart attack is an “MI.”13 Patients are thus reduced to the “site(s) of specific 
disease entities to be detected and evaluated by the doctor independently of the patient” 
(Mishler et al., 1981: p. 224).    
 
The fading of patients’ individual faces into an indistinguishable sea is further aided, as 
noted by Goffman (1961) and later by Helman (2001), by their attirement in hospital 
garb. Patients are immediately identifiable as such (and therefore distinguishable from 
everyone else) by the fact that they wear pale blue regulation hospital gowns or are 
covered by hospital blankets of the same colour. In the words of Dr T, “I can’t recognise 
any of them because they’re all wrapped in blankets.” Each person thus appears as an 
anonymous blue entity, more often than not silent, slumped in a chair or lying on one of 
the beds – ‘patients’, rather than people like ‘us’.   
 
                                                 
13
 Myocardial infarction.  
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Doctors also frequently refer to their patients as “this one” or “that one,” expressing and 
reinforcing their construction as specimens of a group rather than as individual subjects. 
For example, “This one is not seen yet,” or “that one is for ward two.” This deletion of 
patients’ individual subjectivities is further manifest in the not uncommon but 
nevertheless surprising absence of possessive adjectives in the doctors’ talk about their 
patients –  “What’s the iron level?” instead of “What’s her iron level?” – denying the 
existence of the person whose iron level is in question. Dr A’s question, “And is able to 
walk now?” compromises conventional grammar in favour of a subjectless construction. 
And Dr M’s remark that, “Maybe it’s one of Dr R’s patients,” speaks volumes through its 
use of the word “it” to describe a person. A patient’s comment to me about her failure to 
engage her doctor’s attention in attempting to acquire information about her diagnosis is 
perhaps revealing of the patients’ experience of these omissions:  
 “It’s like she’s seeing us and she’s not seeing us.” 
 
The subjective experience of objects 
One of the consequences of the deletion of patients’ subjectivities is the denial of their 
personal experiences. This consequence of the objectification of patients is discussed 
extensively in the literature, as reviewed in chapter two, by authors including Mishler 
(1984), who argues that the negation of patients’ subjective experience in fact precludes 
the possibility for humane care, which depends upon the centrality of the patient’s 
experience to the medical encounter. 
 
Not only is there sparse mention in emergency room talk of the physical or emotional 
discomfort and distress of the patients. There is little recognition, in fact, of their 
lifeworlds at all.  Doctors’ and patients’ conversations with one another are structured 
such that there is small possibility for patients’ experiences to emerge, illustrating their 
successful application of the techniques that DelVecchio and Good (1993; 2000), 
amongst others (Mizrahi, 1986; Fisher, 1986; Apker & Eggly, 2004) argue are taught in 
medical schools to enable doctors to elicit only ‘medically important’ information. 
Generally, their conversations take the form of questions or instructions from the doctor 
and responses by the patient, doctors retaining control over the topic for discussion. The 
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doctors tend to ask their questions in closed-ended format, asking for little more than 
single pieces of information. A patient had fallen on the stump of her recently amputated 
leg, leading to an infection in the wound.  Attempting to decide on the best course of 
action for treatment and subsequent management of the woman’s rehabilitation, Dr G 
asked,  
“Who do you live with?”’ 
“I live,” she replied, “with my two sons and-” cut short as soon as the doctor had 
acquired sufficient information:  
“Ok. So there’s someone to help you.” 
 
Another patient was suffering from extreme anxiety, raising the possibility that the 
physiological symptoms with which she presented might be psych logical in origin.  
“Are you experiencing stress at home?” asked her doctor. 
“Yes because they smoke buttons14 in the house and they-” 
“Ok, so there is stress,” came the reply, again cutting her short and indicating the lack of 
need for an elaboration.  
 
And of a patient who had attempted suicide, Dr G asked,   
“When did you take the pills?” 
 “Day before yesterday.” 
 “What time the day before yesterday?” 
 “Morning.” 
 “OK. Paracetamol levels and give him vitamin K.” 
 
Again, the doctor makes no attempt to inquire after or acknowledge the possible reasons 
for the suicide attempt or the circumstances that led to the patient’s desperate action. His 
questions are concerned solely with determining the length of time that has elapsed since 
the patient ingested the pills so that he can make his decision regarding medication, as he 
edits out the patient’s story, transforming his illness into a disease (Savett, 2002) and 
reinforcing the clear distinction within medical culture between the patient’s physical 
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 Mandrax  
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distress and his life context and emotions (Cassell, 1982). These extracts thus illustrate 
what authors including Mishler (1984), Atkinson (1995), Hogarth and Marks (1998), 
Kirkmayer (2000) and Francis and Hester (2004) have characterised as a confrontation 
between the medical and the patient’s perspective, in terms of which doctors pursue their 
biomedical agendas and patients attempt to present their illnesses in terms of their 
personal life circumstances and emotions (Finkler, 2004; Heritage & Maynard, 2006). . 
 
Not only do doctors make no attempt to elicit information from their patients that might 
give insight into their subjective experiences, and indeed cut them short when they offer 
it, but they discourage each other from the same. Dr N’s comment that “We don’t even 
listen anymore,” discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates the construction of the 
practice of listening as naive and therefore stigmatized. Doctors can further be heard 
warning each other against the dangers of talking and listening to their patients. Dr T asks 
her colleague, 
“Is that the guy that you spoke to before?’ 
“No.” 
“Well don’t.” she advised. “He’ll tell you all about his disciples.” 
 
As previously discussed, Dr P jokingly instructs a student,  
“Here’s a tip- if you want to survive in this unit, never speak to the patients.” 
 
And Dr F proudly tells me of her success in avoiding communication with one of her 
patients. Having exerted considerable effort in avoiding meeting the gaze of the patient, 
who was waiting anxiously for test results, she had eventually been compelled to respond 
to her:  
“‘I am still waiting for the blood results’,” she reported having said. “I just kept walking. 
I didn’t even give her a chance to say anything.”  
 
On those occasions when a patient foists her perspective on an inadequately defended 
doctor, the doctors’ response is often to belittle what has been said, rendering it 
inconsequential and even objectionable: “Is she enlightening you on her issues?” asks Dr 
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Q of Dr R, implying  the  unimportance of anything the patient in question might have 
said. 
 
And a group of doctors gathered at the doctors’ station discuss the experience of two 
patients, a husband and wife, who had injured each other during an argument: 
Dr 1: Her husband bit her on the cheek. 
Dr2: But she did stab him in return. 
Dr3: I’m not sure which one came first – the stab or the bite. 
Dr2: (laughs) She stabbed her husband and he in return bit her – or I don’t know which 
came first.  
All: (Smiles and laughter.) 
 
In the first quote Dr Q expresses disdain for the content of the patient’s story, without 
even knowing what it is, referring sarcastically to “her issues” and ironically to Dr R’s 
knowledge thereof as “enlightenment.” In the second example the doctors joke and laugh 
about what must have happened between the quarrelling husband and wife, denying its 
possible rational explanation as well as its relevance, through their lack of concern as to 
the precise sequence of events. And when a patient’s subjective experience is the 
presenting problem itself, necessitating the doctors’ attention, it is discussed in terms that 
give little insight into its nature, indeed mocking the patient’s perspective, as in, “Is he 
still loopy?” or describing it in terms that refer only to its outward manifestation – “She’s 
very tearful” – thus capturing only what is objectively observable (Mishler, 1984) and 
giving voice to the fundamental scientific assumption that anything that is real can be 
seen (Arney and Bergen, 1984).  
 
The doctors’ constructions alone, however, cannot be held responsible for the 
suppression of the patients’ lifeworlds in the emergency unit. The fact that the majority of 
patients are too ill to be capable of or interested in conversation contributes in large part 
to the invisibility of their subjective worlds. In addition, many of the patients perceive 
their doctors, perhaps correctly, as uninterested in their ailments and circumstances 
beyond those directly relevant to diagnosis and treatment. For example, a man told me 
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immediately after the round had left his bed that he had not eaten since the previous day 
and was hungry. In response to my suggestion that he tell one of the doctors or nurses, he 
replied dejectedly that, “These doctors, they don’t worry with things like that.” The sister 
of a woman Dr P had (mis)diagnosed as having suffered a “big stroke,” after bursting into 
tears as soon as the doctor had left the bed, explained to me that, “I can’t before the 
doctor.” And a woman who had stopped taking her TB medication prematurely, due to 
her belief that a curse placed on her by her neighbour, and not a bacterium, was 
responsible for her illness, illustrates her awareness of and responsiveness to the belief 
prevalent in medical culture and identified by Fisher (1991), namely that the patient’s 
perspective is irrelevant to the diagnosis and treatment of disease. The woman did not 
intend to explain her reasoning to her doctor as “he will not believe me anyway,” 
precluding the possibility of negotiation on the subject of resuming treatment with this 
particular patient. Not only obstructing communication about the management of this 
patient’s particular case, her silence further obstructs the doctors’ view of the cultural 
barriers to effective treatment presented by the context within which they work, thus 
contributing to the maintenance of medical ‘blindness’ to patients’ subjective experiences 
more generally.  
. 
As argued by Lorber (1975), as well as by Goffman (1961) and Mishler et al. (1981), this 
denial of the patient as an active human subject plays an important role in the delivery of 
medical care, enhancing efficiency and creating a distance between doctor and patient 
that makes it easier for the doctor to carry out invasive or potentially mutually distressing 
procedures. Once again, however, I argue, along with authors including Goffman (1961), 
Mishler et al. (1981),  Mishler (1984), Clark and Mishler (1992),  Katz (1984), Mizrahi 
(1986), Fisher (1986), Lewhinsohn (1998), Helman (2001) and Savett (2002), that this 
process has simultaneous damaging consequences, both for patients’ dignity and for the 
more concrete processes and outcomes of healthcare delivery.  
 
Amongst the effects of the objectification of patients is reinforcement of the supremacy 
of the doctors’ position, effectively rendering them the only people in the room. As such, 
patients’ needs, acts and intentions are subsumed under those of the doctors, disappearing 
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from the realm of consideration. The following examples illustrate the shift in priorities 
made possible by the objectification of patients and concomitant construction of doctors 
as the only human subjects present in their interactions. Rather than identifying their 
patients’ needs, the doctors construct these in terms of their own: 
“I need her to go for an X-ray.” 
“She needs to do another gas for me because I’m not going to be happy.”  
And,  
“Can we not give that child something for the pain? Cos I’m going to go and break his 
other leg soon.” 
 
Similarly, actions and events that are in conflict with what we might suppose are the 
patients’ needs are constructed as thwarting only the interests of their doctors. Examples 
of doctors’ discussions of the negative consequences, or possible consequences, of their 
erroneous actions are particularly illustrative, focusing solely on the results for 
themselves and neglecting to mention what might be presumed to be the far greater 
effects on their patients. One afternoon, a discussion was being held in the unit, primarily 
between the more senior members of staff from around the hospital. There was some 
consternation about a baby who had died before being attended by a doctor, as well as 
about a man who had presented with haemoptesis
15
 and had been told to go home and 
attend a clinic the following morning. Another man with head injuries had been sent to 
forensics “still bleeding.” Dr N lectured the junior doctors on the importance of treating a 
life-threatening injury even if it meant losing evidence of a crime in the process. 
Apparently, the doctor who had seen the man had not recorded it in his notes: 
“So then you are not covered. You need to keep a record of at what time you did what. 
What was the status of the patient when you saw him?” 
 
The same applied to the patient with haemoptesis: 
“Haemoptesis is always an emergency. What’s gonna happen if the patient comes back 
and says, ‘That’s the doctor’. Then you will be liable.” 
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 Bleeding of the lung 
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And, discussing the possible transfer of a patient to another hospital, Dr N said more 
humorously, 
“I don’t want to send her in case she dies in the ambulance. And it looks quite bad 
(glancing at the patient). (..) That wouldn’t look good – sending a dead patient to another 
hospital (laughs).” 
 
In all the above stories a person’s life is at stake. However, the risk that is mentioned is 
not that of the patient’s death in itself, but rather the subsequent consequences thereof for 
the doctor. Having deleted his subjectivity, the patient’s death becomes incidental, 
relegated to the status of a preceding event and merely setting the scene for a risk of 
litigation or damage to the reputation of the doctor.  
 
Subjectivity and agency 
The capacity of objects for action 
A direct consequence of the objectification of patients is the resulting extinction of their 
capacity to act. Only a subject can be an agent.  An object is merely acted upon. These 
constructions therefore have interesting and enlightening consequences for the nature of 
patients’ oppression, as constructed within the doctors’ narrative framework. Rather than 
denying their patients the capacity to act, the doctors merely deal with them in 
accordance with their inherent incapacity to do so. The doctors’ conduct in this regard is 
now absolved from its moral implications and, in the process, the job of oppressing the 
patients is made all the easier – the work is done before the patient acts and, thereafter, 
undesired action by the patient can be labelled ‘insubordination’.  
 
Patients are rarely given the opportunity to act within the doctors’ discursive 
constructions, decisions about their treatment, progress through the hospital, discharge or 
subsequent management being expressed in terms of what the doctor(s) will do to the 
patient:  
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“We’ve decided to med reg16 her.” 
 “We are going to keep you here for a few days.”  
“We’re going to discharge you.” 
 
In none of these constructions is any action on the part of the patient required, their 
doctors assuming the role of sole agent in fulfilment of the relevant plan. Any actions on 
the part of the patients are absorbed within the doctors’ stories, the doctors becoming the 
ultimate agents of anything the patients might say or do and the patients positioned as 
acted upon or merely reactive to their doctors.  
“If you wanted to give me a picture of what it is that you do when you attend to your 
patients- (...) How would you describe it?” I asked Dr S. 
“ (...)  I dunno,” she replied. “You find their name, you shout it out, you (.) go through m-
medical holding, go look around shouting it out until you find them, then you drag them 
along until you find somewhere you can examine them (.) and then (.) you deliver them, 
sort them out, and (.) look for a few things and (.) send them off to X-ray and then hh try 
to remember to look at them later (laughs).” 
 
While my question overtly asks the doctor for a description of her actions, her reply 
describes acts that involve only one person, giving no hint of a process of interaction, 
negotiation or even of the patient’s active cooperation. She simply “Shout(s) out” the 
patient’s name until she finds him, making no allowance for the possibility, and actual 
likelihood, that he will make himself known to her on hearing his name. She then “drags” 
him, who has now become an object with no contribution to make to its own movement, 
“examine(s)” him, “deliver(s)” him and “sort(s)” him out, entirely by her own effort and 
unaided by any cooperation, less still initiative, from him. 
 
In other instances, when the doctors do acknowledge their patients’ cooperation, their 
references in this regard tend to depict the patients’ actions as instigated by themselves 
for their own benefit: 
“Lie down for me.” 
                                                 
16
 Send her to the medical registrar for admission 
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“Smile for me.” 
“What I want you to do for me...” 
 
While these instructions imply the doctors’ need for willing cooperation from their 
patients, overtly requesting that the patients perform some action, the disguise is thin and 
falls quickly away when immediate compliance is not forthcoming. A patient, growing 
tired of the neurological tests her doctor was attempting to administer, provoked a more 
definite command from her doctor when she failed at first to comply with her request: 
“No! No! You have to do it because we don’t know what is wrong with you!”  
 
In still other instances, the doctors position themselves not just as the intent behind the 
act, but indeed as the acting subjects in sentences in which their patients perform for them 
– “let’s see you walk.” The doctors are the subjects who will see the patient, the object, 
perform an action directed by themselves. And in still other instances, they position 
themselves as the actual (hidden) agents of their patients’ experiences – “Why am I 
feeling so woozy? Scratch, scratch.” The audience knows, in this case, that the patient is 
feeling “so woozy” because of an injection of valium that the doctor has administered. 
And a passing doctor, unaware of the conversation or the preceding events, on seeing the 
heavily sedated man, assumes as much: “Have you done some work there?” 
 
When patients are positioned as causally responsible for an action or event their 
responsibility as such is construed in passive terms. A woman who became irate at the 
delay of her discharge, and who was anxious to return home to her very young baby, was 
described by Dr N as “losing the plot,” denying her intent, as she loses the plot rather 
than throwing it away in anger. Alternatively, doctors offer their patients permission to 
act, or even command them to do so, connoting secondary status to the patient and 
positioning themselves as the intention and ultimate drive behind fulfilment of the action: 
“OK, we’ll give you some pain tablets and another antibiotic, then we going to see. (.) 
Then if it’s not better we’ll let you come in.” 
 “You can go home after you’ve been to the pharmacy to get your medication.” 
 “Go sit down!”  
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And even, 
“Sit down and wait!” 
 
In giving their permission for their patients to act, doctors presume their patients’ 
dependency on themselves for their capacity as agents. And in commanding them, 
doctors take for themselves the role of ultimate agents of their patients’ actions, which 
become, essentially, reactive to their will. 
 
In turn, patients cooperate by asking their doctors’ permission to act, often in ways that 
confirm their own infantilisation through this process. A woman in her mid thirties asked 
Dr R in a whining tone,  
“Please let me go home!” 
“No!” shouted Dr R. “Go and sit down and wait for your blood results!” 
“Please!” begged the woman. 
“Just go and sit down and stop irritating me!” 
 
When patients transgress their doctors’ orders or act without their consent, rather than 
constructing these events as wilfully designed actions, the doctors construe them in ways 
that continue to deny their patients’ agency. Instead of “Don’t walk around,” Dr G tells 
his patient, “You can’t walk around,” denying her capacity to walk, rather than the 
acceptability of her doing so. Alternatively, when patients act in ways that are contrary to 
their doctors’ wishes, their actions are constructed as ‘anti-actions’. A patient who does 
not comply with his doctors’ orders is ‘noncompliant’. One who fails (or chooses not) to 
take his medication ‘defaults’. And one who will not accept a recommended procedure 
‘refuses’. In each case, the action is constructed as an act against something else, rather 
than simply in its own right. These actions thus exist only in relation (and indeed in 
antithesis) to other actions by the doctors, who remain the defining characters and the 
ones on whom their patients’ limited agency depends.  
 
Not only are patients’ actions construed as deviations or oppositions but the acting 
patients themselves are ascribed deviant identities – “We got a walker!” A man who had 
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not taken the medication prescribed for his high blood pressure was labelled repeatedly in 
his folder as “HBP17 med defaulter,” transforming him from a man with reasons for his 
actions into a deviant who, by definition, goes against his doctors’ orders – he is a 
‘defaulter’. The man’s story as told to me in my conversation with him is revealing of the 
vast discrepancy between this construction and other possible interpretations of his 
behaviour. A chronically ill individual, he was unable to work and had no family to 
support him. From his dress and general appearance it was apparent that he was very 
poor. His parents were both dead, his sister was born without legs and his brother was 
looking after his own as well as this man’s children and could therefore give him no 
further assistance. Since the medication he required was only available at two tertiary 
hospitals, and since he lived near neither and transport was routinely unaffordable, it was 
frequently impossible for him to collect his medication. In light of his story the label 
‘defaulter’ seems somewhat oversimplified and seems to serve the purpose, rather than 
simply representing the facts, that Millman (1977) and Dreyer and Geist (1993) identify 
as served by the stigmatizing labels in terms of which patients are frequently described, 
namely to render them incapable of rational action and thus justify and perpetuate their 
‘ineligibility’ for agency and their consequent treatment as objects.  
 
As in the case of the production or invocation of any deviant identity, a moral dimension 
is involved, in terms of which ‘good’ patients recognise their ignorance and 
powerlessness, accept institutional procedures without question, provide the required 
information, take their medication correctly and so on, and those patients who do not 
accept the doctors’ absolute authority are characterised as ‘bad’ (Lorber, 1975; Fisher & 
Groce, 1985; Armstrong, 2002; and Andersen, 2004). The moral implications of the 
above interpretations of patients’ actions are well illustrated by the example provided by 
a young woman who had left the hospital against her doctors’ recommendations, and 
subsequently returned. In her words, she had made a “vokop.”18 “But I apologised to the 
doctors and I hope they will forgive me,” she said, subdued by the intensity of her pain, 
and invoking constructions both of her actions as morally bad and of the doctors as in a 
                                                 
17
 High blood pressure 
18
 Fuck up (Afrikaans) 
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position to judge and, hopefully, to forgive. She thus takes the implications of her actions 
beyond the mere transgression of norms, invoking characters for herself and her doctors 
that are ‘bad’ and ‘good’, respectively.  
 
As evident in this story, and pointed out by authors including Fisher (1986), Dreyer & 
Geist (1993), Gill (1998), Perakyla (2002) and Heath (2006), who argue that patients are 
complicit in producing their own passivity, doctors are not alone in producing the status 
quo. Doctors and patients both occupy the same social world, and are therefore both 
subject to ‘the powers that be’ (Fisher, 1986; Fisher & Groce, 1990). Many patients, for 
example, perceive their doctors as aloof and not willing to be bothered with unwanted 
questions and therefore refrain from asking them (Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Phillips, 1996). 
Patients are, in addition, in fact dependent on their doctors for matters as important as the 
relief of pain and avoidance of death (Atkinson, 1995; Mishler, 2004).  Many patients in 
the Greenlands emergency unit thus perceived their choices as to whether and how they 
might act as restricted, fearing that if they challenged their doctors they would receive 
inferior care:  
 
“But you can’t say anything because you don’t know what kind of an attitude they might 
have.” 
“And you can’t ask for anything because then they want to know why you want this and 
why you want that.”  
 
One patient, in his conceptualisation of his situation, reveals the reality of the power the 
doctors possess: 
“What can I say? I want help so I must accept.”  
 
Thus, the negation of patients’ personhood and capacity for action is generally 
unchallenged by their uniform appearance and general silence and motionlessness.  
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Patients’ resistance 
It would not be true, however, to say that patients never resist their doctors’ 
constructions, exercising agency within their interactions with them. It is, however, a 
relatively rare occurrence and one that involves overcoming resistance, rather than 
making use of a readily available channel for expression. The man who had overheard the 
doctors on the ward round groaning about his need for a ‘PR’, for example, subsequently 
asked Dr F, when she came to see him,  
“What is a PR?” 
“It’s an examination from behind,” she replied. 
“Why didn’t you explain before?” he demanded, not only requesting the information he 
desired but also asserting his right to an explanation and his disapproval of the doctor’s 
prior omission. 
 
Some patients even contradict their doctors’ statements. A young man diagnosed with TB 
insisted on more rigorous measures than an X-ray to confirm his diagnosis before he 
would commence treatment: 
“It might look like TB on the X-ray,” he told his doctor, “but it doesn’t feel like TB,” 
both asserting his contrary belief and the importance of his subjective experience of the 
disease. 
 
But on those occasions when a subject does emerge from this sea, asking questions, 
complaining about his treatment or ranting and raving insanely, there is little hesitation in 
the employment of more effort in suppressing the disruption. A woman hanging around 
the doctors’ station waiting for information is told to “Sit!” A man asking too many 
questions to “Sit down!” And another to “Just sit down and wait!” And when such 
commands fall on deaf ears, the disruptive individual is frequently restrained by force or 
sedation or both.  
 
Another consequence when patients do exercise agency, as described by authors 
including Millman (1977), Strong and Davis (1978), Fisher and Groce (1985) and 
Mizrahi (1986), amongst others, is their labelling as ‘problem’ or ‘bad’ patients. The 
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labelling of psychiatric patients in the Greenlands emergency unit is especially interesting 
in this regard, making explicit the relationship between the words doctors use to describe 
their patients and the demand for their passivity. In addition to “psych patients” and 
“crazies” – “How many crazies have you got here? D’you guys still have about ten 
crazies lying around?” –, these patients, who tend not to adhere to the unit’s norms, are 
termed, “walkers” and “helicopters.” The latter two labels are particularly revealing, not 
only disguising the patients’ personal identities, but also highlighting their defiance of the 
demand that they remain seated or bed bound. That a person should be singled out for 
doing something so ordinary as walking is not merely absurd, but attests to the strength of 
the expectation that patients should remain in their chairs. That those who do not are 
liable to be named as “helicopters” alludes to the anxiety that their walking about 
produces in their doctors. When I asked Dr W, 
“Why do you call them helicopters?” 
“Because they’re circling us!” he explained, his hands whirring in circular movements 
above his head.  
 
More often, perhaps as a result of these negative sanctions and as discussed by authors 
including Fisher and Groce (1990), Cicourel (1999), Fainzang (2002) and Zaman (2004), 
patients resort to less forthright means of exercising agency, going little further than 
resisting their doctors, without actually proposing an alternative course, very often in 
ways that fail to serve their best interests (Fisher & Groce, 1990; Zaman, 2004). Dr A 
was interrogating a man brought into the hospital for a condition related to his drug 
abuse: 
 
Dr A: So the last one you took was on Monday? 
P: Yes. 
Dr A: So you are going to stop it?  
P: Yes.  
Dr A: So you understand the risks? 
P: Yes.   
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Dr A: [To the other doctors] OK, so lets do an ECG and I’ll try to explain to the patient 
about, you know, the risks. 
P: I’m not a psych patient.  
[No reply from the doctors.] 
P: The other doctor said I can go home.  
Dr A: But you are going to go back to tik
19
, hey? 
[No reply from the patient.] 
Dr A: You take tik, hey? 
[Patient nods] 
Dr A: And dagga
20
? 
[Patient nods] 
Dr A: So are you going to stop? 
P: Yes (..) OK, so am I discharged now? 
 
Dr A leaves little room for the patient to assume an active role in the conversation, 
requiring no more from him than monosyllabic answers to questions that are little more 
than statements of that to which she would like the patient to agree. At one point the man 
interrupts the flow to contradict what he suspects is the doctors’ assumption – “I’m not a 
psych patient.” But even this contrary and uninvited statement represents little more than 
resistance against what he imagines is the doctors’ point of view, rather than initiating 
any viewpoint of his own. He then offers, “The other doctor said I can go home,” clearly 
angling for his release but invoking the agency of another doctor no longer present, rather 
than owning the request for his freedom. To Dr A’s question, “But you are going to go 
back to tik, hey?”  he gives no response, failing to comply but only in the form of a 
refusal. His final question, “OK, so am I discharged now?” reads, in this context, as a 
last-ditch attempt to reclaim some of the agency he has forfeited in his previously 
complaisant responses. In answer to the doctor’s accusations of drug abuse and to her 
request that he confirm his intention to stop he replies in the affirmative. But the question 
about his discharge with which he follows up his answers casts doubt on the truth of his 
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 Marijuana 
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prior statements and seems to point to his employment of the desired responses in order 
to achieve his own end, namely his release. In this roundabout way that illustrates the 
strange mix of resistance and compliance that Fainzang (2002) discusses in her analysis 
of patients’ lies to their doctors, this patient attempts to exercise some degree of agency, 
and to reclaim some of that which he has forfeited, in a situation in which he remains, by 
and large, disempowered.  
The power of sole subjects 
When combined with the doctors’ unquestionable position within the narrative of science, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, and the legal authority imputed as a result to the 
doctors, the diminishment of patients’ agency leaves doctors in the position of 
unchallenged agents, redoubling their power. While Dr V begins in the following story 
by attempting to persuade a man of his point of view, and thereby to influence his 
actions, he resorts, when this tactic is unsuccessful, to stating his institutionally-given 
right to determine the patient’s course (Fisher, 1986). The patient was a young man, 
accompanied by his father, who was adamant that he wanted to remove his son from the 
hospital and to send him instead to a traditional healer who, he felt, would be better able 
to address his complaint, namely confusion following a fit. 
 “I respect traditional healers,” began Dr V, attempting to persuade the father to leave his 
son in his care, “but they can’t fix this.” 
Failing to achieve agreement, Dr V continued: “Sir, I do not recommend that you take 
your son out of the hospital. There is something wrong in his brain that has caused the fit 
and we do not know what that is yet. But it could be TB or it could be cancer.” 
When the father still maintained his original position, Dr V resorted to employing his 
weight as an authority on the state’s behalf: 
“With all due respect, you do not have the right to take the patient out of the hospital. If a 
patient is confused we are not allowed to let him go.” 
Accepting defeat, the father left the hospital, requesting that he be kept informed of his 
son’s condition.  
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Dr V’s initial strategy is to use reason to attempt to change the father’s mind – 
“Traditional healers...can’t fix this.” When this fails he employs his position as the keeper 
of scientific knowledge, or truth, to add weight to his approach – “There is something 
wrong in his brain that has caused the fit and we do not know what that is yet” – and then 
gives fear a try – “It could be TB or cancer.” When even this fails he drops the mask from 
the position of absolute power that he holds, clearly articulating the man’s incapacity to 
act according to his own judgements – “You do not have the right to take the patient out 
of the hospital,” and, by implication, his obligation to accept the doctor’s orders.  
 
While this excerpt thus clearly illustrates the unequal distribution of power between 
doctors and patients, multiple meanings again peer out from beneath the surface. In the 
same breath that Dr V asserts his authority over the patient’s freed m and future 
treatment, he denies responsibility for having wrested it from his father, invoking a 
greater authority than himself, within whose power “we,” the medical collective “are not 
allowed to let him go.” Again, this wording suggests a heightened sensitivity to the 
possibility for criticism of the doctors’ actions and a consequent shirking of individual 
responsibility for the decision he has taken. While I draw attention to these emergent 
meanings at this point, they and related issues will be dealt with in greater depth in the 
following chapter. 
 
Again, my descriptions of the inequality between doctors and patients and of the power 
that doctors can and do exercise over their patients in the unit cannot be left without 
reference to the excessively difficult position in which the doctors find themselves. Under 
no circumstances can they allow their patients free reign in the unit for fear of serious 
disruptions to the practice of emergency medicine. However, without entering into a 
debate about the necessity for the swiftness, severity or style of the suppressive measures 
employed, my argument is that the resulting passivity of the blue-clad figures contributes 
to their construction as subjectless entities, and that the consequences of this are 
damaging in multiple ways.  
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The narrative possibilities for subjects and objects 
Within a context construed in the above terms, and inhabited by actors with the above 
characteristics and capacities, a range of actions on the part of both doctors and patients 
that might otherwise be deemed unacceptable become permissible and even likely, while 
other possibilities are obscured or prohibited. My argument in this thesis is therefore that 
construction of doctors and patients in opposite terms, as subjects and objects, 
respectively, can have serious consequences for the delivery of humane healthcare. I will 
discuss this possibility, addressed in the existing literature by only a few authors (for 
example Lorber, 1975; West, 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; and Andersen, 2004), with particular 
reference to the likelihood of communication and empathy within doctor-patient 
interactions, and to the attribution of responsibility when things go wrong. 
 
Personhood and communication  
As argued by Fisher and Groce (1990), the conversations that occur between doctors and 
patients can be seen as micro-political events, in terms of which processes of 
subordination and domination are played out through the medium of diagnosing and 
treating disease. And, as previously discussed, authors including Mishler (1984: p. 127) 
have argued that the dominance of the ‘voice of medicine’ “impairs and distorts essential 
requirements for mutual dialogue and humane interaction.” A significant number of 
authors, particularly those working within the mode of conversation analysis, have drawn 
attention to the multiple ways in which the structure of medical conversations enables 
doctors to control the form and content of interactions with their patients, including the 
patients’ contributions to these (Atkinson, 1981; Mishler,1984; West, 1984; Fisher, 1986; 
Fisher & Groce, 1990; Heath, 1992; Sarangi & Roberts, 1999; Boyd & Heritage, 2006; 
Heritage & Robinson, 2006; West, 2006).  
Between us, about them 
Consistent with the work of these authors and confirming the validity of Fox’s (1989) 
observation that the distinction between doctors and patients as groups is not merely 
conceptual but is enacted by the individuals who are part of them, the Greenlands 
emergency unit’s doctors identify with one another and exclude others through 
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conversational means. The vast majority of the doctors’ exclusionary transactions go 
unmarked as such and simply take the form of conversations held between themselves, 
illustrating Goffman’s (1961) analysis of the restricted flow of communication between 
groups in what he calls ‘total institutions’, of which the hospital is one. Many of these 
transactions are quite unobjectionable and can only be said to be exclusionary on the 
ground that they rarely, if ever, include a patient.  But others are held about and in front 
of their patients, who are neither included through eye contact nor able to understand the 
scientific and terminology-filled content of the discussion. These discussions, more often 
than not, concern the patients directly in their reference to the doctors’ plans for their 
treatment and care (Goffman, 1961) and illustrate what Goffman calls “the wonderful 
brand of ‘nonperson treatments’ found in the medical world” (as cited in Lorber, 1975: p. 
213).  
 
Examples abound. As subjectless entities, doctors frequently fail, as previously 
mentioned, to address their patients during ward rounds, referring to them only in the 
third person (Mizrahi, 1986) – “She’s a 37-yr old woman with post-TB bronchiectasis,”  
or, “You should have seen him when he came in this morning! (laughs)” . When doctors 
do address their patients they do so almost exclusively to elicit information pertinent to 
diagnosis and treatment or to issue instructions, reverting to their exclusive 
communications as soon as the relevant end has been achieved. Dr A, for example, 
requests of her patient, “Can you just lie down?” following it immediately with a 
comment addressed to her colleagues on the round: “Ja, I think she’ll have to come in. 
This one needs to be sorted out.” While she addresses her patient to issue an instruction, 
Dr A directs the expression of her opinion regarding the patient’s further treatment only 
to her colleagues – “I think she’ll have to come in.” Frequently, the patient is addressed 
only at the conclusion of the round’s discussion of his case – “We are going to keep you 
here for a few days,” or, “You can go home after you’ve been to the pharmacy to get your 
medication.” 
 
No reason exists for doctors to provide their patients with information about their 
diseases or possible treatments – devoid of subjectivity and with no capacity to act in 
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either an informed or uninformed way, the patients are spared the need for information 
and their doctors the obligation to supply it. A man who was unable to walk and who had 
been moved from the wheel chair he had initially occupied sat in an ordinary chair in the 
medical holding area, feeling, as he told me, “helpless” and “at the mercy of people who 
don’t care.” Having read the words, “high risk” in his referral letter and unable to make 
out the remainder of its contents, his anxiety was rising. With his experience invisible and 
indeed impossible, the doctors’ actions, as narrated by him, might be expected. During 
the hours he spent waiting, various doctors approached him, opened his folder and, 
offering no explanation or even greeting, walked away.  
 
While in this example, the consequence to the patient was merely anxiety, the following 
example illustrates an instance in which it may have been much m re serious. The case of 
a man who had been diagnosed with diabetes on arrival at the hospital, was discussed at 
his bedside:  
Dr 1: You guys saw this gentleman here who’s a- (.) a newly diagnosed diabetic I 
believe. (..) Basically the plan was to check if he had a- check his ketones- 
Dr 2: A newly diagnosed diabetic. What was the story? He came in with a high- high 
glucose. 
Dr 1: I’ve got the results. 
Dr 2: Oh. And? 
Dr 3: But was not acidotic? 
Dr 1: No. 
Dr 3: What is a normal PH? 
Dr 1: Its- 
Dr 2: Seven point four. (..) Well there’s a range. Seven point three five to seven point 
four five. 
Dr 3: (..) Ok. 
Dr 1: He’s got ketones in his urine so I- I’d monitor- 
Dr 3: Ja I mean he is not acidotic so it’s not a DKA21. 
                                                 
21
 Diabetic keto-acidosis: a life-threatening condition caused by an insufficiency of insulin in the body, 
resulting in the breakdown of proteins in order to produce energy. 
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Dr 1: Mm. 
Dr 3: So um- (..) But I mean the white cell count of eleven- (..) Where is that coming 
from? (.) The dipstick? What did it show? 
Dr 1: Protein- what? 
Dr 2: Ok. Blood trace. Protein trace. Ketones three plus. Glucose two plus.  
Dr 3: And the chest X-ray? 
Dr 2: Normal. 
Dr 3: So I think (.) we can start him on (.) on uh- (.) [to patient:] How old are you? 
P: Thirty three. 
Dr 3: I think we can start- So- so young, hey? For a type two. 
Dr 2: It is young for a type two. He’s probably going to end up being a type one.  
Dr 3: Ja. I think we can take our chances and- and start on orals. (..) But if he comes with 
a DKA next time then we can start type one treatment. 
Dr 2: Ja. 
[Doctors continue discussion of the appropriate drug and dosage.] 
Dr 4: Is he discharged? 
Dr 3: Ja he’s going to go home. (..)  You can start on type one treatment if he comes 
back. 
[Doctors move on to the next bed.] 
 
The above dialogue is typical of the conversation on the doctors’ rounds and makes no 
attempt to include the patient beyond Dr 3’s request for his age, providing a classic 
example of the ways in which patients’ understanding of doctors’ talk is obfuscated 
through the use of jargon, acronyms and so on (Wodak, 1996). While it remains 
unarguably necessary for doctors to efficiently convey information about their patients to 
one another, necessitating conversation of a scientific nature, their failure to 
communicate their conclusions to the patient highlight the exclusionary nature of this 
conversation. In addition, the doctors fail to include the patient in the making of a 
decision in which he is almost certain to be interested, unquestioningly assuming the 
dominant position as those most linguistically competent within the medical setting 
(Wodak, 1996), and thus disregarding the patient’s right to inclusion in decisions that 
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affect him. From their position as sole subjects, the doctors decide to treat the man as a 
type two diabetic, although there remains some doubt as to the correctness of this 
assessment, arguing that they will change their strategy if and when the patient 
subsequently presents “with a DKA.” Whilst from their point of view this decision may 
seem the most pragmatic, there is a clear omission in procedure in that the man in 
question has not been consulted as to his willingness to take such a chance. The 
implications of the doctors’ decision are in fact of serious consequence and concern the 
patient directly: if the man is a type one diabetic, the oral treatment prescribed for type 
twos will not control his sugar level nor  reduce his ketones, which will, presumably, 
continue to climb  until he becomes acidotic. Their theory is that he will then return to the 
hospital “with a DKA,” at which point he will have proved himself to be a type one and 
be treated accordingly. Although the doctors may find it appropriate to “take (their) 
chances,” the risk to the man is great, even if the likelihood of their error is small – 
ketoacidosis is a life-threatening condition – and to take such a decision on another’s 
behalf, without so much as informing the person in question, would surely in any other 
context be considered unacceptable. 
 
When cooperation is needed from their patients in order to fulfil the doctors’ tasks, 
instructions are issued without explanation – “Come.” And, when these instructions are 
not obeyed, the doctors deem it acceptable to follow them with threats:  
“Work together with me please, d’you want to go home or d’you want to stay here?” 
 
To a man who had suffered an epileptic fit at work that morning, was anxious that he 
might lose his job and was receiving instructions on the management of his newly 
diagnosed illness: 
“‘No, they won’t fire you – if you’re epileptic and you take your medication you can do 
your job. Only if you don’t take your medication then they’ll tell you you must find 
another job where there’s no risk.”  
The threat is obvious – “if you don’t take your medication then...” – disguised as a 
consequence beyond the doctors’ control – “they will tell you you must find another job.” 
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And a man suspected of a psychiatric complaint and who was hanging around the 
doctors’ station asking questions about the likelihood of his release was told, 
“You better sit down cos you’re behaving a little bit weird now. Just now somebody’s 
going to think that you are crazy.”  
Speaking to objects 
In addition, when the doctors do address their patients it is in a manner quite different 
from that commonly used to address an equal subject. For example, their employment of 
language and tone differs markedly from that reserved for each other, illustrating the use 
of a special tone of voice for communication between distinct groups in the total 
institutions that Goffman describes (1961). Dr P describes a colleague’s surprise when, 
addressing his patient as an inferior ‘other’, the man responded as a competent equal, 
challenging the doctor’s implicit assumptions: 
“You know, you get into this mode of almost treating the patients like children and they- 
And you talk differently to them. You talk slowly and treat them like almost retarded 
people sometimes, it’s sad. You know, but I remember, it was- actually happened to a 
friend of mine. And- and he was laughing about it and- Cos he said, ‘Baba22, tell me. 
What (.) pillies (.) have you been taking? So the- so he went, ‘Erythromycin 500mg three 
times a day’. And the guy was like, ‘Oh!’ (laughs) ‘I didn’t even know that was the 
dose!’ You know, so he was just like, his eyes were wide open, this guy knew, you know, 
plenty about it.” 
Dr P, in this extract, overtly admits and disapproves of the fact that doctors “talk 
differently to (patients).” Once again, however, something more simmers beneath the 
surface. His use of the pronoun “you” again appeals to me to include myself amongst 
those who might be guilty of such an action, seemingly requesting an empathetic 
response and generous evaluation and alerting me to the possibility of a latent self-doubt. 
He goes on to assure me that indeed it is not he who is the protagonist of his story. 
Further denying the truth of an imagined accusation, the word “actually” carries the 
connotation that I might be persuaded otherwise – in spite of what you might think it 
“happened to a friend of mine.” The incongruity between his friend’s manner of 
                                                 
22
 Xhosa word for grandfather, respectful address of elderly man. 
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approaching the patient as if he were “almost retarded,” and the patient’s response – 
“Erythromycin 500mg three times a day” – proclaims the inappropriateness of the 
doctor’s habitual manner and the inaccuracy of his implied judgement of the patient as 
inferior. However, as much as he asserts it, Dr P simultaneously attempts to diminish the 
crime, preceding his evaluation of his friend’s manner with a mitigating “almost” – he 
approached the patient “as if he were almost retarded.” He applies the same strategy in 
describing the tone in which the doctors “almost treat... the patients like children.” Once 
again, the multiple and contradictory meanings of the doctors’ talk, in which claims are 
made and denied in the same breath, alert one to their inner ambivalence, an ambivalence 
that I will argue in the following chapter is comprised in the conflict between power and 
vulnerability, certainty and doubt, and irreproachable and guilty self-evaluations. 
The mutuality of one-sided conversations 
As discussed with reference to the construction of patients as passive, these exclusive 
conversations cannot be construed as entirely one-sided. Very seldom do patients 
challenge their own exclusion, for example with interruptions or questions. An incident in 
which the doctors on the ward round attempted unsuccessfully to identify a patient 
provides an extreme but illustrative example. The patient was sitting slumped on the floor 
in the corner of the unit, all chairs and beds being occupied. 
“The other one in the corner here?” enquired Dr G. 
“I don’t recognise him,” claimed Dr M, bending down to look more closely at the man, 
who simply gazed back at him.  Looking up at his colleagues, “D’you recognise this 
guy?” he asked. “Maybe it’s one of [Dr R’s] patients.”  
While none of the doctors present thought to ask the man himself for information as to 
his identity and that of the doctor who had originally seen him, no more did the patient 
venture any contribution toward answering their questions, behaving instead as the 
passive object of their discussion. Without resolving the matter, the round moved on and 
the patient remained unattended to.  
 
As with the exercise of other forms of agency, on those occasions, however, when 
patients do challenge their exclusion they tend to be met with more decisively 
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exclusionary tactics. An elderly man had arrived at the hospital with pains in his chest. 
He was accompanied by his son and had been examined by Dr F, who now stood at his 
bedside, discussing his case with a student. Both father and son were obviously interested 
in the doctors’ conversation, openly attempting to hear and to follow its course. They 
leaned anxiously forward, intent but uncomprehending, until, apparently having gained 
little in the way of enlightenment, the patient’s son spoke up: 
“What are you saying?” he asked Dr F. 
“No, I’m just talking to him,” she replied, gesticulating toward the student and continuing 
her ‘private’ conversation. 
 
Not only does Dr F’s response fail to provide the patient with relevant information, it 
reconstitutes his son’s question as one based on misunderstanding rather than on any 
appropriate desire for knowledge. Correcting the ‘error’, namely that information might 
be passed from doctor to patient as well as between doctors, with a clearer assertion of 
the intended direction of her communication, Dr F defends the borders of the 
conversational arena, reminding the patient of the unacceptability of such an exchange as 
he had attempted.  
 
Personhood and empathy 
The opposite constructions of doctors and patients further inhibit the doctors’ ability to 
identify or empathise with their patients, their construction as ‘not us’ denying all 
possibility of similar or shared experience, as discussed by authors including Mizrahi 
(1986), Andersen (2004) and Maynard (2006), and evidenced by the fact that doctors’ 
talk rarely includes any reference to their patients’ perspectives, or suggestions that they 
can imagine being in their patients’ shoes. While Goffman (1961), Mishler et al. (1981) 
and Lorber (1975), amongst others, have pointed out the value of emotional distance 
between doctors and patients, enabling them to perform and endure invasive or 
distressing procedures and enhancing efficiency, these and other authors, such as Mizrahi 
(1986) and Helman (2001) have emphasised the simultaneous negative, if unintended, 
consequences that are the too frequent result. 
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As objectified persons, the practices discussed above, in terms of which doctors discuss 
their patients in their presence, for example, without any attempt at including them in 
their discussions become acceptable.  Most striking, in the context of the Greenlands 
emergency unit and the present argument, are those occasions on which the doctors’ 
conversations concern matters of a highly sensitive nature, exposing their lack of 
consideration for their patients’ subjective experiences through the insensitivity of their 
discussions, and paralleling the undignified and humiliating treatment of patients 
described by Turnbull, Flabouris and Iedema (2005), and the ‘cold’ and ‘heartless 
treatment of patients that Maynard (2006) describes. Standing before a man to whom he 
referred as “a ratex OD,” Dr G asked his students, 
“What’s ratex?”  
When no response was forthcoming he proceeded to explain: “It’s rat poison, OK. But 
the one this guy took, its not the household one. The household one’s Mickey Mouse 
stuff. The industrial one is the proper one.”  
 
It seems reasonable to assume that, for the patient, who had attempted suicide the 
previous day, this statement could have been more sensitively phrased. Of a man 
awaiting a “PR,”23 Dr M groaned, “Why does everyone have to have flippin’ bleeding?” 
expressing his aversion to the required examination. The patient told me in our 
subsequent conversation that, while he did not know what a “PR” was, the doctors’ 
discussion around the issue had made him anxious and indeed angry at their failure to 
include or respect him.  
 
These conversations even, on occasion, include jokes between the doctors at the patients’ 
expense. On one such occasion, the doctors were gathered at the foot of a young 
woman’s bed. Dr A, leading the ward round, addressed her colleagues: 
“OK, she’s a known epileptic, she has taken some of the pills. She thought she was going 
to have a fit and she took 10 pills.”  
“Ten!” repeated Dr M, as snorts of laughter resounded through the group.  
                                                 
23
 Per rectum – refers to a rectal examination. Earlier ref footnote there 
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The patient, who had not been addressed, was looking depressed and ashamed, sitting up 
in her bed with her face turned away, avoiding the doctors’ gaze.  As the ward round 
moved on she pulled the blanket over her head. Such insensitivity, I believe, is made 
possible through the ‘othering’ of patients, who cannot be expected to feel as the doctors 
might.  
 
Failure to recognise their patients’ subjectivities also frequently results in doctors’ 
physical treatment of their patients as objects. A doctor, for example, taped a piece of 
paper reading, “Admit Ward 1,” to a woman’s shirt, like a sign one might post on an 
inanimate object but that struck me as inappropriate for a person. I observed also, on a 
number of occasions, that doctors stuck name tags to their patients’ foreheads, similarly 
dispensing with the usual treatment of a human being. In one instance Dr G, without 
greeting the patient in question, lifted a man’s arm, showing it to his colleagues. “D’you 
see this?” he asked, proceeding to point out and explain the signs of disease.  Later, again 
without greeting the patient, the same doctor took hold of the head of a man seated on a 
crowded bench. Moving it backwards and forwards and round and about, he pointed to 
various features of the man’s neck, all the while talking to his colleagues and students 
and never uttering a word to the object of discussion, namely the sick man.   
My argument is that, through their constructions of their patients as devoid of 
subjectivity, the doctors obviate the need for their treatment as different from objects, 
rendering ordinary communication and empathy not only superfluous but indeed 
unthinkable. Dr W’s cynically humorous comment, “When I grow up I want to be a 
mechanic,” attests to the accuracy of these interpretations, pointing at the same time, 
however, to a self-conscious awareness of the fact that their patients are in fact 
fundamentally different from motor vehicles and thus both to the unacceptable nature of 
the way they are often treated and to the frequent replacement of ‘detached concern’ with 
‘overdetachment’, to which doctors operating under stressful conditions are susceptible 
(Mizrahi, 1986).  
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Collective identity and responsibility 
The distinct identities constructed for doctors and patients, and in particular the collective 
nature of these, in terms of which individuals are ascribed to groups and defined in terms 
of their membership of them, further facilitates the sharing of responsibility, which is 
often ascribed to the group rather than to the relevant individuals: “We could see he 
wasn’t gonna do well,” “We thought he’d be fine,” “We discharged him this morning.” 
The doctors in these descriptions see with one vision, think with one mind and act as a 
unit, no single doctor identifiable as responsible for any particular action.   
 
Frequently, doctors share responsibility in the form of joint decision-making, an 
unarguably desirable practice that holds much promise for protecting patients’ interests 
by reducing the likelihood of mistakes or oversights. Dr G provides an example already 
discussed in which he takes a decision of considerable weight and requests the support of 
his colleagues: 
 
“If she doesn’t have miliary TB its untreatable at the age of 80. I think, basically, she 
goes to (external ward). TB treatment. If she doesn’t get better, nothing else. Do you 
agree?” 
 
Here, it seems absolutely right and proper that this decision should not be taken by one 
man alone and the doctor’s inclusion of others seems responsible. However, there are 
other instances in which the attribution of responsibility to the group rather than to an 
individual serves to defer responsibility from the self, rather than to include others in it. 
This process, as discussed by Mizrahi (1986), allows actions to be conducted, or 
decisions taken, by ‘us’, rather than merely by ‘me’, offering protection from personal 
accusation and thus the potential for errors or worse to be committed without risk of 
personal blame. Again, this relationship between the form that doctors’ and patients’ 
identities assume and the avoidance of responsibility suggests a possible link between the 
doctors’ eager assumption of powerful positions and a lurking self-doubt, and thus to the 
relationship identified by Rosenthal (1999) between collegiality and uncertainty. Dr N, 
self-consciously aware of the frequently poor communication between doctors and their 
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patients in the unit, talks about the difficulties he and, by implication, the other doctors, 
encounter in attempting to communicate with their patients: 
 
“Like, you want to give them the information, cos you’ve learned to- to give them 
information, explain things to them, ask them if they understand, clarify any questions 
that they may have. So you learn that style ... and you wanna give it to your patients, ‘Do 
you have any questions?’ ‘No, doctor’. (laughs) ‘D’you understand everything?’ ‘Yes, 
doctor’. (.) And they’ll walk out of there (.) and still not be clear as to what’s going on. 
And will not be able to communicate that to the next- to the family member um (.) 
because it was like- it’s, you know, you don’t ask questions of the doctor. You know, it’s 
that, ‘don’t question the doctor’.” 
 
While in all my conversations with the doctors I expressed an explicit interest in their 
personal experiences in the emergency unit, they responded, in the main, in general 
terms, concealing themselves within a group of individually unidentifiable doctors. Their 
interesting use of the pronoun ‘you’, as evident in the above extract, that seems to contain 
an expression of the unity and mutual identification between all doctors, appeared further 
to appeal to me to position myself as one of them in listening to their stories, alluding 
again to their perceived need for a sympathetic interpretation of their actions. In this 
extract Dr N, through his use of the pronoun ‘you’,  identifies himself, and admits his 
own responsibility for the ultimately unsuccessful communication of which he is 
speaking, only as one amongst the “the (many) doctor(s)” whom the patients “don’t 
question,” and begs that I, the listener, identify myself also as one of those who would be 
unsuccessful, given similar circumstances, through his implication that it is not only us 
but “you” too who (would) fail. 
 
Trying ever harder to encourage the doctor to speak of actual events in his personal 
experience, I persisted: 
“I don’t know if you can remember any particular patient where you felt that that was 
what was going on?”  
This elicited the following reply: 
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“(...) Um (..) Ja, there isn’t- I’m struggling to sort of pinpoint. There’s a lot of- I got a lot 
of- I got a lot of scenarios but I- I wouldn’t say ac- you know, there’s this- I can’t think- 
Af- after a while, when you see so many patients a day, you don’t ac- you actually don’t 
remember the particular patients, except what you re- you remember scenarios like (.) 
you know, there- you know, for example say a scenario that I often use as an example is 
like, you know, a patient who’s given a diagnosis of cancer. (..) You know, you tell them 
it’s likely that this is cancer, we don’t have absolute proof but the ultrasound suggests it, 
etc, etc, etc. You give them the- (.) but its, ‘Yes, doctor, ok that’s fine, doctor’ and then 
that’s it. Off they go and (..) you know, its- (.) you don’t know how much has sunk in, or, 
you know-” 
 
Stumbling at first, the doctor fumbles for firmer ground – “Um (..) Ja, there isn’t- ... 
There’s a lot of- I got a lot of- ... I- I wouldn’t say ac- you know, there’s this- I can’t 
think-” – finding his feet again only once he is safely back on more generalised terrain – 
“You know, for example say a scenario that I often use ... is like, you know, a patient 
who’s given a diagnosis of cancer.” Having faltered in his response to my request for a 
more personal story, Dr N’s repetitive “you knows” seem to crave my agreement and 
assert that of the rest of the world, echoing with the implication that what he is saying is 
something that we all know, and thus denying personal causal responsibility – the fact 
that doctors regularly fail to achieve mutual understanding with their patients is a 
phenomenon that exists in spite of him or anything he might do. Similarly, his 
construction of the event in which a patient is given a diagnosis of cancer disguises the 
active subject and represents an instance of the passive linguistic constructions to which 
Katz (1984) refers in his discussion of medical avoidance of responsibility. Tellingly, Dr 
N switches suddenly to use of the active “I” when describing more successful ventures, 
illustrating Maynard’s (2003) argument about the differential attribution of responsibility 
for good and bad events: 
“I always- I have learnt to say, (..) ‘When you come back for your results I want you to 
bring a relative with you’. (..) I’ve learnt to do that ... And then I often counsel, in terms 
of a final diagnosis with both of them there.” 
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In addition to evading their own individual responsibility for adverse events, doctors also 
make use of their shared identity, as part of the repertoire of devices available within 
medical culture for dealing with inevitable mistakes (Mizrahi, 1986), to protect one 
another from the same burden. Dr R’s response to Dr F’s story, referred to earlier in the 
chapter, of the baby who had died before being seen by a doctor is a case in point: 
Dr R: “Mm, I wanted to ask – what actually happened? Did the mom come in and dump 
the baby or what?” 
Dr F: [The mother and baby had been kept in the triage area, where nurses take patients’ 
blood pressure, pulse and blood gases before assigning them a coloured sticker that 
indicates the urgency with which they need to be attended. No doctor had been alerted.] 
“No one told us there was a baby (..) we were shocked.” 
Dr R: “But that triage system is also wrong. Even if the baby looked fine someone should 
have come and said there’s a baby. I mean we all know how quickly those guys crash.” 
 
In her opening question, Dr R presents Dr F with an external target for blame before even 
hearing her story – “Did the mom come in and dump the baby or what?” – presuming the 
doctor’s innocence and offering to displace responsibility for the baby’s death onto either 
the mother or, subsequently, “that triage system (which) is also wrong.” Thus, Dr R can 
be seen to enact the norm of non-criticism of which Mizrahi (1986) writes, pre-emptively 
discouraging any admission of culpability or guilt in Dr F’s anticipated telling of the 
story, and thus protecting not only those doctors present at the time of the baby’s death 
but also herself and indeed the whole profession from possible similar accusations, both 
past and future (Millman, 1977). Dr F, in her reply – “No one told us there was a baby (..) 
we were shocked” -  responds in kind. She overtly denies responsibility for the baby’s 
death, directing it instead to all those who did not tell “us,” and thus displaying use of the 
most discussed of the tools in medical culture’s repertoire of defenses, namely blame 
(Mishler et al., 1981; Mizrahi, 1984; 1986; Paget, 1988; Zagier-Roberts, 1994; and 
Wodak, 2006b), in this case presumably of the patient’s mother and of the nurses. Dr F 
further seeks cover from potential accusations of personal culpability even before they 
are made – it is “us” rather than “me” on whose behalf she denies responsibility, as she 
disappears, so to speak, into the crowd before she can be singled out and accused. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
215 
 
Interestingly, this was not the only account of events circulating the room. The senior 
consultant, whose responsibility it was to determine the truth, and who had acquired the 
nurses’ side of the story too, claimed that the nurse who had performed the baby’s 
observations, finding “virtually no blood pressure,” had immediately reported the 
situation to a doctor. The mother and baby were nevertheless left waiting in the triage
24
 
area from 9 p.m. until 3 a.m. the following morning, during which interval the panicking 
mother had entered the casualty on at least two occasions, only to be told by a doctor to 
“Sit down and wait!” On the last occasion she had entered the casualty, it was too late – 
“the baby was already gasping.” At the end of the day, the head of department had 
reached a conclusion that protected everyone from further investigation: “It wasn’t 
negligence. I think it was just stupidity.” This extract thus highlights the validity of 
Paget’s (1988) concern, namely that the professional etiquette forbidding criticism both 
unites doctors against the lay community and simultaneously allows individual doctors 
maximum autonomy, creating the potential for the development of what he terms a 
‘delinquent community’ within which poor practice remains unaddressed and the 
collective beliefs that enabled its occurrence are perpetuated and reinforced (Alsop & 
Mulcahy, 1999). 
 
The counter discourse 
Again, however, a counter discourse does exist, albeit only in the occasional actions of a 
few doctors. On these occasions doctors can be seen acknowledging their patients as 
subjects, including them in conversation, recognising their lifeworlds and subjective 
experiences and even identifying and empathising with them.  The following incidents 
illustrate the possibility for the enactment of this counter discourse to positively impact 
on the quality of care delivered in the unit in terms of its humanity and even, potentially, 
its effectiveness.  
 
Dr M, for example, frequently referred to his patients by name or spoke of them as “this 
guy” or “this lady.” These more particularising references go further toward 
                                                 
24
 Screening area in which basic observations are performed, in order to assign patients a colour indicating 
the urgency with which the case needs attention. 
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acknowledging the patients’ personhood and even  similarity to doctors than does the 
‘one-size-fits-all-except-us’ label of ‘patients’. In fact, on the first occasion that I met this 
doctor, my attention was drawn to him when I observed him introducing himself to a 
patient and shaking the man’s hand – ordinary practice outside of the hospital but quite 
remarkable within it. Dr Z, too, on a number of occasions included his patients in 
conversations and even in jokes made on the doctors’ rounds. A diabetic patient had 
arrived in the unit with a very high sugar level after failing to take his medication for a 
full seven months. It emerged, during the conversation held between Dr Z and the man, 
that he had believed himself cured.  As usual, the doctors on the round laughed at the 
patient’s misunderstanding and consequent mistake. Dr Z, however, included the man in 
the joke:   
“You see,” he explained, “diabetes never goes away. It stays with you forever like a loyal 
wife. (.) There’s three things that never leave you – a loyal wife, a drunken husband and 
diabetes.”  
The patient and a number of others sitting around him laughed uproariously, along with 
the doctors.  
 
What differentiates this joke from the multitude of others made at the patients’ expense, 
and in which they are unable to participate, is, firstly, the fact that it was addressed to the 
patient himself. Secondly, the joke makes use of imagery with which the patient can 
identify. Rather than medical or aggressive imagery, which the patient would have been 
unlikely to find funny, this joke employs scenes from a more universal reality, namely the 
possible negative consequences of marriage, to illustrate a medical point. In so doing, it 
further acknowledges the patient’s experience of illness, alluding to his hope that it would 
pass and to the frustration and disappointment associated with the realisation that it will 
not. Like a reprehensible spouse – or, for that matter, a virtuous one - the disease, he tells 
the patient, is here to stay. The joke thus bridges the gap between the layman’s and 
doctors’ understandings of disease, translating a medical rendition of the man’s illness 
into non-medical terms and thus integrating Mishler’s (1984) binary worlds of medical 
and subjective experience.  
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Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, this and similar instances in emergency room talk are 
frequently the precursors to conversational contributions from the patients themselves, 
who tend in other instances to be decidedly reticent. Dr Z had begun explaining the do’s 
and don’ts of diabetes when the patient interrupted, “I don’t understand,” seemingly 
accepting the offer of conversational participation. Not only do such contributions from 
the patients enable their participation in conversation, they facilitate, as this extract 
illustrates, their ability to understand and assume responsibility for their illnesses. Other 
similar instances illustrate the importance of patients’ participation in diagnosis. A 
woman’s interruption when Dr Z told his colleagues that her heart disease resulted from a 
fatty diet, including her consumption of butter – “I don’t eat butter!” – has the potential to 
alert the doctors to aetiological factors of which they may have been unaware, and thus 
possibly contribute to a more appropriate treatment and management plan.  
 
A story that similarly illustrates the importance of the patient’s lifeworld to effective 
treatment and management of disease involves a man who had, in addition to a variety of 
other symptoms, an infection of his toes:  
“This is a very common complaint amongst people who live in shacks,” remarked Dr Z. 
“It results from the constantly wet floors and the mud and the wet blankets.” 
 
Responding to the suggestion that the man should be discharged, he commented on its 
failure to account for the context of disease: 
“But this man’s problems come from living in a shack,” he said. “It is therefore illogical 
to send him directly back to that shack.” 
 
On recommending that the man soak his feet daily in potassium permanganate, he 
pondered the feasibility of such a plan, including the patient in its formulation: 
“How are you going to do it? (..) Do you live near a day hospital?”  
 
And, of a man who presented with back pain, he asked, 
“Was he given an X-ray?” 
Dr T shook her head. 
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“The least you can do is an X-ray,” Dr Z replied. “Even if it shows nothing. This man is a 
labourer. He works very hard. And that work depends on his ability to sell his labour. So 
even if an X-ray doesn’t show up a problem, at least he will be able to see he is ok.” 
 
The recommended investigation thus takes account not only of the man’s purely 
physiological symptoms but of how his condition fits into his lifeworld, thus broadening 
the possibilities for his treatment.  
In yet a further incident, the same doctor displayed an awareness of his patients’ 
experiences of being in the hospital, an awareness that precipitated a compassionate act. 
An elderly woman who had suffered a heart attack was lying in a bed next to a young 
man in a most fearsome condition. He was shaking and shuddering frightfully and calling 
out incoherently in a terrible voice. Looking at the woman, Dr Z remarked to the others 
present, “She must be terrified,” and proceeded to advise them on the more sensitive 
treatment of their patients: 
“You must always consider the other patients,” he said. “You should never put a drunk 
man next to an old lady. Get a porter to move him.”  
 
I also not infrequently observed Dr A identifying and empathising even overtly with 
some of her patients. Concerning the plight of the dead baby’s mother, for example, she 
stated that, “I would be frantic. (.) I would definitely litigate,” clearly placing herself in 
the woman’s shoes and standing with the patient against the doctors as she commented 
regretfully, that “whoever was responsible would get away with it.” And in response to 
her colleagues’ mocking laughter at the woman who had stabbed her husband, she told 
them, “Don’t blame the patient for stabbing her husband. Maybe there’s a reason,” 
pointing overtly to the subjective experience that might have provoked such an action and 
alluding to the potentially understandable nature of such drastic behaviour.  
 
In this, as in many of these instances, the doctors’ references to their patients’ subjective 
experiences serve to highlight the wrongfulness of the doctors’ insensitive acts, thus 
reinforcing the argument that the converse objectification of patients in the doctors’ talk 
enables and justifies their inhumane treatment. These alternative constructions, in which 
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doctors acknowledge the subjectivities and experiences of their patients, further open the 
way for medical practice that incorporates the subject and his experience in decision-
making, generating the possibility for more individually attuned, and therefore 
realistically accomplishable, treatment plans. Such displays on the part of the doctors thus 
illustrate at least a tendency in the direction suggested by Mishler (1984) in his 
prioritisation of the patient’s lifeworld as the basis for action, including treatment action. 
Not only do they indicate this tendency themselves, but the doctors’ statements and 
questions that refer to their patients’ lifeworlds also mark the beginnings of potential 
pathways to the delivery of more humane care. 
 
Summary  
In this chapter I have provided an analysis of the positions that doctors and patients 
occupy in emergency room discourse at Greenlands Hospital, using this as a framework 
for tying together disparate themes in the existing literature, including discussions of 
collegiality (Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 1989; Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993; Wodak, 1996; 
Rosenthal, 1999); accountability (Millman, 1977; Mizrahi, 1986; Paget, 1988; Fox, 1989; 
Rosenthal, 1999) the binary construction of doctors and patients (Goffman, 1961; Katz, 
1984; Fisher, 1986; Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 1989; Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Zagier-Roberts, 
1994; Wodak, 1996; DelVecchio-Good & Good, 2000; Rothman, 2003; Maynard, 2003; 
Andersen, 2004); objectification (Mishler et al., 1981; Mishler, 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; 
Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Atkinson, 1995; Hak, 1999; Helman, 2001; Mishler, 2005;Potter 
& McKinlay, 2005) and labelling of patients (Millman, 1977; Fisher & Groce, 1985; 
Mizrahi, 1986; Atkinson, 1995); doctors’ conversational exclusion of patients (Mizrahi, 
1986; Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Atkinson, 1995;Wodak, 1996; Mishler, 1984, 2005; 
Helman, 2001; Potter & McKinlay, 2005); and patients’ resistance and suppression (Katz, 
1984; Fisher, 1984, 1986, 1991; Heath, 1992; Atkinson, 1995; Annandale & Hunt, 1998; 
Fainzang, 2002; Perakyla, 2002; 2006; Maynard, 2003, 2006; Mishler, 2004; Zaman, 
2004;Tanassi, 2004; Wodak, 2006a), that can be argued to have implications for the 
delivery of inhumane care. Looking at the animation of these themes in the Greenlands 
emergency unit, I have shown how they are employed by the doctors in the dialogical 
construction of theirs and their patients’ identities and of the inequality prevalent in the 
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unit. The analysis shows how doctors and patients are construed as binary opposites, 
establishing coherent, and indeed antagonistic, groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Not only do 
these identities divide doctors and their patients but they offer doctors the position of 
acting subject and patients that of passive object, exacerbating already existent power 
imbalances. I have argued in this chapter that the possibilities produced through the 
narrative structuring of events, identities and experiences in the unit in terms of the 
themes identified by past research, as above, promote poor communication between 
doctors and patients, lack of empathy with patients on the part of the doctors and 
opportunities for individual doctors to avoid personal responsibility for adverse events. I 
have further identified instances of alternative discourses that emerge in the unit, alluding 
to the multiple layers of meaning present in the doctors’ talk, including the doubt and 
ambivalence that are the primary subject of the following chapter, and highlighting the 
possibility for change. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-DOUBT IN THE 
DOCTORS’ NARRATIVES OF POWER 
 
The manufacture of distinct groups of doctors and patients, as described in the previous 
chapter, not only produces a medical corps of all-powerful superheroes and an associated 
patient body comprised of passive blue objects. It also facilitates the projection of blame 
for adverse events away from the (powerful) doctors onto their (powerless) patients, 
leading to a paradoxical reversal of roles. In this chapter I will reveal this unexpected 
shift, only hinted at in the previous two chapters, in the positions occupied by doctors and 
patients within emergency room discourse and in the agency attributed to them. I will 
explain how this shift both complicates and reinforces the positions occupied by doctors 
and patients within medical culture.I will further show how doctors’ positions within this 
discursive framework render them simultaneously powerful and guilty and how they 
endeavour in their stories of adverse events to prove their own innocence, blaming their 
patients for unfortunate occurrences, including the mismanagement of chronic illness, 
ineffective communication between doctors and patients, the patients’ deterioration and 
death, and even for the doctors’ own actions. I will argue that this blame necessitates the 
sudden attribution of agency to patients in doctors’ stories of these events, inverting the 
order defined by the narratives of science and of masculinity and rendering doctors the 
helpless bystanders and even victims of their patients’ actions. This inversion of the 
doctors’ position renders patients, in turn, formidable agents, dangerous both to 
themselves and to their doctors. I will argue in this chapter that this ‘narrative twist’, 
through blaming the patient, enables the provision of inhumane care. Via the threat that it 
poses to doctors’ positions as sole agents, it simultaneously represents an incentive to 
doctors to reassert their power and thus the breeding grounds for acts of abuse, further 
blame and so on, in a vicious cycle. The twist thus ultimately reinforces the very 
constructions within the narratives that it complicates, namely those of doctors as gods of 
science and heroes of masculinity, perpetuating the doctors’ need to reaffirm their power 
and their patients’ powerlessness.     
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Agency and responsibility  
By way of introduction to the argument presented in this chapter, I would like to draw 
attention to the relationship first pointed out by Freidson (1970) and later by authors 
including Obholzer (1994) and Speck (1994) between agency and responsibility in 
medical culture, in terms of which all-powerful doctors are understood literally to hold 
their patients’ lives in their hands, and therefore to be wholly responsible for the 
outcomes of care. As I will show in this chapter, the position that the Greenlands doctors 
occupy as all-powerful agents in the unit, alone responsible for finding, “dragging,” 
diagnosing and treating their patients, “let(ting)” them into and out of the hospital, and 
even raising them from the dead, becomes suddenly precarious in the face of negative 
outcomes to what must, according to their own definition, have been the doctors’ actions. 
In their own terms and in those set out within the narratives of science and of 
masculinity, then, poor health outcomes become indicative of personal failure (Mizrahi, 
1986) – indeed, as Zagier-Roberts (1994) points out, failure of the doctor’s self as the 
instrument of care, setting doctors up to grapple endlessly with issues of culpability and 
responsibility (1984).  
 
Dr S speaks of the massive burden of responsibility that she feels:  
“Every patient there, any resusc that happens is my responsibility, every (.) hh person 
who dies who shouldn’t cos they haven’t been seen ... it is my problem and (.) it does all 
reflect and  (.) you know, land on my conscience.” 
 
Dr N speaks of patients for whom there is little that can be done, nevertheless depicting 
their doctors as responsible for their deaths:  
“I think- I think that’s a lot- that a lot of it’s well- the people who come here are so sick 
that there’s (..), you know, (.) if they were motor vehicles they’d be (.) written off and 
scrapped. (...) Um (..) and (.) and you see someone and you think, what’s the point? (...) 
And (.) then (.) from thinking what’s the point (.) sometimes it becomes (.) an action of 
what’s the point. (..) So (.) so (.) that patient will (.) get put into a corner (.) and (.) just 
allowed to die or- or- you know.” 
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Dr P illustrates the exacerbation of the situation in a resource-poor setting, describing the 
magnitude of the decisions in which he and the other doctors frequently find themselves 
literally “playing God”: 
 “You know, you often making decisions which I don’t necessarily think you should be 
making but (.) you know, (.) whether or not you resuscitate a patient based on (.) if 
they’ve had TB or what their baseline is etc, etc, etc ... (..) Just- just purely because of 
lack of facilities. (.) So you know that the prognosis is going to be poor for someone 
who’s got bad lungs from TB (.) therefore if they come in (..) sick (.) then you don’t 
ventilate them because (.) they’re probably going to do badly and you’d rather keep the 
bed for someone with a good prognosis.” 
 
All three doctors describe their patients’ deaths as the outcomes of their actions. Dr S, in 
the first extract, depicts her patients’ deaths as somehow traceable to her own failings, 
both performance-related and moral – “it does all reflect and (.) you know, land on my 
conscience.” Dr N implies through his statement that “sometimes it becomes (.) an action 
of what’s the point,” that in certain instances the doctors become, rather than the 
superheroes they are intended to be, the agents of death, “just allow(ing) (their patients) 
to die.” And Dr P describes instances in which his decision, for example whether or not 
to ventilate a patient in view of insufficient resources and patient overload, is the direct 
precursor to the patient’s death.  
 
Responsibility, reality and the possibility for positive self-evaluation  
The combination of these constructions of doctors as all-powerful superheroes on the one 
hand and of their responsibility for their patients’ deaths on the other places doctors in a 
position of extreme psychological difficulty. Dr R reminds us of the need created by the 
narratives of science and of masculinity for doctors’ actions to produce clearly 
identifiable results of a particular nature, as discussed with reference to their 
characterisation as ‘action men’: 
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“The weekend before that we had a trauma- we had a- we had a big trauma the weekend 
before that with head injuries and whatever. Came in in a very bad way. And we were 
actually able to sort of (.) not get him right but (.) get him in a stable enough position that 
we could send him somewhere that could get him right. (..) And those are the moments 
when you feel like (.) you’re doing something. (..) There’s- there’s- (laughs) there’s need 
for you to be here. (..) You know, it’s just- it’s very- it’s difficult now with HIV. Because 
(.) you get the feeling that like why do we even bother? (.) You know, these patients 
come in in stage 4, this woman (.) that I saw now (.) stage four, they’ve got PCP25 
pneumonia and they’ve had like reactions to all the medication they on and (.) you know, 
there’s really nothing you can do at that stage. It’s just (.) sit and wait and make them 
comfortable. And (.) 70% of the patients we’re seeing are like that. (.) Hh you know you 
kind of feel like why did I become a doctor if I’m gonna sit here and say, ‘Well you a 
right off, you a right off, you a right off?’ You know, it’s kind of- you know, it sounds 
harsh but that’s what’s happening. You know, you not gonna say to a patient ‘Well, you a 
right off,’ you gonna say, ‘Well, let’s look for some palliative care or-’ and you don’t 
ever feel like you’re doing something.” 
 
Dr R makes evident the necessity of a particular kind of result, namely clearly 
identifiable diversion of the course of disease, for a doctor’s action to be considered 
worthy of the term – “those are the moments when you feel like (.) you’re doing 
something.” Actions unlikely to produce these effects, for example those involved in 
“palliative care,” produce, instead of the positive self-evaluations associated, for 
example, with successful resuscitations, questions about the value of the effort spent. 
Unlike other actions, identifiable as the causes of immediate effects, these actions are 
constructed, essentially, as non-actions – “there’s really nothing you can do at that stage” 
– equated to “sit(ting) and wait(ing).” That the value of the doctors’ identity is bound up 
with their potency as defined in these terms is hinted at by Dr R’s question in response to 
the many patients she sees suffering from full-blown AIDS – “Why did I become a 
doctor”? It seems, therefore, that the doctors’ characterisation as action-men, as the all-
powerful causes of their patients’ emergence from disease and death, places their very 
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 Pneumocystis pneumonia 
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identities under threat every time they are faced with a reality that defies their ability to 
live up to this expectation.  
 
These constructions place a millstone of unrealistic expectations and responsibility on the 
doctors and, I believe, account for the self-doubt that permeates so much of their talk, 
discussed in the two preceding chapters. In the remaining sections of this chapter I will 
articulate the process whereby these constructions of incurable disease and death in terms 
of the doctors’ personal failure lead to self-doubt and the potential for guilt, blame and 
defensive reassertions of threatened power. 
 
Guilty or not guilty? 
As illustrated by Dr R’s statement above, the nature of the work and the less than 
desirable conditions under which both the hospital and the community it serves operate 
and live, means that talk in the emergency unit abounds with stories of unhappy 
occurrences. These stories represent the ‘narrative spaces’ within which the cycle of 
power, guilt, blame and reassertions of power unfolds, and in which doctors attempt to 
secure their uncertain innocence. As in Maynard’s (2003) discussion of doctors’ use of 
passive grammatical constructions in their delivery of bad diagnostic or prognostic news, 
the Greenlands doctors in almost all these stories suddenly deviate from their usual 
attributions of power and position, relinquishing their agency, as Katz (1984) has 
described,  and projecting causal responsibility for adverse events away from themselves. 
Dr P tells me about a woman who had been misdiagnosed and left to die until the error 
was detected by chance and remedied, her subsequent death being allegedly unrelated to 
the point of the story: 
 
Dr P: Um (...) There was one (.) time (.) where a- a lady came in – she was known with 
obstructive airways disease (..) and (.) um (..) and (.) no, it was a busy day (.) and she was 
very breathless (.) and (.) it was a quick examination and then she was- (.) you know, she 
was doing very badly and the decision was ag no, she’s not gonna do well. (.) And then-  
I: Sorry, what does ‘not going to do well’ mean? 
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Dr P: It means she’s gonna die. (Laughs) So (.) um (..) so she was (.) put on a bed 
somewhere (.) and she landed up going for x-ray (.) for whatever reason, I can’t 
remember why. And then (.) for some reason someone looked at the x-ray – she hadn’t 
been reviewed cos it was decided nah, she’s gonna do badly – and she had a large 
pneumothorax (..) which (.) is treatable. And that’s most of the reason why she was doing 
badly. But it was no, she’s got this disease (inaudible), it’s just progression, she’s going 
to do badly. (.) And (.) actually she did end up dying anyway ... Which (.) is (.) which is 
not- not justification, but-  
 
Setting the scene for his story with a backdrop of mitigating circumstances – “it was a 
busy day” – the doctor makes use of some interesting sentence constructions that obscure 
those responsible for the misdiagnosis from view – “it was a quick examination ... and the 
decision was ag no” – the actions seemingly independent of any agent. Far from 
“drag(ging) (the patient) along,” as the doctors tend to do in stories with happier endings, 
this patient “was put on a bed somewhere,” a passive construction that fails to indicate an 
actor. In contrast to so many of their other stories, the patient is the only person present in 
this one, the doctors having disappeared, so to speak, into the woodwork. Glimpsed only 
for a moment when “someone” performs the less dubious action of “look(ing) at the x-
ray,” they disappear just as quickly as soon as the trail of erroneous acts is resumed – 
“she hadn’t been reviewed cos it was decided nah, she’s gonna do badly.” Having erased 
the agents of error from the story, Dr P further denies that its outcome was related to their 
actions – “actually she did end up dying anyway.” Of course, he goes on to assure me, 
this latter “is not- not justification, but-” both offering it as such and denying that he is 
doing so in the same breath.   
 
Dr S tells a similar story. Pursuing her assertion that she feels responsible for “every 
patient there ... every (.) hh person who dies who shouldn’t cos they haven’t been seen,” I 
asked her, 
“So can you think of any time when something happened that you were responsible for?” 
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“I mean, it’s not necessarily responsible for-” she replied, shifting hastily out of her 
original position in response to what began to feel like my attempts to pin her down. She 
continued: 
 “It’s like (.) the person who had airway obstruction who waited eight hours, previous 
shift,  and then who obstructed and (.) died even though I, I couldn’t- ja, I got a trachi26 in 
but not quick enough. It’s that. That shit. That- (..) that’s because they’ve waited. And 
they haven’t waited cos the team in front of us have been sitting (.) on their arses doing 
nothing, because they’ve been fucking (.) signing off ambulances (.) for the last, you 
know, I don’t know how many- I mean- it’s just (.) you know, cos it’s not like (.) the 
people were doing nothing, the people were just seeing other sick people, ja. And sooner 
or later some sucker hh has to pay for it. Ja ...  But (.) he was in resusc for a reason and 
there wasn’t any staff because three people were off and I’d phoned the matron and its 
the usual shit so basically there’s nobody on the floor so you put somebody in resusc and 
if I hadn’t walked in to do a gas I wouldn’t have even noticed that he wasn’t breathing.” 
 
Dr S quickly assures me that, contrary to her prior statement that she is responsible for 
“every patient there,” she is not in fact responsible for the death of the man in question – 
“I mean, it’s not necessarily responsible for-”. Lest there should be doubt, she abdicates 
the story for the duration of the events that caused the man’s death, which occurred, she 
tells me, on the “previous shift.” While she alludes to the possibility of her causal 
responsibility – “I got a trachi in but not quick enough” – she does so only after ensuring 
that I will not be taken in by her  ‘admission’, having already established the reason for 
the delay, namely that the man had waited eight hours prior to her arrival at the hospital. 
Establishing even more firmly the safety of her position as being well clear of any 
potential accusation, she proceeds to defend “the team in front of us,” implying their 
position as the only suspects and thereby denying her own possible responsibility. It was 
not their fault, she assures me – “(the patients) haven’t waited cos the team in front of us 
have been sitting (.) on their arses doing nothing.” “The people” I might suspect of the 
crime were in fact “just seeing other sick people” – hardly a reprehensible occupation. 
“And sooner or later some sucker hh has to pay for it,” a consequence of the natural order 
                                                 
26
 Tracheotomy tube – inserted to facilitate mechanical ventilation. 
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of things and therefore beyond the control of the “people” she defends and, by 
implication, even further beyond her own. In addition, his death was not only 
unavoidable – “he was in resusc for a reason” – but there were a variety of other factors 
preventing the doctors in question from saving the man, including the absence of some 
staff. In fact, she assures me on re-entering the story, her noticing that the man “wasn’t 
breathing” was itself, under the circumstances, surprising, alluding to the likelihood that 
she might not have – “If I hadn’t walked in to do a gas I wouldn’t have even noticed.” Far 
from having caused his death, therefore, the man died in spite of her actions – “(he) died 
even though I...got a trachi in.” 
 
These assertions of innocence must be read, in the context of the doctors’ narratives, as 
unsolicited denials of guilt, thus suggesting the opposite possibility and producing a sense 
of too much protestation. I must emphasize here that the argument that I am making is 
not one for the doctors’ actual guilt but rather one for the guilt they impute to themselves, 
a guilt produced not by their actions but by their unrealistically inflated construction of 
themselves, within the narratives of science and of masculinity, as all-powerful agents.  
 
Guilt and blame 
Assertions of innocence, however, are insufficient to conclude a case and agentless 
constructions leave room for a continued search for the culprit. Amongst the functions of 
the cohesive ‘us’, distinct from ‘them’, described in the preceding chapter, appears to be 
the maintenance of positive self-evaluations through the construction of a target for 
blame. Consistent with the pairing of the concepts of collegiality and uncertainty 
throughout the literature that deals with the fraternal nature of the medical profession, this 
component of the Greenlands doctors’ self-presentations appears to serve as a defence 
against an unspoken but ever-present implication of the possibility of their incompetence 
and failure, and against the associated recriminations. The following story, told by Dr J, 
illustrates her transition from self-doubt to blame, the mechanism by which she is able to 
conclude the case for her innocence of a failed attempt to resuscitate a patient:  
“You are with that person and you try- you are doing your utmost. And if they don’t 
make it you know you’ve done your everything. (.) But you still feel (.) you know (.) 
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upset about it. You still go- like for me I still go in my mind I’m like- I’ll talk to someone 
about it and I’ll  say, ‘Look, (.) this was the case (.) is there any- did I miss something? (.) 
So, you’re like, ‘Ok, this is what I did, he came- this is how he came in, this is what 
happened, this is (.) uh what I did and this is what I did next, da da da da da. And (.) in 
most instances he’ll say, ‘Look, um (.) you did everything you could, da da da da da’. But 
still you feel there’s- (.) maybe there’s something you could have done. (..) I think it’s 
only human. (..) You think like, hmm, is there something else that you should’ve done, is 
there- (.) did I miss something? Should I have done something faster? Is- (.) you know, 
should we have acted on this a little bit faster? If we had picked that up earlier would it 
have made a difference? (.) So- (.) Usually I would speak to, if not someone working 
here, someone else who’s also in- doing the exact same thing that I’m doing. (.) and just 
(.) you know, tell them, ‘Look here, I- I um- (.) For instance there was a guy this week. 
Um (.) he had one thing (.) and (.) we kinda didn’t pick it up. (.) Um (.) and he- and we 
assessed him as being something else. Also something urgent. And- we were wait- we 
were going to send him over to Bluewater. (.) Um (.) the guy was inevitably gonna die. (.) 
Based on what he had… He basically came in and (.) what he had was a- his aorta was 
dissecting. (..) His aorta was splitting. It was ripping. And the way we w- like I- you get 
what is known as like a typical presentation of patients. This man was not fitting in with 
my typical presentation. (.) Um, he had- his main complaints was completely different to 
what we have been taught (.) as being (.) patients’ main complaints. And he had sort of 
like the lesser (.) complaint of- of- like- You get a list of complaints and the one at the 
bottom- now that bottom one? That was the one that he complained of. And he had some 
subtle thing. And as I say, retrospect you always have twenty-twenty vision 
retrospectively. Your retrospective vision is always twenty-twenty. Cos now you go- cos 
I know the guys that came on, they like, ‘How did you miss it?’ I’m like, ‘Ja, you know 
what? If you were there you would have missed it’. Because of what he complained of. 
(.) Cos it wasn’t just me it was like other doctors that also examined the guy and they 
didn’t pick it up either. (..) On his way, before he got to Bluewater he died. (..) Uh cos the 
ambulances take so long- Oh! Other source of frustration. Ambulances. (.) They take too 
long to come. It’s a massive frustration. We need to transfer a patient urgently to another 
facility (.) they just don’t come. (..) They just say, ‘No, we don’t have an ambulance 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
230 
 
available’. (.) and then the ambulance brings in rubbish like sore throats (.) and uh (.) 
diarrhoea for a month or whatever (.) and you go like ‘Uhhhh’. (.) Cos their reason is the 
person is already at a hospital so there’s less urgency for that person to go to another 
facility. And if you say you need a paramedic you gonna wait even longer. Cos there’s 
very few paramedics in state.” 
 
As invited by the narrative framework placing doctors in the position of all-powerful 
agents, Dr J describes the failed resuscitation and death in terms of her own actions – 
“this is what happened, this is (.) uh what I did and this is what I did next, da da da da 
da.” Beginning by assuring me that she has done her “utmost” and her “everything” to 
save the patient, Dr J portrays her anxious response to a patient’s death as understandable 
but nevertheless unwarranted – “You still feel ... upset about it.” Invoking the assurances 
of another doctor, she proceeds to assuage her own doubts by supplying his answers to 
her questions – “‘Look ... you did everything you could’.” Shifting the focus from her 
misgivings about her actions to what appears as a surrogate doubt in the understandable 
nature of these misgivings, she proceeds to assure me that these doubts are “only human,” 
the unstated implication being that their unwarranted nature is a given. The list of the 
doubts she goes on to relate seems to highlight their unreasonable and self-penalising 
nature, as well as foregrounding the possibility that a better performance may have made 
no difference. In the example she supplies, however, she continues to display discomfort 
with her error, preceding its statement with ‘kinda’, a word that diminishes the reality of 
what she admits – she (only) “kinda didn’t pick it up.” Interrupting the sequence of 
events to assure us that “the guy was inevitably gonna die,” and to emphasize the horrific 
(and thus presumably incurable) nature of his complaint – “His aorta was dissecting. (..) 
(it) was splitting. It was ripping” – she justifies the error by accentuating the atypical 
nature of her patient’s presentation, again apparently anticipating the accusation that she 
should have seen it. She goes on to assure us that to see the man’s complaint would have 
required “twenty- twenty vision,” and that “it wasn’t just (her)” – “If you were there you 
would have missed it,” her unprompted disavowal alerting us to her own self-doubt. By 
the time that her story reaches the event of the man’s death, she has led us to the real 
cause, distal from herself – “he died ... cos the ambulances take so long.” Her sudden 
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exclamation – “Oh! Other source of frustration. Ambulances” – creates the sense that she 
has found what she herself has been searching for, illustrating employment of the 
defensive reactions that authors including Good and DelVecchio-Good (1993; 2000), 
Dartington (1994), Oberholzer (1994), Mizrahi (1986), Mishler (1984) and Goffman 
(1961) have described, namely a cause for the man’s death that diverts attention from 
herself, having brought another actor to the fore – “They” who “take too long to come,” 
“just don’t come,” “just say, ‘No, we don’t have an ambulance available’,” and “bring in 
rubbish like sore throats.” 
 
Not only, therefore, do doctors disappear as actors in their unhappier stories but, in 
keeping with the substantial discussions of authors including Good and DelVecchio-
Good (1993; 2000), Dartington (1994), Oberholzer (1994)), Mishler (1984), Mishler et al. 
(1981), Goffman (1961), Paget (1988), Rosenthal (1995), Wodak (2006b), Szasz and 
Hollender (1997) and Zagier-Roberts (1994), who identify blame as that defence most 
used by members of the medical profession, a host of other agents suddenly appear. Other 
hospitals are blamed for not carrying their share of the patient burden – “If (name of 
hospital) wants us to deal with all of it then- (.) then this is exactly what they must 
expect.” Nurses at Greenlands, usually backgrounded in the doctors’ talk, come to the 
fore. And doctors from other hospitals are identified as culprits. When no single agent 
present can be found to take the blame, it is shifted either to the minister of health – 
“You’ve got a minister of health who’s nick-named Dr Beetroot27. That just about says it 
all!” – or onto an environmental cause – “Ja, I think that the stress of the job, (.) the work 
environment (.) the lack of staff (..) the burden of patients and how ill they are (.) and you 
start treating them as entities rather than as humans.” Alternatively, the cause is identified 
as a quality of the place itself, rather than resting in the actions of those who inhabit it – 
“This place is actually pathological.”  
                                                 
27
 Manto Shabalala Msimang, the Minister of Health at the time that this research was conducted, was well 
known for her statement, at a time when the department of health was resistant to making antiretroviral 
drugs available to patients suffering from HIV and AIDS, that beetroot was a good alternative treatment.  
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Blameworthy patients 
As noted by a number of authors writing on the subject of blame within medical culture, 
most frequently of all it is the patients themselves who take the blame for the myriad of 
adverse events that take place in the unit, including their own illnesses, their failure to get 
better, their doctors’ inadequacies (Mishler et al., 1981) and even their doctors’ feelings 
of hostility and aggression toward them (Mizrahi, 1984; Zagier-Roberts, 1994).  
 
When a doctor has failed to obtain an adequate history from a patient this is typically 
reported on the ward round in terms of the fact that “(the patient) doesn’t give a good 
history,” attributing sole responsibility to the patient for what can only have been a two-
way communicative endeavour. Not only is the poor quality of the history construed as 
the patient’s  fault, this fault is actually her inherent characteristic – not only did the 
patient not “give a good history” on a particular occasion but she “doesn’t” give one in a 
more generalised sense, further denying the dialogical process. When a patient leaves the 
hospital without an adequate understanding of his illness and treatment it is he who is 
primarily responsible: 
“Sometimes I tell people exactly what’s going on. And they have been asked five minutes 
afterwards and they go, ‘Oh, no, he just told me to take a pill’.” 
 
Since the doctor’s actions are ir eproachable – “I tell people exactly what’s going on,” 
the only cause for the patients’ subsequent lack of the relevant knowledge can be the 
“people” themselves, who are the more reprehensible for denying the doctor’s efforts – 
“he just told me to take a pill.” In fact, patients in general “don’t take responsibility for 
their own health.”  
 
My reply to Dr P’s statement to this effect elicited an interesting response:  
I: Ja, I mean, I agree with you, one has to take responsibility for one’s own health, but if 
you look at the way health care is provided (.) generally patients aren’t given the 
necessary information and so on. 
J: Yes. Absolutely. Cos we expect them to take responsibility for their own health but 
then we say, ‘Take this tablet’. ‘Take these tablets and you’ll get better’. We don’t say 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
233 
 
this one’s for this and this one’s for this, we’re like, ‘Put your arm up there’ and you 
shove a pipe into their chest and before they know it they’re like, ‘What the hell’s going 
on?’ (.) They feel better, therefore they’re like, ‘Oh, you helped me. (.) But I won’t ask 
questions’. (.) You know.  
 
Dr P begins by expressing full agreement and even citing the errors of the doctors’ ways. 
Once he has “shove(d) a pipe into their chest,” however, the patients begin to “feel 
better,” justifying the doctors’ actions and even producing gratitude – “‘Oh, you helped 
me.” Having thus ‘proved’ the positive nature of the doctors’ actions, he then quotes from 
the patients’ minds – “But I won’t ask questions,” effecting a subtly produced exchange 
of positions and reaching a conclusion in which the patients have become the culprits – it 
is they who “won’t ask questions.” 
 
On those occasions when it is the doctors’ actions themselves that are the source of 
concern, these are construed as reactive to those of their patients, mirroring the 
constructions discussed in the previous chapter in which patients’ agency is denied, and 
illustrating the “powerful mix of blame...and professional leniency”  that Rosenthal 
(1999: p. 162) describes. Standing at the foot of an apparently unconscious woman’s bed, 
Dr N asked Dr D, 
“Did you put her to sleep?” 
“She kicked us,” Dr D replied, her affirmative indicated only by her substitution of a 
direct answer with a description of the patient’s (prior) kick, justifying what becomes her 
reaction. 
 
Dr F, elaborating on the reasons for which she would “probably end up telling the patient 
she’s got pneumonia and discharge her with amoxicillin – not because that is what I 
really really think but because she wants an answer,” (see chapter seven) offers a description of the 
consequences she would incur at the hands of her patient’s family should she have told 
the truth, justifying her lie – this time by means of her patients’ anticipated actions: 
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“The family will probably take her to another doctor tomorrow just so they can say they 
came here and she was just sent home with these pills and she’s still sick. Just because I 
can’t tell her anything concrete.”  
 
Patients are blamed for their own illnesses too. Frequently, the patient’s behaviour is 
identified as the most relevant aetiological factor. The doctors may well, on occasion, be 
correct in this assessment and it is arguable that patients should be made aware of the role 
they have played. Dr Z asked a patient,  
 “How much do you drink?” 
 “Not much,” the man replied. 
 “What do you drink?” the doctor persisted. 
 “Brandy.” 
 “Alright,” said Dr Z, “You’ve damaged your liver now. You’re going to have to stop 
drinking. Immediately.”  
 
In a similar but arguably less productive instance of citing the role played by the patient’s 
behaviour in causing her illness, Dr P, after informing the sister of a woman he had 
(mis)diagnosed as having suffered a stroke that she was going to die, launched into an 
angry tirade: 
 “She was told if she didn’t have her feet off she would die and she refused. And now she 
is gonna die. Then that’s her decision. She should have had the amputation. I mean, I’m 
blunt with people. I tell them, ‘If you don’t have your feet off you’re gonna die’. And 
now she is gonna die.”  
 
The combination of Dr P’s anger and his simplistic construction of the woman’s 
“refus(al)” to have her feet amputated implies more than an intellectual commitment to 
the belief he is professing. In fact, his words produce a sense of urgency in his attempt to 
convince me, and perhaps himself, that the impending death is the fault of the dying 
woman. His simplistic construction of what can only be assumed to have been a very 
difficult and emotionally fraught decision seems a glaring omission of the complexities 
that must surely have been involved and indeed a denial thereof, rather than a simple 
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oversight. The anger with which he made his point further convinced me of the truth of 
this interpretation, provoking a suspicion, through overstatement of his case, that he 
‘protest(s) too much’. I believe that his subsequent shift of tack, from a denouncement of 
the patient’s “decision,” to an assertion of his own provision of the information necessary 
to make the ‘correct’ choice in such instances, provides the clue to the reason for the 
doctor’s pressing attempt at conviction. It appears to indicate (and to attempt to avoid) 
once again the possibility of the opposite, namely that the death is not in fact the patient’s 
but the doctor’s fault.  
 
On other occasions the role played by patients’ behaviour is less clearly defined. But their 
doctors are no less convinced of its relevance. Dr M, speaking of the reason the patients 
lying in the beds around us were ill, commented cynically the day after Christmas, “’Tis 
the season to be jolly. Everyone’s rocking up and down!” Dr B, of obese patients, told me 
he disliked treating them because, “They’re the agents of their own demise.” And Dr P, 
of a woman who had suffered a hypoglaecaemic coma, comments that, “She’s probably 
“fried a few brain cells,” the patient thus becoming the agent of the “fry(ing).” In cases of 
injury due to assault, the doctors tend to assume that the patient’s own antisocial 
behaviour was the precursor to the attack:  
“I assure you that guy was not beaten up for no reason – that guy looks skelm28. There’s 
very few people who are beaten up for no reason. Even the community beatings. There’s 
no way a community would just do that. They’re not innocent.”  
 
And Dr I asked his patient, who had been stabbed in the abdomen, 
“Did you do anything to warrant the attack? (..) Did you rob someone or anything like 
that?” looking at me askance when the reply came in the negative. 
 
Not only the patients’ behaviour is faulted but their characters and characteristics too 
come under scrutiny. Paralleling Goffman’s (1961) description of the hostile 
characterisation of patients in total institutions as bitter, untrustworthy and secretive, 
patients who have taken their medication incorrectly or not at all, failed to follow their 
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 Afrikaans slang word implying slyness, dishonesty and some criminality. 
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doctors’ orders in some other way or who have presented very late in the course of their 
disease, are constructed by the doctors of the Greenlands emergency unit as stupid, 
ignorant, irresponsible and irrational. Dr L asked her colleague, 
“Why is he drinking if he’s an epileptic?” 
a question directed at eliciting an indictment of the patient, and to which her colleague 
responded by tapping his head with his index finger, implying stupidity, irrationality or 
both. 
 
Dr P comments on the large number of patients brought to the hospital in a very advanced 
stage of illness or after having failed to take prescribed medication correctly:   
 
“You know, but again, it’s- I mean, who’s (.) fault is it that (.), you know, is it the (.) 
health system’s fault that the patient stayed at home for hh six months getting worse and 
worse and worse and worse before he was taken to us? Maybe there wasn’t a readily 
available doctor or something. Or maybe- ja. But maybe it’s ignorance on the patient’s 
part.  ‘What- what- what tablets are you taking?’ You know, ‘What tablets are you 
taking?’ ‘Oh, I don’t know’. ‘What’s the name of the cigarettes you smoke?’ ‘Rothmans’. 
‘So you can read’. So therefore, ‘Why don’t you know the name of your tablets?’ Cos if 
you don’t know the names of your tablets you’re probably not taking them. Which I find 
inexcusable. Cos- And it’s a complete move of responsibility for their health onto 
someone else. Onto the health care providers. Which is wrong. But that’s (.) the way it’s 
been. You know, um-” 
 
Dr P begins by introducing a search for the culprit – “who’s (.) fault is it?” – which he 
follows immediately with a suggestion that draws our attention to the illogicality of 
blaming anyone other than the patient himself – “is it the (.) health system’s fault that the 
patient stayed at home for hh six months getting worse and worse and worse and worse 
before he was taken to us?” As the only agent in this construction, the patient is the only 
possible culprit. It was, after all, he who “stayed at home.”  This action having occurred 
prior to the patient’s being “taken to us,” it is logically impossible for his demise to be 
“the health system’s fault.” While Dr P acknowledges that “Maybe there wasn’t a readily 
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available doctor or something,” his subsequent suggestion, “But maybe its ignorance on 
the patient’s part,” makes use of the word, “but” to shift the spotlight away from this 
possibility and to refocus attention on the patient’s “ignorance.”  Rendering this 
possibility all the more convincing, the doctor proceeds to construct an image of the 
patient as someone who does not even know what medication has been prescribed for 
him. However, he goes on to suggest that the patient’s “non-compliance” is more 
culpable than would be implied if ignorance were the only contributing factor, indicated 
by the fact that he can read the brand name on his cigarette box and presumably, 
therefore, the details of his medication. Dr P thus sets the scene to convince us that it is in 
fact “inexcusable” behaviour on the patient’s part that has led to his current illness, 
further emphasising the moral unacceptability of his failure to assume responsibility for 
his own illness and thus completing the “health care providers’” vindication and firmly 
establishing blame within the patient’s arena.  
 
Subjects and objects, victims and perpetrators 
Not only, however, are patients simply construed as to blame for adverse events in the 
unit, they are in fact depicted as dangerous, both to themselves and to those around them, 
including the doctors. Thus, the doctors’ relinquishment of their own agency in order to 
blame their patients for adverse events effects the role reversal that Katz (1984) 
describes, in terms of which doctors bring into being the “world of contradictions 
wherein the patient (is) oppressed while being characterised as the oppressor” (Mizrahi, 
1986, p. 35) and, I argue, along with Mizrahi, is in turn subjected to abuse. No longer 
objects devoid of any capacity for action, patients become the culpable causes of every 
problem. In the process, the doctors deny their own agency or render their actions 
ineffectual, unable to deter their patients from their irrational, irresponsible or malicious 
behaviour. In those instances in which patients are blamed for the doctors’ actions, 
however, passivity is not always sufficient proof of the doctors’ innocence. Doctors and 
patients are therefore pushed even further toward their opposite poles, doctors becoming 
their patients’ victims, driven by them to behave in the ways that they do. The ‘real’ 
perpetrators, the patients, are constructed as “literally harassing” their doctors, “circling 
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(them)” (like helicopters), “conspiring to irritate (them),” “wasting (their) time,” and 
generally “mak(ing) (their) lives difficult.” Dr L describes their relationships as she sees 
them: 
“You know, that’s the other thing. You try’na help someone and they swearing at you. (.) 
And they being abusive to you. And you just gotta deal with it.” 
 
Proceeding with an example, she describes her interactions with a young boy who had 
been hit by a car and had his leg broken: 
“He was very, very obnoxious. He was rude, he was swearing at us (.) um, you know, 
while we trying to help him.” 
 
While I have little doubt that the boy was indeed “swearing at (her),” and that she was 
“trying to help (him),” his construal as the aggressor and hers as his innocent victim 
seems at least one-sided in light of her response to my subsequent question:   
“And d’you have any idea why he thought he was swearing at you?” 
“Well because-” she replied, “Well, the thing is we- (.) his leg was painful (.) and we 
were moving his leg. We had to move his leg cos he had a massive gash there as well that 
needed - that I needed to- to suture. (.) Um (.) and I needed to get to the wound. (.) and I 
gave him sedation and that kind of also- sedation also lowers your inhibitions. So- (.) he 
was just swearing at us, you know, and um- (.) He was becoming very- he was fighting 
and uh we had to get a porter to hold him down and even then it wasn’t helping.” 
 
In her initial description of the boy’s behaviour Dr L did not tell me that he was in pain 
and that, in order to treat him the doctors had to make his pain worse. Nor did she reveal 
that the boy had been given a sedative, which may have lowered his inhibitions, reducing 
his motivation to control his behaviour. While she admits in her reply to my question that 
“we were moving his leg,” she makes no causal connection between this action and the 
boy’s distress. Instead she construes these as two independent facts – “his leg was painful 
(.) and we were moving (it),” the conjunction ‘and’ implying an association between the 
movement and the pain but not a causal one. Dr L also gives no indication of her and her 
colleagues’ involvement in the “fight.” It was “he (who) was just swearing (and) 
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fighting,” the word ‘just’ suggesting an absence of motive. Her own and the other 
doctors’ actions, on the other hand, are justified by necessity – “We had to move his leg,” 
“I needed to get to the wound,” and “we had to get a porter to hold him down.” While 
these necessary actions were motivated by the doctors’ intention to “help” the boy, they 
were, she reminds us, nevertheless ineffectual, once again demonstrating the doctors’ 
new position of impotence – “even that wasn’t helping.”  Reading between the lines and 
surmising some causal connections myself, however, the picture can be altered 
dramatically with no great stretch of the imagination. Instead of the “very, very 
obnoxious” boy Dr L describes as “abus(ing)” his doctors, it becomes quite easy to 
envision a boy in excruciating pain, who has been made somewhat irrational and 
uncontrollable both by the intensity of the pain and by the sedatives he has been given. 
From this point of view, it is quite plausible, then, that to him his doctors would have 
seemed the aggressors and he their helpless victim, pinned down by a porter and 
subjected to unbearable torture, highlighting the distortion in the doctor’s construction.  
 
Doctors portray themselves as the victims not only of verbal abuse from their patients but 
also of physical violence. Dr P describes the extent of patients’ violence in the unit: 
“Two doctors, two nurses and two patients have been assaulted in the last three months 
by psychiatric patients. (.) One patient sexually assaulted- two patients sexually assaulted. 
(..) In the casualty. By psychiatric patients.” 
 
And Dr R elaborates the threat that these patients pose:  
“But apart from anything it’s dangerous to us and it’s dangerous to the other patients. 
That’s the big thing. I mean you get- you get these aggressive guys coming in and you 
sedate them ok fine, but then they wake up on the sly, go sneaking around the hospital, 
and the next thing you know he’s raped some woman in a ward (.) or (.) you know, 
something really terrible. (..) You know, these guys wake up and they literally (.) sneak 
past you. (..)They- they sneaky, they really are.” 
 
While no reason exists to doubt the accuracy of the figures Dr P provides, and Dr R’s 
claim that there is a risk to both doctors and patients would be difficult to deny, a number 
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of features of the doctors’ talk on this topic render it nevertheless an aspect worthy of 
discussion. Firstly, descriptions of patients’ violence toward doctors exist in the absence 
of similar descriptions of doctors’ violence toward patients, which are not uncommon. 
Only once during the time that I spent at the hospital did I hear a doctor make mention of 
such an event – “You should have been here on the weekend!” he laughed as we watched 
his colleague’s rough treatment of a man he was attempting to sedate. “One of the doctors 
hit a patient! The man was drunk and the doctor lost it and klapped
29
 him!” Secondly, 
doctors’ portrayals of their patients’ violence tend to depict them as motiveless, driven by 
irrationality, as in Dr L’s description of the “very obnoxious” boy above and Dr P’s 
failure to mention Dr J’s attempts to perform a lumbar puncture against her patient’s will 
in his narration of the story in which the patient hit Dr J. Alternatively, patients’ violence 
is depicted as the product of pure malice, again independent of the interactions within 
which it occurs, as in Dr R’s description above of the “sly,” “manipulate(ive)” and 
“aggressive” patients who “go sneaking around the hospital” doing “really terrible” 
things. While again not denying that terrible things do sometimes occur, nor the real 
malice and aggression of a patient who rapes “some woman in the ward,” my argument 
concerns the absence of any mention of what frequently occurs as part of an interaction, 
rather than as an action emanating from the relevant patient’s evil intentions.  
 
Thirdly, while again not denying the serious nature of some incidents, the doctors tend, in 
many of their stories, to exaggerate their patients’ violence and the risk that they incur. 
An incident that illustrates the reason for which I began to question the doctors’ 
proclamations of fear, and characterisation of their patients as frightening opponents, was 
one in which three doctors and two security guards chased, caught and sedated a man 
clearly suffering some mental disturbance. The man was thin and frail looking and, while 
the chase occurred all around me, the man at one point even seeking shelter behind me, at 
no point did I sense any threat either to my own safety or to that of anyone else. In fact, 
contrary to displaying aggression, the man appeared frightened of the doctors, and was 
certainly convinced that any threat was to himself. At that point during the incident when 
the man was caught and sedated, he did, however, make a most feeble attempt to hit the 
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doctor holding the syringe, an attempt that can be described better as a flap of the hand 
than as an attempted blow. Watching this action and feeling pity for the man, I 
inadvertently muttered, “Shame30.” 
“Shame what?” retorted Dr P defensively, seated next to me at the doctors’ station. 
I described what I had seen to provoke my sympathy.  
“Did he try and hit him?” Dr P asked with great consternation, sitting up sharply in his 
chair.  
I reiterated the pathetic nature of the attempt.   
“That constitutes a threat, which needs to be suppressed!” he replied, jokingly refusing to 
be dissuaded of the danger and thereby suggesting the usefulness of this construction to 
him.   
 
Caring for perpetrators 
It is not difficult to imagine how such constructions might, as Mizrahi (1986) argues is 
the case, enable the delivery of less compassionate care, rendering patients less worthy, 
justifying avoidant behaviour on the part of their doctors and, in the words of Millman 
(1977: p. 202), providing the grounds for “the profession’s inclination to make the client 
at best a passive participant in the work – to, in essence, remove from the client his 
everyday status as an adult citizen, to minimise his essential capacity to reason and his 
right to dignity.” Indeed, a number of authors including Lorber (1975), Szasz and 
Hollender (1997) Paget (1988) and Zagier-Roberts (1994) have argued that constructions 
in terms of which patients are blamed for adverse events increase the likelihood that 
patients will be subjected to inferior care. Three key mechanisms whereby blame can be 
argued to facilitate inhumane care appear to be operative in the Greenlands emergency 
unit: first, blame conjures feelings of anger and hostility toward the patients, both 
rendering them less worthy of care and provoking and justifying acts of aggression on the 
part of their doctors; second, blaming patients involves the attribution of agency to them 
and hence constitutes a threat to doctors’ power, creating a need for its more vigorous 
reassertion; and third, blame defers responsibility away from the doctors, reducing their 
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 The word “shame” is used colloquially in South Africa as an expression of sympathy. 
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accountability for quality of care.  In the remainder of this chapter I will detail and 
illustrate the workings of these mechanisms and the role of the associated constructions 
in reaffirming the positions of doctors and patients and in perpetuating the nature of the 
interactions between them, as forecast by the narratives of science and of masculinity. 
Blame, hostility and quality of care 
As illustrated throughout this and the preceding two chapters, the doctors in the 
Greenlands emergency unit regularly express feelings of hostility toward their patients. 
The relatively direct pathway between blame, these hostile feelings and the delivery of 
inferior care is illustrated in the following extract. Dr Q and Dr V, seated at the doctors’ 
station, expressed their feelings for one of the patients with whom they were dealing that 
day: 
Dr Q: We hate her. Woops, did I say that out loud? 
Dr V: That’s why she never got a chest X-ray. 
Dr Q [To me, in explanation of what I had just overheard]: This woman epitomizes 
everything that’s fucked up about this country. She went to a hospital in the Eastern 
Cape, where she was fully worked up and given an appointment to return in March last 
year. (.) She never went back. (.) Now she shows up in the Western Cape system. She’s 
wasted R20 000 of the Eastern Cape’s money and now she’s going to waste R20 000 of 
our money. 
 
While the “hospital in the Eastern Cape” is faultless, having “fully worked (the patient) 
up and given (her) an appointment to return in March last year,” the patient herself 
“epitomizes everything that’s fucked up about this country.” She has “wasted” the money 
of the Eastern Cape’s health system and is about to inflict the same damage to that of the 
Western Cape, providing ample justification for denying her a chest X-ray. While there 
was a hint of humour in this conversation and I cannot speculate about the clinical 
indications that the woman in fact required an X-ray, what is certain is that Dr Q is 
offering her demonisation as justification for his feelings of “hate” for her and for the 
delivery of inferior medical care.  
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The deficient care offered to psychiatric patients at the hospital, too, is justified by blame, 
the doctor this time invoking the threat that these patients pose to other patients:  
“We don’t manage psychiatric patients here. Here we sedate them, tie them to the bed. (.) 
If they (.) stop breathing (.) bonus.(..) You know, that’s what happens. You don’t 
interview them half the time (.) uh- You know, you don’t give a shit. They (inaudible), 
you just bash them on IV, sedate them, chuck them on a bed and then (.) if they keep on 
getting rowdy then you send them off to (name of psychiatric hospital) and if they don’t, 
well then in three days time you boot them out and just wait for them to do it again. (.) 
It’s not managing psychiatric patients. Cos they’re so disruptive.  And the problem is is 
that (.) they (.) skew (..) the treatment of patients um (.) because they are so intensive in 
terms of their time and then- So (..) somebody could come in stabbed in the belly (.) but a 
psychiatric person’s gonna be making such a rumpus that you’ll have to sort him out first. 
Before the stab belly. Now that’s- it’s absolute- that’s wrong. Should they even be 
brought here? I’m sorry. (..) You can- y can ask any one, you ask any doctor who’s 
worked in the casualty here. (.) And (.) probably, well- one of the first things he’ll say to 
you is (.), ‘Ja, the psych patients (.) ja, we take them down’.” 
Dr W, in this extract, describes the frequently appalling treatment of psychiatric patients, 
following it with a causal explanation that foregrounds the patients’ behaviour and its 
consequences for other patients. When another patient who needs immediate treatment 
has to wait while the doctor attends to the psychiatric patient, the doctor’s action is 
described as determined by that of the “psychiatric person” and devoid of his own choice. 
Not only do the actions of the psychiatric patients have disruptive consequences, but they 
are morally “wrong,” provoking the reaction to which all doctors fall prey – “You 
can...ask any doctor who’s worked in the casualty here” – namely, applying the ‘take 
down’ of the psychiatric patients. Again, this insistence that “you can ask anyone” 
smacks of an unsolicited denial of the possibility that Dr W in fact attributes his response 
to his own personal failing, while simultaneously providing the justification for it.  
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
244 
 
Reassertions of power and the potential for abuse 
In addition to projecting blame onto patients and others for negative events, and thus 
establishing their own innocence, the portrayal of patients as perpetrators and doctors as 
their hapless victims creates a need for doctors to assert and reassert their power, just as 
soon as they have renounced it. Having designated their patients as threats, the doctors 
must in turn suppress them, necessitating and justifying, for example, the patients’ heavy 
sedation with valium, the tying of others to their beds and the “feral” reactions Dr P 
describes when facing the “threat(s)” he feels he must “destroy.” 
 
Dr J describes the procedure for sedating patients at the hospital, the patients’ behaviour, 
and that of one in particular, requiring and justifying the extreme measures adopted: 
“There was another psychiatric patient, Delilah (.) Smith. (.) She was a regular here. (.) 
She’s been a regular for a while and- and um (..) she went off one day, she pulled out her 
drip and she’s the type of patient that gets a bit manic at times. And so she will sing and 
dance and perform in the casualty. So (.) I dunno (.) we were on night shift and it was 
about eight o’ clock in the morning and- uh- she was just getting out of hand and when 
Dr Y comes he doesn’t like the psychiatric patients running around. This was some time 
last year. And she (.) started to get aggravating, shouting and screaming. So we wanted to 
sedate her. But we need to get a drip up on her. (..) So first she kicked me in the bum (.) 
just walked up to me and kicked me in the bum. (laughs) I dunno if because my bum is so 
big everyone like goes  for it, but um- She kicked me in the bum and I said, ‘I don’t like 
that. Please stop it’. So she was laughing there (.) and then I said, ‘Right, we going to 
give you some medication’. She refused to take the medication so I- I asked uh- some of 
the male guys just to help me hold her down. (.) She got a hold of (laughs) Dr T (.) and 
tried to choke him. (.) So we eventually had to take her down, we had to trip her and 
force her onto the ground to hold her down and sedate her. (..) And I told- I told Dr E- I 
told Dr E, she was here yesterday, she came to visit, I told her um (..) when you work in 
Greenlands casualty (.) you do not get scared of sedation. You do not get scared in 
sedating patients. (..) I mean, a lot of people say, ‘Oh, only use 10mg of valium,’ and 
stuff like that. Here our standard dosage is 20 mg of valium and five haliperidol and you 
are going to go to sleep. (..) And if you wake up then we will give you more.” 
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Dr J begins her story with a description of that particular patient, Delilah’s, actions. The 
only agent in the story’s introduction, which sets the scene for the doctors’ subsequent 
actions, Dr J describes Delilah’s actions as the result of “the type of patient” that she is 
and as wholly irrational and out of the blue – “She went off one day,” “She ... just walked 
up to me and kicked me in the bum,” and, “She refused to take the medication.” The 
doctors’ first action in the story is a direct consequence of the patient’s prior action – 
“She (.) started to get aggravating, shouting and screaming. So we wanted to sedate her.” 
Dr J, interestingly, connects her own next (polite and innocuous) request – “‘I don’t like 
that. Please stop it” – to Delilah’s kick with the conjunction ‘and’, apparently 
comfortable this time to leave the question of causality less clearly stated. No sooner do 
her actions become potentially controversial again, however, and she reverts to the safety 
of the conjunction ‘so’, more firmly placing causality in her patient’s court – “She 
refused to take the medication so I ... asked ... some of the male guys just to help me hold 
her down,” and, “She got a hold of ... Dr T (.) and tried to choke him. (.) So we eventually 
had to take her down.” Preceding Dr J’s statement of the high dosages of drugs she and 
her colleagues use to sedate their patients, this anecdote serves as justification for her 
admission. Dr J’s emphasis of the word ‘going’ – “you are going to go to sleep” – 
reinforces this justification, implying the patients’ resistance to sleep and cooperation. 
Even a further dose is threatened if the obstinate patients dare to wake up again – “If you 
wake up then we will give you more” – the doctors’ projected action a consequence of 
the patients’ anticipated one.  
 
Thus, construction of patients as threats to themselves, to other patients and to their 
doctors, while rendering them momentarily powerful enemies, necessitates their 
suppression, providing the opportunity for doctors to re-establish their own power just as 
soon as they have implied their vulnerability. That these attempts to re-establish 
threatened power can and do, on occasion, lead to acts of abuse, are illustrated throughout 
the material presented in this thesis, perhaps the most striking example being provided by 
the story presented in chapter seven of the “Greenlands takedown,” in which a psychotic 
patient’s violent outburst necessitated the administration of a double dose of valium, 
strangulation and compression of the man’s face into the stretcher. 
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Blame and accountability  
In addition to provoking hostile feelings and feelings of vulnerability and exposure to 
threat, and thus, potentially, allowing the delivery of inferior care, blame, of both patients 
and other non-doctors, in combination with the existence of distinct, clearly bounded 
groups, as described in chapter eight, further protects doctors from accountability both for 
the inferior care that they sometimes provide and for their “feral” reactions to more 
exceptionable patients. The conversation held around the doctors’ station about the death 
of a very young baby who had been brought into the unit the previous night, as detailed in 
chapter eight, is a case in point. This story reveals the manner in which the doctors 
participating in the conversations surrounding the baby’s death worked together to 
protect one another, presuming each other’s innocence, laying blame elsewhere and 
ultimately concluding that the incident had resulted from “stupidity,” as opposed to 
“negligence,” and therefore required no further investigation.  
 
Another instance of medical error that ended in near disaster further illustrates the 
potential for blame to enable poor quality care to go unchecked: The same woman who 
had been (mis)diagnosed as having suffered a stroke, above, was wheeled into the 
casualty by her sister. She was unconscious and her toes were completely rotten with 
gangrene. After asking a number of questions, Dr P elicited from the woman that she 
thought her sister had had “a slight stroke.” He contradicted her: 
“No. This is not a slight stroke. This is a big stroke. She is going to die.”  
He then asked whether the woman would prefer to leave her sister in the hospital or to 
take her home. The woman insisted that she should stay in the hospital, clearly not 
understanding the doctor’s implication.   
“Well, there’s no bed for her. She’s just gonna stay where she is here in the corner.”  
Still not grasping the doctor’s meaning, the woman maintained that she would stay.  
“Look, it’s your decision. It would be very difficult to look after her at home like this so I 
won’t blame you if you decide to leave her here – I’m just asking because sometimes the 
relatives want to be close.” Dr P then walked away from the bed. A few minutes later he 
returned, telling me that he was going to try, as a “last ditch attempt,” to “wake her up 
with some sugar.” Explaining to the woman’s sister and husband, who had joined her, 
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that “either it will work immediately or if it doesn’t that will not be a good sign. I’m sorry 
to be the bearer of bad news, but, ja, that won’t be good.” Moments after the injection, 
the patient woke up, lifted her head and began talking to her family members. There was 
an enormous sense of relief all round and Dr P was glowing: 
 “I gave the wonder drug and she survived.”  
Still reeling from the emotional ordeal, I stammered, “that was-” 
“Cool!” he interjected for me.  
 
Only afterwards was the question raised of why the woman’s blood sugar levels had not 
been tested as soon as she arrived, which would have averted the near disastrous mistake. 
While the mistake was both that of the nurse who took the patient’s observations and the 
doctor, Dr P, who failed to notice the missing test result, first promising to provide no 
treatment at all and then proceeding to administer sugar without the blood glucose 
reading, only the nurse’s fault was ever implied. Dr P, on the other hand, revelled in the 
glory of having saved the woman’s life. Thus, in both instances, the presence of a host of 
targets for blame serve as immediately available causal factors in stories of adverse 
events, diverting attention from the doctors’ mistakes and other undesirable actions, 
completing the picture and thus obscuring the need for further investigation. 
 
The cycle of guilt, blame and power 
The retaliatory and suppressive actions the doctors describe, whereby patients are, for 
example, sedated or ’taken down’, assist in the reestablishment of doctors’ temporarily 
forfeited power but are the very same actions that produce, through their potential to 
provoke criticism, the sense of self doubt that originally necessitated patient blame. This 
brings the doctors back to the beginning of what has become a vicious cycle. Defined as 
all-powerful and faced with a situation in which failures are inevitable, doctors find 
themselves caught in a ‘narrative trap’, in terms of which they must either accept 
responsibility for disease, death and abuse, an option that would strip them of their 
integrity and of the possibility for positive self-evaluation, or refuse the only positive 
identity available to them within the discursive framework, namely that of the all-
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powerful doctor. The emerging pattern of patient blame can thus be seen as a defensive 
manoeuvre, allowing the doctors at least partially to escape the self-doubt arising from 
the contradiction between their narratively structured expectations and the realities of the 
Greenlands emergency unit, and simultaneously to affirm their continually threatened 
sense of power. These affirming actions that blame enables, however, are no different 
from those it attempts to escape, thus contributing toward a repetitive cycle in terms of 
which the doctors’ position as all-powerful agents, along with the associated 
responsibility and consequent self-doubt, is produced and reproduced 
 
Summary  
Again, this chapter has made use of disparate themes represented in previous research as 
prominent components of medical culture and has illustrated the animation of these in the 
Greenlands emergency unit, showing how they might contribute to the delivery of 
inhumane care. With reference to themes including the god-like power ascribed to 
doctors (Millman, 1977; Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 1989; Good, 1994; Obholzer, 1994; 
Kellerher, Gabe and Williams, 1994; Van der Geest, 2005); the simultaneous inevitability 
of medical failures (Atkinson, 1981, 1984; Katz, 1984); Allsop & Mulcahy, 1999; 
Finkler, Hunter & Iedema, 2008); the attribution of responsibility in medical settings 
(Freidson, 1970; Katz, 1984; Fisher, 1984; Obholzer,1994; Speck, 1994; Atkinson, 1995, 
1999; 2004; Maynard, 2003); blame (Mishler et al., 1981; Mizrahi, 1984; Zagier-Roberts, 
1994; Rosenthal, 1999) and the construction of patients in terms of hostile stereotypes 
(Goffman, 1961; Millman, 1977; Fisher & Groce, 1985; Mizrahi, 1986; Atkinson, 1995), 
I have argued in this chapter that the positions occupied by doctors and patients, as 
outlined in the two preceding chapters, are not as static as they appear at first glance. 
They are interchangeable, to a certain degree, in response to the doctors’ need to evade 
responsibility for negative events, a responsibility imposed by their narrative 
characterisation as all-powerful agents. The discursive patterning, in terms of which 
doctors establish their innocence of these occurrences, and in support of which their 
patients’ guilt, necessitates that they temporarily renounce their agency, leading to the 
calling in of their patients and others as the primary actors, in those scenes with 
unfavourable outcomes or portraying unfortunate events. I have argued in this chapter 
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that blaming their patients enables the delivery of inferior care by inspiring anger and 
thereby justifying poor treatment; and by denying doctors’ responsibility and protecting 
them from processes whereby they might be held accountable for their less praiseworthy 
actions.  In addition, this defensive move requires that they reassert their power in order 
to regain their ‘rightful’ position as doctors within the narratives of science and of 
masculinity, inciting them to suppress their patients and simultaneously justifying the 
means of doing so. This brings the doctors back, full circle, to that point in the cycle at 
which they are automatically attributed responsibility for adverse incidents, inspiring 
further patient blame, renunciation, reassertion of power, and so on. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
I began in this study with a question about the discrepancy that exists between legislation 
and ethical guidelines and practice in the provision of health care, and about how it 
comes about that health care professionals, and doctors in particular, perform actions that 
constitute inhumane care and even violations of their patients’ human rights. In 
attempting to provide some insight into why this discrepancy exists, I focused in this 
thesis on the discursive context of an emergency unit in a South African hospital in which 
inhumane and abusive practices were performed with routine regularity.  
 
This thesis is intended to contribute to answering these questions in t o primary ways. 
First, by integrating themes in the existing literature on culture, identity and power in 
medical settings that pertain to the topic of abusive medical practice, I have attempted to 
provide a more coherent picture than was previously available. I have therefore detailed 
the interaction of the various themes identified in the literature on medical culture and 
specified their contribution to the establishment of ‘pathways to inhumane care’.  
Weaving together the various, otherwise largely disconnected strands in this area of 
work, I have argued that previous research has identified, more often implicitly and even 
inadvertently, but at other times quite explicitly, a myriad of interrelated factors that 
enable and encourage inhumane practices by members of the medical profession.  
 
Second, using an eclectic mix of methods in order to highlight the interaction of this 
network of threads, I have illustrated the manifestation and enactment of these and related 
themes through the details of talk in a particular health care context, namely that of a 
South African public sector emergency unit. I have further extended understanding of the 
relevance of the variety of themes identified in the existing literature on medical culture 
for inhumane practice, exploring the range of actions that they make available to doctors 
in the Greenlands emergency unit and articulating the relationships between identified 
features of medical culture and violation of patients’ rights in the context of this 
particular hospital.  
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 Summary of findings 
 
The literature 
In the first five chapters, in which I reviewed the literature pertinent to the arguments 
presented in the empirical chapters, I have attempted to weave together disparate themes 
that span a broad range of research, including areas of work located within medical 
sociology, medical anthropology, medical education, social and individual psychology, 
and health systems research. These themes also represent work undertaken from a wide 
variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, ranging from positivist 
employment of quantitative research methods to constructionist uses of conversation and 
discourse analysis. Since the areas of work represented in this review are therefore 
disparate, and since their relevance for the delivery of inhumane care with which this 
thesis is concerned is often only implicit or even indirect, my aim in reviewing the 
literature addressed in these chapters was to delineate a field that, while diverse in 
content and approach, has relevance for understanding the routine perpetration of abusive 
and otherwise inhumane acts in the practice of medicine. 
 
In the first review chapter, chapter two, I have therefore attempted to identify threads in 
an amorphous mass of literature describing the various components of medical culture 
and its relationship with the broader social context. In particular, I have identified themes 
that explore representations of scientific, religious and traditionally masculine discursive 
constructions in medical culture, highlighting the propensity for some of their features to 
facilitate acts of inhumane care. With reference to the predominance of scientific 
discourse in medical culture (Mishler et al., 1981; Mizrahi, 1986; Arney & Bergen, 1984; 
Mishler, 1984; Fisher, 1986 and 1995; Fisher & Groce, 1990; Waitzkin, 1991; Dreyer & 
Geist, 1993; Wodak, 1996; Donnelly, 1997; Lewinsohn, 1998; Good, 1994; Good and 
DelVecchio-Good, 2000; Helman, 2001; Apker & Eggly, 2004; Potter & McKinlay, 
2005), I have focused in particular on discussions of the objectification of patients and its 
potential effects on medical practice (Goffman, 1961; Lorber, 1975; Mishler et al., 1981; 
Mishler, 1984 and 2005; Katz, 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; Good &DelVecchio-Good, 1993; 
Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Turner, 1995; Atkinson, 1995; Donnelly, 1997; Hak, 1999; 
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Helman, 2001; Savett, 2002; Rothman, 2003; Potter &McKinlay, 2005; Heath, 2006).  I 
have further explored discussions of the similarities between religious discourse and 
certain elements of medical discursive practice (Millman, 1977; Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 
1989; Good, 1994; Obholzer, 1994; Kellerher, Gabe and Williams, 1994; van der Geest, 
2005). In this regard I have focused on discussions of the omnipotence, authority and 
infallibility ascribed to doctors and of the coexistent uncertainties of medical knowledge 
and its application (Fox, 1957; Atkinson, 1981 and 1984; Katz, 1984; Allsop & Mulcahy, 
1999), attempting to highlight the propensity for these interrelated features to facilitate 
the perpetration of inhumane acts. And with reference to the presence of traditionally 
masculine constructions in medical discourse (Arney & Bergen, 1984; Mizrahi, 1986; 
Fisher & Groce, 1990; Cassell, 1992; Konner, 1997; Drife, 1998; Wicks, 1998; Erickson, 
1999), I have traced linkages in the literature between, for example, the employment of 
military metaphors and the importance attributed to action with dramatic impact and the 
devaluation of caring acts.  
 
In the second review chapter, chapter three, I have identified themes that pertain to the 
construction of identity in medical culture, as they appear in previous work. In so doing, I 
have discussed the centrality of the doctor’s identity of bioscientist within past 
explorations of medical culture (Millman, 1977; Good &DelVecchio-Good, 2000), 
highlighting the relationship between the desirability of this identity, the power with 
which doctors are imbued as a result of it and the associated need and ability to conceal 
flaws, including, for example, uncertainty or error (Obholzer, 1994). I have reviewed in 
this chapter discussions of the collective nature of medical identity (Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 
1989; Good & DelVecchio-Good, 1993; Wodak, 1996; Erickson, 1999), highlighting the 
relationship between this particular form of collegiality and the inadequacies of the 
accountability of the medical profession and its members (Millman, 1977; Mizrahi, 1986; 
Paget, 1988; Fox, 1989; Rosenthal, 1995 and 1999; Alsop &Mulcahy, 1999). I have 
further explored in this chapter discussions of the binary construction of doctors’ and 
patients’ identities (Goffman, 1961; Katz, 1984; Fisher, 1986; Mizrahi, 1986; Fox, 1989; 
Dreyer &and Geist, 1993; Zagier-Roberts, 1994; Wodak, 1996; DelVecchio-Good & 
Good, 2000; Rothman, 2003; Maynard, 2003; Andersen, 2004) and of the associated 
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stereotyping and labelling of patients in medical discourse (Goffman, 1961; Millman, 
1977; Strong &Davis, 1978; Fisher &Groce, 1985; Mizrahi, 1986; Atkinson, 1995), 
attempting to highlight the resultant potential for inhumane care, a possibility that is 
rendered more likely through the related effects of the psychic defences available within 
medical culture and discussed by authors including Fox, 1957; Lorber, 1975; Mishler et 
al., 1981; Katz, 1984; Mizrahi, 1984, 1986; Obholzer, 1986; Paget, 1988; Cassell, 1992; 
Zagier-Roberts, 1994; Dartington, 1994; Szasz and Hollender, 1997; Good & 
DelVecchio-Good, 2000; Wodak, 2006b; and Iedema, 2007. 
 
In the third review chapter, chapter four, I have identified threads in the literature that are 
relevant to the medical profession’s institutionally based power and to the individual and 
interpersonal aspects of power as it is enacted between doctors and patients. In particular, 
I have explored discussions of the superior status ascribed to medical knowledge 
(Millman, 1977; Borges, 1986; Waitzkin, Katz, 1984; Arney & Bergen, 1984; Turner, 
1995; Wicks, 1998; van der Geest, 2005) and highlighted the sense in which it places 
medical practices beyond question and therefore beyond scrutiny by anyone outside of 
the profession (Freidson, 1970a, 1970b, 1975; Millman, 1977; Borges, 1986). Identifying 
the usefulness of the albeit often implicit concept of agency for establishing the 
relationship between discussions of power and the possibility for inhumane care, I then 
turned in this chapter to an exploration of discussions of the power imbalances between 
individual doctors and patients. In this regard I focused in particular on investigations of 
patients’ domination by doctors, through their access to supposedly superior knowledge 
(Millman, 1977; Katz, 1984; Mishler, 1984’ Arney & Bergen, 1984; Fisher, 1986, 
Mizrahi, 1986;  Silverman, 1987; Phillips, 1996; Szasz & Hollender, 1997; Wicks, 1998; 
Armstrong, 2002; Fainzang, 2002; Costello, 2002; Luftey, 2005; Finkler, 2008), and 
through the mechanism of blame (Katz, 1984; Fisher, 1984; Maynard, 2003).  I further 
explored discussions of patients’ own complicity in their oppression (Fisher, 1984; Fisher 
and Groce, 1990; Dreyer & Geist, 1993; Atkinson, 1995; Phillips, 1996; Sasz & 
Hollender, 1997; Gill, 1998; Perakyla, 2002; Heath, 2006), and subsequently of their 
resistance to medical domination (Fisher, 1984, 1986, 1991; Heath, 1992; Atkinson, 
1995; Maynard, 2003; Mishler, 2004; Zaman, 2004; Tanassi, 2004; Perakyla, 2002, 
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2006).In this regard, I noted the relevance of the work of authors including Katz, 1984; 
Fisher, 1986; Fisher & Groce, 1990; Ten Have, 1991; Annandale & Hunt, 1998; 
Cicourel, 1999; Fainzang, 2002; Mishler, 2004; and Wodak, 2006a, who argue that 
patients’ efforts in this regard often fail and/or fail to promote their best interests, leading, 
on occasion, to the delivery inferior medical care. 
 
In the fourth review chapter, chapter five, I have addressed discussions of the importance 
of the influence of particular contexts on the actions of specific individuals, and 
attempted to show the relationship between these contexts and the features of broader 
medical culture reviewed in the previous chapters. To this end, I have reviewed 
discussions that address themes relevant to the manifestation or animation of the various 
features of medical culture and of their implications for the actions committed by 
individual doctors in particular settings, exploring these themes in the work of authors 
including Strong & Davis (1978), Mishler et al. (1981), Fisher (1986), Mizrahi (1986), 
Cicourel (1987, 1999), Helman (2001), Halford & Leonard (2006) and Finkler (1991, 
2008). Having addressed these discussions of the relationship between the individual 
doctor, the particular setting and the features of the broader medical culture and 
institutional context, the chapter goes on to identify the importance of the growing field 
of hospital ethnography (see for example Wind, 2008; Zaman, 2004, 2008; Finkler, 2004, 
2008; Warren & Manderson, 2008; Kelly, Pearce & Mulhall, 2004; Scheeres et al., 2008; 
Andersen, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Tanassi, 2004; Vermeulen, 2004; and van Amstel & van 
der Geest, 2004). Work in this genre represents a particularly rich avenue for exploring 
the relationships between the various themes reviewed, as they are animated by 
individuals operating within particular contexts, and the possibility for the delivery of 
inhumane care.  
 
The chapter goes on to focus on work addressing the South African context in particular, 
reviewing discussions of medical culture, identity and power in the South African 
literature (Swartz, 1989; Muller, 1999; Gibson, 2004), and again highlighting its 
relevance for the possibility of abusive practice. This chapter further details research 
documenting the violation of patients’ rights in South African medical settings (Swartz, 
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1989; Wood, 1997; Stadler, 1997; Mathai, 1997; Jewkes et al., 1998; Baldwin-Ragaven 
et al., 1999; Muller, 1999; Williams, 2000; Gibson, 2004; Levin, 2005a, 2005b; Lucas & 
Stevenson, 2005, 2006; Lund & Flisher, 2006; Fassin, 2008) and explores explanations in 
the South African literature for these occurrences (Jewkes et al., 1998; Muller, 1999; 
Baldwin-Ragaven et al., 1999; Gibson, 2004; Lucas & Stevenson, 2006; Fassin, 2008). 
While research in this area is very limited, this chapter notes the importance of the fact 
that its documentation continues into the very recent past, making a strong case for the 
relevance of research that attempts to explain inhumane care and hence to contribute to 
its prevention.  
 
The empirical findings 
After reviewing themes across this sprawling mass of literature that can be argued to be 
pertinent to an explanation of the relatively routine provision of inhumane care, I have, in 
this thesis, applied these themes in attempting to make sense of abusive and seemingly 
heartless practices on the part of doctors in the Greenlands Hospital emergency unit. In 
describing the interconnected aspects of the discursive context in the unit, I have 
highlighted their relationship both to the themes identified in previous research and to the 
abusive and otherwise inhumane acts that occurred during my period of observation in 
the unit.  
 
In the first empirical chapter, chapter seven, I have attempted to show the ways in which 
the discursive environment in the unit, through its incorporation of features identified by 
past research as prevalent throughout the broader medical culture, promotes the adoption 
of dominant identities by the doctors and enables actions that would, under other 
discursive conditions, be unacceptable to both patients and staff, but that in this 
environment go almost unnoticed. In this chapter I have argued specifically that scientific 
and traditionally masculine discursive constructions, present throughout medical culture, 
as indicated by the literature reviewed, and predominant in the Greenlands emergency 
unit, are woven together within the unit’s local culture to create overarching narrative 
structures through which the doctors interpret themselves and their patients, and the 
unit’s events. I have drawn attention to the ways in which these narrative structures with 
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their various features are used by the doctors to position themselves as all-powerful, 
affording them superior and unquestionable status and presenting them with a multitude 
of opportunities for aggressive domination. Through the invocation of certain narrative 
‘truths’ – for example, that scientific knowledge is superior to knowledge of any other 
form, that scientific activity is of unparalleled importance and that the features of 
traditional masculinities are indicative of strength and potency – non-scientific, caring 
activities are made to seem irrelevant.  Hence, callous and even aggressive behaviours are 
more readily accessible to doctors than are displays of compassion. Thus, certain actions 
on the part of the doctors that might in other situations seem impermissible are rendered 
both possible and justifiable.  
 
In this chapter I have further shed light on aspects of emergency r om discourse 
discordant with the position of power available to doctors within this narrative 
framework. Resonant with much of the literature addressing this topic, I have identified 
what appears as the ‘underbelly’ of their powerful personas and have attempted to show 
that many of the discursive means whereby doctors establish and assert their power seem 
in fact to defend them against their own distressing emotional responses to disease, 
suffering and death over which they very often have little or no control. A great deal of 
the talk in the emergency room serves the purpose of boosting the doctors’ power. But a 
simultaneous narrative thread, the traces of which are audible in the ‘fleeting little words’ 
of which many of the doctors’ ostensibly bravado statements are composed, gives voice 
to their more vulnerable selves. Thus, there are occasions in which the emergency room 
doctors can be heard articulating the helplessness that they feel in the face of the often 
overwhelming realities that impact on their ability to successfully treat their patients. This 
counter discourse of powerlessness offers insight into the enormous difficulty of the 
position in which the doctors find themselves, opening the door to a more compassionate 
reading of processes that all too frequently lead to their abuse of power. Caught in a 
position, in terms of which enactment of the only positive identity available to them 
within the narrative framework depends on successful treatment of their patients and 
achievement of tangibly positive results, and in a context in which late attendance by so 
many patients and limited resources continually doom their efforts to failure, doctors find 
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themselves plagued by self-doubt. Thus, actions that appear at first glance to be nothing 
but callous, such as ignoring patients’ pain or making jokes across the bed of a dying 
man, might be understood in much more complex terms as attempts to ward off emotions 
that, in the context of medical culture in general and of the Greenlands emergency unit’s 
local culture in particular, they do not have space to acknowledge.   
 
I note also in this chapter, however, that neither the discursive context of the broader 
medical culture described in the work of previous authors nor that of the local culture of 
the unit is deterministic. Rather, its inhabitants, including the doctors, remain free agents, 
choosing to enact, animate and reproduce the discursive structures that they embrace. 
Indeed, snippets of talk that can be heard about the unit confirm the possibility that 
doctors can and sometimes do employ other discursive constructions that diverge from 
the dominant narrative framework, enabling the adoption of alternative identities and 
facilitating actions that deviate from those courses most obvious within the this context.  
 
In chapter eight, the second empirical chapter, I have offered an analysis of the subject 
positions that doctors and patients occupy relative to one another within the emergency 
unit’s discursive context, discussing the ways in which doctors draw on the resources 
available to them within the broader medical culture, identified in past research, as they 
build their own identities relative to those they attribute to their patients. I have attempted 
to show how doctors and patients are construed in these terms as binary opposites, 
producing coherent and even antagonistic groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’, animated on a 
moment-to-moment basis in the unit by the individual doctors who work there, with 
implications for the interactions between them and their patients. As altogether different 
from ‘us’, patients’ subjectivity is obscured from view. And as subjectless entities, 
patients are, for example, not addressed by their doctors during ward rounds. Their lack 
of subjective experience renders respect for their feelings unnecessary or even 
inappropriate. And since such objects are devoid of the capacity to act in either an 
informed or uninformed way, the requirement that doctors supply their patients with 
information about their conditions and treatment options is inapplicable.  
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Again I have argued that the discursive constructions, originating in the broader medical 
culture and brought to life in the context of this particular unit, are not deterministic. This 
point is illustrated both by those doctors who deviate from them in their talk and other 
actions, and by the patients themselves, some of whom actively resist their ascribed 
status, for example, demanding recognition, asking for information and making their own 
decisions. However, I have also argued in this chapter, in agreement with much of the 
previous work in this field, that the path of patients’ resistance is neither easy nor 
necessarily likely to promote their best interests, frequently being met instead with more 
vehemently suppressive measures.  
 
I have attempted to show in this chapter that these discursive constructions, identified by 
previous research as prominent in the broader medical culture and animated within the 
Greenlands emergency unit’s local context, have significant implications for the quality 
of healthcare delivered. In particular, I have shown that distinct groups of doctors and 
patients are brought into being and maintained through conversational means, talk 
between groups in the unit being highly restricted and ‘border crossing’ in either 
direction being negatively sanctioned. Thus, conversations about patients, ranging from 
the simple conveyance of information from one doctor to another to discussions of 
weighty decisions about treatment and management options tend to exclude the patient 
whom they concern, and decisions are taken solely by the doctors, without reference to 
their patients’ unsolicited views. 
 
Construed as unlike each other in every way, there is, in addition, little possibility for the 
perception of similar or shared experience between doctors and patients. Empathy is 
therefore unlikely. Doctors are thus not only able to perform potentially distressing 
procedures without the complication of empathising with their patients at these crucial 
moments. They are also able to disregard their patients’ feelings even when such 
distantiation is not required for the successful completion of their tasks. Doctors can thus 
subject their patients, for example, to insensitive treatment and humiliation without 
concern for the effects of their actions on their patients’ overall well-being. In addition, 
the existence of two distinct and coherent groups facilitates ascription of collective rather 
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than individual responsibility amongst doctors. This collective responsibility protects 
them from personal accountability for their less desirable actions and enables individual 
doctors to defer responsibility for adverse events to the group. The possibility for such 
deference further facilitates the delivery of inhumane care by diminishing the likelihood 
that the doctor concerned will be held personally accountable or have to face the 
consequences of her actions.  
 
Again, a counter discourse exists in terms of which doctors are able to acknowledge their 
patients’ subjectivities, generating the possibility for empathy and for practices that, for 
example, incorporate patients in decision-making about treatment options. These 
alternative constructions both demonstrate the possibility for individual doctors working 
within local contexts to diverge from the dominant discursive practices prominent in the 
broader medical culture and for the generation of contextually sensitive, and hence more 
realistically achievable, treatment plans. These alternatives thus highlight the dynamic 
nature of discourse and the possibility for change.  
 
In the third empirical chapter I have attempted to reveal an apparent contradiction, in 
terms of which the positions occupied by doctors and patients in broader medical culture, 
as animated in the local emergency room context, undergo a superficial shift that 
paradoxically denies and enables maintenance of the doctors’ power. As sole agents 
within the narrative landscape, doctors are construed by their own definition as 
necessarily responsible for everything that occurs in the unit, including adverse events. In 
view of the inherent limitations of medical practice, the poor social conditions and 
resource shortages that characterise this particular hospital and the community that it 
serves, and the ultimate inevitability of death, this construction of doctors as responsible 
is necessarily accompanied by the potential for self-doubt, recrimination and guilt when 
their efforts fail. Attempting to navigate the structures that produce this uncomfortable 
position in which they find themselves, I have shown in this chapter how doctors 
sometimes defensively project blame outwards, onto their patients and others, for all 
manner of untoward happenings, including their patients’ illnesses and death and indeed 
the doctors’ own actions. Patients are thus transformed in their doctors’ constructions 
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from objects devoid of the capacity for action into the culpable causes of every problem, 
dangerous to themselves and to those around them. And in turn, doctors become, far from 
the powerful superheroes as whom they were originally cast, their patients’ hapless 
victims. The relationship between them is thereby changed from one in which the 
doctors’ role is to help their patients into one in which they must defend themselves 
against them. In combination with the doctors’ discursive loss of power and consequent 
need to reassert it, these constructions create an incentive for doctors to engage in 
avoidant behaviours and to adopt defensive strategies, which, in these terms, seem 
justifiable and indeed warranted. In addition, the sense of victimisation that doctors 
experience in terms of these constructions produces anger toward those seen to be 
persecuting them or making unmanageable demands, spawning the opportunity for 
doctors to commit aggressive and abusive acts. Again, patients must take the blame for 
these actions if their doctors are to retain their positive self-evaluations. A vicious cycle 
is thus established, in terms of which the provision of humane care becomes ever less 
likely.  
 
Thus, I have attempted to show in the analysis presented in this thesis that the hopelessly 
unrealistic expectations defined for doctors within the narratives of science and of 
masculinity lead, in many instances, to inevitable failure. In the absence of discursive 
resources for coping with these failures in ways that enable continued positive self-
evaluations, doctors are subject to perpetual feelings of guilt, to which they respond by 
projecting blame onto their patients, creating an antagonistic relationship between them. 
The doctors are thus set up, both by their own narrative constructions and by the realities 
of economics, disease and death with which they are faced, to doubt themselves and their 
worthiness of the only positive identity on offer within the dominant discourse, namely 
that of all-powerful agent. Through the processes outlined above, in which doctors and 
patients respond to the available discourse and the material realities with which they are 
confronted, the delivery of inhumane care is rendered a likely outcome. 
 
This study has thus provided anecdotal evidence of the continued prevalence of the abuse 
of patients by hospital staff in South African public sector hospitals, as found by previous 
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research and reported in numerous newspaper articles. Weaving together the often 
disparate or implicit explanations for the delivery of inhumane healthcare offered by a 
wide variety of other authors covering a broad range of topics, I have used these 
interrelated threads to highlight the discursive mechanisms whereby such acts are enabled 
in the specific context of the Greenlands emergency unit. Thus, while past research has 
identified many of the themes discussed in this thesis and has even linked some of these, 
individually, with the possibility for abuse and delivery of inhumane care, this thesis has 
contributed to the field through highlighting and articulating the interaction between the 
various themes previously described. It has further shown, through illustration of 
concrete events in a particular setting, how not just one theme but the myriad of related 
themes, operating together to form coherent narratives, represent ‘pathways’ to inhumane 
care, making possible actions that in other discursive contexts might seem unjustifiable or 
even unthinkable. Foregrounding the influence of the social and meaning-laden context 
on medical practice, the thesis has shown how the actions of the doctors within this 
particular unit are framed by broader cultural understandings identified within a diverse 
range of previous studies, in interaction with the realities of the local setting. I have thus 
tried to bring into view a network of features of the ‘invisible biomedical lens’ alluded to 
in past studies of medical culture, and reproduced and animated within the specific 
context in which this study was conducted. Through detailed exploration of these features 
within the Greenlands emergency unit, the study is intended to show how these coherent, 
interacting narratives and their multiple components are brought to bear on the sense that 
individual doctors make of their experiences, predisposing them to the delivery of 
inhumane care but at the same time, as indicated by their occasional deviations from the 
dominant ‘pathways’, remaining non-deterministic and therefore amenable to change. 
 
Interestingly, within the South African context, and in light of the findings of previous 
studies that race and class represent key variables influencing the quality of medical 
interactions, overtly racialised or class-related discourses did not emerge in this analysis. 
In the case of race, doctors in the unit were from diverse race groups and there was 
therefore no clear demarcation between doctors and patients in these terms. This 
characteristic may thus have been backgrounded by the participants in this study in 
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favour of other characteristics more useful in constructing the distinction between 
doctors’ and patients’ groups. It is perhaps more surprising in these terms that class issues 
did not emerge as key features of the divide between doctors and patients, as the two 
groups were more obviously distinct in this sense. However, it is worth noting that some 
of the stereotypes in terms of which doctors construed their patients, for example as 
ignorant, stupid and irresponsible, are, within the South African context, also 
representative of stereotypes sometimes applied to the poor. It may be, therefore, that 
within the context of the emergency unit class distinctions are in fact a feature 
contributing to identity construction and to the construction of associated relationships, 
but that the categories of doctor and patient are so strong in this context that they 
overshadow these. Nevertheless, they might be discernible through an analytic lens more 
finely attuned to this issue.  
 
Some concluding remarks 
In conclusion, then, this research has shown that there is indeed a vast gap between 
legislation and ethical principles and practice, at least in the unit in which it was 
conducted. This research can make direct claims only with respect to this particular 
context. However, the relationship between the findings of this study and those of both 
international and other local South African researchers suggests that the context of this 
study is not unique but that, on the contrary, the patterns identified here are, as d’Oliveira 
et al. (2002) contend, “commonplace” in the delivery of health care.  
 
While a few moments spent in almost any public sector emergency unit in South Africa 
will provide overwhelming evidence of the resource shortages, patient overload and 
associated stress that one might assume would lead to shortcomings in the behaviour of 
the staff, it seems that internationally relevant ‘discursive pathways’ exist that facilitate 
particular forms of behavioural shortcomings, leading to the delivery of inhumane care. 
Not once, for example, did I observe doctors abusing each other – avoidance, callousness, 
ridicule and aggression, while unarguably made more likely by exposure to adverse 
structural conditions, were reserved solely for patients and assumed a form in keeping 
with that described by studies globally. In addition, while in an ideal world inhumane 
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practices would never occur in medical settings, in reality it might be expected that under 
extremely stressful conditions doctors may from time to time commit acts that violate 
standards for humane care. However, what is striking in the analysis presented in this 
thesis is the routine and even obviously justifiable status ascribed to these actions when 
they do occur. While it might be unrealistic to expect of doctors that they never err in the 
provision of humane healthcare, any aberrations should, if they are to be kept to a 
minimum, be viewed as such, and not as ordinary, expected and even necessary aspects 
of health care delivery. The argument in this thesis, then, is that acts of avoidance, 
callousness, aggression and so on are not merely errors committed by individuals under 
stress. Rather, they are the product of a more systemic problem, namely a discursive 
context that renders such actions both easily accessible and justifiable.   
 
This study has thus highlighted, by weaving together relevant themes in the literature on 
the culture and practice of medicine, the importance of an understanding of these aspects 
for truly understanding the occurrence of inhumane, abusive or otherwise poor medical 
practices. The study has illustrated the emergence of these practices in response to a wide 
range of interrelated contextual features, both universal in medical culture and particular 
to the local context. Based on these illustrations and on the arguments associated with 
them, it appears that, while legislation and ethical principles may define rules and 
standards for individual doctors’ actions, the discursive environment within which 
medicine is practiced is key to determining the extent to which these rules and standards 
will be adhered to and upheld. In the words of Fisher (1986: p. 4),  
 
“It would be easier…if the problem could be seen as an individual one. Individual 
doctors could be depicted as particularly insensitive or inept, while specific patients could 
be described as either too emotional to understand complex medical explanations or too 
dependent on authority to make independent medical decisions. While (individually-
oriented explanations) would be simpler and perhaps even more plausible or more easily 
demonstrated empirically, they merely blame the individuals, obscure the process through 
which medical decisions are reached, and isolate the physician-patient relationship from 
the cultural, structural and institutional context…”  
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
264 
 
 
In agreement with Fisher, my argument attempts to avoid an overly simplistic and narrow 
view of poor medical practice, and one that blames the individual for events in which she 
is certainly an active participant, but that are also of much broader origin than his 
individual character, attitudes, responses to stress and so on. Rather, I argue, the 
‘invisible lens’ of medical culture needs to be brought into view and carefully scrutinised 
in order to ascertain its contribution to the delivery of poor, inhumane or abusive care and 
even, potentially, to the realisation of poor health outcomes. If this is so then insight into 
the gap between legislation and ethical guidelines and actual practice that brings into 
view the details of interaction and the consciously intended and unconsciously produced 
meanings of talk is essential to the possibility of bridging this gap and of bringing 
medical practice into line with patients’ rights.  
 
Some possibilities for effecting change  
Marx’s observation that, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various 
ways; the point, however, is to change it,” (as cited in Waitzkin, 1991: p. 179) 
underscores the importance of ensuring that understandings of the reasons for inhumane 
care are used to enhance the possibility for transformation. A significant body of work 
has prescribed a huge variety of techniques for making medical practice more humane. 
The important point that the findings presented in this thesis make is that, if the conduct 
of individual doctors is to be changed, the context in which they practice must also 
change. Thus the multiplicity of instructions to doctors, asking them to listen to their 
patients empathically and with fewer interruptions, to provide them with fuller 
explanations and to engage their patients in the process of decision-making, for example, 
are unlikely to lead to the delivery of humane health care in the current environment.  
 
This environment presents, on the contrary, too many incentives and opportunities for 
domination and obstacles to equality between doctors and patients, characterising them in 
binary terms, denying patients’ status as subjects, imparting omnipotent responsibility to 
their doctors, and making no allowance for unavoidable medical failure or for doctors’ 
vulnerability to emotion. Rather than asking how individual doctors should better treat 
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their patients, therefore, the implication of the arguments I present in this thesis is that we 
would do better to ask how we can change broader medical culture and stimulate the 
development of local cultures that encourage understandings, identities and practices that 
promote the protection of patients’ rights.  As Katz (1984) points out, such a shift will not 
be easy “for professionals are unaccustomed to looking that deeply into their professional 
psyche” (p. 150), and will require “nothing less than uprooting the prevailing 
authoritarian value and belief systems and replacing them with more egalitarian ones.”   
 
It is toward such a major and difficult shift that this thesis hopes to offer its contribution 
through providing a source of social criticism that “exerts its power through its ability to 
demystify those elements of culture that enable and justify social oppression” (Waitzkin, 
1991: p 181). It hopes to reveal previously hidden alternatives for constructing medical 
practice that hold the potential to transform the relationship between doctors and patients.  
In addition to the structures of understanding that I have outlined with this intent, through 
its very existence as a text that positions the doctor, always before the subject of 
knowledge, as the object of knowledge (Armstrong, 2002), this thesis hopes to contribute 
to subverting those discourses that render patients susceptible to abuse and doctors to 
abusive action.  
 
Thus, the issue of inhumane and abusive medical interactions is neither simple nor easily 
addressed. The inequality between doctors and patients, with the associated potential for 
doctors’ abuse of their power, is embedded in medical and broader cultural thinking. And 
resistance, for any individual patient, has been shown to be a risky battle, in terms of 
which the doctor has little to lose, whereas the patient gambles his life. While the 
literature details the roots and mechanisms of imbalanced power, solutions to this 
complex and daunting problem that account for its complexity as well as for the risk to 
the patient and indeed to the existence of the medical profession, on whose expertise few 
of us would be happy to relinquish our dependence, remain to be found. 
 
Limitations 
While this study has produced findings that are, I believe, both interesting and important, 
they are also subject to certain limitations. First and foremost, the findings presented here 
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are the product of research conducted in one specific context, namely an emergency unit 
in a South African public sector hospital. They may well have implications for other 
contexts, as indicated by their resonance with the international literature. However, the 
likelihood that the contextual features described globally and in the specific context of 
this study will lead elsewhere to the same extent and regularity of inhumane practice as 
described here in the Greenlands emergency unit cannot be assumed and would need to 
be established through further research. In addition, the methods employed in the 
production of these findings have exerted their influence on their form. While being a 
resource in terms of enabling ways of seeing and interpreting the data, they have also 
closed off other possible interpretations that may have been produced through different 
means. In particular, my role as collector and interpreter of the material has informed 
both the production and analysis of data. In all these ways, this study should be treated as 
the outcome of a particular process in a particular place at a particular time and in some 
senses bound to those circumstances. 
 
Further research 
In order for the findings presented in this study to be better able to contribute toward the 
transformation of medical practice, further research is required.  In particular, it seems 
very important to establish the extent to which abusive practices are prevalent within the 
South African health care system more broadly. Despite the limitation emphasized on the 
previous page, it is unlikely that the frequency of the events described in this thesis is 
peculiar to the unit in which the research was conducted. This is indicated by newspaper 
reports, by the small number of other studies documenting abuse in South African 
hospitals and by the extreme stress under which doctors working in the public sector 
healthcare system are having to operate. It further seems logical that the medical 
profession’s awareness of abusive practices and the violation of patients’ rights is a 
prerequisite for change.  Establishment of the prevalence of abuse therefore seems the 
more urgent.   
 
While inhumane care is unacceptable in itself, it is also probable that it has consequences 
that extend beyond the events that occur within the health care setting. Research 
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exploring the links between inhumane service delivery and treatment outcomes would 
thus be useful in establishing the extent to which such practices are impacting not only on 
patients’ rights, as described in this thesis, but on the healthcare system itself in the form 
of wasted resources. Linked by previous research to ineffective communication between 
doctors and patients, it is no great leap to imagine that abusive treatment also affects 
diagnostic acumen, adherence to treatment and patients’ return for follow up visits. If we 
accept, for example, as the majority of medical practitioners do, that a patient’s history is 
amongst the most sensitive diagnostic tools, and that, as suggested by the theoretical 
standpoint from which this study departed, this history represents an artefact jointly 
produced between doctor and patient, then the absence or presence of humane care must 
have profound implications for accurate diagnosis. In addition, the active involvement of 
the patient in managing her own condition is widely accepted as desirable and necessary. 
It therefore seems worth considering that her acceptance of the doctor’s diagnosis and of 
the prescribed treatment is likely to be strongly influenced by the nature of her 
relationship with her doctor, as must be her willingness to return for follow up care. It 
seems disconcertingly plausible, therefore, that abusive practices on the part of doctors 
are not merely responsive to the stresses that result from working in an overburdened 
system. In fact it seems likely that they contribute to them, increasing the average number 
of times that each patient will return to the hospital with the same ineffectively treated 
condition, as well as increasing the severity of presenting conditions, as patients postpone 
their visits to the hospital for as long as possible. Establishing such linkages through 
sound research seems important not only for the contribution this might make to 
improving the results of medical care. In a world that predominantly recognises only the 
most tangible events and that is in constant search of measurable outcomes, the 
establishment of such linkages would also represent a significant contribution toward 
making a case for the importance of measures to ensure humane medical practice. Lastly, 
and perhaps most importantly, studies investigating the characteristics of positive 
interactions between doctors and patients, and the discourses that enable them, would 
provide further insight into what might be required for successful intervention. 
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